INTL507 - What the Coup? Operation AJAX and the Overthrow of Iran's Mossadegh
What intrigued me was… how one man, Kermit Roosevelt Jr., went to a Middle East democracy and, in the space of a week, overturned it.
-Noel Salzman, speaking to journalist Leonard Jacobs about why he wrote a play about Operation AJAX
According to Mark Gasiorowski, the coup was the first instance of the U.S. using covert operations in a peacetime environment and was singled-handedly responsible for kicking off a series of coups in Guatemala and Chile (Gasiorowski 1987 & Etges 2011). The U.S. had learned they could depose leaders, and therefore put coups in its toolbox of foreign relations. Scholars and journalists agree that the events in Iran on 19 August 1953, called Project TPAJAX (or just AJAX, for short) were a pivotal moment in post-World War II history. And roughly there, agreement ends. The story is full of persistent myths, disinformation, conflicting information, classified reports, and citations in academic journals that should have never made it past the peer-review process. [1] Even whether or not the CIA had any effect at all is debated, with some claiming the Prime Minister would have never been overthrown without the operation, and others claiming it was akin to throwing a cup of gasoline on a raging forest fire and then taking credit for burning down the forest. Those who try to tell the story of the history of Project AJAX and those who analyze it from an operational or policy perspective often seem to be using different versions of the same story. This paper will critique many common and often unquestioned assumptions before trying to analyze the operation’s harm or benefit to U.S. foreign policy from the time of Mossadegh’s departure to the present day. Specifically, this paper will review the veracity of claims that oil was the primary motivation, that Mossadegh’s leadership was leading Iran towards greater democracy, and finally that the U.S. actions constitute a coup. Succinctly, the answers are no, no, and no.
The story, as commonly told through literature and media, goes roughly like this; Dr. Muhammed Mossadegh was the last democratically elected and popular prime minister of Iran before the Shah’s 25-year dictatorial rule. Mossadegh was appointed Prime Minister by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi on 29 April 1951. In the late 1940s, Mossadegh had made a political name for himself on two primary issues, (1) nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and (2) transferring political power from the monarchy to the parliament (Gasiorowski 1987). The British owned and operated the AIOC, which controlled the world’s largest refinery, the Abadan refinery. The refinery was essential to both the British and the West in general as a source of income, economic stability, and the oil itself for power. Etges claims, “at the center of the dispute [between Iran and the U.S.] was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co (AIOC)” (Etges 2011, 503). James Risen writing for the New York Times in 2000, wrote: “Washington and London shared an interest in maintaining the West’s control over Iranian oil” (Risen 2000). Russia Today claims it was the underlying resentment for the actions of 1953 that resulted in the Islamic Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979. “The 1953 coup still casts a long shadow over Iranian-US relations” claims the article (“CIA Finally Admits” 2013). However, once the source documents are reviewed, the histories scrutinized, and the logic questioned, the narrative, and its resulting analysis, become exceptionally murky.
The Problem of Sources
I am indebted to many friends and former associates for their help and encouragement in this book, but it seems best for several reasons not to enumerate them.
-Kermit Roosevelt. Author’s Note in Countercoup.
Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt, was one of the CIA’s primary officers involved in Mossadegh’s overthrow, and for obvious reasons, decided to omit the names of friends and colleagues from his memoirs. His book is full of inaccuracies, omissions, and embellishments, and as one of the first detailed works on Operation AJAX revealed to the public, he seems to have set a trend, starting with his Author’s Note. An analysis can only be as accurate as the facts that it is based on, and the inaccuracies and contradictions in the literature pose quite a problem. This section is presented to the reader to illustrate just how murky the literature is by offering some of the more glaring or widely believed “facts” and furthermore to disclose why some authors, prolific as they might be, have been largely excluded from this study.
In September or October of 1980, Counterspy accused the coup of replacing “the constitutional government of Mohammed Mossadegh with that of a pro-Nazi named Zahedi [that] marked the onset of 25 years of Shah-led dictatorial rule” (New York Times Covers 1980). CIA documents, however, note that Zahedi had only been accused by the British of having pro-Nazi sympathies, there was never a conviction of any sort. He was subsequently interned in Palestine during the war (Background information 1953). No further discussions of Zahedi’s political views were found in the literature. While Zahedi’s past, and even name, aren’t widely known now, there has existed a cultural anti-Nazi bias worldwide since the end of World War II. If left unquestioned and unaddressed, this “fact” about Zahedi’s Nazi sympathies would have contributed to a chain of biased analysis since the beginning.
De Bellaigue claims that for decades “Americans and Britons were led to believe that [Mossadegh’s] toppling was the result not of CIA or MI6 operations, but of a popular uprising in favor of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi” (De Bellaigue 2013). This is a curious statement. A letter to the editor in the Saturday Evening Post, published on 8 February 1964, was from a woman stating she was pleased Senator Eugene McCarthy mentioned the CIA’s role in Mossadegh’s downfall, calling it a “shady activity” and further adding, “billions spent on foreign aid will do little good as long as the CIA is allowed to undermine the image of the United States as a proponent of self-determination and democracy” (Trenchcoat Diplomacy 1964).
