Intelligence Failures in Countering Terrorism

Intelligence Failures in Countering Terrorism

By Ludovica Mattioli?

Introduction?

Terrorism is a very challenging political problem whose study is often controversial. The conceptual and empirical requirements for defining, classifying, explaining, and responding to terrorist attacks are more complex than usually recognized by policymakers and academics, complicating the intention to formulate an effective counterterrorism policy. Intelligence is a defensive means of counterterrorism and is the tool the state uses to collect, store and disseminate to stakeholders, whether public or private, information relevant to protecting the security of institutions and citizens. In recent years, intelligence agencies have taken on a distinct role in counter-terrorism efforts,? employing strategies to combat and prevent acts of terrorism, which are defined as violent actions driven by political or religious motives. Therefore, a counter-terrorism strategy is a comprehensive governmental approach employing national resources and tools to eliminate terrorists and dismantle their organizations and networks. Its ultimate goal is to render them incapable of using violence to generate fear among civilians and compel governments to comply with their demands and goals.?

Intelligence agencies are government-led organizations that function covertly and aim to protect the national interest and ensure the security of a nation. However, the work of intelligence and security services is not indisputable. The intelligence process is frequently prone to errors, exposing the systems in which intelligence agencies operate to various risks, including failures and unexpected strategic events. Despite intelligence agencies' exceptional professionalism and competence and the resources available to a country, the information they generate is not always comprehensive enough to accurately forecast and prevent an attack. For the intelligence community to thrive, it is crucial to furnish information that prompts decision-makers to take appropriate actions based on actionable intelligence. This clarifies why achieving intelligence successes is more challenging compared to failures, as the latter can arise from malfunctions at any point in the process,? whereas successes rely on the effectiveness of both analysts and decision-makers.1?

1 Dahl, Erik J. 2013. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond.? Georgetown University Pre, s.?

The intelligence cycle serves as a crucial analytical and theoretical framework to comprehend a significantly complex endeavor's intricate operations. The intelligence cycle encompasses five distinct phases. It begins with developing an appropriate intelligence plan to determine the specific areas to be monitored and analyzed. Subsequently, various techniques,? including human intelligence (HUMINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), are employed to acquire raw information. The collected data then undergoes processing and refinement, followed by analysis. This analysis and production phase involves translating the processed information into a comprehensive intelligence product, involving the study, classification, and evaluation of all gathered data. Lastly, the dissemination stage marks the final step, where the analysis results are delivered to higher-level authorities.?

The 9/11 attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington and the attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, have been recognized as major intelligence failures in history, influencing the practices of intelligence agencies worldwide and shaping the study of security in the realm of international relations. Despite being a global power in economics, politics, and military strength, The United States of America has experienced vulnerabilities in the intelligence field. Even as the victor in the two World Wars and the Cold War, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, the country has faced significant attacks from external enemies. What? makes these attacks particularly striking is that they occurred on American soil without being effectively intercepted by the nation’s security agencies. On the other hand, the jihadist movement carried out the deadliest terrorist attacks in Europe in over a decade during the 2015 November attacks in Paris. These attacks revealed a significant intelligence failure on the part of the French intelligence services, which can be attributed to their inability to properly analyze the information shared by other countries and effectively coordinate their efforts based on that intelligence.?

There is no universally agreed-upon definition of “terrorism” at the international level due to disagreements among states and other actors within the international community regarding its characteristics and nature. Since terrorism takes various forms and employs political violence to achieve diverse objectives, the aim of this paper is to explain instances when intelligence systems fall short in their efforts to effectively countering terrorism. In the initial section,? I will examine how malfunctions in the intelligence process can lead to intelligence failures,? elucidating the reasons behind the inability of security systems to anticipate and thwart terrorist attacks. Then, two prominent case studies in the Western world will be analyzed from a historical perspective, analyzing facts, causes, and consequences, explaining why they represent intelligence failures: the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, as well as the November 13, 2015? attacks in France. In the conclusion, the paper will endeavor to address whether the 9/11 and Paris terrorist attacks could have been averted. Through an in-depth analysis of the two case studies, I will highlight the specific points and levels at which intelligence systems faltered.

