INDIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY: WAY FORWARD

Evolution

1.????????India's nuclear programme traces its origins to March 1944. At the time of Independence, India followed a policy of constructing a civilian nuclear energy program, while at the same time, formally foregoing development of capability to make nuclear weapons / nuclear bomb. This policy was adopted based on assumed conventional weapons superiority over its rivals Pakistan and China. Its three-stage efforts in technology were established by Homi Jehangir Bhabha when:-

(a)??????He founded the nuclear research centre, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. ?

(b)??????India built its first research reactor in 1956.

(c)???????India built its first plutonium reprocessing plant by 1964.

2.????????India's loss to China in Sino- Indian war in October 1962, provided the Indian government, momentum to develop nuclear weapons as a means of deterring potential Chinese aggression. By 1964 India was in a position to develop nuclear weapons. However, the then Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri was initially opposed developing nuclear weapons. However, he came under intense political pressure, due to reasons stated below, and announced that India would pursue the capability of what it called "peaceful nuclear explosions" that could be weaponised in the future.

(a)??????Pressure from elements within the ruling Congress party.

(b)??????India was also unable to obtain security guarantees from either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Nuclear Tests and its Impact

3.????????India conducted its first successful nuclear weapon test in 1974. Consequent to this test by India, a non – nuclear state, the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) was formed in 1974. Its prime objective was to preventing nuclear proliferation and to curb export of materials and technology that could be used to build nuclear weapons.

4.????????India, further conducted a series of five nuclear tests of advanced weapon designs on 11 and 13 May 1998 at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan Desert and after its successful completion it declared itself a de - facto nuclear weapon state.

5.????????In 1999, India adopted a draft nuclear doctrine based on “NO FIRST USE” (NFU) Policy. Key aspects of the draft were: -

(a)??????India would not initiate a nuclear attack on any country. India would not use nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states.

(b)??????India’s nuclear arsenal was for the sole purpose of defence and would serve as a deterrent against external nuclear attacks.

(c)???????India would adopt the nuclear triad model i.e. India should have capability of launching nuclear attacks on three fronts i.e. land, air, and water. In this model the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) would act as the ace, if the other two were to fail

6.????????However, this draft did not receive official recognition. In 2003, India officially accepted a Nuclear Doctrine based on NFU policy. Certain key features of this are: -

(a)??????Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.

(b)??????In the posture of "No First Use" (NFU), nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere. ?

(c)???????Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be “massive” and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.

?(d)??????Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.

?(e)??????Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;

?(f)????????A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.

(g)??????Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear. disarmament.

Current Status

7.????????Presently India follows the 2003 Nuclear Doctrine. Hence, India’s policy is based on nuclear deterrence. Thus credible second strike ability plays a vital role. ?

8.????????India is among the five countries that didn’t sign the treaty. The others are Pakistan, South Sudan, Israel and North Korea. India finds Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) discriminatory and that’s why it has refused to sign it. Apart from that, there are various other reasons why India didn’t sign the NPT. They are as under:-

(a)??????The treaty, in its current form, gives the victorious nations of World War II, the right to have nuclear weapons while condemns nations without access to nuclear weapons, from developing it.

(b)??????According to India, either all 5 nations denuclearize, or every nation has the right to possess nuclear weapons.

(c)??????Growing tension with China which has Nuclear Weapons. China was the reason why India started nuclear tests in the first place.

9. ???????Impact of Present Nuclear Doctrine. The following aspects merit consideration: -

(a)??????No First Use has worked well.

(b)??????It builds stability into deterrence by credibly promising nuclear retaliation in the face of extreme provocation of a nuclear first strike by one’s adversary.

(c)???????India’s current Nuclear Doctrine has helped India secure crucial international deals, such the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) waiver as part of the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal in 2008.

(d)??????In the recent past, India has signed a nuclear co-operation agreement with Japan, in spite of Japan having a staunch anti-nuclear stance and India not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

(e)??????India is currently also seeking to join the NSG as a permanent member which is a doctrinal shift and is only going to give China more reason to delay India’s entry. This posture would also play into the hands of Pakistan, which has long accused India of duplicity over its no first use policy and called India’s expanding arsenal a threat to the region’s stability.

Need for Review of the Nuclear Doctrine?

10.??????India’s restraint and decision not to weaponise its nuclear capacities after the 1974 tests were well known. However, when Pakistan accelerated its nuclear proliferation, it was not stopped in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, when U.S. President Jimmy Carter designated Pakistan a “frontline” state. The Chinese transferred nuclear materials and technology to Pakistan, including the weapons design and the means to deliver them (the solid fuel 300 - kilometre range M-11 ballistic missiles). In a paper published in1972 Professor Wayne Wilcox of Colombia University, then working as cultural attaché in the U.S. Embassy in London, perceptively recognised that India’s policy concerning China and Pakistan “is to hedge all bets and cover all contingencies.” India was compelled to acquire nuclear weapons to deter nuclear blackmail in its contiguity.?????????????????????????????????????????