Ervand Abrahamian, one of the more prolific writers on the topic and often cited by other scholars in their works on Operation AJAX, claims that the coup was spurred because of the oil dispute between the West and Iran and consequently kicked off the “three decades [that] the United States and Iran have been locked in a deadly embrace” (Abrahamian 2013, 1). His claim is that the coup against Mossadegh was carried out because of oil interests held by the U.S. and U.K. Rocky Mountain PBS writes that the British and U.S. worried about a communist takeover, carried out the operation, but at the end emphasizes that the coup “[ensured] support for Western oil interests” (Chronology - U.S. Iran Relations, 1906-2002). Even Wikipedia’s entry on the subject supports this narrative; the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup planned and executed by the CIA to retain Western oil interests in Iran (“1953 Iranian Coup D’état” 2017).[2] Dr. Trita Parsi, an Iranian expat who advised both the Iranians and Obama administration during the 2015 nuclear agreement was asked by this author at a recent talk about the effect Operation AJAX has on modern U.S. – Iranian relations. His opinion, in stark contrast to Abrahamian’s, is that AJAX really only affected the very oldest generations in Iran. He cited a number of factors he believes are more prescient to the relationship, such as the Iran-Iraq War (Parsi 2017).
The story is often framed with the Iranian people as mere puppets of the U.S. and U.K governments. Matherly writes that immediately after Mossadegh’s removal, the Shah’s newly appointed Prime Minister, Fazlollah Zahedi, gave a speech accepting the Shah’s appointment over the radio. The Iranian’s initially didn’t notice the U.S. National Anthem playing in the background, and in relayed broadcasts, CIA radio operators managed to scrub the anthem (Matherly 2013). Matherly cites page 56 of Wilber’s book, Overthrow of Mossadeq in Iran for this U.S. Anthem claim. Upon consulting page 56 of Overthrow, it’s revealed this citation is blatantly fraudulent. The CIA’s website makes a similar claim, citing the New York Times and National Security Archives as a source, but these sources make no mention of the anthem either (Robarge 2003). This Iranian-bystander paradigm is relatively typical of most analysis done on Operation AJAX, but as Mokhtari states, “Iranians were far from mere bystanders in the events of 1953,” he continues, saying that while the West certainly had a hand in the coup, the true cause stemmed from “subterranean political disagreement that had plagued Iran for at least two centuries” (Mokhtari 2008, 459). This is another common and conflicting theme in the literature. Some authors assume the Iranians were just along for whatever ride the CIA planned, while others stress the decisions made by Iranians over the actions of the CIA.
Dr. Donald Wilber was one of the CIA’s primary planners of Operation AJAX. In his classified book, written in 1959, and leaked to the New York Times in 2000, he tried to analyze the events and stated, “early accounts of various participants differed widely enough to make it impossible to follow the slender thread of truth through the dark night” (Wilber 1959, 39). Wilber’s statement, like Roosevelt’s, is nearly prophetic for modern researchers; the thread of truth is indeed slender. Other books that weren’t classified by the CIA, all in the form of memoirs, were released over the years. President Eisenhower briefly addressed the coup in his book, Mandate for Change. He explained, “Iran’s downhill course toward Communist-supported dictatorship was picking up momentum. For the Shah, the time had come to check that course” (Balaghi 2013, 73). Eisenhower’s account seems to line up with that of Kermit Roosevelt, one of the CIA officers leading the operation. Roosevelt, in his memoir Countercoup, stated that the idea for the coup came from the United States and that “Dr. Mossadegh had already attempted to expel his monarch, replacing him with himself, and he had formed an alliance of his own with the Soviet Union to achieve the result he wanted” (Roosevelt 1979, 2). In 1978 Adm. Stansfield Turner was asked why the CIA felt the need to overthrow Mossadegh. He responded, saying Mossadegh’s government was “the imposition of a communist government on a free society” (Turner Says CIA is not 1978). Unfortunately for Eisenhower, Roosevelt and Turner, the memoirs of C.M. Woodhouse, the British politician, and spy, and Donald Wilber, the CIA officer who planned the overthrow, as well as documents declassified by the CIA since those memoirs were published, provide evidence to cast their statements and accounts in serious doubt. Wilber even details part of the anti-Mossadegh propaganda used to claim that Mossadegh favored the communists both within and outside Iran; he admits this propaganda is “black” (Wilber 1959, Appendix B -16). It doesn’t help Roosevelt’s credibility that Countercoup was recalled by publisher McGraw-Hill just after its initial shipping due to inaccurate information (Petroleum Firm’s Protest 1979). Woodhouse’s memoir, Something Ventured, claims that the plot to overthrow Mossadegh was initiated by the British Foreign Office. CIA documents show that the CIA was not worried about an immediate takeover by the Soviets, and furthermore, they even considered Mossadegh a bulwark against Communist takeover of Iran. That Wilber was involved is not disputed by any writers on the subject, and because Roosevelt “largely erased Wilber’s role” in the coup, along with the multitude of other falsehoods, Roosevelt’s writing is excluded from this study (Balaghi 2013, 90). Turner and Eisenhower’s statements are brought up for their relevance to the final analysis of AJAX regarding U.S. policy and Iranian relations, which will be addressed in the last section of this paper.
Abrahamian, mentioned earlier, is also largely excluded from this study. This author agrees with Gasiorowski that Abrahamian does not appear to have interviewed participants or reviewed any of the documents available in the US National Archives (Gasiorowski 2013a). Furthermore, while oil was a concern by the U.S. and British initially, by the time the decision to oust Mossadegh was made, motivations had changed. Multiple declassified documents reveal oil was not the only, nor even the primary, reason the U.S. and U.K had to oust Mossadegh. Abrahamian’s work is clearly biased towards economic determinism, and he omits any information in his works that suggests otherwise (Gasiorowski 2013a).
