Integration of tri-services is need of the hour

On December 16, the country will be celebrating the 47th anniversary of Vijay Diwas to mark the stupendous victory of our armed forces over Pakistan in 1971, leading to creation of Bangladesh. This victory was achieved due to the gallant officers and men of Indian tri-services who forced the enemy to bite the dust. One such name is of former Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), who participated in the IAF 'counter-air campaign' that repeatedly targeted Pakistani air bases with accurate aerial attacks and inflicted heavy attrition on Pakistan Air Force. In an exclusive interaction with SHASHWAT GUPTA RAY & NIBEDITA SEN, the former Navy chief shares his memories of the war, the changing nature of combat and his concerns regarding the quality of leadership in the armed forces.

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Admiral Arun Prakash is a specialised Navy fighter pilot, who flew from the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant in 1968. In the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, Admiral (then Lieutenant) Prakash flew Hawker Hunter aircraft for the 20th Squadron Lightnings. For his gallantry in air action over West Pakistan, he was awarded with the Vir Chakra (VrC).

"I was a young Lieutenant, relatively inexperienced and I played a very minor role during 1971 Liberation war. But I was very fortunate as few months before the war started, I was sent on deputation from Navy to the Air Force. Little realising how events would turn out in 1970, I left INS Vikrant where I was learning how operate from the aircraft carrier. I was posted to 20 Squadron, which was one of the frontline IAF squadrons," narrated Adm Prakash.

Sharing his war memories he continued by saying, "My squadron commander Wing Commander Cecil Parker was worried that if war broke out we would be falling prey to Pakistani bombers because, in 1965, our air base (Pathankot, which was just 12 miles away from the international border) had been targeted and many aircraft destroyed on the ground, by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). In late November 1971, as a precautionary measure, our squadron moved to Ambala and then to Hindon near Delhi)."

"By now, the war clouds were building up, and we were watching things happening in East Pakistan. In the evening of 3 December 1971 around 5:30 pm the PAF carried out 'pre-emptive attacks' on 8-9 Indian Air Force bases. The then incumbent prime minister Indira Gandhi addressed the nation through radio and declared that the nation was at war. At about 4 am, all our aircraft took off from Hindon, and headed back to Pathankot. There was dense fog all over Punjab and North India. Our commanding officers gave us the targets, as soon as we landed in Pathankot" he described.

Speaking about India's preparations he mentioned, "We had been practicing for quite a few months. We knew the likely targets, the airbases, radar stations, ammunition dumps in Pakistan. We had intelligence, photographs etc."

DEMOLISHING CHAKLALA BASE:

"On the first mission, on December 4, 1971, myself and my fellow officer were assigned the responsibility of attacking Pakistani Air Force base called Chaklala, near Rawalpindi. As we took off and crossed the border, we found the dense fog was continuing. We had to fly at 500 ft above ground level to avoid radar detection but as we pulled up to 2000 ft before attack, we couldn't see much, the runway was covered with fog. Then we came down and found the tail of a large aircraft hidden in a mango grove near a hangar. We went and fired on it and smoke started coming out. As we were pulling out of the dive we saw few more small aircrafts lined up and attacked them also. We finished our ammunition and came back. At that point we didn't know what we had attacked. But later on it was revealed that there was a Hercules transport aircraft hidden which was attacked," Adm Arun Prakash (Retd) said. 

"We also learnt that an aircraft belonging to the US Military attache had been destroyed".

"In subsequent days from December 3 -16, we attacked around eight Pakistani Air Force bases and Pak troops in Chhamb sector and our Squadron in totality managed to inflict pretty heavy damage on Pakistan. We destroyed the aircrafts, oil dumps, refineries, radar stations, troops and tanks" he said.

Two of his Squadron pilots were shot down over Pakistan territory. His Squadron commander came back from mission with bullet holes in his aircraft and earned a Maha Vir Chakra..

INTEGRATED APPROACH HELPED:

The coordination and integrated approach by chiefs of all the three services was the key to India's victory in 1971.

He said, "Fortunately, the three chiefs, at that juncture, had a good understanding with each other, and due to coordinated planning, everything worked out well. Regrettably, we have rarely been able to replicate the 1971 synergy."

NO INTEGRATION NOW:

"The nature of combat has changed tremendously from 1971, which was a purely conventional war. Now we have fifth generation warfare, where nuclear warfare is a possibility. But the armed forces have not adapted themselves because successive governments have failed to integrate the armed forces with the MoD and with each other - for want of resolve - and is a major shortcoming. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) should have been created long, long ago. He would have been the single point of contact between the three armed forces and source of cohesive advice to the government and vice versa," he said.

According to him, even though the political leadership is indifferent regarding appointment of CDS, there is much that the armed forces can do internally without seeking help from the government; but unfortunately the three Services don't agree with each other (this is an universal problem that can only be resolved through political intervention/wisdom). 

"One or the other of the three services don't agree with this integration. Unfortunately it is the Air Force that feels most threatened by integration. Since both the Army and Navy have aviation wings, the IAF feels that if put under a single commander, possibly their role will be diluted," he said.

Traditionally it is for the political leadership to have the foresight to understand that if the armed forces don't have integrated approach the country’s security would suffer. He can push it through, even against the wishes of the armed forces. It has happened in USA, UK, China. Unfortunately that is not happening in India.

"The three service chiefs need to sit together and discuss amongst themselves how the integration can be done at their level. However, it must be remembered that when the services integrate with each other, and adopt the 'Theatre Command' system the operational command functions will be taken away from the three chiefs. That is possibly a factor for not favouring any change" he said. 

LEADERSHIP QUALITY:

"Perhaps we are not providing the right inputs to our budding officer material, during basic training, and this tends to manifest itself 20-30 years later, at the higher levels of leadership. We need to introspect about the system of training being followed in our academies where young men and women are moulded. If we are not producing good leaders after three to four years of training then there is some problem with our system. This is exactly what Col Vinay Dalvi (Retd) from Pune has been campaigning in his four volumes of 'Victory India' book series," he said.

"We need to relook at our system of selection and training and identify what is going wrong. Unfortunately though this issue has been noted by many senior Service officers, but to my knowledge nothing has really moved forward. This will require an overhaul of the full system. While we ensure physical qualities like stamina and, physical fitness, we need to mould the boys and girls intellectually as moral, upright and ethical individuals. We need to strike a new balance," he said.

"The ethics part has been forgotten and young boys and girls whom we pick up from schools and colleges, go to the academies and unfortunately indulge in stealing, physical abuse of cadets, lying, impersonation, cheating in examination which have become acceptable traits. This is because of the belief that young officer who has to fight terrorists, some of these traits are acceptable but are actually unacceptable. The ethical moorings must not be allowed to get eroded," he said.

REFORMS AT NDA:

Being a former Commandant of the prestigious tri-services military training institution the National Defence Academy (NDA), Adm Prakash emphasised on the need to begin reforms starting with the NDA, which is the apex institution meant for converting young boys into future officers.

"NDA is one of the finest academies in the world, but unfortunately we have allowed the environment to degenerate over the years and hence we are producing officers with certain flaws which erode their moral fibre in later years. This trend must be nipped in the bud," he said.