Indo-Chinese border issue - Chinese animosity hegemony hedonism narcissism

India has always attached great importance to its relations with China, not only because of the old historical legacies that bind the two countries together, but also because of China’s strategic importance for India as its biggest and the most powerful neighbour. India, therefore, assiduously cultivated its ties with China after the Communist Revolution of 1949. One of the great visions of Jawaharlal Nehru was to enlist China’s support and collaboration for building a stable and peaceful world based on adherence to the rule of international law, and free from the rivalry of the major powers for supremacy and from the burden of armament. It was, therefore, not surprising that India was the first non-Communist country after Burma, to recognize the People’s Republic of China. India also led the movement for ending the isolation of the new China in international politics and restoring to it the Chinese membership of the UN.

One of the most disappointing experiences of newly independent India and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru was the fast deterioration in Sino- Indian relations beginning from the late 1950s. Though this was brought about by a variety of factors, the immediate trigger was developments in Tibet, starting from the Chinese invasion and reoccupation of Tibet in 1950. For maintaining amity in Sino-Indian relations, which was essential for realizing Nehru’s vision of the world as well as out of practical considerations, India reconciled itself to the fair accompli presented by the Chinese presence in Tibet and gave up almost all its privileges in the region inherited from the colonial past. This was done through the 1954 Agreement on Border Trade which also formally recognized China’s sovereignty over the Autonomous Region of Tibet and incorporated the famous Panchsheel or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

One of the most disappointing experiences of newly independent India and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru was the fast deterioration in Sino- Indian relations beginning from the late 1950s. Though this was brought about by a variety of factors, the immediate trigger was developments in Tibet, starting from the Chinese invasion and reoccupation of Tibet in 1950. For maintaining amity in Sino-Indian relations, which was essential for realizing Nehru’s vision of the world as well as out of practical considerations, India reconciled itself to the fair Accompli presented by the Chinese presence in Tibet and gave up almost all its privileges in the region inherited from the colonial past. This was done through the 1954 Agreement on Border Trade which also formally recognized China’s. India also led the movement for ending the isolation of the new China in international politics and restoring to it the Chinese membership of the UN.allenges from China. In its defense planning, India was required thereafter to make contingent military provisions for coping, in the event of a war with Pakistan, with a two-pronged threat, one emanating from Pakistan and the other from China. The boundary problem remained a stumbling block in the development of relations between the two countries till almost the middle of the 1970s. The severance of the relations between China and the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1960s and the latter’s general support for India also contributed to the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations. This coincided with Pakistan turning towards China after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, when the US stopped arms supplies to both the warring powers, and China’s positive and prompt response culminating in the two countries forging a special relationship that endures till today.

China has since emerged as the largest source of military supplies and assistance for military capacity building for Pakistan. Between 2009 and 2013, Pakistan received 47 per cent of the total volume of the Chinese arms exports. This has helped Pakistan in a major way to maintain near-parity with India in conventional arms. It is now well-documented that China transferred equipment and technology and provided scientific expertise for Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Going by newspaper stories and published research findings, China provided the design for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and also carried out tests in its territory to verify their reliability. A significant development in this regard was the supply of 34 short-range M-11 missiles by China in 1992. China has built two nuclear reactors at Chasma in Pakistan and is currently moving forward with plans for building two additional nuclear reactors at the same site. It also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750 km-range solid fuelled Shaheen-I missile. Moreover, the Chinese JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft is under serial production in Pakistan. China also plans to provide Pakistan with J-10 medium-role combat aircraft. China’s other recent sales of weapons to Pakistan include F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 Jet trainers, T-85 tanks and F-7 aircrafts. Pakistan placed an order for eight F22P frigates from China out of which four were delivered in 2009. Pakistan is also the recipient of anti-ship cruise missiles as well as submarines from China. China is helping Pakistan develop a deep sea port at the naval base Gwadar. It financed 80 per cent of this $250 million project in its first phase and is reportedly funding most of the second phase. It is speculated that China will use it for the berthing of its warship and as a vantage point for exercising influence and observation of military activities in the nearby Indian Ocean and the Gulf region.

