INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Literal rule & golden rule
. *Taruna jaiswal[1]
Abstract: The Paper is an analysis of ambiguities, uncertainty, incompleteness, words having several meanings that arise in the interpretation of legal language and understanding the intention of the legislator. Primarily, this paper broadcast the ambiguities that exists in English language and then goes on to discuss how the vagueness in language results in making the law uncertain. The rules of interpretation of statues broadly help in removing the uncertainty and ambiguity in the language also in understanding the intention of the legislator while making the law. The two rules of interpretation i.e. Literal rule & Golden rule is chiefly discussed in this paper. With Various examples and case laws it explain how the language sometimes used makes the law uncertain and to avoid such ambiguity it talks about how the literal rule and golden rule of interpretation helps in rightly interpreting the law, thus avoiding error in decision making in the court. It shows how judges have power to interpret the statute giving a clear and precise meaning, deriving the clear intention of the legislator while it exercise its power in decision making.
Keywords: Literal Rule, Golden Rule, Ambiguity, Plain meaning, Reasonable meaning, Interpretation.
INTRODUCTION
Interpretation what it means: As Defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, it is “An act of the legislature declaring, commanding or prohibiting something; a particular law enacted and established by the will of the legislative department of the government; the written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law of the state.”
Interpretation meaning in Jurisprudence: Legislation is inseparable from a process of interpretation by the courts. Though the statutes are carefully drawn up, the courts have to determine the precise meaning of the phraseology before they can apply the law. According to Salmond, ‘Interpretation is that process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of the authoritative forms in which it is expressed.’
Language of the statute should be read as it is: The intention of the legislature is first and foremost to be congregated from the language employed, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said[2]. As a consequence a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.[3] This rule like all other rules is subject to exception. The rule stated above has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court.[4]
When it is said that the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words must be adhered to in the first occasion, it means that most words have primary meaning in which they are usually used, and such meaning should be applied first. Words have a secondary meaning also, that is a particular meaning in which they are used in a particular context. When the first plain meaning found inappropriate the second meaning of word should be applied. In this regards the general English practice is as under:
“There are three fundamental rules suggested in the English Cases. Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of section is plain, it is to be applied whatever the result. The Second is “golden rule” that the words should be given their ordinary sense unless that would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; and the “mischief rule” which emphasizes the general policy of the enactment and the evil at which it was directed.[5]”
The rule of literal construction
“Loquitur ut vulgus, that is according to the common understanding and acceptation of the terms.”[6]
Literal interpretation is that which regards exclusively the verbal expression of the law. This is ‘literalegis’ ie, literal construction of the law. On the other hand, free interpretation departs from the letter of the law and seeks for evidence of the true intention of the legislature ie, ‘sententia legis.’
It is the duty of the judicature to discover and to act upon the true intention of the legislature – the ‘mens or sentential legis’. The essence of the law lies in its spirit, not in its letter. In all ordinary cases the courts must be content to accept the ‘litera legis’ as the exclusive and conclusive evidence of the ‘sentential legis’[7]. For interpreting a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator or author.[8] Court must always lean to the interpretation which is a reasonable one and discard the literal interpretation which does not fit in with the scheme of the Act under consideration.[9] It is not the task of the Supreme Court to find out or search for the wisdom of legislature. The Court is concerned with the interpretation only.[10]
A statute has to be interpreted on its own and its interpretation would not depend upon any contingency. While construing the statute, it cannot be extended to a situation not contemplated thereby.[11] Court has to interpret the statute as it stands and not on considerations which may be perceived to be morally more correct or ethical.[12] The approach of the court while interpreting a statute should be that the entire statute must be first read as a whole then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word.[13] Court has the last say in the in interpretation of statute.[14]
The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless;
(1) That leads to some absurdity or
(2) Unless there is something in the context, or
(3) In the object of the statute to suggest the contrary.[15]
In the statement of the rule “the epithets ‘natural’, ‘ordinary’, ‘literal’, ‘grammatical’ and ‘popular’ are employed almost interchangeably”[16] to convey the same idea. The word primary is also used in the same sense.[17] When it is said that the words are to be understood first in their natural, ordinary or popular sense, what is meant is that words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject-matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. This is also known as cardinal rule of interpretation.[18]
In words of Justice Holmes : “ A word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and many vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”[19] Shorn of the context, the words by themselves are slippery customers.”[20]
In a recent decision B. Premanad v. Mohan Koikal[21] the Supreme Court has explained the literal rule of interpretation of statutes. Governing the interpretation of statues, the literal rule is the often invoked rule passed into action to ascertain the legislative intention behind the framing of the enactment. The rule governs and regulates the meaning of the law in as much as the rule provides that the meaning has to be ascertained from the text of the law itself.