Conflicting claims, sources, citations, and analysis exist through every portion of the entire exposition, climax, and resolution of the Operation AJAX narrative. Before any analysis of policy implications can even be attempted, it’s necessary to review the existing literature and try, as much as possible, to establish a more coherent and logical narrative than currently exists. Abrahamian does make a point on this topic, noting that until MI6 and CIA allow “daylight to disturb their buried archives,” there is no choice but to deal with a multitude of disparate and conflicting sources (Abrahamian 2013, 8).
What did the CIA Know Before Mossadegh’s Overthrow?
“The Tudeh Party is a difficult subject to discuss, because of the clandestine nature of its operations and also because, like so many other things in Iran, what was planted as an oak seems to have come out resembling a melon vine, growing in all directions.”
-Despatch from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State. 23 February 1951.
Much of the analysis found on Operation AJAX focuses on the effects of the operation in the years and decades after its conclusion. Few, if any, begin by looking at what the U.S., U.K., CIA, and SIS did, could, or should have known before and during the operation. In this, the existing literature takes on a quasi-presentism quality, assuming the actors knew and thought then what people know and think now. This section endeavors to understand what the actors knew and thought at the time.
In World War II, Britain and Russia had occupied Iran to set up trade routes. After the end of WWII, the Soviets refused to leave and began to set up “autonomous republics” throughout the northwest in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, hoping to turn them into small Soviet satellite states (Gasiorowski 2013, 5). The U.S. had a preexisting presence in Iran, leftover from WWII, which eventually morphed into the TPBEDAMN operation. Gasiorowski, having interviewed many CIA operatives and officers working during the time, claims Dr. Donald Wilber was likely the one running TPBEDAMN, the main objective of which was to disseminate anti-Soviet propaganda and prevent Iran from falling behind the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, its objectives included frustrating the efforts of the Tudeh party, which was a Soviet connected communist party in Iran. Conveniently, Wilber even had operatives inside the Tudeh party, a useful asset given that Tudeh’s subversive activities had already created “discord, suspicion, and confrontation among societal factions” (Gasiorowski 2013 & Mokhtari 2008, 457).[3] While not primarily because of Tudeh, though they were exacerbating the problem, the political scene in Iran was so chaotic in the decade between 1941-51, that the average length of each parliamentary government was only seven months; political assassinations and violent demonstrations were common (Mokhtari 2008).
Even before Mossadegh came onto the scene as Prime Minister, nationalization of the oil industry had been a topic of political interest. Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara, who believed “Iran did not have the industrial capacity to explore its oil independently, nor did it have the ability to market it internationally,” had subsequently cautioned that nationalization in such a position was “the greatest treason” (Mokhtari 2008, 467). He was finally in a position to negotiate a settlement with the British who had softened their stance on the ideas of a settlement. Razmara was killed by an assassin before the deal could be announced (Etges 2011). One week later, the Majlis (the lower house of the Iranian parliament) voted to nationalize the oil industry and elect Mossadegh as the Prime Minister. All efforts to get both sides back to the negotiating table in the summer of 1951 failed (Etges 2011). The communist Tudeh party, according to a declassified report to the National Security Council on 2 May 1951, used the failure to negotiate and the conditions of the oil workers to stir up trouble and gain a greater foothold in Iranian politics (De Bellaigue 2013).[4]
With intelligence officers covertly stationed in Iran to work against the Soviets and Tudeh party, the embassy in Iran sent an intelligence estimate to the Department of State on 21 February 1951. In it, the estimate’s author reveals the concerns the U.S. bore towards the situation in Iran. “Nothing could be more interesting,” he begins, “were it possible to do so, than to eavesdrop upon a meeting of the Politburo during a discussion of the Iranian problem as it must appear to the Soviet planners” (1. Despatch 1951). The author points out that the Russians had sought a foothold in Iran for more than two hundred years, and furthermore that the past is a “prologue to the future” and the Soviets were acting to increase the strength of the Tudeh party to their own ends (1. Despatch 1951). At the very least, the CIA estimated the Soviets would continue attempts to bring Iran behind the Iron Curtain.
The U.S. knew that Baku, Azerbaijan, with its oil fields, was particularly susceptible to attack, and that the Soviets would want to secure lands south of Baku to fortify their position. If that were to occur, Tehran would be in the precarious position of having the Soviets in a position to cut off their food supply at will, leaving them extremely susceptible to Russian overtures (join and eat, resist and starve). The problem, the report notes, is that Iran “probably would have been assimilated by the Soviets long before this had they been able to find more than a handful of persons willing to sacrifice themselves for the advancement of Communism” (Despatch 1951). While an immediate takeover wasn’t a concern, the report goes on to mention the scenario most likely to result in Communist takeover of Iran. The average Iranian, states the report, would most likely move to the Tudeh camp because of Tudeh’s promise to rid Iranians of “a regime which he [they have] learned to despise and which [they are] certain will do nothing for [them]” (Despatch 1951). Given the chaos of Iranian politics at the time, this would not have appeared an implausible scenario. The report goes on to state that the Moslem Church in Iran occupied the same level of corruption as the government, leaving it a weak stop-gap against Soviet incursion. Not surprisingly, the Tudeh were popular with Iranian youth, with Tehran University mentioned specifically (Despatch 1951).
