India in the Middle East

By Jonathan Fulton - Sep 17,2024

As I mentioned, India’s Observer Research Foundation was the co-host of last week’s Yerevan Dialogue, and there was a lot of discussion of India’s growing engagement in countries and regions where we don’t typically think of it as a consequential foreign policy actor. It just so happened that around the same time India’s Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar was in in Riyadh for an India-GCC strategic dialogue ministers’ meeting. And Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohammed Al Nahyan was in India for an official visit. Which all makes this a good opportunity to shift the focus away from China for a day and look more about what India’s doing in the Middle East.

Most of the action is in the Gulf, of course, where there is an enormous expat Indian population and long and deep historical ties. India is a massive energy importer from the Gulf and two-way investment is significant. Security and strategic relations are on the rise as well. It’s under most people’s radar, but you should absolutely be thinking of India as a major regional actor. With recent multilateral initiatives like I2U2 (if that’s still a thing) and IMEC (which is), the reach expands to the East Med as well.

With that in mind, a few relevant stories and reports:

UAE-India ties are growing stronger in more than one key area - The National. An op-ed by Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, who is the president of the Emirates Policy Center, the Emirati think tank I referenced yesterday. This piece gives a good overview of the bilateral.

Sheikh Khaled's visit to India aimed to explore opportunities to elevate the UAE and India's strategic partnership to new heights, under the framework of their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, which came into force in May 2022. Both countries have signed agreements for the long-term export of liquefied natural gas, as well as co-operation in civil nuclear energy, green hydrogen and the application of the state-of-the-art innovative technologies in the food industry.

India shines as an energy opportunity for Gulf amid China slowdown - The National. From Robin Mills, an energy analyst in Dubai looking at the potential for deeper energy cooperation between India and the GCC.

For the GCC and neighbours, India offers robust and continuing oil demand growth, while China’s prospects have dimmed because of its economic slowdown and the growing use of electric vehicles.

??????? ??????-?????? ??? ????? ?????? ???????: ????????? ??? ??? ?????? (Sino-Indian competition for leadership of the Global South: Implications for the Gulf states) - Emirates Policy Center. This is an Arabic-language report published in January 2024 looking at China-India competition, a topic I haven’t seen discussed very much in the Gulf and one that I talk about frequently here. Given the depth of Gulf-Asia ties, the possibility of Asian geopolitics playing out here is not as far-fetched as one would think. This report is worth a read. The key points, translated:

• In recent years, the Chinese-Indian competition for leadership of the Global South has increased, especially in light of the different approaches of each of them towards this South. It is likely that this competition will escalate further in the coming years, and will result in important multi-dimensional repercussions, including the areas of financing, economic support, infrastructure projects, reform of multilateral institutions, and great power competition between Beijing and Washington.
• While China wants to implicitly share the world with Washington as the leader of the Global South, India is vocal about its desire to create a bridge between North and South. This is done, according to India's vision, by reforming the global system, but in a way that does not lead to changing the status quo or ending or undermining American leadership, but rather includes giving India a central role in the reform process.
• The competition between China and India has repercussions on the positioning and interests of the Gulf states, the most important of which is that the military competition between the two powers in the Indian Ocean will have direct repercussions on the security of the Gulf region, and will be reflected in infrastructure projects, and the intensification of the competition between them threatens to reduce the effectiveness of institutions representing the South, such as BRICS, which the Gulf countries are looking to benefit from.

Sheikh Khaled's official visit to India ends as economic partnerships are signed - The National. A brief overview of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’s official visit to India.

Indian Foreign Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Are Passing Through a Difficult Phase with China - Asharq Al-Awsat. The headline is misleading; this is a rather broad interview with FM Jaishankar on India’s presence in the Middle East, covering energy, trade, the Red Sea, Gaza, IMEC, and tech. On the India-GCC front:

On India’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Jaishankar stressed that ties between the two sides is deeply rooted in a rich tapestry of history, culture, and shared values.

However, the geopolitics came into the discussion, inspiring the headline:

Commenting on India’s foreign relations, in particular with China, the United States and Russia, the minister said that his country pursues a multifaceted foreign policy, engaging with all major powers.

This is relatively mild, compared with the headline. However, at the end of August his take on India-China was more pointed. From The Hindu:

Mr. Jaishankar said that if people are complaining of trade deficit with China and "we are too", it is because decades ago, "we consciously overlooked the nature of Chinese production and the advantages which they enjoyed in a system where they got a level playing field with all the advantages they brought to bed".

