Intelligence in Law Enforcement: The Most Misunderstood Tool in the Toolbox.

Abstract?

As societal complexity continues to evolve conventional policing models struggle to keep pace. This article explores the transformative shift towards Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP), a strategic approach aiming to prevent and disrupt criminal activities. The 'crime funnel' concept vividly exposes the limitations of reactive policing models. Case studies of the New Zealand Police and Dutch Police shed light on the critical role of leadership, collaboration, and decentralized decision-making in successful ILP implementation. Ratcliffe's 4I Model and yardsticks provide a practical framework for adopting ILP. In a tech-driven era with sophisticated criminal networks, ILP stands out as a strategic imperative.

Faced with uncertainty, insecurity and dynamic elements of modern societies, social institutions including policing organisations are required to rapidly adapt to keep pace. The emergence and adoption of different philosophies, paradigms or models of how to respond to crime and disorder are central this adaption. Modern law enforcement endeavours not only to combat crime, but to proactively prevent future criminal activity. The genesis of criminality is rooted in a complex interplay of socioeconomic and environmental factors that extend beyond the traditional scope of law enforcement. Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) represents a transformative approach to help policing organisations overcome the limitations of the traditional law enforcement model. At its core ILP emphasizes a comprehensive, strategic, and collaborative approach to crime, involving multiple agencies and stakeholders working in unison to address the underlying causes of criminal behaviour. This article will explore ILP by first establishing the parameters of the traditional model of policing. It will then assess the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and various crime reduction tactics and strategies. Subsequently it will provide a comprehensive definition of ILP, followed by an assessment of organisational implementation using two case studies, ultimately culminating in a conclusive assessment of ILP’s impact and effectiveness on modern law enforcement.

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Since the 1970’s there has been a shift away from the traditional model of policing towards more proactive methods. Traditional models put emphasis on crime that has already occurred, mobilising resources based on requests from outside the organisation through uniformed rapid response, and focus on the particulars of a given criminal incident (Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). The unsystematic deployment of officers to arrest and detain, where probable cause exists, are also central to the traditional model (Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). In the 1970’s, the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment looked at the effectiveness of patrol strategies on crime prevention and public safety. The study used three experimental groups subjected to differing levels of patrol: the first to standard patrol, the second to significantly increased police patrol, and the third to significantly reduced patrol (Kelling et al., 1974). Results of the study were among the first to challenge conventional policing wisdom by demonstrating that the level of patrol activity[1] had little impact on crime rates (Kelling et al., 1974). Further foot patrol experiments by Kelling (1981) provided further evidence that saturation policing has no quantifiable impact on crime. These experiments highlighted a need to reconsider the tactics of traditional policing.

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Traditional policing remains dominant despite the strategies it entails failing to show a sustained reduction or prevention of crime (Eck & Weisburd, 2015). Cited tactics include preventative patrol, efforts to reduce response times, increased numbers of police officers, generalised follow-up investigations or undifferentiated intensive enforcement activities (Eck & Weisburd, 2015). Reactive tactics have been shown to have little or no impact on crime prevention and are void of the strategic vision essential for the achievement of long term objectives (James, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2016; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that within any policing organisation solving crime comprises a small component of policing output and there is a considerable service to the public aspect (Ratcliffe, 2016). To illustrate this Figure 1 (below) shows the demands on the Philadelphia Police Department by volume of incidents recorded in 2014. (Ratcliffe, 2016).

The criminal justice system is a central tenant of the traditional policing model and statistics associated with arrest and prosecution are often used to define policing success. Before evaluating ILP, it is important to establish a lifecycle of criminals who commit crime, are apprehended by police and enter the criminal justice system. Ratcliffe (2016) demonstrates this through the concept of a crime funnel shown in Figure 2 using statistics from national reporting mechanisms in England and Wales. The model uses a base of 1000 offences to demonstrate how they proceed through the criminal justice system. For every 1000 offences[2], 530 are reported to police[3], 429 are recorded, 99 are acted on, 60 cases appear in court, 50 of the 60 end in a guilty verdict, and only four will receive a custodial sentence (Ratcliffe, 2016). These figures are useful in demonstrating the limitations of relying on the criminal justice system as a blunt, unfocused tool to solve crime problems (Ratcliffe, 2016).