The Soviets had begun, so was the rumor, to “subsidize important merchants in return for [their] exertion of internal political activity in Soviet interest” (Despatch 1951). Given the ongoing operations of TPBEDAMN, led by Dr. Wilber, it’s likely this is less guesswork and more actual information obtained by Jalali and Kayvani, who were well connected with merchants, press, politicians, and clerical circles (Gasiorowski 2013). The Iranian people had been frightened by the Soviet strength displayed in Korea when compared to the relative weakness perceived of the West. Subsequently, the report notes Iranian’s will to resist the Soviets had been “lessened considerably” (Despatch 1951). An information report from the CIA dated 6 April 1953 lists the Tudeh Party’s weekly instructions (though does not mention from whom the instructions came). One of the instructions reads “In case trouble develops, be ready to ‘protect’ the Mossadegh Government because the party does not yet deem circumstances favorable for a seizure of power” (185. Information Report 1953). From the sparse available evidence, it can be concluded that the CIA was concerned that Russian operatives were conducting themselves in Iran at cross purpose to the West.
A policy proposal draft by the National Security Council on 14 March 1951 reveals the position and desires of the U.S. before the initial stages of Operation AJAX had been hatched. Worried about a communist takeover, “either as a result of invasion or internal subversion,” the plan was to strengthen Iran, particularly the north. Oil was only mentioned once; if the Soviets took over Iranian oil, the entire economy of Western Europe would be threatened (6. Draft Statement 1951).
In summary, the United States was already operating in Iran with Operation TPBEDAMN and had connections with Iranian clergy, merchants, press, and politicians. They were fighting the Soviets using propaganda and had spies embedded in the communist Tudeh party. There was no immediate concern of a Soviet takeover of Iran, but they were concerned about a more gradual weathering of Iranian politics and culture that would allow for an eventual Soviet takeover. To combat this, the United States proposed military and economic aid to Iran (Etges 2011). The Truman administration had seen Mossadegh as an impediment to Soviet expansionism, and the Eisenhower administration initially had no reason to take a different stance (Wilford 2014). While authors of the various CIA reports at the time seem reluctant to state so outright, it appears clear they were concerned with Soviet meddling in Iranian politics, both independently and by using Tudeh as a vehicle.
The British and the Oil Problem
“Never had so few lost so much so stupidly so fast.”
– Dean Acheson, on the failure of the British to accept a settlement already agreed to by Mossadegh and the U.S.
It would be accurate to say, at the beginning, the plans to overthrow Mossadegh were initiated by the British because of oil concerns. Mossadegh was elected as Prime Minister, running on a platform of oil nationalization. The British were not pleased when the parliament approved the nationalization bill at the same time Mossadegh was elected prime minister. The British plan involved three steps; blockades to prevent oil shipments, thus cutting off the oil industry of its income; trade restrictions and sanctions, to further pressure the Mossadegh regime to give up its nationalization program; and finally, a plan to overthrow Mossadegh entirely (Gasiorowski 1987). The United States, desiring to keep Mossadegh at the head of government to prevent Soviet takeover of Iran, urged the British to come to a settlement, and even stepped in as a mediator. Unfortunately, an agreement suitable to both Mossadegh and the United States was not acceptable to the British, who cited “the sanctity of treaties,” and rejected the deal (Mokhtari 2008, 471).
Those, such as Abrahamian, who cite oil as the primary reason the U.S. overthrew Mossadegh, fail (or intentionally neglect) to take into account a multitude of evidence to the contrary. On 18 May 1951, the U.S. State Department announced their position: “Arrangements should be worked out with the Iranians which give recognition to Iran’s expressed desire to greater control over its petroleum resources. We… sympathize with Iran’s desire that increased benefits accrue to that country from the development of its petroleum” (Etges 2011, 499). At one point, the British had assembled the Royal Navy, Air Force, and Army to forcefully take back the Abadan refinery in an operation dubbed “Buccaneer.” It was the United States that prevented the British from moving forward (Mokhtari 2008). The United States’ push for an equitable oil settlement makes sense. The Tudeh were taking advantage of the poor conditions of Iranian oil workers, allowing the British to forcefully take the refinery back, or settle the oil dispute in a way unfair to Iran, would serve only strengthen communist propaganda about the oppression of the bourgeoisie.[5]Furthermore, the quantity of oil being produced in Iran by the time the U.S. became involved in the plans to overthrow Mossadegh could have been made up in short order if the West lost access to Abadan refinery. Intelligence memorandum prepared by the CIA on 11 July 1952 stated that without any special drilling programs, any loss of Iranian oil could be made up within a year from Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, which hints at the rapid pace those resources could be recovered if special drilling programs were implemented (39. Intelligence Memorandum 1952). According to Wilber, the U.S. State Department refused to go along with the overthrow plan until it could be assured of two things, one of which was that the British “would signify in writing, to the satisfaction of the Department of State, its intention to reach an early oil settlement with a successor Iranian Government in a spirit of good will and equity” (Wilber 1959, v). A previous offer, in which the British offered a 50/50 share of profits to the Iranians until 1993, at which time the AIOC would become completely Iranian, was considered by the U.S. to be not generous enough to the Iranians, providing an idea of what the U.S. wanted the British to give up in the interest of satisfying the Iranians (21. Progress Report 1951). The U.S. objective in an oil settlement, according to Wilber, was to enable Iran to become “economically sound and financially solvent”, a useful strategy against Soviet overtures (Wilber 1959, iv). And finally, before the final plans for Mossadegh’s overthrow were approved, “the United States insisted that Britain accept the reality that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would not be returned to it” (Mokhtari 2008, 475). The main U.S. concern does not appear to be a want of oil control, but only to deny that control to the Soviets. Oil is a means of power, influence, and wealth generation. While the U.S. preferred Iran control its own oil, the main concern was to deny the Soviets that control.