India’s diplomacy has a ‘S. Jaishankar problem’ - Global Times. The Minister’s comments inspired an impassioned response, which has since been scrubbed from the Global Times’ site. A sample:

In India, there are many "China experts," like Jaishankar, who are considered authoritative on issues related to China in India simply because their past work involved some connection to China or East Asia. In reality, they often lack a true understanding of China and may not even grasp India's fundamental national conditions and interests. For instance, Jaishankar claims there is a "China problem" and that China works in a very different way. In fact, many countries believe that the "India problem" is the real problem, with India being the one that operates in a very different way, making it difficult to deal with. Jaishankar argues that banning Chinese telecom technology is necessary for security reasons, but is American technology truly secure? So far, we haven't heard of any "Huawei scandal," but we are all aware of the PRISM scandal revealed by Edward Snowden. It is always difficult to prove the authenticity or falsification of the high-profile statements made by Jaishankar on China. They are quite deceptive in the field of international public opinion. For example, he said the Global South countries placed their trust in India and China skipped two meetings convened by India last year to listen to their concerns. Then, on another occasion, he admitted that China was not among the invitees of such summits. If China was not invited to the Global South conference hosted by India, and then India accused China of not participating in it, how did India come to the conclusion that China does not pay attention to the countries of the Global South? The logic behind this is probably something only Jaishankar can understand. Jaishankar's diplomatic wrangling has won him some "fans." However, the diplomatic strategies and tactics he led were full of tricks - they had neither the moral sense of Jawaharlal Nehru's diplomacy nor the ethic sense of Indira Gandhi's diplomacy. India's diplomacy under the guidance of Jaishankar has set tricks on all countries, and what it has ultimately gained is other countries' tricks on India. As minister of external affairs, Jaishankar's priority seems not to be national interests. Although he now seems to be very active in "decoupling" with the Chinese economy and not willing to see the strengthening of China-India economic cooperation, he would change his position if necessary. When he retired and got an appointment in the Tata Group, because Tata needed to develop business with China, he worked hard to promote cooperation between Tata and China. Many politicians in India just use the country as a tool for personal gain. They do not take the long-term interests of the country seriously. In fact, this is the "real problem" of India's diplomacy now, and it can be called the "S. Jaishankar problem."

Finally, on my China-MENA Podcast I’ve had some relevant episodes:

• In February 2023, I spoke with C. Raja Mohan about The Middle East in the US-India-China Strategic Triangle.
• This April Jean-Loup Samaan joined me to talk about minilateralism in MENA, with a focus on IMEC.
• In May Ambassador Navdeep Suri and Kabir Taneja came on the show to discuss their report for ORF on IMEC and how India is looking at the Middle East.
• In June Hasan Alhasan, an India-Gulf expert from Bahrain, talked with me about Gulf-Asia relations, with lots of great insights about India’s role in the region.

There’s lots more to consider here, but really, the point is that the binary of US-China competition does a bad job of explaining the complexity of geopolitics in the Gulf, and anyone who isn’t bringing India (among others) into the analysis is missing an important set of variables.

Thanks for reading The China-MENA Newsletter! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

++++++++++++++++

India-U.S. Relations Beyond the Modi-Biden Dynamic

The forthcoming Modi-Biden bilateral meeting on September 21 will enable the two leaders to not only take stock of the significant progress made in the relationship under their watch but to also identify potential harvests for the incoming U.S. administration.

by?Arun K. Singh - Published on September 19, 2024

The forthcoming Modi-Biden bilateral meeting on September 21 will be held on the margins of the sixth Quad summit in Wilmington, Delaware, United States. It will enable the two leaders to not only take stock of the significant progress made in the relationship under their watch but to also identify potential harvests for the incoming U.S. administration.

I had closely watched two such transitions: from former president George W. Bush to Barack Obama in 2009 and then from Obama to Donald Trump in 2017. Both were significant changes, involving presidents of differing party affiliations in each case. And in both instances, the relationship in the United States had been driven heavily by the White House and the National Security Council during the pre-transition phases.

Bush was known to have personally intervened on many occasions, involving bureaucratic and congressional logjams, to see the transformational civil nuclear cooperation agreement over the finish line. During a September 2008 meeting with the outgoing Bush in Washington, DC, then Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh famously said, “The people of India deeply love you.” This came at a time when Bush had otherwise become extremely unpopular in the United States because of the failure and losses from the efforts in Iraq since 2003. There were also worries about whether the incoming administration would advance the logical next steps from the nuclear agreement, signed in October 2008. It had faced opposition from both Obama and Hillary Clinton during its Senate passage. In an October 2008 interview with TIME magazine, Obama also commented on the possibility of appointing a special envoy for dealing with issues between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir. This was something completely unacceptable to India, which has for decades ruled out any third-party role.