The crime funnel illustrates the challenge of effectively addressing and reducing crime through arrests. The justice system interjects too far down the crime funnel to have any measurable impact on the 1000 cases that enter at the top. Put simply, increased unsystematic detection, arrest and prosecution would significantly stress the justice system, require more public prosecutors and jail space, while not directly reducing crime (Ratcliffe, 2016). To be effective, interjections must take place higher up the funnel, ideally before offences enter the funnel. This is where prevention and crime reduction become important concepts. A blunt and unfocused use of the criminal justice system does not prevent and reduce crime, however, it can be utilised more effectively (Ratcliffe, 2016). For example, recidivist individuals commit a disproportionate percentage of criminal activity (Everson, 2003; Falk et al., 2014). Indeed Falk et al., (2014) determined that in Sweden 1% of the population was accountable for 63% of all violent crime convictions. In an ILP environment, the identification and targeting of those that commit a disproportionate volume of crime is a central strategy (Ratcliffe, 2016).

Crime exhibits discernible patterns and trends that when analysed provide valuable insights. Studies have shown that a small percentage of individuals and locations are responsible for a disproportionate amount of criminal activity (Bottoms & Wiles, 2002; Everson, 2003; Sherman, 1990; Wolfgang, 1973). For example, Wolfgang, (1973) followed 9,945 boys born in Philadelphia in 1945. Finding that 35% had at least one conviction between ages 10 and 18 years. Of the 35% with one conviction, about half were only one-time offenders and 18 per cent were chronic recidivists. The 627 chronic recidivists made up 6.3% of the entire study cohort, but committed 52% of all offences recorded against the study group (Wolfgang, 1973). Perhaps just as impactful and equally relevant to a proactive approach, is that a small percentage of victims also suffer a large proportion of offences (Everson, 2003; Falk et al., 2014; Gill, 2000). These studies show a body of evidence that supports the merits of targeting those that commit a disproportionality large proportion of crime, and a focus on victims who are repeatedly impacted.

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Further patterns that can inform a proactive response are observed in the spatial temporal relationship of residential burglaries. Upon being burgled, the same location has an increased risk of repeat victimisation for a period of time (Chaseling et al., 2003; Johnson & Bowers, 2004). Furthermore, locations with geographical proximity are at a heightened risk of being targeted for a limited number of weeks (Chaseling et al., 2003; Johnson & Bowers, 2004). Individuals and locations associated to gangs also experience heightened crime (Ratcliffe & Taniguchi, 2008), where gang members commit two-three times more crime than non-gang members (Esbensen & Huizinga, 1993). Moreover gang members are more likely to participate in substance abuse and violence (Harper & Robinson, 1999). The known geographic dispersion of criminal activity[4] can also be used as a rational indication of a larger ‘dark figure of criminality[5]’ (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2013). Exploiting patterns and trends in crime can provide insights that can enable police and other partners to develop more proactive approaches.

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Innovations and tactics to fight crime more effectively have developed in response to many of the trends and patterns noted in the preceding paragraphs. Weisburd and Majimundar (2018) find the strongest evidence for crime reduction through tactics that proactively priotitise geographical areas, such as hot spot policing. In 2009, Ratcliffe et al. (2011) conducted a study on the impacts of increased foot patrols on the level of reported violent crime. In contrast to the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment referenced earlier which measured unsystematic patrol, the 2009 study used spatial analysis to define 60 violent crime hotspots that were subjected to increased police presence (Ratcliffe et al., 2011). Ratcliffe et al’s results were promising with control sites seeing 23% more violent crime then target areas, a estimated net prevetion of 53 violent crimes[6]. Community policing, as the name emplies is found to reduce fear of crime in the community, but falls short of impacting crime and disorder (Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). However, a growing volume of literature evidence suggests the effectivness of Problem Oriented Policing (POP) in crime reduction and disorder (Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). For example, Ratcliffe (2016) notes a greater emphasis on problem-solving at the street level, where it is intended to operate. Additionally, it is increasingly being observed in approaches to transnational crime and national security. Increasing bodies of literature exist on the specific effetiveness of a broad range of tactics that is easily accessible to intelligence practicioners and decision makers alike[7].