In M/s Hiralal Ratanlal vs. STO[22], this Court observed: “In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of construction is the literally construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statues. The other rules of construction are called into aid when the legislative intent is not clear.”
SECONDARY MEANING – LITERAL INTERPRETATION
It is often said that a word, apart from having a natural, ordinary or popular meaning, may have a secondary meaning which is less common eg. technical or scientific meaning. But once it is accepted that natural, ordinary or popular meaning of a word, in the process of interpreting a statue, is derived from its context, the distinction drawn between different meanings loses much of its relevance.[23] In construing the word ‘coal’ in a Sales Tax Act, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the poular meaning by applying the test: “what would be the meaning which persons dealing with coal and consumers purchasing it as fuel would give to that word”,[24] On this test coal was held to include charcoal and not restricted to coal obtained as a mineral. In contrast, it was said that in the Colliery Control order, the word ‘coal’ will be understood in its technical or scientific sense and will be interpreted as a mineral product and will, therefore, not include charcoal. In the words of the court : “The Colliery Control Order, the word ‘coal’ will be understood in its technical or scientific sense and will be interpreted as a mineral product and will, therefore, not include charcoal. In the words of the court : “The colliery Control Order deals with Collieries and obviously, therefore, the term coal there is used as a mineral product”.[25] It can quite legitimately be said that the natural, ordinary or popular meaning of the term ‘coal’ would be coal used as fuel in the context of a Sales Tax Act, and coal as a mineral product in the context of the Colliery Control Order.
APPLICATION OF LITERAL RULE
For the application of literal rule a clear and unequivocal meaning is essential. In jugilal kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.[26] The Supreme Court held that the cardinal rule of interpretation of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But when no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. V. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar[27] the Apex Court had held: “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinary be understood in a sense in which they best harmonies with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two constructions are feasible, the court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the legislature envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. “In Newspaper Ltd. V. State Industrial Tribunal,[28] the Supreme Court said: “ in order to get true import of the statute, it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the object it was to sub-serve. The Act has therefore to be viewed as a whole and its intention determined by construing all the construing parts of the Act together and not by taking detached section as to take one word here and another there”.
Defects under the Literal Rule of Interpretation
There are definite flaws of the literal rule of interpretation. The deficiency may be of two kinds Logical defect which comprise of uncertainty, variation and deficiency and the second kind is illogicality or ridiculousness. Ambiguity crop up where a word or an expression used in a statute has not one but several denotation, and it is not apparent which meticulous meaning it symbolize at which particular circumstance or place. Hence the court, sort to go outside the statute and yet stick to the same literal words of the statute to determine its meaning. Also the vagueness at times is synaptic[29] which means the imprecision arises from words like “or”, “and”, “all” and other such words. For instance if a penalty for a certain crime is fine or imprisonment or both”, the court can imprison the accused or impose a fine or impose a fine as well as imprison him. If the language of the statute is clear and unmistakable, the Court cannot abandon the plain meaning, even if it leads to an in justice.[30] The words cannot be implicit properly without the context in which it is used. The firm devotion to this principle may cause injustice and sometimes it might give results which are quite opposing to broad intention of the statute or ordinary rational.[31] In case there is some lacuna or omission in the statute which avoids it from giving a absolute idea, or it makes it logically incomplete, it is the duty of the court to make up the defect by addition or alteration of something, but the court is not permitted to do more than that. It is acceptable only in cases where the statutes are inappropriate in their present form, which is inconsistent. For the change, either modification or addition the court looks into the matters which will probably help it in establishing the intention of the legislature. It is not needed that judges would at all times find some or the other means to help them in cases of the defective texts. There will be some cases where they might find not anything of this kind. They may ascertain the intention of the legislature which presumably, would have the flaw come to notice.
Golden Rule of Interpretation
To ascertain the intent of the legislature the cardinal rule applied by the judges is that the meaning of the legislator is to be sought in the actual words used by him, which are to be understood in their ordinary and natural sense. It was observed in Sussex Peerage Case[32]
If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to explain the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone, in such case best declare the intention of the law giver.