11.??????Indian strategists have debated India’s nuclear doctrine, both sporadically and inconclusively, for nearly two decades. Though NFU remains the most controversial element of India’s nuclear doctrine, other aspects of the doctrine have also been contested. These include, references in the doctrine to, “massive” retaliation, to deterring CBW attacks and adequacy of the doctrine for dealing with new developments such as: -

(a)??????Pakistan’s reported development of TNWs.

(b)??????Dealing with both China & Pakistan combine, simultaneously.

12.??????It is important to note that many developments in the region that are related to nuclear weapons have not triggered adequate debate in India such as:

(a)??????Persistent reports that Pakistan has surpassed India in the size of its nuclear arsenal, or frequent reports about Pakistan’s missile capability.

(b)??????Scant attention has been given to the doctrine’s efficacy in deterring China and China-Pak combine.

13.??????Nuclear policy of any nation should evolve according to the changing times and geopolitical dynamics. Some of the following aspects need to be majorly debated, in India, due to changing circumstances: -

(a)??????No first use (NFU), According to an eminent Strategic analyst, late K. Subrahmanyam, deterrence is more about perception than numbers, and as long as the other side perceives a survivable nuclear capability, deterrence will hold.

(i)????????Moderates strongly support NFU. For them, India’s NFU posture provides multiple advantages such as: -

(aa)????It obviates the need for the expensive nuclear weapons infrastructure that is associated with a first-use doctrine.

(ab)????It puts the onus of escalation on the adversary, without preventing India from defending itself.

(ac)????A purely retaliatory posture allows India to limit its reaction to nuclear attacks, forgoing threats of use of nuclear weapons.

(ac)????NFU allows India to keep its weapons disassembled, thus averting the need for systems such as Permissive Action Links, which are necessary to maintain control over nuclear weapons if they are stored ready to fire condition.

(ii)???????The Non – Moderates reject the above arguments for the following reasons: -

(aa)????An NFU posture is possible for a country that has “extreme confidence in survivability of its nuclear forces, its capability to muster a devastating retaliatory strike, and the efficacy of its crisis management system.

(ab)????The NFU principle is unenforceable. Since there is no way in which nuclear weapons can be designed only for a second strike, NFU is more a peacetime declaration that a country does not have to abide by during war.

(ac)????Such an approach has unnecessarily kept India on the back foot and defensive thus making it obvious that India would have to face the consequences of a first strike before being able to respond. Moreover, it prevents India from keeping a potential adversary off balance.

(ae)????Some suggest that India should abandon NFU because India cannot keep its arsenal limited if it has to prepare to receive an initial attack and then have enough weapons left over for retaliation.

(iii)??????Late Manohar Parrikar, former Defence Minister said, abandoning the no first use clause of the doctrine will add to the strength and deterrent effect of our nuclear weapon programme as quoted by the Indian Express in 2016. A declared policy that forecloses the possibility of a first-strike reduces the nuclear options available to New Delhi and diminishes its nuclear strength. Further details are as under: -

(aa)????Pakistan. While India’s tests gave Pakistan the excuse to go official with its nuclear capability thus making public the world’s worst kept secret. In 2016, PM Narendra Modi called out the nuclear bluff of Pakistan by launching cross border strikes in retaliation to Uri and Pulwama terrorist attacks. However, there is an increasing evidence of Pakistan’s inclination to use tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) against India. In order to deter Pakistan from using TNWs against India, its existing nuclear doctrine may have to be reviewed

(ab)????China. It has been established that China is India’s most formidable adversary. Possession of nuclear capability has helped India. Chinese military planners have to take into account if they engage in escalation at the border and beyond. Debate on China between traditional advocates of a “minimum deterrence” and new arguments for a more flexible “limited deterrence continues”. The latter envisages counterforce operations and supports building nuclear war-fighting capabilities, including a greater and diverse arsenal.

(b)??????Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). ?CMD refers to the quantity of nuclear forces that India needs to deter potential nuclear adversaries. Moderates and Non – Moderates disagree about quantity of weapons that are necessary, as well as about India’s progress in weaponisation. Views of Moderates and Non Moderates are as under: -

(i)????????Moderates. K Subrahmanyam, a noted Strategic Analyst, stated that what matters is not so much the “exchange ratio” of damage suffered by both sides, but how much punishment an adversary calculates that it can accept. This level of punishment is achievable “so long as India has a survivable retaliatory force.”?In other words, decision makers are not worried about who suffers more, but about how much they themselves will have to suffer. Some moderates believe that India has to worry about maintaining an assured capability for counter-strike.