Mossadegh, the Shah, and the Iranian Constitution
It is characteristic of Iranian history that the fall of an absolute and arbitrary ruler has resulted in rebellion and chaos, and persisting chaos has ended up in the return of absolute and arbitrary government. Until very recent times what most educated Iranians – both conservative and radical – understood by ‘dictatorship’ was arbitrary rule, and by ‘democracy,’ the traditional Iranian chaos.
– Homa Katouzian
The personal and political relationship between Mossadegh and the Shah Pahlavi needs to be touched on, at least briefly as it helps put the Shah’s motivations and sentiments in perspective. After all, the first step in the operation to remove Mossadegh required the Shah to sign the necessary royal decrees. Iran’s Constitution came into existence in 1906 and Iran became a constitutional monarchy. The Shah was the head of state, and the Prime Minister was the head of government.
Mossadegh believed the parliament was nothing more than a body of placemen, carrying out the Shah’s bidding, and essentially violating the constitutional order of government. He had spent the 1910s and 20s moving through various senior government positions and had opposed the rule of Shah Reza, Shah Pahlavi’s father (De Bellaigue 2013). A 1967 declassified CIA newspaper article described Mossadegh as “marked by extreme nationalism and intense emotionalism” (Mohammed Mossadegh 1967). From what little evidence exists, it appears Mossadegh and the Shah did not see eye-to-eye. Wilber described the Shah as a man of “indecision” and had planned to have the Shah leave Tehran after the beginning of the coup, fearing that “sooner or later, he will begin to brood and to doubt” and might reverse his orders to the Prime Minister and military (Wilber 1959, Appendix B – 8). It seemed the two were prone to personality clashes. A declassified information report from the CIA marked 30 November 1951 describes a six-hour meeting between the Shah and Prime Minister as “stormy” with at least one person overhearing the Shah shout “This is unacceptable” to Mossadegh. Upon exiting the meeting, Mossadegh’s face was described as “flushed with anger” (Meeting Between Shah 1951). The power of the Shah had been significantly lessened under Mossadegh’s premiership (for example, Mossadegh had gained enough power to order the Shah’s brothers and sisters to evacuate the country) (254. Paper Prepared 1953 & Mokhtari 2008). Woodhouse once reported that the Shah had started to become amenable to the idea of dismissing Mossadegh as prime minister, an act allowed by Article 46 of the Supplementalary (sic) Fundamental Laws of 7 October 1907 (Balaghi 2013 & “Iran’s 1906 Constitution and Its Supplement”).[6]
The State of the State (of Iran)
Sadeq Hedayat wrote to Peter Avery – a noted British scholar of Iranian history and literature – after his brother-in-law’s assassination that the “vileness and political obscenity of Tehran had become intolerable. There was no hope any longer that political freedom or decency might prevail, and he was leaving never to return.” A few months later he committed suicide in Paris in despair.
The CIA was concerned of a more gradual erosion of Iranian politics and culture that would open the door to Soviet overtures. Given that, it is worth taking a closer look at Iranian politics and culture in the decade leading up to the 1953 overthrow. Tudeh was promising to rid Iranians of “a regime which he [they have] learned to despise and which [they are] certain will do nothing for [them]” (Despatch 1951). So how real was this concern? Was the state of Iran such that Mossadegh would have had trouble keeping the population satisfied with the current regime?
Mokhtari notes that the political turmoil “energized ambitious political leaders who found political instability fertile ground for prescribing simplistic solutions to gain public support” (Mokhtari 2008, 463). Adding to the chaos was a cultural psychology that had infected the Iranians; a sense they had lost their independence after years of “Russo-British meddling” (Mokhtari 2008, 463). As mentioned previously, political assassination and intimidation were common in Iranian politics. The Shah himself had survived an assassination attempt in 1949 while giving a speech at Tehran University’s College of Law. The gunman, Nassar Mirfakhraii, had been a member of the Tudeh Party and Fadaiyan-e Islam, making him both a communist and a terrorist. A member of Fadaiyan-e Islam had killed a former prime minister, Abdol-Hossein Hazhir on 4 November 1949 (Mokhtari 2008). A Fadaiyan assassin had also struck Razmara before he had a chance to announce the oil deal that may have ended tensions regarding the oil situation in Iran. After Razmara’s assassination, the parliament publicly celebrated his murder (Moktari 2008).
Once Mossadegh had become Prime Minister, the Ayatollah Kashani threatened a jihad against the AIOC if they didn’t immediately turn all assets over to the Iranian government. To make matters worse, the Tudeh used the opportunity to incite a riot amongst the oil workers. As Mossadegh had taken control of the AIOC, Tudeh instigations managed to even further weaken Mossadegh’s government. Parliamentary governments are built on coalitions, and Mossadegh’s was falling apart (Mokhtari 2008). Dismayed by the way their country was going, the election results for the 17th parliament in 1952 displayed a low turnout, “suggesting many eligible voters may have declined to vote” (Mokhtari 2008, 472). After the election, Fadaiyan struck again, seriously injuring a new member of parliament, Dr. Hossein Fatemi (Mokhtari 2008).