However, the period between the elections in November 2008 and the new president taking over in January 2009 was used effectively by both sides to sensitize the incoming administration. No special envoy was appointed, and India-Pakistan relations were kept out of the ambit of Richard Holbrooke, who was then special envoy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was also indicated that the civil nuclear agreement would be taken as settled law and that the relationship would be taken further keeping that in mind. Furthermore, Obama invited Singh as the first state visitor of his administration in 2009.

Trump, in 2017, was unknown and untested in the foreign policy space. His criticism of Pakistan in 2017 and 2018 for undermining the United States’ efforts in Afghanistan and of China for its predatory economic and trade policies provided a ballast to the India-U.S. relationship. Despite antipathy toward the previous administration, the Trump White House followed through on several of the steps flowing from earlier decisions. In November 2017, former first daughter Ivanka Trump visited India for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit, a framework started by Obama. After the Obama administration had declared India as a Major Defense Partner in 2016, Trump placed India under Strategic Trade Authorization Level 1, a category for technology releases on par with its NATO allies. He revived the Quad (made up of the United States, Australia, Japan, and India), a forum that had not seen much success since 2007, with official-level meetings in 2017 and foreign-minister-level meetings starting in 2019. He also joined the visiting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Houston in September 2019 for a rally of 50,000 Indian Americans and visited India in February 2020.

President Joe Biden began his tenure by elevating the Quad to summit-level meetings in March 2021. The Wilmington meeting will be the sixth in the series, with the United States having hosted four of them. It reflects the importance that the United States and Biden have attached to this format. The next summit will now take place in India in 2025, forcing the incoming team to also focus early in the term on outcomes and deliverables from an India visit.

Biden had a history of engagement with and support for India as the former ranking member and chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and as the former vice president. During a 2006 interview to Rediff, in the context of the Senate’s consideration of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement, he stated, “My dream is that in 2020, the two closest nations in the world will be India and the United States.”

After coming to office in 2021, the Biden National Security Council catalyzed several pathbreaking areas of agreement with India. An initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, also known as the iCET, was launched in January 2023. The ambit of the initiative includes exploring cooperation in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies, cyber, 5G/6G, biotech, semiconductors, defense, and space. A new avenue for defense cooperation was initiated in June 2023 through the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem, or INDUS-X, bringing together defense start-ups from the two countries. Since then, the forum has conducted three meetings and also announced joint challenges and awards. Moreover, Modi was invited as a state visitor in June 2023, where he addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress for the second time (after having done so earlier in 2016). Very few world leaders have historically had such an opportunity. In September 2023, President Biden visited India for the G20 Summit, during which he held an extensive bilateral meeting with the Indian prime minister.

The Biden administration continued the Trump administration’s 2018 initiative of holding 2+2 meetings of foreign and defense ministers. These convenings were held in April 2022 and November 2023, following the three held during the earlier presidency. Doing so has led to several decisions bucking past trends and hesitations. The Indian Navy now has the mandate to cooperate, as required, not just with the Hawaii-based U.S. Indo-Pacific Command but also the Gulf-based U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Africa Command, mindful of India’s vital interests in the Indian Ocean region. India can now place a liaison officer with the Florida-based U.S. Special Operations Command. In addition, the United States has a presence at the Gurugram-based Information Fusion Centre, which has been established to develop maritime domain awareness.

In the recent past, both countries have signed several agreements that seek to enhance potential mutual support and collaboration opportunities. These have included the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement for mutual logistics support in 2016, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement in 2018, the Industrial Security Annex for enabling private sector participation in the defense supply chain in 2019, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for the sharing of geospatial information in 2020. Following from these, the two countries finalized an industrial cooperation roadmap in 2023 and a security of supply agreement for priority in defense supplies in 2024. U.S. navy ships, which are a part of the United States’ sealift capacity, have started undergoing repairs at Indian shipyards. A 2024 report by the American Chamber of Commerce in India suggested that nearly 50 percent of India’s defense exports over the last five years have been part of the global value chain of U.S. defense companies. Teaming agreements have been announced to explore the setting up of maintenance, repair, and overhaul facilities in India.

