Informatisation & Cyber: The Future of the People's War

?(extract from dissertation "From nuclear to cyber: Evolution of the People's War in China" (June 2022)) DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11712.71682

"The weapon of criticism obviously cannot replace criticism of the weapon.”??

Karl Marx (The Communist Manifesto 1948)?

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China’s evolution of nuclear weapons and weaponization of cyber is characterized by the repetition of ideologically-influenced rather than technologically-driven decisions.

Informationisation is more powerful than nuclear weapons?

China’s rise since 1949 has been dependent on two fundamental aspects of national security – military power and economic prosperity. Nuclear weapons with a “no-first-use” posture provided sufficient deterrent against external threats whilst providing an opportunity for China to become engaged and create high-level dialogue with influential states, including, but not limited to the P5 (China, France, Russia, UK and US). As a dual-use technology it offered the opportunity for China’s economic development at a time when private entrepreneurship was actively encouraged following the reform of state-owned enterprises. The weaponization of cyber was arguably more complex.

China’s view of cyber for civilian use is underpinned by a recognition that it is a form of media, and therefore a communication vehicle that can be used to shape ideological beliefs. The use of cyber for commercial activities reflects a view that guiding economic development is the responsibility of the state because economic power can be equated with global power. Informationisation therefore has become more powerful than the threat of nuclear weapons, and will continue to grow in importance.?

Protecting national interest means increasing self-reliance?

While Deng Xiaoping’s 1979 trip to the US included visits to weapons manufacturers, national security and a focus on technological self-reliance have characterized the approach since Xi Jinping rose to power. China‘s Military Strategy 2015, mentions “new threats from hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism” and “international competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests is tending to intensify”.

In 2017, China’s cyber security law went into effect to promote local technologies and restrict sales of foreign ICT in China. China is now actively promoting a dual-circulation strategy that allows it to pursue national development and puts effectively returns to more introspective similar to the situation prior to 1979.?

Technology is the vehicle for rejuvenating Ideology?

Since Xi’s accession as President of China, and as reinforced in the 2013 communique, China effectively saw a return to an evolved version of the communist political ideology of the 1960s that motivated development of nuclear capabilities. Echoing Jiang Zemin in 1997 whilst adding military strength, Xi Jinping’s “guiding ideology” has been clearly and widely communicated since 2015:?

“…adhere to the important ideas of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the "Three Represents". Guided by the Scientific Outlook on Development, in accordance with the requirements of the "Four Comprehensives" strategic layout, and guided by the Party's goal of strengthening the military under the new situation………build a military system that is commensurate with my country's international status and in line with national security and development interests. Consolidate national defence and a strong military, and provide a strong guarantee for the realization of the "two centenary goals" and the realization of the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.153?

Cyber therefore is a much more critical domain of warfare for China because it covers control of ideology for the domestic audience plus the ability to disrupt critical infrastructure in specific or multiple states.

Informationisation has become the ultimate way to secure global leadership. Via control of the narrative in cyberspace, the intangible domain has come to define the physical behaviour of civilians, their psychological believe in national identity and a reinforced acceptance of power and the state. Support of the ideology is therefore self-reinforcing with cyber providing a legitimate vehicle for realization of the China Dream.?

China’s will lead ideological challenges to multilateral institutions?

In 2018, Yan predicted “China’s rise will simultaneously reshape the international configuration from US-dominated unipolarity to China-US led bipolarity.” China has emerged from the tripartite relationship with Russia and the US, from being the most behind to arguably the most technologically advanced state with potential to dominate and realise a hegemonic position despite saying this is not its objective. Using economic diplomacy and leading alliances of non-democratic or non-Western countries in alliances such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and RCEP, China is already doing this. As ideological adherence leads to economic prosperity, China’s relationships with these states will become an increasingly strong challenger to accepted alliances such as the WTO and the UN. Therefore, China’s relationship with the US cannot be considered as simply a bilateral relationship, but rather reflects a challenge to the ruling ideology and the democratic values assumed in global order. Such status also strengthens China’s influence on international agreements such as the UN Charter and other laws regarding military conflict including ‘no use of force’ and proportionality should in cyberspace. Whilst acknowledging that in cyber warfare should be subject to the same rules as kinetic warfare, China maintains continues to remain firm on its right to protect national sovereignty from threats with definitions of proportionality and jus ad bellum remaining unresolved.??

Economic prosperity strengthens ideological confidence?

China arguably sacrificed the development of its Marxism with Chinese characteristics and Maoist ideology and tolerated the liberal-democratic ideals of the West in order to enable economic development. Now economically powerful it is able to return to independence and choose to engage with states that share its ideology. The strategic goals for the development of China's national defence and military focus on enhanced informationisation and greatly improved strategic capabilities; overall modernization of the military in line with modernization of the country, and modernization of national defence and the military by 2035156. The threats mentioned by China include increasing international strategic competition and weakened global strategic stability driven by the US; unilateral national security and defence strategies by the US plus increased defence spending to increase capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defence; enlargement of NATO; strengthened nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities by Russia; and defence integration in the EU to protect its security.??

Weapons are for protecting the People?

China’s deterrent posture on the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely to change. However, its ability to reach the US with current technology sends a strong message regarding interference in areas of strategic interest in other parts of the world, regionally or protecting national sovereignty.??

Finally, speculation about China’s nuclear capabilities assume that they will be used for war. Given China’s technological advances including in cyber and space as well as a push for dual-circulation economy and independence, it is quite possible that nuclear and cyber experimentation is also being conducted for civilian application including food security and medical applications.?

So the People’s War, which started with Mao, continues to be relevant and evolve in a bid to realise the China Dream of 2049. At the heart of this however, despite China’s increasing presence on the international stage, is the fundamental goal of self-preservation and maintaining national security under the CCP.?

“The people's military…is a strong pillar for safeguarding our socialist country and preserving national dignity, and a powerful force for protecting peace in our region and beyond.”??

President Xi Jinping, July 1, 2021 on the CCP 100th Anniversary.??

Bibliography (for detailed bibliography see the full article)

China's Foreign Ministry “China’s position on international cyber,” 2021

State Council “China’s National Defence” 2019

Xi “Military with Chinese Characteristics” 2015

Yan, Xuetong. 2018. “Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the International Normative Order?”?The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 11, Issue 1, Spring 2018, 1–22,?https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy001?

US Dept of State “Memo to President Carter” Jan 15, 1979

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