Under the golden rule for statutory interpretation, where the literal rule gives an absurd result, which Parliament could not have intended, the judge can substitute a reasonable meaning in the light of the statute as a whole.
The so called “golden rule” is really a modification of the literal rule. It was stated in this way by Parke B.: “It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself , or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further”[33].
As also held by the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. V Bombay Environment Action Group[34], the Golden Rule of interpretation is that unless literal meaning given to a document leads to anomaly or absurdity, the principles of literal interpretation should be adhered to.
The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.
The latter part of this golden rule must, however be applied with much caution. If remarked Jervis, C.J., the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it do lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied, where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely, because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning.[35]
APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE
If the choice is between two interpretations, said Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. “We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility or the narrower one which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation. We should legislative only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. Thus, if the language is capable of more than one interpretation, one ought to discard the literal or natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt the interpretation which leads to reasonably practical results.”
In India there are several good examples[36] where the Supreme Court or high Courts have applied the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it appears that even for literal rule, this rule is named. As golden rule initially starts with the search of literal meaning of the provision and if there is unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and no repugnancy uncertainty of absurdity appears, apply the meaning. But when there is possibility of more than one meaning, we have to go further to avoid the inconvenience by even modifying the language by addition, rejection or substitution of words so as to make meaning accurate expounding of intention of the legislature.
CONSTITUTTUTION VIS-à-VIS’ INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Rule of harmonious construction
When any provision of a taxing statute is interpreted, it must be so constructed that the meaning of such provision must harmonise with the intention of the Legislature behind the provision in particular and the enactment in general – CIT vs. Chandanben Maganlal[37] . However, this would always be subject to the fact that the particular provision, or even the entire enactment, should not be held unconstitutional.
Doctrine of ‘reading down’
Resort to reading down is done where a legal provision; read literally, seems to offend the Constitutional provisions concerning fundamental rights or is found to be outside the competence of the particular Legislature. Some relevant decisions are given hereunder. Sri Venkateshwara Timber Depot vs. Union of India[38] The Court construes the provision in question in a limited sense to ensure that its meaning falls within the parameters of constitutionality or is intra vires the powers of the Legislature in question (generally in the case of State Legislatures). Arun Kumar vs. UOI[39] Reading down a provision is based on the premise that to sustain the law by interpretation is the rule. To add further, as held in Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar [40]“The Legislature is presumed to be aware of its limitations and is also attributed an intention not to overstep its limits.” The Supreme Court in case of Arun Kumar, was required to consider the validity of rule 3 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 as amended vide Notification No. S.O. 940(E), dated September 25, 2001. The substituted rule revised the method of computing valuation of perquisites in the matter of rental accommodation provided by employers to the employees. It was contended by the writ petitioner that rule 3 is invalid on the ground that the amended rule does not provide for giving an opportunity to the assessee to convince the A.O. that no concession is given by the employer to the employee in respect of accommodation provided and, hence, rule 3, has no application, as the amended rule is arbitrary, discriminatory or ultra vires article 14 and inconsistent with the provisions of section 17(2)(ii). The Court did not accept the petitioner’s contention and has said that (amended) rule 3 is in the nature of a machinery provision and applies only to cases where concession in the matter of rent is involved, respecting any accommodation provided by an employer to his employee. The Court held that the assessee (employee) could contend that there is no concession in the matter of accommodation provided by the employer to the employee and on that basis, claim that rule 3 is not applicable
The doctrine of reading down can be applied if the statute is silent, ambiguous or allows more than one interpretation. But where it is express and clearly mandates to take certain actions, the function of the Court is to interpret it plainly and declare intra vires or ultra vires without adding, altering or subtracting anything therein.