Both countries now conduct more bilateral military exercises with each other than with any other country. These have included army, navy, air force, tri-service, and special forces exercises, with the stated objective of also building toward interoperability. Policy discussions have now extended to defense cyber, space, and AI. India has also become a member of the Bahrain-based Combined Maritime Forces.

A signature success during the Modi-Biden phase has been iCET. It was a signal given at the level of the national security advisors of the two countries that they supported such cooperation also from the national security imperative. This contrasted with the United States’ “small-yard, high-fence” strategy of restricting high-technology access from China’s government as well as its companies.

Aside from kickstarting cooperation discussions in several areas, the iCET has led to some significant outcomes. Several American companies have since announced fresh investments in India when it comes to semiconductor assembly, test, and packaging, as well as the engineering and training of personnel. On September 9, 2024, the U.S. State Department announced a “new partnership with India to explore semiconductor supply chain opportunities,” involving a “comprehensive assessment of India’s existing semiconductor ecosystem” that could “serve as the basis for potential future joint initiatives.” Earlier in March 2023, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry signed a memorandum of agreement to “establish a collaborative mechanism… on semiconductor supply chain resiliency and diversification.” The United States also authorized the technology transfer of General Electric’s F414 engines to India, and it did so at a level higher than it had so far for any other country.

That said, the strength of a relationship is judged not only by how the actors involved cooperate but also how they handle their differences. India and the United States have been tested recently by their differing approaches to the developments in Afghanistan in 2021, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and U.S. allegations regarding the involvement of an Indian official in the planned assassination of an Indian-origin U.S. citizen.

Despite these differences, U.S. officials have shown understanding for India’s position and compulsions when it comes to Russia. At the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was quoted as follows: “India’s relationship with Russia was developed over decades at a time when the United States was not able to be a partner to India.” He further added that the United States was now willing to be such a partner. During the same year, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that with India, the United States was “playing the long game.”

While not overtly criticizing or condemning Russia or voting against it at the United Nations, India has expressed support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. During a meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, Prime Minister Modi told Russian President Vladimir Putin that this was “not an era of war,” further indicating that diplomacy should be given a chance. He followed up on his visit to Moscow in July this year with one to Ukraine in August and reiterated the need for a peaceful resolution. In its approach to Russia, India has to be mindful of the legacy defense relationship and the need for Russia to see options beyond China.

On the alleged assassination attempt, the two sides have reportedly engaged in discussions, and India has attributed the episode to a nexus of drug traffickers and organized crime.

Biden’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of August 2021 and Trump’s earlier withdrawal agreement with the Taliban in February 2020 were driven by the United States’ political compulsions. They did not fully factor in the security interests of its allies and partners. India had provided significant assistance to Afghanistan since 2002, within the ambit of the broad security framework led by the United States. It had to rework its presence in Afghanistan once the Taliban came back to power without any negotiated intra-Afghan political agreement in place.

In September 2022, the United States approved a $450 million “sustainment package” for the F-16 aircraft with Pakistan, which it essentially has for use against India. This development was received negatively in India.

Nevertheless, encouraged by the overall progress in the bilateral relationship, India has now signed some plurilateral arrangements, such as the Artemis Accords for space exploration and the fifteen-member Minerals Security Partnership. The United States and India also launched I2U2, a food security and renewal energy cooperation agreement that also involves Israel and the UAE, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which aims to strengthen connectivity through the Gulf and Israel.

Such initiatives add to the well-known strengths in the bilateral relationship. The United States is India’s largest trading partner. U.S. companies have invested nearly $60 billion in India, and Indian companies have invested $40 billion in the United States. Indian students enrolled in U.S. universities are now among the largest, at around 270,000. Trade discussions that were earlier conflictual are now marked by positive efforts to explore new areas of cooperation. America’s Indian-origin diaspora of nearly 5 million people is now well integrated in politics, administration, and business, with an Indian-origin/African-American candidate in the running for president.

Amid the intense global contestation playing out between the United States, Russia, and China, India’s national interest clearly lies in sustaining the relationship with Russia, deepening the partnership with the United States, and strengthening itself to deal with the enduring and growing challenge from China.

The Modi-Biden meeting later this week will sustain the momentum and messaging from high-level exchanges, which the relationship still needs. It will also set the stage for the next set of actors that are likely to shape India-U.S. relations.

India-U.S. Relations Beyond the Modi-Biden Dynamic - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The End++++++++++++