Is India’s fourth party system intact?

By Milan Vaishnav & Caroline Mallory

On paper, India’s 2024 poll results herald a return to coalition politics, marking a break with the previous decade of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) dominance. For the first time since Narendra Modi catapulted to power in 2014, the BJP is reliant on its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) partners.

The resurgence of the BJP as a dominant party in 2014 and the dramatic expansion of its electoral footprint marked the beginning of a new electoral era known as the fourth party system. The first party system, dominated by the Congress, was in place from independence until the 1967 elections when the Congress’s grip on power in India’s states sharply waned. In the second-party system, from 1967 to 1989, the Congress largely retained its control over the Centre even as its popularity gradually declined. India’s third-party system, in place from 1989 to 2014, was synonymous with an era of coalition politics and the absence of a core political party.

The resurgence of coalition politics in New Delhi and the presence of a stronger political Opposition raise the question of whether the 2024 verdict reflects a repudiation of the fourth party system. A dispassionate analysis of newly available data suggests that while the 2024 verdict represents a curtailing of the BJP’s dominance, many attributes of the new party system persist.

Presence of a dominant party

The 2014 elections were historic; it was the first time a party won a parliamentary majority in three decades, and it was the first time that a party other than the Congress did so. In the 2019 elections, the BJP defied challenges of anti-incumbency and grew further. Against this backdrop, the 2024 elections certainly represents a setback for the party.

On the surface, the decline in the BJP’s seat tally from 303 to 240 suggests major cracks in the edifice of the fourth party system. But a closer look at the data suggests that, despite experiencing a setback, the BJP retains its dominant position at the helm of the fourth party system.

For starters, the BJP’s vote share declined by less than one percentage point in 2024 relative to 2019 (36.6% versus 37.3%). This suggests that, on an all-India level, its popularity has not changed significantly. However, its seat share dropped dramatically, indicating that what has shifted is the regional distribution of that support—with losses in the Hindi heartland largely offset by gains in eastern and southern India. Although the BJP failed to meet both internal and external electoral expectations, ironically it emerged as a truly pan-Indian party for the first time.

In terms of pan-Indian parties, the BJP has only one rival: the Congress. In 2024, the Congress’s vote share crept up to 21.2%, a modest upward swing from the 19.4% it enjoyed in 2019. However, the Congress’s vote rise looks impressive only in comparison with recent elections; its 2024 share was its third-worst performance ever. To be sure, the Congress contested its lowest number of seats, 328, this time; this was 93 lower than the number of seats it fought in 2019.

The fact that more than two dozen opposition parties, including the Congress, joined hands to form the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) is a further testament to the BJP’s centrality. One of the tests associated with a system-defining party is the extent to which elections are fought in favour of, or in opposition to, the party with a preponderance of power. By all indications, the BJP retains that designation for now.

Another way of assessing the BJP’s centrality is to look beyond the national stage and focus instead on the party’s state-level performance. BJP chief ministers are currently in office in 13 states (occupying 43% of all chief ministerial positions). At the start of 2014, the BJP held only 17% of all chief ministerial positions. The current BJP share was last matched by the Congress in 2012.

The BJP’s control of state governments has meant that its share of members of the legislative assemblies (MLAs) has exhibited a corresponding increase. In 1980, just 4 % of MLAs across India belonged to the BJP. Today, the BJP’s share of MLAs stands at 38%, an all-time high.

While the BJP has significantly expanded its footprint at the state level, the party has not achieved state-level dominance by any stretch. In the 66 state assembly elections held since 2014, the BJP has formed the first post-election government in roughly half of all states. And in the 34 cases where it formed the government, it did so with a single-party majority in only half of all instances.

A final indicator of the BJP’s systemic import comes from the Rajya Sabha, whose members are indirectly elected by the state assemblies. 41% of Rajya Sabha MPs belong to the BJP, a figure that has remained roughly constant since 2020. After Upper House elections in August 2024, the BJP boasts of 96 MPs in the Rajya Sabha, where the NDA now has a thin majority if nominated members and independents are counted in its favour.

Political centralisation

In 1952, 53 parties fielded candidates in the country’s inaugural general elections. That number surged to 113 in 1989, the year coalition politics came to New Delhi. Since then, the number of parties contesting Indian general elections has grown steadily; in 2024, 744 distinct parties entered candidates in the fray.

However, many of these parties had little chance of winning even a single seat. For this reason, political scientists prefer to calculate the effective number of parties (ENP), a measure that weighs parties by the number of votes (or seats) they actually earned.

Between 1962 and 1989, the ENP for votes remained under 5, ranging from 3.4 in 1977 to 4.7 in 1967 and 1989. During the coalition era, this number grew significantly, peaking at 7.6 in 2009. This period, in retrospect, reflected the high point for party fragmentation. Beginning in 2014, but more substantially five years later, the ENP for votes declined significantly — to 5.4 in 2019. In 2024, this metric hardly budged, exhibiting a value of 5.3.

On the metric of ENP for seats, however, there has been some sign of reversal. The ENP for seats grew to 4.2 in 2024, a level comparable to the year 1989. This is a sharp rise from the ENP value of 3.0 five years prior. The divergence between the ENP for votes and seats is likely an artefact of India’s first-past-the-post electoral system, in which a small shift in votes can result in a disproportionate change in seats.

Political competition

The third party system witnessed rising levels of political competition, a trend that firmly reversed post-2014. The 2024 results suggest a modest shift toward more competitive elections. The simplest way of measuring the degree of competition is to calculate the average margin of victory — or the difference in the vote share of the winner and the runner-up — across parliamentary constituencies.