Intelligence Failures?

There is often a lack of consensus among security scholars regarding the concept of intelligence failure, and there is no universally agreed definition in the literature despite the significance of national security and the extensive attention given to intelligence work by States. Some scholars believe that an intelligence failure occurs when intelligence agencies fail, and others argue that it should be attributed to the decision-maker’s inability to predict an event. Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky define an intelligence failure as a misinterpretation of a situation leading a government to take inappropriate and counterproductive actions in their interests. 2 On the other hand, Mark? Lowenthal suggests that an intelligence failure refers to the intelligence agencies’ incapacity to provide accurate or timely information and analysis on a matter of national concern.3?

The intelligence cycle is a process prone to recurring risks and errors. However, there are specific reasons that can contribute to intelligence failures, as identified by Mark Lowenthal.4 Overestimation is a common cause of failure where an error is perpetuated over a long period of time if not corrected, as demonstrated during the Cold War era when the United States consistently overestimated the “missile gap” with the Soviet Union. Instead, underestimation occurs when the intelligence fails to heed warnings or misinterprets the intentions of an enemy. The underestimation often leads to the distrust of foreign intelligence. The 1941 situation could be an example where Stalin disregarded warnings from British and American intelligence agencies about the possibility of Hitler invading Russia. The lack of communication could also contribute to intelligence failures. Problems may arise when there is no centralized office or when different operators from various agencies with different roles and communication protocols are involved. Moreover, the subordination of intelligence to politics is a widely discussed and analyzed type of failure. It happens when intelligence reports are manipulated to align with decision-makers’ expectations instead of being based on objective data analysis. For instance, the 9/11 attacks are believed to have been influenced by non-intervention policies towards Saudi Arabia, potentially affecting intelligence regarding the? Saudi hijackers. Lastly, as stated by Mark Lowenthal, another reason contributing to intelligence failures is the inability to connect the dots. This occurs when intelligence fragments are not adequately integrated to form a coherent picture, as happened in the case of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.??

2 Shulsky, Abram, and Gary Schmitt. 2002. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. Brassey’s Publisher. 3 Lowenthal, Mark M. 2003. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. C Q Press College.?

4 Ibid.

Intelligence failures, which have been observed in various historical instances and government bodies, stem from common causes. Erik Dahl asserts that analysts and decision-makers are responsible for these failures, as they can occur when intelligence agencies fail to provide the necessary information or when decision-makers cannot appropriately act upon the received information. Dahl categorizes the main theories explaining intelligence failures into three different schools of thought.5 The traditional school comprises theories that argue intelligence failures are inherent and, to some extent, unavoidable. These failures can arise during the analysis phase due to inherent cognitive limitations that cannot be completely eradicated. They can also occur during the dissemination phase, where decision-makers may fail to properly interpret or act upon the received information. On the other hand, according to the proponents of the reformist school, intelligence failures are primarily a result of organizational limitations that can be addressed through targeted bureaucratic reforms. In fact, they contend that inefficiencies in intelligence stem from inadequate coordination among different agencies and a need for more lack of information sharing between various departments. Finally, the contrary school asserts that the primary causes of major intelligence failures lie in the information collection phase of the intelligence process. Scholars adhering to this perspective argue that in instances of intelligence failures, there was a lack of appropriate information that could have served as an early warning system.6 Dahl concludes that the most objective approach to studying intelligence failures is by comparing them to instances of success. However, this task is often challenging since secret services and intelligence agencies typically do not publicly disclose successful intelligence operations to safeguard operational secrecy, sources, and methods.??

The 9/11 Attacks?

The September 11, 2001 attacks involved a series of synchronized suicide attacks conducted by some members of Al-Qaeda on civilian and military targets in the United States. These attacks are widely regarded as the most significant acts of terrorism in contemporary history and a profound failure of? US intelligence due to their immense impact, the large number of victims, and the dramatic nature of the events. On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes operated by major US airlines. These hijacked planes were deliberately flown into various civil and military structures. In 1 hour and 42 minutes, the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City collapsed, resulting in subsequent damage and the collapse of other buildings within the complex. Additionally, another plane crashed into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the US Department of Defense, causing the collapse of a section of the building’s West facade. Following the attacks, American security agencies promptly attributed the responsibility to Al-Qaeda and identified Osama Bin Laden as the mandator behind them. The primary motive for these attacks was believed to be the United States' support for Israel.??