China has extended its support to Pakistan in its dispute with India on Kashmir. On a few occasions of conflict between India and Pakistan, China has even held out an indirect threat to intervene on behalf of Pakistan. It has also supported India’s other neighbours in their disputes with India and joined their chorus of protests against India’s alleged hegemonic intentions in South Asia. The principal motive behind China’s assistance to Pakistan for maintaining military parity with India and behind military supplies to India’s other neighbours, particularly Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, is to undermine India’s position in its neighbourhood and to prevent India from emerging as a rival Asian power. In its military assistance to Pakistan and in seeking access to military facilities there, China is also motivated by its desire of using Pakistan’s geo-strategic position to reach out to West and Central Asia, where China has crucial interests at stake. In the process, China has been instrumental in placing Pakistan in a position to pose by far the most serious, direct and immediate threat to India’s security.

In a major shift of India’s policy towards China, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took the initiative in 1975 to order India’s Tibetan Special Frontier Force to draw back at least 10 kilometres from their position along the Indo-Chinese border and also despatched an Indian ambassador to China in July 1976, thereby restoring the diplomatic relationship to the ambassadorial level some 15 years after it was downgraded in 1961. When Indira Gandhi came to power again in 1980, the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India in June 1981, when the two sides agreed to resume talks on the border issue at the level of vice ministers annually by rotation in their capitals. The next major initiative for improving Sino-Indian relations was taken in 1988 by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who, in the midst of the intensified tension prevailing along the eastern sector of the border due to the military confrontation in the Sumdorung Chu Valley, decided to pay a visit to China in an attempt to normalize the relations between the two countries. This visit took place 34 years after the last visit by an Indian prime minister to China, that is, by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954. By then, the Chinese political scene had undergone a drastic transformation. The Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping, who became the supreme leader soon after the death of Mao Zedong, ushered in an era of pragmatism and openness in Chinese society, putting aside the earlier policy of pursuing ideological militancy. He needed the breathing space for attaining the goal of economic modernization that he had set before the nation. During Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, the two sides agreed to set up a joint working group at the vice-ministerial level to meet annually in order to accelerate the search for a settlement of the border issue. Since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, both China and India have made serious efforts to impart to their relationship an active and high profile. The most conspicuous manifestation of this has been the regular visits of the heads of government of the two countries to each other. Prime Minister Li Peng visited India in December 1991. President R. Venkataraman’s visit to China in 1992 was followed by the visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1993. Jiang Zemin, the paramount Chinese leader, came to India in 1996 and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in 2003. This was followed by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in 2005 and President Hu Jintao’s visit in 2006. Since then, the visits to each other by the heads of government of the two countries have become quite frequent. In addition, they meet at the summit gatherings of groups like G-20, BRICS and SCO.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China in January 2008 when a joint document entitled ‘A Shared Vision for the 21st Century’ was issued. During the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013, the two sides issued a Joint Statement and signed several agreements and MoUs. After assuming the post of Prime Ministership, Li Keqiang made India the first destination of his foreign visit. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China in 2013, the two sides released a Joint Statement entitled ‘A Vision for Future Development of India- China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership’. The Vice President of India visited China to participate in a function on 28 June 2014, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Panchsheel. During this visit he had meetings with top Chinese leaders to discuss issues of mutual interest and three agreements between the two countries were signed. The new Chinese President Xi Jinping visited India from 17 to 19 September 2014 at the end of which a Joint Statement by the two sides was issued. In this Joint Statement, the two sides, among others ‘agreed upon regular visits at the level of Heads of State/Government’.

These high-level visits and exchanges at other levels have no doubt resulted in significant improvements in the relations between the two countries. On the border issue, an agreement was signed during Narasimha Rao’s visit to Maintain Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This was reinforced by an Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the LAC. In 2001, measures were initiated to exchange maps that would clarify the LAC. During Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit, it was decided to raise the level of the border talks to the political representatives of the leaders of the two countries. During this visit, China gave an indication of a movement towards recognizing Sikkim as a part of India, which it had not done since Sikkim merged with the Indian Union in 1975. It was also decided to open the traditional route between India and Tibet via the Nathu La for border trade. In order to resolve problems relating to border incidents, army commanders of the two countries have been meeting regularly at predetermined places in the border areas. In December 1992, China opened its Consulate General in Mumbai and India opened its Consulate General in Shanghai.