Krishna Iyer, J., in Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji vs. Union of India[41] has observed :-
“. . . reading down meanings of words with loose lexical amplitude is permissible as part of the judicial process. To sustain a law by interpretation is the rule. Courts can and must interpret words and read their meanings so that public good is promoted and power misuse is interdicted. As Lord Denning said: ‘A judge should not be a servant of the words used. He should not be a mere mechanic in the power house of semanties’. . . .”Sanyasi Rao vs. Govt. of A.P.[42] The constitutional validity of sections 44AC and 206 of the Income-tax Act, was challenged. These sections were introduced in the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act, 1988. Section 44AC (which had since been deleted with effect from April 1, 1993 by the Finance Act, 1992) determined the profits and gains of a buyer from the business in trading in certain specified goods at a given percentage of the purchase price; and section 206C deals with collection and recovery of tax relating thereto. It was contended, inter alia, that section 44AC is an arbitrary and discriminatory provision, the measure of profits and gains prescribed by that section constitutes an unreasonable restriction upon the assessee’s fundamental rights guaranteed by sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 of the Constitution; and that there ought to be income, before tax is levied. The amount collected at source under section 206C is related to the income component of the purchase price. In its judgment, the High Court held that the legislative policy of fixing the rate of profit, as has been done in section 44AC, had to be regarded as in the nature of unreasonable restriction in cases ofsome of the assessees. Therefore, section 44AC has to be regarded as violative of Article 19(1)(g) in the cases of some of the petitioners before the Court. The High Court then considered whether anything can be done to uphold the validity of section 44AC and the court found the solution in “reading down the provision”. The reading down was to the extent that section 44AC shall be read not as an independent provision but as an adjunct to and as explanatory to section 206C; and that it does not dispense with regular assessment altogether with the result that after the tax is collected in the manner provided by section 206C, a regular assessment would be made where the profit and gain of business in goods in question would be ascertained in accordance with sections 28 to 43C. The High Court’s decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. A. Sanyasi Rao[43], saying that section 44AC is a valid piece of legislation and is an adjunct to and explanatory to section 206C.
Legislative response: While the debate about the constitutionality of section 44AC was on, the Government, realising the deficiencies of section 44AC, omitted section 44AC by the Finance Act, 1992 w.e.f. assessment year 1993-94. However section 206C continued as an aid to collect tax at source from the buyers of the products/items covered in the section. C.B. Gautam vs. Union of India[44] The Court had to deal with section 269 UD of the Income-tax Act, which did not contain any provision for an opportunity to the parties to be heard before an order for compulsory purchase of the property under Chapter XX-C of the Incometax Act was made. Therefore, the requirement of an opportunity to show cause before an order for compulsory purchase is made by the Central Government must be read into the provisions of Chapter XX-C, otherwise it would have adverse civil consequences for the parties affected. The provisions were later amended to incorporate the principle of natural justice vide sub-section (1A) of section 269UD by the Finance Act, 1993 from November 17, 1992.
Rule of beneficial construction
In cases where there are two interpretations possible, the one which is beneficial to the assessee would be preferred. This principle was laid down in a landmark Judgment in IRC vs. Duke of Westminister[45] wherein Tomlin LJ. stated that an assessee may arrange his affairs within the bounds of the law so as to minimize the incidence of tax. McDowell & Co. Ltd. vs. CTO[46] The Apex Court clamped down on the liberal construction and the pendulum swung to the other extreme, as the Court made fine distinctions between tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax planning and virtually rendered the Westminister Principle nugatory. Here the Court followed the interpretation that the letter and spirit of the law must be followed. In this post-McDowell era, the department generally got favourable verdicts and a lot of assessees suffered due to the Courts coming down heavily on tax avoidance measures, which were equated with tax evasion. UOI vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan[47] The case dealt with conflicts between the Indo- Mauritius Double Tax Avoidance Agreement and the Income-tax Act, 1961, it was held that an assessee was entitled to arrange his affairs so as to minimize the incidence of tax, thus, partly confirming the Westminister Principle. CIT vs. Naga Hills Tea Co. Ltd.[48] Where a literal construction would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result, the court must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. If the interpretation of a fiscal enactment is open to doubt, the construction most beneficial to the subject should be adopted.
