Interagency Centered Training (IAC-Training) and Hybrid Scenario Simulation (HS-Sim): New concepts to address the Hybrid Warfare!

Interagency Centered Training (IAC-Training) and Hybrid Scenario Simulation (HS-Sim): New concepts to address the Hybrid Warfare!

?Strategic thinkers are seeking novel and better ways to defend themselves against hybrid threats by more closely cooperating in areas such as improved situational awareness, civil (and military) preparedness and resilience, cyber defense, strategic communications and joint training and exercises.

?This paper aims to propose the concepts of Interagency Centered Training (IAC-Training) and Hybrid Scenario Simulation (HS-Sim) to help expand strategic thinkers’ instruments to prevent and counter hybrid and irregular threats.

?INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS

1.?Military and civilian decision makers are used to plan, train and make decisions to face hybrid threats based on the processes, doctrine and protocols they were taught at technical courses, colleges and universities. The easiest and common attitude has been putting all actors together by the first time only at the moment they are supposed to analyze critical scenarios and make decisions, which has proved to be unrealistic and less effective!

?Interagency Training is not as a recipe – experience has proved that training for interagency operations is not similar to the preparation of a good meal! It is not enough to mix the ingredients in the right time, place and quantities. In order to operate synergistically, seeking the necessary unity of command and especially the convergence of efforts, the different actors must be deeply used to this type of decision making process. It is time to start using an interagency-focused training methodology which deems a wide range of new possibilities and limitations. Without reaching this level of integration and interoperability, how can we face hybrid threats?

?Most of current high level team managers have attended to specialization courses many years prior becoming high level decision makers. Should they keep using the same doctrine, protocols and planning processes? Are they using the proper tools to train? Should they keep the same mindset? Although most of them work hard to keep updated on doctrinal, procedural and technological terms, the key point is: are they prepared to face this new mutant scenario of hybrid threats? The answer to this question will vary from person to person, institution to institution, country to country and alliance to alliance… The concept of a new training thinking is here proposed: Interagency Centered Training (IAC-Training).

?2.?Constructive Simulation should no longer be a conventional training tool, but a comprehensive concept for high-level interagency training and analysis!

?Constructive Simulation is to be much more than a useful software to train military leaders and staff on conventional challenges, but an unabridged concept to enable synergic interagency efforts to prepare military and civilian decision makers and management teams to face conventional, irregular or even hybrid threats -?experience has demonstrated that military and civilians are so used to train with low level and limited spectrum simulation solutions that when it is time to perform real complex interagency operations, or when there is a brand new type of threat, there is very little synergy.

?The next generation constructive simulation must cover both conventional and irregular operations, as well as any other interagency operations such as operations other than war (OOTW), public safety, natural or manmade disasters, evacuation of refugees and even terrorist attacks. The concept of this new simulation will be proposed: Hybrid Scenario Simulation (HS-Sim).

?THE ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS

Into the field of M&S, an innovative alternative to help facing hybrid threats considers two main innovative baselines:

1 – Interagency Centered Training (IAC-Training), and

2 – Hybrid Scenario Simulation (HS-Sim).

?Interagency Centered Training (IAC-Training) and Hybrid Scenario Simulation (HS-Sim): New concepts to address the Hybrid Warfare!

?INTRODUCTION

?“Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.”[1]

?The term strategy derives from the Greek word strategos. During the 18th century[2] , it was seen in its narrow sense as the "art of the general",[3] or "'the art of arrangement" of troops.[4] Military strategy deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy.

?Gradually, the lessons learned in many different military campaigns began to serve as lessons learned to the military leaders, arising several new concepts and definitions from authors ranging from Sun Tzu to Raymond Aron, through Clausewitz, Jomini, Liddell Hart, etc. The strategy was to distinguish the winners from the losers, and the war turned into art.