During the April 2005 visit of Premier Wen Jiabao, the two sides established Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. They also signed an ‘Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles’ for solving the border question. This sought to signal progress in the first phase of the Special Representatives’ Talks. By now some 40 dialogue mechanisms covering diverse subjects of bilateral, regional and international issues, are operational under the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership. A mechanism called Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) has been created and meetings are taking place under it every year. So far three meetings have taken place under it and the fourth is planned in 2015. Five Working Groups covering such subjects as policy coordination, infrastructure, energy, environmental protection and high technology are meeting under the SED and a number of MoUs have been signed reflecting the outcome of the discussions in these Groups. In the Joint Statement issued at the end of President Xi’s visit to India, the SED was assigned to look into new areas such as industrial development, clean energy and sustainable urbanization. The two sides have also set up an India–China CEO Forum, the first meeting of which took place during Premier Li Keqiang’s s visit to India.

A jarring note in the relationship between the two countries was introduced following the Pokhran-II nuclear weapon tests by India in 1998. China joined the other major nuclear weapon powers in denouncing these tests and moving the P5 (permanent members of the UN Security Council) and the Security Council to adopt resolutions to compel India to freeze and roll back its nuclear weapons programme and to sign the NPT. The tone that China adopted in reacting to the tests was harsher than that of the other permanent members. The Joint Statement of 1998 issued by the Presidents of China and the US during the latter’s visit to China provoked widespread resentment in India, because it not only asked India to give up its nuclear ambitions, but also envisaged that China and the US would work together for stability and security in the South Asian region. The opinion widely shared in India was that China, being a part of the problem in South Asia, could hardly be expected to play an objective and constructive role in the region.

Except the remarkable spurt in trade exchanges which have now started stagnating, there has been no qualitative change in the relationship between the two countries. China has not resisted from or brought about any significant change in any of its policies that impinge on India’s vital interests. In spite of raising the level of discussions on the border issue to a notch higher and despite more than two decades of annual meetings on this subject at this level, an agreement even on the alignment of the lines of actual control in the disputed sectors, let alone on the demarcation of the border, is nowhere in sight. This has made peace and tranquillity along the border a hostage to China’s sweet will. In 2003, the two sides reached an understanding on the line of control in the middle sector of the border and exchanged maps to confirm it. However, one is still waiting for the exchange of maps confirming the understanding on the line of control in the eastern and western sectors, where the real dispute lies. In these sectors, reaching an agreement on the line of control amounts to an agreement on the border alignment itself. Since such an agreement can be reached only as a part of the package for an overall solution of the boundary dispute, it is not surprising that there is no progress towards reaching an understanding on the line of control in these sectors. In the meanwhile, China has taken a series of steps which have led to the exacerbation of the border controversy and have, from the Indian perspective, introduced unexpected and uncalled for tensions in Sino- Indian relations. China sought to block an Asian Development Bank project for the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China regards a disputed territory. China has been lodging formal protests against the visits of Indian leaders, including the Prime Minister of India, to Arunachal Pradesh and has denied visas or issued the so-called stapled visas to officials and citizens belonging to this state and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In the summer of 2010, India was constrained to take the extreme step of suspending military ties with China in retaliation for the latter refusing a visa to the Chief of the Northern Command of the Indian Army, to visit China to participate in a high-level India-China defence dialogue. The defence ties were resumed in June 2011 when China allowed the visit of an eight-member military team to China.

