Institutional Power, Acemoglu, et al., and Bangladeshi Political Reformation

At the primary level, we were taught that people from cold climates are more industrious, while those from hot-humid regions are inherently indolent. This doctrine originated from Montesquieu's renowned 1748 work, "The Spirit of Laws," where he posited that individuals residing in temperate climate zones are economically more productive than those in tropical regions. However, this year's Nobel laureates in Economics - Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson - have decisively challenged this notion, demonstrating that neither geographical nor cultural factors, but rather 'robust institutional frameworks' or 'institutions' are the primary determinants and regulators of developed nations and, by extension, advanced societies.

What are institutions? We often hear in political discourse (now in the context of Bangladesh) that our institutions have been destroyed. Which institutions have been demolished? Fundamentally, our institutions are built around family, society, and state, and these institutions have deteriorated at each level. Various state policies influence familial institutions, just as familial values or their degradation gradually impact various social and state institutions. Holistically, any institution defines human-social qualities and character in light of various formal/informal education and philosophies. In other words, any institution determines people's characteristics (human, social, cultural), a process that is typically long-term (a century or more).

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's argument primarily posits that when European settlers established colonies worldwide, two types of policies governed their colonial establishment (especially in institution building): (1) In regions where European settler mortality rates were low, such as North America, Australia, New Zealand, etc., they adopted policies aimed at building sustainable institutions. Property rights, resource distribution, private investment, democracy, etc., formed the foundation of these sustainable policies. On the other hand, (2) in areas where European settler mortality rates were high, such as many parts of Africa, South Asia, Latin America, etc., they primarily adopted "extractive policies." In these regions, due to lower immunity to diseases like malaria, yellow fever, and various other ailments, European settler mortality rates were high (in some places, over 91%). Consequently, they did not consider permanent settlement in these places in the same sense; they adopted policies keeping only the idea of plunder (resource extraction) in mind. In the policies of these regions, aspects like individual ownership of property, voting rights, etc., were virtually nonexistent.

The centuries-old forms of sustainable and extractive institutions continue to influence the policies of various nations in subsequent periods. It is observed that a developed and wealthy nation emerges due to some sustainable institutions from a hundred years ago. Good governance, democratic systems, and inclusive policies are why developed countries have much higher per capita income, fewer poor people, and improved living standards. Conversely, many developed and wealthy regions have become poorer due to the century-old policies of extractive institutions. Exploitative policies have helped European settlers advance their business interests. Many resources have been plundered from numerous regions in Africa and Asia.

However, another crucial point is that when settlers left after building extractive institutions or when a country in these regions gained independence, these countries continued to govern based on those policies/ideologies left by European settlers even a century after independence. Even looking at Bangladesh, we see that many of our laws are essentially some "extractive institutional ideologies." Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson further state that since the foundation of these so-called independent states is based on some extractive institutions, many privileged political predatory groups have formed based on these, whose main foundation is that same -- "resource extraction." If someone has a resource extraction policy while monopolizing power, can any person resist that opportunity (read: temptation)?

Do we find a few similarities?

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Therefore, the depth to which we must delve becomes a tangled thought when considering political reform. And even if true reform does occur, we may have to wait a century to reap its benefits.