The Interplay of Democracy: U.S. Strategies Against Electoral Violence and Their Applicability in Nigeria

I have always been intrigued by the significant influence developed countries exert on the democratic processes in developing nations. However, when such influence fails to favor the ruling class, there is often resistance, and the ruling elite adapts these influences to create what they label as "home-grown democracy." This interplay between the democratic practices of developed and developing nations has prompted me to examine the electoral violence prevention strategies employed in the recent U.S. elections and to assess potential lessons that Nigeria could derive from them.

In the most recent U.S. elections, voters expressed profound concerns regarding the potential for electoral violence. Jacob Ware's publication, "Preventing U.S. Election Violence in 2024: Contingency Planning Memorandum," underscores the serious risk of extremist violence surrounding the 2024 presidential election. Further supporting these concerns, a poll commissioned by The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights revealed that 73 percent of American voters are apprehensive about political violence. Additionally, a survey conducted by the Associated Press NORC Center for Public Research, published by Gary Fields, Ali Swenson, and Linley Sanders, indicated that approximately 40 percent of registered voters are "extremely" or "very" concerned about violent attempts to overturn the election results post-November.

Research indicates that apprehensions regarding electoral violence stream from the political rhetoric employed during campaigns, which became increasingly perilous given the pronounced ideological divide between the? Democrats and the Republicans. This scenario sharply contrasts with Nigeria, where democratic processes are frequently organized around race, religion, or ethnicity rather than ideology—a topic warranting further exploration. It was also noted that the manner in which candidates communicate their ideologies to the public further exacerbates this ideological divide.

The University of Chicago’s Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) conducted quarterly,? nationally representative surveys that revealed an alarming correlation between support for political violence, a lack of confidence in democratic institutions, and the anticipation of electoral violence. This observation was echoed by a recent survey from the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), which found that support for political violence is prevalent among determined minorities on both the right and left. The widespread belief that the 2020 presidential election was neither free nor fair has profoundly affected concerns regarding potential electoral violence in 2024. For instance, should the Democrats win, it is plausible that many on the right?will perceive the results as unjust, potentially leading to post-electoral violence.

Another concern was the series of assassination attempts directed at Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, who is now the President-elect of the United States. Also in Virginia, a 66-year-old man was arrested for threatening the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, Kamala Harris. Such incidents have contributed to a politically charged environment characterized by fear, anger, and uncertainty.

Focusing on personality politics, Jacob Ware highlights, “The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves. Political figures are certain to use divisive and perhaps even existential political rhetoric during the campaign, warning of an urgent threat to the rank-and-file of either political party and to the country as a whole.” Therefore, the communication style of candidates emerges as a critical indicator of potential electoral violence.

In the contemporary landscape, social media also plays a detrimental role in escalating electoral violence through the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation. The recent U.S. election was not immune to such challenges.

From all that has been said, the indicators for the electoral violence were high and real, however, US government initiated strategies to mitigate the impending violence. And from my research, these are some of the major actions taken to mitigate the risk of electoral violence.

Allocation/ Utilizations of Resources for Security -

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's decision in 2022 to allocate certain federal funds toward security enhancements, such as badge readers, cameras, and protective fencing. Conversely, in Nigeria, security budget allocations primarily focus on the welfare of personnel rather than on the implementation of robust security measures.

Building the Capacity of Poll Workers: In the just concluded US election, the poll workers, underwent training focused on conflict resolution and de-escalation strategies. This initiative is commendable as these individuals represent the first line of defense against electoral violence, which frequently occurs at polling units. It is essential to enhance the capacity of this front line to effectively manage and reduce instances of violence. Furthermore, beyond training the poll workers, high-risk counties were also equipped with safety features. Jessica Huseman, Editorial Director of Votebeat, a nonprofit organization dedicated to election reporting, notes, "There are counties that have implemented panic buttons for poll workers to activate. Additionally, some counties have outfitted every polling location with smartphones to ensure immediate access to a central hotline." In stark contrast, in Nigeria electoral officers are equivalent to poll workers in US seldom receive similar levels of training. Given our observations of electoral violence in Nigeria since 2016, we have consistently recommended that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) invest more resources in the training and development of electoral officers.