Similarly, the history of warfare has gifted humanity with planners and brilliant commanders since ancient times. Alexander III of Macedon (356 BC a 323 BC), Scipio Africanus (236-183 BC), Hannibal Barca (247 BC a 182 BC), Julius Caesar (100 BC a 44 BC), Genghis Khan (1162-1227), Napoleon Bonaparte (1729-1821), Erich von Manstein (1887-1973), Heinz Guderian (1888-1954), Erwin Rommel (1891-1944), George S. Patton (1885-1945), Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976), Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969), Gueorgui Jukov (1896-1974) are examples of military leaders who applied their skills and knowledge to overcome the opponents, often at a disadvantage.

Similar to the nature of conflicts in the last fifty years, the strategies to address them have also undergone considerable changes, many of which have evolved to the association of two or more approaches previously considered typically individual, unique. Certainly the great strategists of history felt the need to adapt their thinking to achieve success in their campaigns, and many of these changes have become the key to success.

?In this sense, the combination of conventional and irregular methods is not new and has been used throughout history. A few examples can be found in the American Revolution (a combination of Washington’s Continental Army with militia forces), Napoleonic Wars (British regulars cooperated with Spanish guerrillas) and in the Araguaia guerrilla (After an unsuccessful conventional military offensive, Brazilian regulars started using irregular warfare techniques, preceded by a thorough intelligence work, and managed to defeat the enemy)[5] ,[6] .

?Although it is possible to suggest commonalities or similarities between their characteristics as strategists and commanders, each one has experienced specific circumstances which, combined with their own qualities, led to brilliant results on developing strategies as well as on the battlefields - they have adapted their knowledge, their strategies and tactics, their way of thinking…

?The main differences between those former scenarios and the threats we face today are due to the time perspective in which changes occur and to the rapid and continuous need to adapt: to its “modus operandi”[7] and the multidimensional environment in which it presents itself.

Thus, should interagency decision makers keep using the same doctrine, protocols and planning methodologies? Are they prepared to cooperate and decide in an interagency operational environment? Is the way these decision makers are trained and train their staff providing satisfactory results and consistent courses of action to address the new threats?

?HYBRID WARFARE

Although there is no consensus yet on the term hybrid warfare, and maybe getting that consensus is not really relevant, it must be admitted that we are facing a new type of threat and, to properly address it, is necessary that we not only seek to adapt, but improve the way we interpret this almost intangible enemy and, from that point on, plan, train and fight better.[8] ,[9]

?If we intend to seriously assess this new type of threat, we should no longer use a simplification to say that it adopts irregular methods to counter a conventional incontestably superior force, as advocated by some proponents of the resistance strategy. Its approach is far from being conventional! The abstractness of the term means that it is often used as a catch all term for all non-linear threats[10] . Thus, how to understand this startling challenge?

? [11]

A recent definition is “hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects: A non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary. A hybrid adversary can be state or non-state. An adversary which uses a combination of conventional and irregular methods. It is flexible and adapts quickly, uses advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies and uses mass communication for propaganda and recruiting tools”.[12] And how should we interpret the battlefield in which this new enemy will be faced? Whereas “a hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields: the conventional battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the international community”[13] , can we say that our security forces have the necessary skills to face it?[14]

? ?But then how can we prepare ourselves to face this kind of threat / enemy whose way of thinking and acting presents a paradigm breaking of our conventional defense models?

?Today, the threats are transformed, amalgamated by the overwhelming influence of technology, easy access to information, the speed of information sharing, and the resources required to conquest of power by other means. To face them is mandatory that, among other measures, we improve our ability to think, plan and work synergistically.

?INTERAGENCY CENTERED TRAINING (IAC-TRAINING)

?There are countless methods of military training, planning processes and human resources capacity building. However, their applicability must observe parameters of reliability and actuality that are indispensable in conflicts and crises we have been facing since the advent of the new millennium.

?Therefore, many references of the current academic education are more closely linked to history books than to procedures in use by those who have been facing real hybrid threats. Incidents like the recent terrorist attacks in Paris made it clear that we can no longer remain in the condition of viewers, once “this form of warfare will evolve into a struggle to quickly learn, adapt, and out-think a changing hybrid threat.”[15] In this scenario where there will be no simple winners and losers, those who are better trained, using the most appropriate tools to make interagency decisions, will have increased their chances of winning.