In 1952, the United States had estimated that the government of Mossadegh would not be able to make an agreement with the British on the oil situation and that his deficit spending was endangering the Iranian economy (Mokhtari 2008). “Coercion through assassination and mass demonstrations had cast a pall over the nation” and a collapse, or severe recession, could have further opened the door for Soviet incursion (Mokhtari 2008, 477). The Tudeh party was continuing to gain power and influence, frightening “religious leaders, merchants, and politically silent segments of the population” (Mokhtari 2008, 477). A declassified CIA report dated 8 September 1952, notes that Mossadegh’s actions had so demoralized the Army that the CIA suspected they couldn’t put down a Tudeh coup attempt if they needed to (Kashani’s Threat 1952)
That last piece of information is a key point of U.S. thinking at the time. The CIA suspected that the Soviets, through Tudeh, would continue to maneuver, gain influence, and possibly attempt a coup against the Iranian government with the intent to bringing Iran behind the Iron Curtain. If they thought the Iranian Army could no longer put down a coup attempt, the CIA would have become desperate to strengthen the Iranian government in any way possible. As Mossadegh had already proven himself exceptionally difficult to work with, was losing his coalition in parliament, and the fact that the Iranian people had become disillusioned with their political leaders, it only makes sense the CIA would have assumed (given the events in communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948), even if they had no proof, that the Soviets would be considering a coup of their own.
The CIA was not the only group fearing for the continued stability of Iran. Briefing notes prepared in the CIA for Director Dulles, dated 21 April 1953, show a continued weakening of Iranian politics and Mossadegh’s administration. It notes the Iranian Parliament had failed to meet at least twice, and that General Fazlollah Zahedi, who had been the U.S. and U.K.’s chosen successor to Mossadegh, had postponed his own, independent, coup attempt against Mossadegh. “Current Tehran cables reflect high tension and suggest that the situation is building up to a climax which could result in a breakdown of public order as antagonistic groups struggle for power” concludes the report (194. Briefing Notes Prepared 1953). Even as early as 1952, a telegram from the U.S. embassy in Iran to the Department of State reported that political leaders had urged the Shah to do something to “prevent the complete ruin of the country” (Telegram from the Embassy 1952).
Coup de Gras, Coup de Main, or Coup D’etat? Or, None of the Above
If Mossadegh remains in power economic collapse is certain, and since Mossadegh is permitting extensive Communist penetrations, the economic collapse would be followed by a Communist takeover of the country.
– Dr. Donald Wilber, Overthrow
The British had wanted to oust Mossadegh for years, but the U.S. had refused to jump on the plan. The proverbial straw on the camel’s back came in May of 1953. Mossadegh contacted President Eisenhower and informed him that if the U.S. didn’t immediately supply financial aid, Mossadegh would cooperate closely with the Soviet Union (Lewis 1953).When forced to choose between blackmail and Soviet takeover, the U.S. picked regime change. Having decided Mossadegh needed to be relieved of the Iranian premiership, the U.S. and Britain set to work on the plans. Article 46 of the Supplementalary to the Iranian Constitution permitted the Shah to relieve any of the ministers, include the prime minister. The first question, with no clear answer, is why an operation was needed to oust Mossadegh at all? If the Shah could legally remove Mossadegh with a simple decree, why was an entire operation planned?
Wilber discusses the plans for the overthrow at length. The first step in the plan was to ask the Shah to sign the royal decrees (firmans) to relieve Mossadegh and appoint General Fazlollah Zahedi as his successor. As Wilber described the Shah as a man of “indecision,” the CIA formulated a plan to apply pressure to the Shah to make him acquiesce to Western desires (Wilber 1959, vii). The first step was to recruit Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s twin sister who would make it clear to the Shah she had been approached by the U.S. and U.K. governments with their desires to see Mossadegh replaced (Wilber 1959). Ashraf was a forceful personality. One newspaper article from 1953 claims “the old Shah is said to have remarked it was too bad that she, and not her brother, was born a woman. She is still rated as being twice the man the Shah is” (Coup in Iran 1953). The second point of pressure was to be applied by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who had previously established a reputation with the Shah as a man who was willing to tell the Shah “unpleasant truths that others withheld from him” (Wilber 1959, 25). The final two steps were to have an indigenous British agent, whose bona fides had been previously established, and Kermit Roosevelt, follow Ashraf and Schwarzkopf’s meetings to finalize the Shah’s decision (Wilber 1959). On 4 August 1953 Mossadegh held a referendum “calling for the Iranian parliament to be dissolved” (Timeline of Iranian Coup n.d.). On 15 August 1953, the Shah finally agreed and signed the firmans; Mossadegh’s “disembowelment” of the parliament was the final straw (Mokhtari 2008, 481).
At this point, motivations and knowledge that lead the CIA and SIS to plan further steps become unclear. Firmans from the Shah should have ended the reign of Mossadegh the second they were released. Mossadegh was beginning to show dictatorial tendencies, but nothing in the literature denotes the CIA believed he would not give up power. Indeed, with 20/20 hindsight, it can be argued that it was fairly obvious Mossadegh would have tried to hold on to power through illegal means, but there exists (at least in the public realm) no evidence this author found illustrating the CIA ever came to that conclusion at the time. The few pieces of evidence that do exist that hint at that conclusion are nebulous at best. While it was no secret that Mossadegh wanted to transfer power from the Shah to the parliament, he had so far operated within the bounds of the Iranian constitution. A declassified CIA document that discussed the then upcoming coup, authored on July 29, 1953, provides a rather vague clue revealing CIA thinking on the matter. In it, the author warns that Mossadegh’s “almost miraculous ability to recoup should not be overlooked” (254. Paper Prepared 1953).