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Research suggests there is little consensus among officers as to what are the most effective policing practices (Willis & Mastrofski, 2016). Unlike military environments where low or no rank soldiers are continuously supervised, police officers leave the academy and find themselves with significant responsibility and individual decision making flexibility in how they respond to and resolve incidents (Ratcliffe, 2021). This solitude coupled with a lack of direction and feedback results in officers developing individualised approaches (Ratcliffe, 2021). The art (or science) of intelligence is translating information about the criminal environment into intelligence that can be used to develop an operational strategy that enables the decision maker to utilise frontline resources in the most impactful manner. To enable this there needs to be overarching organisational methodology to facilitate informed decisions and mitigate individualised response based on what an individual commander or officer ‘considers’ as the most effective.?

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ILP is a paradigm shift and emerged in response to the ineffectiveness of the justice system, reactive models of policing, organisational pressure and an external environment that is more technologically advanced and interconnected. ILP (also referred to as proactive policing) is rooted on a set of ideas and principles that require police to operate strategically in order to achieve the primary goal of reducing crime (Gibbs et al., 2015; Maguire & John, 2006; Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). ILP should not be confused as a tactic. ILP is a business model that requires organisational leadership and management to operationalize a toolset of tactics (Huotari, 2014; Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). The primary target of these tactics is the underlying forces that are known to drive crime and disorder (Huotari, 2014; Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). Policing operating models are often a mix of tactics (reactive & proactive) that work to target criminals and the criminal environment, or develop relations with the public as is the case with community policing (Ratcliffe, 2016).

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A distinguishing features of ILP is that the business model is supported by the collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of actionable and timely criminal intelligence to assist decision makers (Ratcliffe, 2016). This criminal intelligence supports decision making within the policing hierarchy (Ratcliffe, 2016). For clarification, ILP does not disregard traditional policing tactics such as criminal informants and information gleaned from suspect interviews (Ratcliffe et al., 2014; Sanders et al., 2015). Conversely, ILP integrates this information with crime analysis and surveillance of national databases (Ratcliffe et al., 2014; Sanders et al., 2015). Criminal intelligence is a foundation that enables decisions makers to optimise resource allocation and tailor prevention strategies and tactics that prioritise crime reduction (Ratcliffe, 2016; Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). Ratcliffe (2016) states that law enforcement globally has been impacted to varying degrees by an increasingly sophisticated transnational criminal environment, accountability to the public, demand that contends with limited resourcing, and emerging threats to community safety. These implications have demanded a reorientation of policing to a model that is increasingly risk oriented to enable the effective and efficient use of resources (Gemke et al., 2021). In sum, increased information availability and technology have opened new opportunity for criminals, particularly transnational actors, while affording law enforcement an opportunity to harness the data and information to improve decision-making (Ratcliffe, 2016).

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The implementation of ILP is situationally unique. ILP fundamentally requires an entire reorientation of core business (Gemke et al., 2021). Maguire and John (2006) identify two requirements essential to ILP implementation. First, a framework of business processes that allow for the management of policing priorities of all types (Maguire & John, 2006). Second, interpretation and implementation of ILP should be broad enough to incorporate the perspectives of partner agencies and communities, as well as setting parameters for reactive, as well as proactive responses to crime (Maguire & John, 2006). Innovation is crucial for organisations undergoing a change in operating model (Mueller & Thomas, 2001; Rogers, 2003). Damanpour and Schneider (2006) define innovation as a change of practice or adaption that is undertaken with the intention of benefit or improvement. Research on innovation in the public sector suggests that it can be particularly challenging (Altshuler, 1997; Borins, 2001). Furthermore, these challenges are amplified in policing organisations (Ernst et al., 2021; Moore, 1992; Skogan, 1992). Innovation in ILP does not necessarily mean a business model where all practice is novel, it could include using POP in new and innovative ways (Matusiak & King, 2021). Depending on agency size and existing structures; personnel and expertise may be required to support the transition to ILP. Pre-existing working relationships with surrounding and external agencies may be advantageous (Carter et al., 2014).