Charging sections to be strictly construed while benevolent and procedural sections should be liberally construed
This is a very important and practical rule of interpretation and generally resorted to while interpreting the sections pertaining to incentives, exemptions and deductions where the spirit is to promote exports, increase earnings in foreign convertible exchange, promote industrialisation, infrastructure development etc. A provision for appeal should also be liberally construed. CIT vs. Naga Hills Tea Co. Ltd.A provision for exemption or relief should be construed liberally and in favour of the assessee even if it results in his obtaining “a double advantage”. Gursahai Saigal vs. CIT[49] Those sections which impose the charge or levy should be strictly construed; but those which deal merely with the machinery of assessment and collection should not be subjected to a rigorous construction but should be construed in a way that makes the machinery workable. Bajaj Tempo Ltd.[50]A provision in a taxing statute granting incentives for promoting growth and development should be construed liberally, and since as provision for promoting economic growth has to be interpreted liberally, the restriction on it too has to be construed so as to advance the objective of the provision and not to frustrate it. While interpreting the various provisions, the Court must not adopt a hyper technical approach and apply cut and dry formula. A pragmatic approach should be adopted so that the object of the introduction/insertion of a particular provision could be achieved. [51] CIT vs. Poddar Cement (P.) Ltd.[52]Where there are two possible interpretations of a particular section which is akin to a charging section, the interpretation which is favourable to the assessee should be preferred while construing that particular provision. Reiterating the same view, in the case of CIT vs. Shaan Finance (P.) Ltd.[53] it has been held that in interpreting a fiscal statute, the Court cannot proceed to make good the deficiencies if there be any. The Court must interpret the statute as it stands and in case of doubt, in a manner favourable to the taxpayer. CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd[54] It has been held that if the Court finds that the language of taxing provision is ambiguous or capable of more meaning than one, then the Court has to adopt the interpretation which favours the assessee. Gannon Dunkerly & Co. Ltd. vs. CBDT[55] The object of section 80-O is to encourage the export of Indian Technical Knowhow and augmentation of foreign exchange resources of the country and hence a superficial and narrow interpretation can only defeat the benevolent purpose behind the provision of section 80-O.
Golden Rule v. Grammatical/Literal meaning
In the past, the Judges and lawyers spoke of a ‘golden rule’ by which statutes were to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word. They took the grammatical or literal meaning heedless of the outcomes. Even if such a meaning gave increase to unfair consequences which legislature never projected, the grammatical meaning independently was kept to reign. They said that it would be for the legislature to amend the Act and not for the court to intervene by its innovation. During the last several years, the Golden rule has been given a go-bye. The court now looks for the intention of the legislature or the purpose of the statute. First, the court should examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, there is no need to go further. The court expounds those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the word. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arise as to the terms employed, it would be the paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. The court should then examine every word, every section and every provision. It is the duty of the court to examine the Act as a whole and examine the necessity, which gave rise to the Act. The court should then look at the mischief rule which the legislature intended to redress and look at the whole situation and not just one to one relation. It is to be remembered that the court will not consider any provision but of the framework of the statute and does not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive and force behind. The court will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin and will further consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences. This adventure, no doubt, enlarges courts discretion as to interpretation. But it does not imply power to courts to substitute its own notions of legislative intention. It implies only a power of choice where differing constructions are possible and different meanings are available.[56]
Conclusion
We see that the ambiguity or uncertainty can arise in language due to the limitations of the English language when the words are to be used in common sense. It is possible for one word to have different meanings now to understand the meaning of the word which will help in arriving at the rightful decision the basic principles of interpretation is used. The existence of homonyms, homographs, homophones etc. further add to the ambiguity that may be caused in flexible usage of the language. Existence of such ambiguity is common in language, however, when there is ambiguity in the statutes thereby preventing the understanding of the law in its rightful sense, it rings an alarm, as it ascend to the leeway of overturning the decisions of the courts in cases of crucial matters, or influence the route of rendering of justice in such a manner that may result in unfair, unjust and unreasonable decisions by the court. And it is required to eliminate such ambiguity from the arena of law. Thus, the application of basic principles of interpretation by the judges in interpreting the words of the statutes that was intended by the legislators. Literal, Golden and Mischief Rule of Interpretation helps in procuring rightful decision making.
Shruti (literal meaning) or Linga (suggestive power): As per Mimansa principles, Shruti principle or literal rule of interpretation, held, will prevail over all other principles e.g. Linga, Vakya, Prakarana, Sthana, Samakhya, etc.[57]
The extent of severity and literal construction functioned by the Courts move back and forth like the proverbial pendulum. The paper gives the overview of the rules of interpretation of statutes and is intended to provide an insight into the various methods employed by the Courts to determine the meaning of legal provisions. To conclude, one must strive hard to read between the lines by using the interpretative techniques, since one must bear in mind the words of LJ. Denning who stated that:
“it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity”.
[1] Student, 4th Year, Kiit School of Law, Bhubaneswar in 2013-2014.