Nevertheless, plans were made beyond the Shah’s signing of the firmans. On D-Day of the overthrow, the Shah would be relocated somewhere outside of Tehran and the firmans given to Zahedi. The CIA’s relocation of the Shah solved two problems; (1) they feared there might be an attempt on the Shah’s life; and (2) they feared the Shah might start to worry and reverse his firmans. On 16 August 1953, colonel Nassiri, loyal to the Shah and Zahedi, was tasked with presenting the firmans to Mossadegh and arresting him, but he failed, and sources vary on why. Regardless, he was arrested at some point by forces loyal to Mossadegh, and blamed the failure on the delay of another colonel who was supposed to provide reinforcements, but was two minutes late (Wilber 1959).[7] At his trial after his fall, Mossadegh would claim the firmans were both faked, claiming that was why he rejected their contents (Norouzi & Norouzi 2012). This contradicts Iranian ambassador Henderson’s account of what happened after Nassiri’s arrest. Henderson met with Mossadegh that evening and asked him about the firmans, Mossadegh replied that he had never seen them, and even if he had, he would have ignored them (Mokhtari 2008). [8] Wilber’s Overthrow was leaked instead of released, giving it an element of veracity not present in the written works of others involved in the operation who intentionally wrote for the public audience. Wilber mentions, multiple times, the desire to carry out a legal operation, so it makes no sense to forge a document when a legitimate copy could be easily obtained. After Nassiri’s arrest, Mossadegh deployed the troops to the street to enforce the peace and prevent any further attempts (Wilber 1959).
Mossadegh had, somehow, learned of the overthrow plot against him. The existing literature contains no indication of how he found out, but is likely the reason colonel Nassiri was arrested at the beginning of the coup. Wilber notes that the Tudeh “appeared to be at least as well posted on the coup plans as the government-how is not known” (Wilber 1959, 47). Nassiri was arrested, and Mossadegh declared his victory over an attempted military coup. Upon hearing about the failure to arrest Mossadegh, the Shah and Queen Soraya escaped to Iraq, fearful that Mossadegh would come after them (Moktari 2008). As Wilber points out, the Shah’s escape was not entirely unexpected, as the plans had already called for the Shah to temporarily relocate out of Tehran until things settled, though they didn’t expect the Shah to relocate quite so far away (Wilber 1959). Mossadegh contacted Iranian officials throughout Europe and the Middle East and told them the Shah had been deposed; he was now the highest power in Iran (Mokhtari 2008). Military officers loyal to the Shah were arrested and scheduled to hang on 20 August while other supporters were arrested, their fates uncertain (Wilber 1959).
Interestingly, the Shah’s departure and military officer’s scheduled executions are likely what sealed Mossadegh’s fate. On August 16, Mossadegh’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Fatemi, held a press conference. He announced that his views on the Shah and Mossadegh could be found in a local newspaper. The op-ed is described as a “savage, lengthy, [and] malicious attack upon the Shah” and his father, both of “whom the general public still [felt] a large measure of respect and awe” towards (Wilber 1959, 49). As word spread about the Shah’s necessary flight from Tehran and the remaining military officers planned the best way to exfiltrate their imprisoned friends and colleagues, Mossadegh’s fate began to be sealed. Mossadegh, ignorant about the events taking place in the shadows and the cauldron of negative emotion brewing over the Shah’s flight, thought the situation handled and recalled his troops off the street (Wilber 1959).
The CIA station spent the day circulating copies of the farmans relieving Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi; the military was particularly singled out for circulation of the farmans. The population questioned, wondering if the farmanshad actually been signed by the Shah and, if so, why Mossadegh would lie about it.
By the morning of the 18th, word had spread, and the population was irate. Wilber says he wasn’t sure who started the violence on the streets that day or why, exactly, but does speculate. After the Shah’s flight from Iran, the Tudeh party had “defiled statues of the monarchy” and at certain points in the city, raised their own flags. Tudeh members had also torn down any street sign that mentioned the Pahlavi family or their accomplishments. Wilber further speculates that the Tudeh Party “seemed ready for an all-out effort to bring in a people’s democracy, believing either Mossadegh would not challenge them or they could outfight him in the streets” (Wilber 1959, 62).
19 August 1953 marked the end of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh’s premiership. Anti-Mossadegh crowds gathered in the bazaar, but if they were spontaneous or organized, and if organized, by who, is unknown. Gasiorkowski notes several conflicting narratives; (1) They were organized by Ayatollah Behbehani who had been paid by the CIA; (2) The Rashidian brother (U.K. assets operating in Iran) were given $10,000 to organize the mobs; (3) Jalali and Kayvani, as the Official History of the CIA notes, assembled the crowds; (4) Mossadegh’s many opponents mobilized themselves (Gasiorkowski 2013b). Wilber wrote that the Iranian had self-assembled at the bazaars, desiring the overthrow of Mossadegh (Wilber 1959). It likely was a combination of all four options, though determining which was the greatest catalyst is nigh impossible. “To what extent the resulting activity stemmed from the specific efforts of all our agents will never be known,” wrote Wilber (Wilber 1959, 67).