?In 2005, the United States Government Accountability Office reported on “key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration”[16] . The aim was and remains being to enhance and sustain interagency collaborative efforts. Nonetheless, this effort has not provided the expected results, particularly due to the multi-cultural and institutional diversity of the various agencies.

In recent years, important initiatives have been taken to achieve real convergence efforts on interagency collaboration, which include scenario-based planning, conflict assessment frameworks, multilayered assessment, and operational planning systems[17] . These are just some of the faces of a prism that we still do not know well enough, and the challenge now is to improve the way we relate and fight, becoming a real team, developing our flexibility and improving our ability to adapt to an unusual operating environment.

?From the study of various efforts to succeed in interagency operations in recent scenarios, it is clear that the mutual understanding and respect, as well as adaptability are sine qua non[18] attributes for leaders and decision makers in crisis management, in purely military conflicts and, more recently, also in hybrid warfare.

?- Mutual understanding and respect

– Throughout the story, despite the continuing evolution of the military thinking and the art of war, the need to know and respect your opponent and yourself has always been an undeniable reality. If in the past the decision makers sought to gain an advantage over their opponents, taking details of the battlefield and exploiting their vulnerabilities and limitations, it is also true that the leadership exercised by the commanders, their initiative as well as the judicious use of means and techniques of available combat increased their relative power of combat. Thus, even under outnumbered or inferior tactical conditions, several battles were won and goals were achieved with mastery.

When the allied forces - military, security forces, government and non-governmental agencies - build up a more closely cooperating environment, they will be able to multiply their ability to face the hybrid threats, with all its complexities and dilemmas, overcoming this new enemy and undermining its willingness to confront us. The key to achieving this goal passes obligatorily by mutual understanding and respect.

?- Adaptability

- In the early days of mankind, passively accept the surprises of "fate" was common in various activities undertaken by humans. Over time, we acquired the ability to question the circumstances and felt the need to seek alternatives, adapt, survive...

- After we have learned a little more, our ability to adapt began to offer significant advantages, even to the weakest individuals. This "skill" then started to influence the relative power of combat, causing imbalance in favor of those who take away best advantage of it.

If we have understood the importance of seeking mutual knowledge and respect and adaptability in an interagency context, how can we systematize the training of decision-makers to improve these aspects? How to achieve synergistic effects?

?The call for a paradigm shift that enables us to face this new threat is presented - “The critical challenge facing the Army Profession of the future is determining what professional competencies to add or adapt in relation to the warfare inflection point that the force currently faces”[19] .

?An alternative to achieve more closely cooperation in areas such as civil (and military) preparedness and resilience, as well as joint training and exercises, stimulating and enhancing mutual understanding and respect, and the ability to anticipate is the IAC-Training.

?IAC-Training four steps

?1)???Decision-makers' intra-institutional update

- This step is critical because without a reliable knowledge update about operational protocols, doctrine, rules and procedures, the tendency is that commanders and decision makers continue analyzing and deciding just based on their rooted preconceptions. The aim is to prepare agents to think and act in accordance with the political and doctrinaire parameters currently adopted by their institutions, thus minimizing the interpretation deviations and the negative personalism. To achieve these goals, they must participate in knowledge update seminars and study in detail the political and institutional situation relating to their organization.

2)???Update knowledge on each of the actors (agencies) members of the Interagency Task Force

- One of the biggest obstacles to achieve synergy in interagency operations is the lack of knowledge or the existence of limited (distorted) knowledge on real capacities, possibilities and limitations of other partners. We're not talking about simply attending occasional meetings with other agencies, or even reading reliable articles and interviews about their roles. The most important aspect is to achieve a consistent knowledge level about "the other" in order to explore each of its strengths while minimizing its weaknesses, and finally integrating efforts in order to achieve maximum proficiency in interagency operations. To achieve this goal, agents must participate in knowledge update seminars and study in detail the political and institutional situations relating to these organizations.