5 Dahl, Erik J. 2013. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond.? Georgetown University Press.?

6 Ibid.?

The 9/11 attacks represent a significant intelligence failure of our time, given their nature and the profound impact they had on American and global public opinion and the short-term and long-term consequences they generated. Despite previous Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden attributed attacks on US targets abroad, most Americans were unaware of the magnitude of the threat facing their country. The coordinated crashing of three hijacked planes into separate buildings simultaneously left people astounded, questioning how such a remarkable feat could be accomplished by a small group of individuals. As a result, to investigate these events, President George W. Bush? established the “9/11 Commission.”7 The Commission’s final report recognized the challenges of assessing the performance of the numerous intelligence community agencies involved and emphasized a widespread failure to fully grasp the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. This failure was attributed to various levels and sectors of US politics, diplomacy, and intelligence, indicating a general underestimation of the danger posed by the terrorist organization.8?

The examination of failures to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks can be approached from four different viewpoints.9 Firstly, the failure to acknowledge the threat of terrorism was influenced by cognitive bias among intelligence analysts and policymakers, as terrorism was not considered a top priority of national interests, resulting in a limited allocation of resources to the counter-terrorism department. In fact, analysts overlooked the fact that Al-Qaeda possessed both the intention and capability to carry out significant attacks in the United States. Consequently, conditioned by this bias, the CIA and FBI concentrated their efforts on potential attacks outside the country rather than within its borders. Secondly, the organizational dysfunctions within the CIA and FBI played a? significant role in the lack of early warning regarding the attacks. The failure to provide tactical warnings was partially attributed to the lack of response from the intelligence community to the strategic alarm, resulting in inadequate improvements in information collection, analysis, and action-taking capabilities. Additionally, despite the heightened level of strategic alarm surrounding it, certain institutions did not prioritize counterterrorism as a core mission.10?

7 Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National ?Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report)”. Government. National Commission on Terrorist ?Attacks Upon the United States, July 22, 2004. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-911REPORT 8 Ibid.?

9 Byman, Daniel. 2005. “Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks.” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (1):? 145-70. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104927

Political and strategic errors can be attributed to the emphasis placed on Al-Qaeda as an emerging terrorist threat resulting from necessary political constraints and trade-offs in foreign policy.? These mistakes arose due to counter-terrorism not being a prioritized concern for the United States during that period. Lastly, Terrorist organizations are often considered challenging adversaries by intelligence communities due to their elusive members and unpredictable tactics, employing unconventional methods of warfare. In particular, Al-Qaeda was notable for its well-structured organization and global reach. The United States government and intelligence community lacked a? comprehensive strategy at that time to effectively address the capabilities of these terrorists.11

Therefore, the intelligence failure that led to the 9/11 attacks can be attributed to several causes. These include the underestimation of the risk posed by the terrorists, a lack of effective communication between different intelligence agencies and security departments, the failure to connect important pieces of information, and the tendency to prioritize political considerations over intelligence.? However, it is evident that numerous mistakes were made at all levels of the US government and within the broader US intelligence community, ultimately increasing the likelihood of the strategic surprise of the 9/11 attacks.?

The Paris Attacks of November 13?

The Paris attacks that occurred on November 13, 2015, were the most significant terrorist attack in the European Union since the Madrid train attacks on March 11, 2004. A group of nine individuals associated with an ISIS cell in Europe carried out a series of coordinated assaults on three civilian targets. The terrorists had connections to the Verviers cell in Belgium and were led by Abdelhamid? Abaaoud, a Belgian of Moroccan descent, who is believed to have been the main planner and leader of the attacks. Most of the attackers were young individuals born and raised in? France and Belgium. Additionally, many of the assailants had previously fought as militants for ISIS? in Syria and had managed to return to Europe covertly amidst the wave of migration that began in 2014.12 The attackers formed three groups and launched almost simultaneous attacks at the Stade de? France, various bars and restaurants in the 10th and 11th arrondissements, and the Bataclan theater. The attacks resulted in a total of 130 fatalities from 26 different countries, and 368 people were wounded. The day after the attacks, ISIS claimed responsibility for them, using their official Twitter account, motivated by a desire to retaliate against France’s airstrikes on ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq,? as well as to protest against President Hollande’s foreign policy, which was perceived as harmful to Muslims worldwide.?