The average margin of victory peaked at 26.1% in 1977, the year the Congress was defeated after the Emergency. After that, it exhibited a considerable decline, plummeting to 9.7% in 2009. With the BJP’s rise to power in 2014, this trend sharply reversed, with the average margin touching 15.2%. By 2019, it had grown to 17.3%, signifying that elections had become appreciably less competitive in the fourth-party system. 2024 marks another partial reversal as the average margin fell to 13.6% —a 20% decline from 2019 levels.

Nationalisation of electoral politics

During the coalition era, national elections often resembled an aggregation of state-level verdicts. The 2014 elections were a watershed in this regard. A groundswell of support in favour of the Narendra Modi-led BJP was felt in diverse pockets. The 2019 elections operated with a similar template in that the BJP, especially in the wake of the Pulwama terrorist attacks, successfully whipped up a nationalist fervour in its favour.

The dynamics of the 2024 elections surprised many observers because they reverted to the kind of state-by-state contest India experienced before 2014. The BJP’s inability to craft a defining election narrative, in conjunction with significant Opposition consolidation, helped create the conditions for a more federalised contest. Unlike the prior two elections, there was no discernible national wave in support of one party or leader.

Despite this clear reversion to the pre-2014 era, a few elements of the fourth party system remain unchanged. First, during the coalition era, national elections were predictably influenced by state-level political calendars. The received wisdom held that if a national election were held early on in a state government’s tenure, the ruling party in that state would perform well in national elections. Conversely, if a national election were held late in a state government’s term, that state ruling party would struggle in the national polls. These “honeymoon” and “anti-incumbency” effects have weakened post-2014.

Another aspect of the diminished federal character of elections is the changing balance of power between national and regional parties. Between 1996 and 2014, there was roughly an equal distribution of votes shared by national and regional parties. Barring minor fluctuations, the BJP and Congress collectively earned around 50% of the vote, meaning that one in two votes in a general election accrued to a regional party. In 2019, and again in 2024, that roughly equal distribution was disrupted when the BJP won markedly larger vote shares. In 2019, the BJP and Congress collectively won 56.8% of the vote, and this vote share divergence grew by an additional percentage point in 2024.

Voter mobilisation in national elections

In 2014, India saw record-breaking turnout in general elections, at 66.4%. This was a significant increase from the 2004 and 2009 elections, when turnout hovered around 58%. In 2019, turnout was even higher, clocking in at 67.7%. Much of the commentary during the 2024 elections featured a narrative of sagging voter turnout. While turnout did drop, the decline was modest: Overall turnout stood at 65.8%.

A second dynamic that came into view during the tail end of the third party system does not pertain to overall turnout levels but to the composition of who comes out to vote. In the first several decades after independence, female turnout consistently lagged male turnout by eight to 12 percentage points. In 2004, the male-female turnout gap stood at 8.4%. By 2014, that gap shrunk to 1.8%; by 2019, it virtually disappeared. In 2024, the gender gap in turnout stood at a miniscule 0.02%.

Caste and social composition

The fourth party system also coincided with a shift in the social composition of India’s elected representatives. In 1989, 47% of MPs from the Hindi belt belonged to the upper or intermediate castes, compared to 20% from the Other Backward Classes (OBC). By 1999, the former dipped to 42% in 1999 while the latter grew to 25%, making it the first year in which the combined share of OBC and Scheduled Caste (SC) legislators exceeded that of upper caste and intermediate castes. This gap widened further in 2004.

By 2014, the upper and intermediate castes regained the upper hand, once more approaching 50% of the total. These dominant communities maintained their representational advantage over lower castes through 2019, albeit with shrinking margins.

2024 witnessed an unprecedented surge in OBC representation, with nearly one in three Hindi belt MPs hailing from this group. In contrast, at 39%, the share of upper or intermediate caste MPs from this region was at its lowest level in history. Since 1989, the SC and Scheduled Tribe (ST) share of Hindi belt MPs has remained constant; OBCs, on the other hand, have gained considerable ground. In 2024, Muslim representation stood at 3%, half the share seen in 1989.

Conclusion

While coalition governance has returned to Delhi, the BJP retains a position of national strength. Looking ahead, the future trajectory of India’s party system will largely depend on answers to three questions.

First, to what extent has Narendra Modi’s popularity peaked? Modi’s standing is important because public opinion surveys have shown that the prime minister consistently outperforms his party’s brand. According to Lokniti-CSDS, 41% of Indians polled in 2024 favoured Modi as prime minister, down from 47% in 2019.

Second, how sustainable is the INDIA bloc? The ability of the coalition to hang together will significantly impact both the format of political competition in key states and the BJP’s ability to exploit a divided Opposition for electoral gain, something it skillfully accomplished in 2014 and 2019. The degree of Opposition unity was significantly higher in 2024 than in the prior two elections.

Finally, to what extent have the views of the median voter shifted in a more conservative direction that provides a sustained electoral advantage to the BJP? Put differently, what if Modi is a lagging, rather than leading, indicator of changing political and social attitudes? If this is correct, it means that the BJP’s political dominance could have greater staying power, irrespective of Modi’s standing.

For now, in the immediate aftermath of the 2024 result, several aspects of the fourth party system have been called into question. But in large measure, its foundations remain intact.

About the Authors -

Milan Vaishnav is senior fellow and director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. Caroline Mallory was a James C. Gaither Junior Fellow at Carnegie.