In the following section I will draw on case studies of ILP adoption by The New Zealand Police (NZP) and the Dutch Police to draw out factors that enable or hinder the implementation of ILP. Darroch (2009) in his PhD thesis assessed the impact of organisational, enviro nmental and individual factors on ILP uptake and organisational innovation within the NZP. His findings conclude that the adoption of crime reduction as the principal organisation goal promoted a mindset within the organisation of seeking innovative solutions (Darroch, 2009). In subsequent research Darroch assessed organizational factors influencing innovation. Leadership was identified as the most important factor for innovation and ILP adoption (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013). Two leadership models were identified, with transformational leadership observed as critical to the uptake of innovation. Commanders of strong uptake sites were seen to inspire and motivate individual officers to support the ILP model (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013). Transactional leadership played a role in successful ILP uptake but only when used specifically in tasking initiatives related to ILP (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013).

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A subsequent 2015 analysis by the same researchers analysed how community context influenced innovation and ILP. The research concluded that strong uptake of ILP was associated with three primary factors: a healthy relationships with local government partners, officer perceptions of a manageable demand for their services and a stable operational environment that was not overly complex (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015). There is value in intertwining the last paragraph with an earlier statement from Ratcliffe (2021), which relates to officers developing idiosyncratic methods of policing during their earlier careers. ILP should make the role of front-line police officers less complex and more informed. However, it is essential that leaders at appropriate levels are educated on ILP so that they can impact the officers ‘doing the leg work’, particularly mid-level managers (Sergeant to Captain/Inspector) who are asked to lead crime and disorder initiatives (Ratcliffe, 2021; Sanders et al., 2015).

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Gemke et al., (2021) conducted a study to identify enablers present in the Dutch Police’s adoption of ILP. They found that multidisciplinary collaboration was identified as a fundamental enabler of ILP, however, organisational structure was found to either strongly hinder or facilitate multidisciplinary collaboration. Gemke et al. also highlighted the importance of decentralised decision making at lower levels, paired with a high formalisation of task and output measures related to the objective of preventing and disrupting crime (Gemke et al., 2021). This was said to encourage creativity, innovation, collaboration, certainty, trust, and enable a configuration which optimised intelligence supply and demand to drive more efficient resource use (Gemke et al., 2021).

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The 4I model developed by Ratcliffe (2016) outlined in Figure 3 illustrates conceptually a desired configuration of ILP. The model places importance on what Ratcliffe perceives as the key pillars of ILP, the criminal environment, criminal intelligence analysis and the decision maker. The intelligence unit interprets the criminal environment (as the arrow flows), subsequently using this intelligence to influence decision-makers who are then able to use the product to develop strategies that have a positive impact on the criminal environment. The ‘intent’ direction marker was amended to an early version of the model, known as the 3I. This amendment reflected a common failure of the decision maker to guide the analyst, and a failure of the analyst to understand the specific requirements or problem posed by the decision maker (Ratcliffe, 2016). Other common points of failure are a decision maker that does not understand intelligence or holds unreasonable expectations, an organisational structure that doesn’t allow for proactive intelligence led decision making, a failure of the analyst to understand how police command staff (and other clients) define success, and/or failure to sell the intelligence value, or influence the decision maker (Ratcliffe, 2016). The dissemination of quality intelligence products is fundamental to ILP (Carter, 2013). A functioning ILP environment implements strategies that places emphasis on the criminal intelligence available. Therefore, there needs to be a relationship between the disseminated intelligence and crime reduction tactics (Ratcliffe, 2016).

The most obvious yard stick for the evaluation of ILP would appear to be the objective of crime reduction. As observed the occurrence of crime is not entirely random (Bottoms & Wiles, 2002; Chaseling et al., 2003; Esbensen & Huizinga, 1993; Everson, 2003; Falk et al., 2014; Gill, 2000; Harper & Robinson, 1999; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Ratcliffe & Taniguchi, 2008; Sherman, 1990; Wolfgang, 1973) and there are tactics which have proven effective at preventing crime (Ratcliffe, 2016; Ratcliffe et al., 2011, p. 20; Weisburd & Majimundar, 2018). ILP itself does not directly prevent or reduce crime, it establishes at an organisational level a decision-making framework that enables the most effective mixture of tactics and strategies to impact the criminal environment. Influentially, the intelligence aspect provides decision makers with material about the criminal environment to enable the coherent use of resources and tactics to reduce crime.