“It was as if exterior pressure had been released so that the true sentiments of the people showed through” recollected Wilber (Wilber 1959, 68). Pro-Mossadegh troops had once again moved into the streets, though in smaller number than just a few days prior. Faced with the oncoming mob, the troops refused to shoot them down, opting to instead fire over the crowd’s heads. The Saadi, a theater historically sponsored by Tudeh, was burned to the ground. Pictures of the Shah were displayed with gusto. People with vehicles turned their headlights on, midday, to show their support for the Shah. Military leaders not aware of or included in the coup, Colonel Ali Pahlevan and Major Husand Mirzadian, vocally supported the Shah at rallies and on the radio (Wilber 1959).
Mid-morning of the 19th, General Riahi, still loyal to Mossadegh, informed Mossadegh he no longer had control of the army; it had declared its allegiance to the Shah. One Colonel was able to assemble a single battalion to circumscribe and protect Mossadegh’s residence (Wilber 1959). A battle broke out between the crowds and the battalion, leaving 300 dead. By the end of the day, Zahedi controlled Iran and the next day, Mossadegh surrendered (Balaghi 2013). Upon hearing about the events from his hotel room in Rome, the Shah declared “I knew that they loved me” and hurried home (Wilford 2014, 53). “The Shah arrived home in Triumph” read a newspaper headline from 31 August 1953 (Shah Returns in Triumph 1953).
When, or who, first started calling Operation AJAX a coup is unknown. It could have been Roosevelt or one of the many leaked rumors before his memoir, but whenever it started, its premise is rarely questioned. Given the chain of events laid out here, and specifically Mossadegh’s ignoring of the firmans dismissing him, this study concludes it was Mossadegh who attempted a coup, not the U.S. Furthermore, applying strict definitions, Mossadegh’s actions are more accurately described as an attempted revolution, which is a change in the form of government. A coup is the violent and illegal seizure of power from a government. Mossadegh wanted to rid the country of royalty, not just gain power. If the Operation AJAX did have an effect and was not just akin to throwing a cup of gasoline on an already raging forest fire, that effect was to preserve the constitutional monarchy of the 1906 Iranian constitution, not overthrow it. Mossadegh himself was the only one in this story looking to completely remake the form of the Iranian government.
Policy: Then and Now
Certainly, Iran was not in danger of immediate takeover by the Soviet Union and nor was Mossadegh pro-Soviet. He did, however, allow them to operate to his own political advantage and gain, which had inadvertently given them a degree of power. The CIA worried that a slow and subversive corruption from Iranian politics, Tudeh, the Soviets, and the terrorist group Fadaiyan-e Islam would eventually disillusion the Iranian of their own political system so severely they would eventually accept the Soviet alternative. This fear was buttressed by the fact that not only did Mossadegh allow Tudeh to operate and cause disturbances, but at one point openly attempted to blackmail the United States for increased monetary support by threatening alliance with the USSR. Multiple reports from the time mention Soviet activity, largely using the Tudeh party as their vehicle of influence. And finally, the fact that Mossadegh seemed so well informed of the plot against him, considered in conjunction with historical Soviet desire to obtain Iran, and instructions from an unknown entity to the Tudeh party cautioning it was not yet time to seize power, hints that Soviet intelligence was operating in Iran before and during Operation AJAX. The conclusion is inductive, but the evidence is there. Until the buried archives of the CIA and SIS are released from whatever labyrinth they currently reside in, it will be impossible to know for sure.
General Fazlollah Zahedi had previously planned a coup attempt of his own (given the Shah didn’t support the dismissal of Mossadegh until early August, it appears Zahedi’s plan was actually a coup, since he wouldn’t have had the support of the Shah). While the events up to the 18th were certainly of the CIA’s making, no one knows for sure to what degree the CIA took part in Mossadegh’s removal on the 19th. The necessary ingredients to take action against Mossadegh were all present, sans a leader to put it all together. It’s possible Zahedi, who was both the CIA and Shah’s choice, would have stepped up on his own eventually, or maybe another leader would have stepped forward. That is, of course, assuming Mossadegh himself was not soon up for assassination like so many before him.
There is another way to look at it though. Operation AJAX cost $100,000 and six days. Adjusted for 2017 dollars, the operation costs a little over $10,000. There is simply no way the CIA altered the reputation of Mossadegh from “popular and democratically elected” to “dictatorial and power hungry” over the course of six days for $10,000. Those sentiments must have already been overwhelmingly present throughout the population for the CIA’s propaganda efforts to have had that much of an effect. Though not covered in any depth here, many authors had made significant note of the anti-Mossadegh propaganda disseminated through the press, conveniently leaving out that out of the 370 newspapers in Iran, only 70 agreed to publish the propaganda (Mokhtari 2008). Throughout the literature, the propaganda is over-played and the analysis of Iranian sentiment without propaganda ignored. Iranian-American journalist Sohrab Ahmari accuses thinking like this of denying Iranian’s free agency and autonomy (De Bellaigue 2013).
The policy and international relations problems experienced between the U.S. and much of the Middle East are not so much a result of the Operation AJAX itself, but how the details of the operations were handled by those involved who published memoirs and political leaders (like Turner, Eisenhower, and McCarthy) who wrote about it later, and subsequently, the press who picked up their stories and ran with them. The narrative established decades before Wilber’s book leaked and the CIA partially opened the doors to their vault has persisted ever since, painting the U.S. as an international bully, overthrowing the popular and democratically elected prime minister for a want of oil resources. As illustrated here, little could be further from the truth.
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