In the maps issued recently, China is now showing as a part of its territory not only Arunachal Pradesh but also the part of Jammu and Kashmir ceded to it by Pakistan. It has ignored all protests by India against its road link through this territory with Pakistan and its plan to build a rail link. The Chinese protest against the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Arunachal Pradesh in February 2015 was unusually harsh. Apart from taking it to the formal diplomatic level, China characterized it as inimical to finding solution to the boundary problem. The incidents of confrontation resulting from assertion of claims and counter-claims in the Western sector are becoming more frequent and assuming threatening proportions. The timing of some of these incidents have been, to say the least, quite intriguing. The troops of the two countries came face-to-face in the Depsang region in April–May 2014, just before the much heralded visit by the new Chinese prime minister. Instead of the earlier practice of withdrawing and leaving trails behind as an assertion of claim to the disputed territory, the Chinese this time built temporary structures. The next incident in Chumar coincided with the visit of President Xi Jinping. An unusual feature of this incident was that India’s show of presence in the disputed territory was sought to be deliberately obstructed and the troops deployed from both sides were unusually large in size. Nevertheless, the two sides avoided any clash or firing. They constantly kept in touch with each other, including at a fairly high military level and in both the instances the issue was ultimately resolved through the use of the established mechanism. After the May 2013 incident, the two countries signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) to improve management of the border. It is designed to reduce tension by providing more and higher levels of avenues for taking up border incidents and establishing additional channels of communication.

A reason why border incidents have become more frequent and have assumed relatively serious proportions is that with the improvement in the infrastructure in border areas on both sides, patrolling has become more frequent and method of asserting claim more high-tech. In 2006, India introduced a major road building programme for the border area. Three years later, it announced its decision to raise two new Mountain Divisions for deployment on its side of the border. Subsequently it upgraded several airstrips and advanced landing grounds. In 2013, the Government of India approved the raising of a new Strike Corps for the Eastern sector of the border, the first offensive military formation India has deployed along the Line of Actual Control. On its part, China has bolstered its own capabilities in the border area in a comprehensive manner. Through its superior roadways and long-range rail transport connectivity to the border area it can move troops and equipment with high speed. China fields 400,000 PLA soldiers in the military regions opposite India. In recent years, it has also upgraded its arsenals of ballistic missiles located in the area and built new air fields in Tibet.

The Chinese assistance to build the military might of Pakistan to keep India unsettled in the region, continues unabated. China promptly comes to Pakistan’s support whenever the latter is censured by the international community for harbouring terrorist groups operating against India. Through its stand in the Security Council, China has prevented Pakistani terrorists from being blacklisted by the UN. China is today engaged in a single-minded pursuit of establishing itself as a major military power in the world. It is busy testing and producing or acquiring the most up-to-date varieties of weapons, including stealth bombers,

intercontinental missiles, aircraft carriers and submarines. It tested an anti-satellite system in 2007. It has one of the most ambitious plans undertaken by any power in recent times, to expand and upgrade its navy and air force. China has embarked on the path of the accumulation and upgradation of nuclear arms and its delivery vehicles at a time when other nuclear weapon states are making progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals. Its declared objective is to interdict access of US naval forces in its vicinity and to develop a second-strike capacity. Therefore, the Chinese nuclear arms build-up does pose a short- or medium-term threat to the security of countries like India which neither have nor can develop a nuclear deterrence against China in the foreseeable future. India also cannot ignore the Chinese deployment of armed forces in Tibet, which includes nuclear weapons targeted at India, a large number of troops and a large air force, backed by state-ofthe-art railways, roads and supply infrastructure. To strengthen its deterrence postures relative to India, China has recently replaced liquid-fuelled nuclear capable CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with more advanced and survivable solid-fuelled CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) systems. There is no doubt that these pose a strategic threat to India’s security.