10 Byman, Daniel. 2005. “Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks.” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (1):? 145-70. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104927?

11 Ibid.

The November 13, 2015, Paris attacks cannot be considered an isolated case, rather, they highlight significant failures in intelligence by French and European secret services. These failures have led analysts to reassess the intelligence model in response to the new and evolving threat they are confronted with. These attacks constitute an intelligence failure for different reasons. The first reason was the failure to detect and prioritize threats. In fact, one of the most prevalent mistakes is the failure to assign to treat a high priority within the spectrum of high-risk threats, and it often occurs due to the focus on known threats, which can prevent the recognition of new ones. Additionally, a threat may be acknowledged as potential but not assessed as imminent or capable of causing a significant impact.??

In the case of the Paris attacks, both of these dynamics were evident, as some of the attackers were already known to authorities, while others had not been identified as potential threats.13 After the threat is recognized, it is crucial to establish ongoing and efficient surveillance. Despite having prior knowledge, the surveillance of individuals considered potential threats in the Paris attacks was unsuccessful. Two of the suicide bombers at Bataclan and the leader, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, were previously monitored by French intelligence services between 2010 and 2012. Despite their known status, these individuals evaded surveillance and freely traveled between Europe and Syria.? As a result, the authorities were unable to track them within Belgium or France, preventing the security services from raising their alert levels and potentially preventing the attacks. Furthermore,? Turkey reportedly informed Paris twice, in 2014 and 2015, about the presence of these terrorists on their territory but did not receive any response.14?

12 Henley, Jon, Ian Traynor, and Warren Murray. 2015. “Paris Attacks: EU in Emergency Talks on Border Crackdown.”? the Guardian, November 20, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/paris-attacks-france-launches-un push-for-unified-declaration-of-war-on-isis.?

13 Camilli, Edoardo. 2015. “The Paris attacks. A case of intelligence failure?”. NATO Review Magazine. 14 Moran, Lee. 2015. “Turkey Says It Warned France Twice About Paris Attacker.” The Huffington Post, November 16,? 2015.

Moreover, these attacks underscored the issue of information sharing among European Union countries and NATO members. While the French and Belgian security services may bear responsibility for losing track of their suspected terrorists, other European nations that encountered these suspects crossing their border should assume their share of accountability. Sharing information is crucial, especially within the Schengen Zone, where individuals can freely travel across the continent. In practice, this means that individuals identified as suspects should have been closely monitored in Syria and upon returning to Europe. This necessitates the sharing of a list of suspected extremists among EU countries, enabling partner nations to be vigilant and report relevant information about these suspects. The intelligence failure between France and Turkey is particularly surprising, as the two NATO allies have a history of sharing intelligence in military cooperation.??

The occurrence of any terrorist attack represents a failure on the part of the government agencies responsible for safeguarding the residents of that particular state.15 Specifically, the Paris attacks revealed an intelligence failure by the French intelligence services, as they did not sufficiently analyze and coordinate the information shared by other countries. Despite alerts from Germany, Turkey, and Belgium regarding suspicious individuals, the French services overlooked crucial information provided by the Turkish authorities about one of the Bataclan attackers, Omar Ismail Mostefai. If the French authorities had thoroughly examined all the available information, they could have predicted the occurrence of the November 13 attacks. While the rise in Islamic attacks throughout the yea made terrorist attacks in France foreseeable, the nature of the chosen targets and the complexity and coordination of the attacks exceeded all expectations. However, there was a noteworthy success for the intelligence services on November 17, when the French Police conducted a raid in the Saint-Denis neighborhood, eliminating the attackers and preventing a new attack at La Défense, arresting eight suspected militants.??