3)???Updating and sharing of information and knowledge about the operating environment, the potential enemy (hybrid threats) and on collective strategies to overcome it

- The Hoffman study on the rise of hybrid wars highlights this new "environment" where we will be forced to fight. He points out that “the battlespace in tomorrow's Hybrid Wars will take place in complex terrain, most likely the burgeoning cities of the developing world.”[20] The operational advantage gained by defenders of this type of complex terrain challenges stratagems generally used by our conventional superiority. Thus, we need to break the paradigms we have about how to confront the enemy in this operating environment, studying it and adapting our best practices to it.

? - What we know about hybrid threats? Do we understand their political objectives? The principle that hybrid threat is “a phenomenon resulting from convergence and interconnection of different elements, which together form a more complex and multidimensional threat”[21] leads us to consider that such complexity requires that protection forces are thoroughly updated about this potential enemy's possibilities and limitations. It is necessary to study and discuss in detail their motivations, underground network support, and recent and current activities. In short, it is essential to know the best possible this new and terrible enemy.

?- Once the operational environment and the enemy is deeply studied, we will be able to identify, qualify and develop preventive and reactive control strategies. In most cases we will not be able to anticipate its movements and actions precisely because this enemy employs cowards and unconventional artifices. However, if our decision makers are properly prepared and our security forces operate synergistically, we will be creating the conditions necessary to greatly minimize the effects of their actions, avoiding unnecessary loss of human lives and the destruction of public and private assets.

?4)???Intensive command posts training on interagency operations in hybrid scenarios with suitable and reliable constructive simulation

? - Decision makers training courses on purely military or even interagency operations should effectively submit the trainee audience to conditions similar to those they would face in a real critical event. However, use cases studies and tabletop exercises, although of great value, offer a limited range of possibilities to course of action analysis and culminate stimulating the prevalence of personal opinions based on experiences and inferences, generally resulting in a passive acceptance of the highest authority's perspective. This precisely happens due to the lack of consistent technical arguments that this type of exercise provides to participants.

? - Constructive simulation involves military forces, security forces, governmental and non-governmental agencies, simulated elements and simulated operational systems, controlled by real players, generally in a command position or constituted task forces. Also known as "war games", the emphasis of this type of simulation is the interaction between agents, split as opposing forces facing each other, under the control of an exercise direction. Its main goals are training commanders and staff on decision-making process, as well as on control command systems.

?- The next generation constructive simulation system cannot simply simulate courses of action in a traditional environment! There is a new and well-defined need that it must allow users to cover a comprehensive range of operating environments, challenging decision makers to face typical situations presented by hybrid threats such which terrorism, destruction, suicide, rebels, enemies, crime, religion, security, psychosis, weapons of mass destruction, extremists, cyber terrorism, human crowds, OOTW and peacekeeping operations, among others.

HYBRID SCENARIO SIMULATION (HS-SIM)

?HS-Sim is a powerful concept which can help improving strategic thinkers’ instruments to prevent and counter hybrid and irregular threats such as operational and tactical planning, decision support, connected individual and collective training.

?Simulation should no longer be specifically geared to conventional or unconventional military operations, or OOTW, nor solely oriented to public safety, or even only cover the management of natural or manmade disasters. It must simultaneously cover multiple operational possibilities and count on reliable artificial intelligence algorithms based on military doctrine, protocols, procedures and the “modus operandi”[22] of each participant entity of the scenario, to fight this new enemy in a hybrid scenario.

? ?In addition, a simulation system for this new environment must also offer non-deterministic simulation of complex situations involving collective human behaviors such as guerrilla warfare, humanitarian operations or riot control. It must provide a realistic visualization of both sides’ groups/units and their capabilities (time required to interact, propagation and the effect of a terrorist attack, availability of resources…), etc.

?This new simulation tool needs to decisively contribute to the improvement of decision-making skills, improve co-ordination between all actors on interagency and joint operations, providing reliability to contingency plans and decision support protocols.

The key principle is the need for a new and powerful training and decision support tool. This need is in line with the understanding that “war games are simulations combining game, experiment and performance”[1], particularly because what really counts is that decision makers are put to the test based on experimental situations like those they will face when they fight hybrid threats.