[2] Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (wvg.) Co. Ltd. V. Custodian of Vested Forests, AIR 1990 SC 177,P1752
[3] Shyam kishore Deviv Patna Municipal Corporation, AIR 1966 SC 1678, P.1682
[4] Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of Inidia, AIR 2002 SC 1351,P.1354.
[5] G.W.Paton, Jurisprudence,(1946), p.294.
[6] The Fusilier (1865)Br.&L.341, per Dr.Lushington at p.393.
[7] Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th ed, p 132
[8] Karnataka State Financial Corp v. N Narasimahaiah (2008) 5 SCC 176
[9] Bihar State Council of Ayurvedic and Unani Medicine v. State of Bihar (2007) 12 SCC 728
[10] TN SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2007) 7 SCC 636.
[11] Supra 6
[12] Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab (2007) 1Scc 574.
[13] Supra 6
[14] TN Electricity Board v. Status Spg Mills Ltd. (2008) 7 SCC 353
[15] Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 4 MIA 179, p 181.
[16] CRAIES :Statute Law, 7th Edition,p.65.
[17] Ibid
[18] Lion Insurance Association v. Tucker, (1883-84) 12 OBD 176, P.186.
[19] Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC1461, P.1497.
[20] Nyadar Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1979, p.1984.
[21] B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266
[22] M/s Hiralal Ratanlal vs. STO[22], AIR 1973 SC 1034
[23] CROSS: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edition, p.82
[24] Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1454,P 1457
[25] Ibid
[26] AIR 1955 SC 376
[27] Air 1963 SC 1207
[28] AIR 1957 SC 532.
[29] P J FITZGERALD,,SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 152 (12TH ed., Universal Law Publishing Co.Pvt.Ltd.,2008).
[30] CIT vs. T.V. Sunadarm Iyyengar(1975) 101 ITR 764 (SC)
[31] AIYER,P. RAMNATHAN, LAW LEXICON 1134 (2ND ed., Wadhwa and Co., ,2002).
[32] 8 ER 1034.
[33] Becke v Smith (1836) 2M & W. 191 at p.195.
[34] Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. V Bombay Environment Action Group[34] (2006) 3 SCC 434.
[35] Abley v. Dale 138 ER 159 at p.525.
[36] Jugilal Kishore Saraf v. Raw cotton Mills, AIR 1955 Sc 376.
[37] CIT vs. Chandanben Maganlal [2002] 120 Taxman 38 (Guj.)
[38] Sri Venkateshwara Timber Depot vs. Union of India [1991] 189 ITR 741/155 Taxman 308 (Ori.)
[39] Arun Kumar vs. UOI [2006] 155 Taxman 659 (SC)
[40] Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955
[41] Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji vs. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 234
[42] Sanyasi Rao vs. Govt. of A.P. [1989] 178 ITR 31 (AP)
[43] Union of India vs. A. Sanyasi Rao [1996] 219 ITR 330 (SC)
[44] C.B. Gautam vs. Union of India [1992] 199 ITR 530 (SC)
[45] IRC vs. Duke of Westminister 1936 AC 1
[46] McDowell & Co. Ltd. vs. CTO [1985] 154 ITR 148 (SC)
[47] UOI vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan [2003] 263 ITR 707 (SC)
[48] CIT vs. Naga Hills Tea Co. Ltd. 89 ITR 236, 240 (SC); CIT vs. Contr ED vs. Kanakasabai 89 ITR 251, 257 (SC)
[49] Gursahai Saigal vs. CIT 48 ITR (SC)1
[50] Bajaj Tempo Ltd. 196 ITR 188 (SC)
[51] Juggilal Kamlapat vs. CIT [1969] 73 ITR 702 (SC), CIT vs. Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1989] 177 ITR 431 (SC) at page 434 and CIT vs. South Arcot District Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. 176 ITR117 (SC) at page 119]
[52] CIT vs. Poddar Cement (P.) Ltd. [1997] 226 ITR 625 (SC)
[53] CIT vs. Shaan Finance (P.) Ltd. [1998] 231 ITR 308 (SC)
[54] CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd [1973] 88 ITR
[55] Gannon Dunkerly & Co. Ltd. vs. CBDT 159 ITR 162 (Bom.)
[56] Kehar Singh v. State ( Delhi Admn.) AIR 1988 SC 1883.
[57] (2011) 4 SCC 266-B