A major problem that has emerged recently in Indo-Chinese relations is China’s construction of structures on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra lying in its territory. Transfer of water or the blockage of its flows through these structures can have a disastrous impact on the lives and livelihood of the millions of Indians inhabiting the Brahmaputra valley. Ever since this Chinese activity came to India’s notice, it has been taking it up with China at the official level, demanding transparency, access to data and mutual consultation. All that China has been saying in response is that it is conscious of its responsibilities in this regard and of the interest of the lower riparian countries. It has also been asserting that the structures are basically run-of-the-river projects which should not give cause for anxiety as they do not involve diversion of water. Last year, it was reported in the media that the Chinese government gave a go ahead for building three new hydro-power dams on the river. China has not denied this report yet and has simply reiterated that any structure that is built will not adversely affect the downstream flow. An agreement was signed during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China in October 2013 in which the ‘two sides agreed to further strengthen cooperation on transborder rivers, cooperate through the existing Expert Level Mechanism on provision of flood season hydrological data and emergency management and exchange views on other issues of mutual interest’. More or less the same formulation was repeated in the Joint Statement issued at the end of Chinese President Xi Jinping visit to India in September 2014. The Indian side is taking comfort from the part of the formulation providing for ‘exchange [of] views on other issues of mutual interest’, which could include exchanging views on the projects. But China may not agree to this interpretation. Moreover, it is not possible to engage in any serious discussion on the matter without China providing the project details. According to the prevailing international law, a lower riparian to a common river has the right to be consulted before the upper riparian takes up a development project in its territory that can adversely impact the former’s interest. The Chinese are persistently refusing to agree to such consultation or make data available on the project. The MoU that they have signed is confined to sharing data relating to only the flow of the river which can have an impact in terms of creating a flood situation. China’s obduracy on the subject can be explained only by its determination to pursue its national interest at all costs, even if it is in disregard of international law.

Another negative factor is that China has never been enthusiastic about India playing an important role in the evolving regional multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region. China certainly does not want India to be a part of the monetary arrangement taking shape in Asia under ASEAN+3 in which China is a dominant partner. In 2004–05 when India was actively promoting the idea of a pan-Asian economic grouping, China was in the frontline opposing this initiative. Though the trade exchanges between the two countries increased nearly 30 times within a decade, India faces an ever-widening adverse balance of trade with China. The adverse balance increased from $0.69 billion in 2000 to nearly $31.4 billion in 2013. Moreover, the structure of India’s exports to and imports from China is reminiscent of the pattern of trade

between developed and developing countries during the post, Second World War period. Whereas China is exporting mostly manufactured goods to India, the Indian exports consist primarily of raw materials. The share of capital goods in India’s total exports to China remained stagnant between 2002 and 2010 at around 4 per cent; the share of intermediate goods declined during this period from 57.9 per cent to 24.6 per cent, but the share of raw materials increased from 35.3 per cent to 68.5 per cent. Thus, most of the increase in India’s exports to China during the last 14 years has been accounted for by raw materials. On the other hand, China’s export of capital goods to India almost doubled from 28.6 per cent in 2002 to 54.8 per cent in 2009. The share of intermediate goods declined sharply from 47.7 per cent in 2002 to 36.4 per cent in 2010, whereas raw materials virtually disappeared from China’s export basket to India, the share declining from 11.7 per cent to 1.3 per cent during this period. There has been very little qualitative change in the situation since 2009. Capital goods are now missing altogether from India’s export basket to China. The shares of raw materials and intermediate goods have declined from 20 and 21 per cent, respectively, in 2010 to 17 and 18 per cent in 2013. The share of consumer goods has gone up from 58 to nearly 64 per cent during this period. There have been only marginal variations in the shares of these four product groups in China’s exports to India between 2010 and 2013. The trade exchanges are basically market-driven and have no backward or forward linkages in the economies of the two countries. There has not been a single major joint-venture project undertaken by them so far. Currently, it seems to be more inclined to work with the developed member countries of APEC, particularly the US, to negotiate a new generation of economic integration schemes, involving far-reaching liberalization in the exchange of goods, services and flow of investment and much higher level of protection of intellectual property rights, than working with earnestness with other countries of Asia, including India, to make the RCEP a reality.

The position that China has taken on the expansion of the Security Council also seems to be primarily designed to frustrate the effort of India to seek permanent membership of the Council. The only formulation acceptable to China on India’s permanent membership of the Security Council is that it would like India to play a more active role in the UN, including in the Security Council. This formulation is hardly of any consequence. India is already playing an active role in the UN, in fact more active than China in several spheres. Besides, playing an active role in the Security Council depends critically on India becoming one of its permanent members, preferably with a veto power. And China currently happens to be the biggest obstacle to the realization of this Indian ambition. Moreover, by emphasizing the need for increased representation of small and medium powers in the Security Council, China, having already inherited a permanent seat there, wants to keep India as far away as possible from even the non-permanent membership.