The basic premise is the fidelity of responses to orders issued and the quality of feedback received from simulation through employee control command system.

?It is time to stop using the simulation with a narrow one-sided view. It is necessary to anticipate and simulate actions and consequences of this new type of threat.

Applying the Hybrid Scenario Simulation (HS-Sim)

We’ve seen that this new hybrid threat can have multiple faces and surely has the capability to surprise and overtake our expectations. As a non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary, it can be state or non-state, use a combination of conventional and irregular methods and be flexible and adapt quickly. A hybrid adversary can also use advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies and mass communication for propaganda[23] .

Another aspect that further highlights the need for change is the fact that a hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields: the conventional battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the international community[24] . Thus, which tool should we use to improve the way we train our decision makers and help conceiving novel and better ways to defend ourselves against hybrid threats by more closely cooperating in areas such as improved situational awareness, civil (and military) preparedness and resilience, joint training and exercises?

The next generation constructive simulation system should possess the following characteristics:

High level of realism

The simulation system must represent high-fidelity ground forces immersed in highly realistic joint-forces scenarios and high-fidelity emergency response units and teams immersed in complex crisis and disaster scenarios through the use of physical models and advanced interoperability features.

Automated forces and units

Platoons, companies, emergency response units and teams must be intelligent and autonomous. They must receive operational orders and execute them without additional input from the operators, while adapting their behavior accordingly as the situation evolves. Such a level of fidelity on combat actions, the operations of battalions, brigades, army divisions and higher, provides commanders and their staff with remarkably reliable simulation exercises.

The trainees and their crisis team members must be able to give instructions to the subordinate level using their standard means of communication. These high-level instructions should then be executed automatically, without any additional input from the players, with teams on the field adapting their behavior accordingly as the situation evolves. The Artificial Intelligence should then determine the impact on the situation and its evolution.

Operational reports from the incident area are to be then sent back up through all levels of the incident organization, resulting in a new status report at the crisis team level. This is essential that the system provides to users a dynamic interaction between the instructions given and a continuously evolving situation and environment.

Adapted to your organizational structure, procedures and doctrine

Everything in this next generation simulation system must be customizable to match the specificity of any of every possible crisis situation, procedure or doctrine: from vehicle speeds, weapon system performance and sensor accuracy, through unit composition, basic loads and logistics systems, to unit behaviors and missions. Emergency response vehicles, equipment, and material in the simulation must provide a highly accurate representation of those deployed during the real crisis. Furthermore, human behaviors supplied are to be equally realistic in such situations.

Flexible and complete

Use cases need to cover command staff large-scale training centers, officer self-training, course of action analysis, planning, decision support high-level crisis management training, validation of procedures/equipment/means of communication, and interoperability and emergency plans. This new system must also have the capability to be used as a decision-support system during a crisis situation or as support for a largescale live exercise. Furthermore, support of interoperability standards and integration with existing command & control systems used by the military or emergency response organizations are essential requirements, as well as other simulation systems.

Extensive outof-thebox content

This next generation simulation system must also contemplate a large number of predefined units including armed forces (infantry, tanks, artillery, engineering, army aviation, etc.), public safety (police forces, firefighters, ambulances, etc.), asymmetric threats (terrorists, militias, etc.) government agents and civilians (NGOs, refugees, etc.), but also with threats such as natural, manmade, chemical, petrochemical, nuclear and biological disasters.

Total solution “all-in-one”

Other relevant requirements for this simulation system are a timeline to set up in advance events on the scenario, tools for scenario preparation, terrain generation, physical and decisional models adaptation, after-action review, self-training launcher and a web-based interface to manage distributed exercises.

CONCLUSION

We can say that we are dealing with an unknown, powerful and perhaps unpredictable threat that, regrettably, believes and defends values diametrically opposed to ours. However, new challenges has been a common practice since ancient times.

Training itself is not a solution, if the methodology applied does not target the necessary goals. This paper suggests some training practices already known and used by several organizations. Still, if we do not understand that we must use them systematically and cooperatively, the results will not be satisfactory.

