The Integrated Review Refresh & Air Superiority

As the UK Government refreshes its Integrated Review and updates its Defence Command Paper, the Royal United Services Institute last week published a report on how NATO air forces can regenerate warfighting and deterrence capabilities including drawing upon lessons from the conflict in Ukraine.

The report identifies that ‘almost all European air forces, including the RAF, currently lack many of the critical capabilities required to credibly be able to gain and exploit air superiority against Russian forces, or indeed any state opponent with modern ground-based air defence systems and long-range strike capabilities’. Whilst a debate is ongoing about whether allies should accept the need to operate without air superiority – and some “reversionary” means of operation may always be required – the report is clear that ‘if NATO’s European air forces cannot credibly gain and exploit control of the air… then they are not fit for purpose’.

One of the critical capabilities for achieving air superiority is the capacity to conduct Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (more commonly known as ‘SEAD/DEAD’) at scale. The report says that this is the ‘the key warfighting bottleneck standing in the way of generating sustainable European deterrence credibility against Russia (or other regional near-peer threats like Iran)... Fixing this deficiency should, therefore, be seen as a matter of urgent priority’.

The foundations for SEAD/DEAD exist. The report highlights that ‘the F-35 was designed specifically to be able to operate against modern SAM [Surface-to-Air Missile] systems in both the penetrating strike and SEAD/DEAD roles’, including the ability of the F-35’s sensor suite to enable the targeting of weapons and to deliver Electronic Warfare effects. It also highlights some air-launched weapons that are suited to suppression and destruction tasks, as well as the potential for a multi-domain approach to the Destruction of Enemy Air Defences by integrating the F-35 with ground-based long range precision fires such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) systems (with appropriate warheads).

In the run-up to the Integrated Review and Defence Commander Paper in March 2021, Lockheed Martin recommended that the UK should focus on fielding credible Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defence capabilities – if not develop a specific strategy in this area. I believe there is still an opportunity for the UK to take a leading role in this area within NATO, but doing so will require important choices to be made.

Firstly, larger numbers of aircraft suitable for Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences will need to be fielded, such as the F-35. As RUSI notes, this may mean choosing to disinvest in other areas in order to generate financial headroom and capacity.

Secondly, larger numbers of suitable air-launched munitions will need to be fielded to attrite multi-layered integrated air defence systems. These weapons will need to have the necessary survivability, lethality, and autonomous attributes, as well as a higher probabilities of hit-to-kill. The UK’s industrial base could face challenges in developing weapons systems with these characteristics. The systems have high development costs, which could in turn impact stockpile numbers, as well as long development timescales. Moreover, the UK’s focus on ‘Commonality, Modularity, and Re-use’ for weapons has limited novel concepts. Is now therefore the time for the UK to review its approach to Complex Weapons? Collaborating with the U.S. could enable reduced development costs, larger stockpiles, lower risk, earlier transition to new capabilities, better interoperability, and inclusion of UK companies in larger programmes of record.

Finally, should Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences be a test case for Multi-Domain Integration? Whilst RUSI notes that a greater reliance on land-based fire power could be more challenging and costly than regenerating NATO air forces, a balance of capabilities across domains may provide redundancy and more options. The British Army is refocusing on its Deep Fires capabilities and has the opportunity to take more of a role, collaborating with allies in the spiral development of systems such as GMLRS and the Precision Strike Missile. A key lesson is that early involvement in collaborative programmes brings greater capability, industrial, and prosperity benefits.

RUSI’s report concludes that ‘not every air force in NATO needs to specialise in SEAD/DEAD to unlock the problem set of how to regenerate a viable and credible airpower posture to deter Russian military aggression in the medium term. However…it is not a discretionary requirement for at least some of Europe’s air forces to step up to the task’. The UK has an opportunity to take a lead role in SEAD/DEAD.