(ii)???????Non Moderates They believe that India needs to keep the idea of CMD open-ended, saying that “with a policy of No First Use and Massive Retaliation, the concept of CMD must factor in ‘survivability and sufficient numbers’ that can inflict unacceptable damage.” The actual size of the arsenal associated with CMD “has to be dynamic, because, the adversaries’ arsenals are increasing by the year. India has adequate means and potential to cause unacceptable damage to any adversary if attacked by nuclear weapons, notwithstanding the gap in long-range missiles to reach all of China. CMD is tied to India’s capacity to cause unacceptable damage. It requires a plan to destroy a large number of counter-value targets to include population centres, industrial complexes, important infrastructure, and available counterforce targets. As per them, CMD requires the capacity for destruction of the enemy’s society to an extent that would make recovery and reconstruction long and costly. A nuclear strike must render the adversary’s economy regressed. Non Moderates also feel that in light of long-standing China-Pakistan collusion, India should seek a capability sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on both Pakistan and China. The complexity of the triangular deterrence relationship has to be fully considered in the Indian nuclear doctrine.

(c)???????Command and Control. Some of the views of the Moderates and Non Moderates about the command-and-control arrangements in India’s nuclear doctrine are as under: -.

(i)????????Moderates. They claim the benefits of a de-alerted and de-mated nuclear force, such as: -

(aa)????Greater safety and its reduced vulnerability to theft and inadvertent use or misuse.

(ab)????Another view suggests that integrating the warheads in storage would be detrimental to safety and security.

(ii)???????Non-Moderates. They argue that India’s nuclear deterrence will not be effective unless potential adversaries accept that India has the operational capacity to employ its nuclear weapons. ?Some of the reasons are as under: -

(aa)????Many critics of the Indian nuclear doctrine, say that India’s nuclear operational capacity is doubtful because the Indian nuclear doctrine leaves the military out of the decision making loop.

(ab)????India’s de-alerted and de-mated nuclear posture is severely criticized by former military officers due to delays and vulnerabilities.

(ac)????Non Moderate Strategic Analyst such as Karnad argue that a de-mated posture elongates the logistics chain and increases the number of potential targets, rendering the delivery system or warhead inoperable if even one of the targets is hit. Large numbers of such strikes with advanced conventional weapons “would leave the entire nuclear deterrent in disarray and, great parts of it, unusable.” It also makes the nuclear force vulnerable while these weapons are being readied for operation, a process that he expected would take days, weeks, or months.

(ad) Instead of creating additional time for Indian decision-makers to react, the additional time would be used by the adversary to conduct “mopping-up strikes.” Moreover, the additional time would be used by global powers to pressure India into settling for some “symbolic” token retaliation.

(af)?????They also dismiss other presumed benefits of a de-alerted and de-mated nuclear force, such as the greater safety of such a force and its reduced vulnerability to theft and inadvertent use or misuse. Non moderates suggest that it is easier to protect fewer mated weapons than a large number of distributed components, and that the Indian military has a good record of protecting its hardware.

(d)??????Massive Retaliation. The following merit consideration: -

(i)????????Massive retaliation in response to Pakistani tactical nuclear first use undermines India’s deterrence by violating the principle of proportionality.

(ii)???????There is lack of compatibility between massive retaliation and minimum deterrence as a small nuclear force cannot produce massive attacks.

14.???????Likely Impact of of Changes in Nuclear Doctrine. Any change in existing Nuclear Doctrine is likely to have implications. Some of the major issues may be as under: -

(a)??????All the gains enjoyed by India, in the international community, by the restraint of India’s nuclear posture of past would be frittered away if there is change in stance of nuclear doctrine

(b)??????It would enormously complicate and increase the expenditure incurred by us in regard to our command and control mechanisms which would have to be reconfigured to engage in calibrated nuclear war fighting.

(c)???????It would weaken the possibility of our engaging in conventional warfare insulated from the nuclear overhang.

(d)??????It would encourage the use of tactical nuclear weapons under the illusion of no massive response.

(e)??????It would facilitate the painting of South Asia as a nuclear flashpoint and thereby encourage foreign meddling.

?15.?????Recommended Way Forward.

(a)??????India’s nuclear doctrine needs to be periodically re-examined?in light of technological developments that can impact credible deterrent or No First use Policy. It must also take into account the impact of digitisation on early warning and command and control system in terms of counter space and offensive cyber actions.

(b)??????Periodic review and statements about the nurturing and upgradation of India’s nuclear arsenal and systems including alternate command structure be done.

(c)???????India’s nuclear arsenal should be large enough to take care of all adversaries with appropriate delivery systems.

(d)??????Enhancing effectiveness of an upgraded NTRO, capable of providing indicators of any attack on us and ensure swift and massive nuclear retaliation inflicting unacceptable damage.

(e)??????Advocates of a change in India’s NFU policy would like its nuclear doctrine to mimic those of most of the established Nuclear Weapon States.

(f) ???????The external diplomatic challenge of gaining acceptance as a responsible nuclear power has been achieved. We must not lose sight of it while tweaking our nuclear Doctrine to cater for current requirements.

(g)??????Changing geopolitics has revived rivalries between major nuclear powers even as geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted from Euro-Atlantic to Indo Pacific. Navigating such challenges may need policy adjustmebts.