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The mixture of criminogenic factors are mostly beyond the ability of the police to impact directly, therefore it is practical to pool resources with other agencies that have capacities and direct intervention ability (Ratcliffe, 2016). There is an ample body of research evidence to suggest that through partnership approaches with community partners that utilise innovative tactics, it is possible to have local impacts on crime (Reiner, 2000). It should be mentioned that relying on crime statistics can be an ineffective measure of ILP as it is well known that reported crime is a function of trust and confidence in the police, where more trust, often equates to more crime being reported, and vice versa (Weisburd & Eck, 2004).

Innovation is a major factor impacting the adoption and success of ILP. Innovation can be ?troublesome for policing organisations. Ratcliffe’s 2008 yardsticks (Figure 4) for an ILP environment can provide some context on how organisations can design measures to evaluate the effectiveness of innovation and ILP implementation. ILP is implemented in various forms by organisations upon their own interpretations within distinct pre-existing cultures, influenced by internal and external variables. Critically, ILP should enable policing to be conducted on a risk-based model that utilises intelligence to ensure informed and transparent decision making. This is crucial to a policing landscape that is increasingly impacted by societal expectations, rapid advancements in technology, criminal activities that transcend national borders, resource constraints, crisis response and accountability. The modern nature of policing requires a multifaceted and adaptive approach and ILP enables this by providing a proactive risk-based framework to target the underlying criminogenic factors. Each organisation will have a unique set of circumstances that dictate the shape, size and manifestation of ILP. Critical assessment is required to identify what changes and innovation are needed to optimise the use of information about crime to ensure a more impactful approach. For organisations who have an ILP operating model it should be seen as a process of continuous improvement.

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It is evident that ILP marks an important paradigmatic shift in modern law enforcement. Prioritising the analysis and management of the underlying criminogenic factors to disrupt the cycle of criminality is a stark departure from traditional models of policing. Through the strategic integration of criminal intelligence policing organisations are empowered to optimize resources and efforts, to prevent and disrupt criminal activity. The significance of the shift to an ILP model lies not only in the potential to optimise criminal intelligence, but to promote collaboration, innovation and a risk-based approach to policing. ILP offers a more holistic model to address criminality. One that enables organisations to adapt to the evolving landscape of modern society and the increasingly complex threats associated with a globalised world. The crime funnel illustrates the ineffectiveness of using the justice system as a blunt instrument and emphasises the importance of tactics that target certain individuals, or places that disproportionately commit or experience crime. More than this it emphasizes the role of? prevention and targeted interventions. Through leveraging data and technology policing organisations can optimize efforts to prevent and disrupt criminal activity. Case studies from the NZP and Dutch Police provide valuable insights into the enablers and challenges of implementing ILP and emphasize the importance of leadership, multidisciplinary collaboration and decentralized decision-making. As the policing landscape continues to evolve, embracing ILP emerges as a strategic advantage to ensure safety and security in the face of an ever-changing world.

[1] Note. The patrols conducted were not systematic and targeted, they were ‘routine’

[2] To understand a large criminal justice system, such as exists in most countries, some latitude is necessary when interpreting the crime funnel. As just one example of its limitations, the funnel omits many crime types. Corporate crime, sex offences, organised crime, and drug and prostitution offences are rarely recorded in surveys.

[3] 470 therefore go under detected, representing a dark figure of criminality.

[4] Noting that the number of crime reported to police is a relatively small proportion of actual crime (as we saw in the crime funnel).

[5] The dark figure is a term used to describe the gap between actual crime and crimes known/and or reported to police (Mosher et al., 2002).

[6] This figure accounts for possible displacement.

[7] https://popcenter.asu.edu/ & https://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/

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