Ineffective Naval Leaders at Guadalcanal

#Marines #Navy #Pacific #Guadalcanal

The United States naval leadership was ineffective through the early months of Operation Watchtower (August 7, 1942–February 9, 1943). A prime example of an incompetent commander was Admiral Robert Ghormley, the Commander of the South Pacific (COMSOPAC). Throughout Ghormley’s time as COMSOPAC, he remained at the command post in Nouméa without observing the events as they happened on Guadalcanal. As the conditions deteriorated at Guadalcanal, Ghormley fretted about the reports he received from his officers. Yet he missed opportunities to advocate for his men. On paper, Admiral Ghormley had a stellar career and had earned respect as a tactician, but he somehow lost his way. Because of the 1st Marine Division’s struggles, Admiral Ghormley became overwhelmed. Struggling with exhaustion, Admiral Ghormley became a weak commander and permitted Admiral Frank Fletcher to navigate deeper ocean waters to protect his carriers on August 8, 1942.[1] Having previously experienced horrific losses in battle, Admiral Fletcher allowed his fears to guide his decision.[2] Once Fletcher's carriers traversed the deep seas, Admiral Richmond Turner concluded that the Japanese would attack his ships along the coastline. On August 8, 1942, Admiral Turner ordered his transports to unload their cargo as much as possible through the night before his vessels set sail in the afternoon. When Admiral Turner and his vessels departed, the ships brought the Marine Corps much-needed supplies, such as weaponry, medical, and rations. To the 1st Marine Division, the decision Fletcher made caused the Marines undue hardship without any naval support, provisions, or necessary weaponry. Fortunately, Admiral Chester Nimitz heeded General Alexander Vandergrift (USMC) and Admiral Richmond Turner's concerns.

After Nimitz observed Admiral Ghormley at his command post, he traveled to Guadalcanal to observe the Marines and their combat conditions. At Guadalcanal, Nimitz noticed the combat conditions the Marines had, and he listened to the frustrations of the officers on the ground. When Nimitz returned, he immediately removed Admiral Ghormley and sent him stateside. His next step was to assign a new commander to the South Pacific. With Nimitz's selection of William Bull Halsey, the naval leadership took a positive turn for the better. Halsey was an ally to the 1st Marine Division, and he rapidly started acquiring weaponry, rations, and other supplies needed to retain American control of Henderson Field. In conclusion, the naval leadership became a partner at Guadalcanal, and the Marine Corps and Navy ensured the lines of communication remained open between the Americans and Aussies.

[1] Samuel Eliot Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal August 1942-Febraury 1943, vol. 5, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (1949, repr., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 27-28.

[2] Morrison, 28-29.

Works Cited

Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Struggle for Guadalcanal August 1942-Febraury 1943. Vol. 5, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010.