Although obviously there are no miracle formulas or infallible solutions to defeat it, experience has proved that together, we are always stronger and more effective. Time can be a valuable ally, but also this new threat is learning and developing new destructive practices every day. Therefore, it is essential that we improve our concepts, our professional knowledge, our ability to cooperate and act synergistically, as soon as possible.

In this scenario, constructive simulation with artificial intelligence emerges as a powerful tool capable of revolutionizing the training of decision makers in interagency operations, offering realistic simulation of operational situations in a hybrid war context.

Thereby, the new concepts of Interagency Centered Training (IAC-Training) and Hybrid Scenario Simulation (HS-Sim) can surely help expanding strategic thinkers’ instruments to prevent and counter hybrid and irregular threats by more closely cooperating in areas such as civil and military preparedness and resilience and joint training and exercises.

[1] von Clausewitz, Carl (1989). Howard, Michael; Paret, Peter, eds. On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 593.

[2] Carpenter, Stanley D. M., Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651: The Genius of This Age, Routledge, 2005, p25.

[3] Matloff, Maurice, (ed.), American Military History: 1775-1902, volume 1, Combined Books, 1996, p 11.

[4] Wilden, Anthony, Man and Woman, War and Peace: The Strategist's Companion, Routledge, 1987, p 235.

[5] Hoffman, Frank (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 20–22.

[6] MORAIS, Tais de. SILVA, Eumano. Opera??o Araguaia: os arquivos secretos da guerrilha. S?o Paulo: Gera??o Editorial, 2005. 656p. ISBN 8575091190

[7] A particular method of working - Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2016

[8] Jasper, Scott; Moreland, Scott (2014-12-02). "The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does That Matter?". Small Wars Journal. Small Wars Foundation. Retrieved 2015-08-05.

[9] Fleming, Brian P. (2011-05-19). "Hybrid threat concept: contemporary war, military planning and the advent of unrestricted operational art." (pdf). United States Army Command and General Staff College. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved2015-08-05.

[10] Grant, Greg (2008-05-01). "Hybrid Wars". Government Executive. National Journal Group. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05.

[11] Source: MSC

[12] https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ACiteThisPage&page=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FHybrid_warfare.

[13] Pindják, Peter (2014-11-18). "Deterring hybrid warfare: a chance for NATO and the EU to work together?". NATO Review. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05.

[14] McCuen, John J. "Hybrid Wars". Military Review 88 (2): 107.

[15] Davis Jr, John R. “Como Derrotar as Amea?as Híbridas do Futuro: O Maior Desafio à Profiss?o Militar de 2020 e Além”. https://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/Portuguese/MilitaryReview_20131031_art008POR.pdf.

[16] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). ?

[17] Ryan, Alex J., “Interagency Collaboration by Design”, InterAgency Journal Vol. 3, Issue 3, Summer 2012, pp. 3

[18] "Sine Qua Non." “A description of a requisite or condition that is indispensable.” West's Encyclopedia of American Law. 2005. Encyclopedia.com. 2 May. 2016 <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

[19] Davis Jr, John R. “Como Derrotar as Amea?as Híbridas do Futuro: O Maior Desafio à Profiss?o Militar de 2020 e Além”. https://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/Portuguese/MilitaryReview_20131031_art008POR.pdf .

[20] Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Monograph (Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Students, 2007), 15

[21] ?Pawlak, Patryk, Posted By Members' Research Service ? June 24, 2015 at https://epthinktank.eu/2015/06/24/understanding-hybrid-threats/

[22] A particular method of working - Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2016

[23] https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ACiteThisPage&page=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FHybrid_warfare.

[24] Pindják, Peter (2014-11-18). "Deterring hybrid warfare: a chance for NATO and the EU to work together?". NATO Review. Archived from the original on 2015-08-05. Retrieved 2015-08-05.

Monteiro, Paulo Eduardo Ribeiro

Brazilian Army Retd Col, PhD

CEO S&T Defence Brazil