15 Holman, Timothy. 2015. “Paris: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure to Understand the Limits of Intelligence?” Royal? United Services Institute, December 14, 2015.

Conclusion?

Terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be circumscribed within a nation's borders. The internationality that characterizes it has been the subject of challenge and study by states, intelligence agencies and international organizations, which over time have committed themselves to finding the most appropriate measures to combat this phenomenon. Drawing from the analysis of the two case studies undertaken in this thesis, it is evident that both the 9/11 attacks and the events of November? 13 in Paris witnessed intelligence failures across multiple levels. These failures shed light on shortcomings within the intelligence framework, specifically in terms of its capacity to forecast and prevent such attacks. Assuming the accuracy of the gathered information pertaining to the attacks and the generation of actionable intelligence by intelligence agencies, certain errors were apparent within the planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle. This was primarily due to a failure to prioritize the terrorism threat. Additionally, shortcomings were observed in the dissemination phase,?as the produced intelligence did not adequately emphasize the ongoing danger nor sufficiently acknowledge the imminent nature of the attacks. However, it is crucial to recognize that an intelligence failure occurs not only when the intelligence system falters, but also when, despite receiving excellent actionable intelligence, political decision-makers either take no action or respond insufficiently based on the information they received.??

Intelligence failures, though causing profound shock to a nation in terms of national pride and loss of life in the aftermath of attacks, present an opportunity to restructure the bureaucratic apparatus and reassess the security models. In order to mitigate the risks of future intelligence failures in countering terrorism, enhancing the overall effectiveness of national intelligence agencies and fostering improved communication and coordination among them at the macro level is imperative. To conclude,? considering the global environment in which states and intelligence agencies operate is crucial. To avert future strategic surprises, terrorist attacks, and threats, collaboration among agencies from different countries is paramount. This cooperation should encompass both bilateral relationships and institutional frameworks such as the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations against the common adversary of terrorism. Establishing intelligence systems and agencies within these institutional frameworks could serve as a promising foundation for coordinating the endeavors of member states in combating terrorism.?

Disclaimer: The statements attached to this article are the author's own and do not reflect those of the Global CT Institute.

Bibliography?

Archick, Kristin. 2014. “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism.” Congressional Research Service,? December 1, 2014.?

Argomaniz, Javier, Oldrich Bures, and Christian Kaunert. 2014. “A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism? and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment.” Intelligence and National Security 30, no. 2–3 (December? 23, 2014): 191–206. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.988445.?

Byman, Daniel. 2005. “Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks.” Annual Review of Political? Science 8 (1): 145-70. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104927?

Camilli, Edoardo. 2015. “The Paris attacks. A case of intelligence failure?”. NATO Review? Magazine.?

Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final ?Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report)”. ?Government. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 22,? 2004. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-911REPORT?

Dahl, Erik J. 2013. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11? and Beyond. Georgetown University Press.??

Derencinovic, Davor, and Anna-Maria Getos. 2008. “Cooperation of Law Enforcement and? Intelligence Agencies in Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism.” Revue Internationale de Droit? Pénal Vol. 78, no. 1 (February 25, 2008): 79–112. https://doi.org/10.3917/ridp.781.0079.?

Henley, Jon, Ian Traynor, and Warren Murray. 2015. “Paris Attacks: EU in Emergency Talks on? Border Crackdown.” the Guardian, November 20, 2015.? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/paris-attacks-france-launches-un-push-for-unified declaration-of-war-on-isis.?

Holman, Timothy. 2015. “Paris: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure to Understand the Limits of? Intelligence?” Royal United Services Institute, December 14, 2015.

Lowenthal, Mark M. 2003. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. C Q Press College.?

Moran, Lee. 2015. “Turkey Says It Warned France Twice About Paris Attacker.” The Huffington Post,? November 16, 2015.?

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/turkey-warned-france-twice_n_5649c5ebe4b060377349be9c?

Shulsky, Abram, and Gary Schmitt. 2002. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence.? Brassey’s Publisher.?