Localizing Security Mitigation and Prevention Strategies. During the elections, local security authorities, including local police departments and sheriff’s offices, primarily provided security. In certain states, state police or highway patrol units offered support in high-risk areas. While federal law enforcement agencies were present, they were mainly on standby to assist in the event of escalations. This approach aligns with recommendations made by Jacob Ware in Preventing U.S. Electoral Violence: 2024, where he emphasizes, “Focusing on local law enforcement would alleviate concerns about a federal government crackdown, allowing local authorities to reinforce the rule of law within their communities.” This stands in contrast to the Nigerian experience, which I term "Policerization," characterized by the overwhelming presence of security agents, including the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigerian Army, Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), Department of State Services (DSS), and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). These entities were not merely on standby but were actively involved in operations. However, it is noteworthy that recent local government elections in Rivers and Kaduna States were conducted with significantly less intervention from the NPF.

Observations indicated that despite public announcements of non-involvement, there were allegations of ballot box snatching involving police forces. This observation is supported my recent publication, Minimal Participation of the Nigerian Police Force in Elections: A Case Study of the Just-Concluded Rivers State Local Government Election: A Call for Action, where incidents of voter intimidation, including tear-gassing, were documented. In Kaduna, although isolated incidents of violence occurred, the overall electoral environment in 2023 proved to be more peaceful compared to previous elections, where violence was rampant and often resulted in significant fatalities and disruptions. This disparity raises critical questions regarding the "Policerization" of the electoral process, especially in light of the substantial funding allocated for security measures.

Recommendations:

1.???????? Investing More in Security Features: Drawing inspiration from recent elections in the U.S., whereby security budgets were effectively utilized for the implementation of safety features, Nigeria should explore similar avenues, particularly in this digital age, where technology can enhance security measures seamlessly.

2.???????? De-Policerization of Polling Units:: Security forces should adopt"asymmetrical security" strategies, commonly called smart security. The focus should be on employing strategic thinking and intelligence to facilitate preventive measures. This proactive approach will enable security personnel to address potential violence before it escalates while minimizing the need for excessive force.

3.???????? Training and Re-training of Electoral Officers:: The importance of ongoing training for electoral officers cannot be overstated. It is essential to equip these frontline workers with the necessary skills to manage challenging situations effectively. Several reports electoral observation reports indicate that many electoral officers feel overwhelmed and lack the appropriate training to navigate complex circumstances, which often exacerbates electoral violence.

Therefore, there is a critical need for INEC to provide comprehensive training in conflict resolution and the implementation of available security features for electoral officers and any ad hoc polling staff.

These measures should be implemented in parallel with efforts to advance the digitalization of the voting process, thereby reducing the need for human intervention and enhancing the overall integrity of the electoral system

Jacob Ware Jessica Huseman Nate Haken Yiaga Africa Independent National Electoral Commission Nigerian Law School Search For Common Ground Nigeria Nate Haken 美国东北大学 Patricia Agupusi (PhD) Yiaga Africa PLAC NG ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OF THE NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION Nigerian Bar Association Young Lawyers Forum Nigerian Bar Association HQ Senate Committee On Public Petitions Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND)

Articles/Reference

? Election Violence Is Already in Full Swing, J. Ware, Lawfare, 22 Sep2024

? Opinion: Trump Assassination Attempts are Just the Beginning

Imagine What is Coming After the Election, J. Ware & C. Clarke, L.A.

Times, 17 Sep 2024

? How Bad Will Political Violence in the U.S. Get? B. Hoffman & J. War,

Foreign Policy, 28 Jun 2024

? Preventing U.S. Election Violence in 2024, J. Ware, CFR, 17 April 2024? https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/participation-nigerian-policeforce-elections-case-esinwoke-ogbalor-wqlyf/?trackingId=7cRXgyBtTk%2Bon4wuHu0wMQ%3D%3D Egondu Esinwoke–Ogbalor Oct 11 2024

? https://www.wvnews.com/newsfeed/politics/us-voters-concerned-about-post-election-violence-and-efforts-to-overturnthe-results-ap-norc/article_6fb19d67-0171-5880-86b47240cc960477.html GARY FIELDS, ALI SWENSON and LINLEY SANDERS Associated Press Oct 28, 2024

? https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/politics/yall-itics/texas-election-results-poll-workers/287-56ff8bf9-4b66-4caf-bcbe-9e4ee1b473c8 Michael McCardel Oct 31 2024

? Political Violence Becomes America's New Norm - But is Still Shocking, A. Zurcher, BBC, 15 Sep 2024