Inaction is a crime without a statute of limitations. Part 2. We are capable of making everything fall into its place
December 22, 2024
Dear friends, I am continuing the series "We are capable of making everything fall into its place", which started with Part 1 "Compromises have a price"
Since December 22 is my professional holiday, I congratulate my colleagues and friends who honestly, motivated by natural and acquired abilities, deep understanding, best knowledge and hard experience, continue to selflessly devote the best years of their lives to this difficult profession of Ukrainian power engineers, and have no doubts about choosing the fate of a nuclear power plant operator.
My country is at war, and nuclear power plants are part of the foundation of our economic, military and political security. So it is time to talk about how Ukrainian NPPs and their personnel acted in extraordinary conditions, what opportunities they lost, and what they should do to survive.
We are not able to stay away from the mistakes that overtook us, and became a bitter experience and opportunity to draw proper conclusions, punish evil and continue the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
That is why I will start with February 24, 2022, when for the first time in the world, the nuclear state - the russian federation - committed an act of nuclear terrorism by seizing the Chornobyl NPP (ChNPP), where thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel and more than two hundred tons of melt from the destroyed Unit 4 reactor are stored.
Surprisingly, but the heads of the Regulator and the Operator (utility) did not use their powers to change the Emergency Plans - the emergency response system of NPPs and strengthen their physical protection. Ukrainian NPPs did not receive any technical instructions, orders, or changes to the technological regulations for safe operation that would define the procedure for personnel to act in case of loss of physical protection of NPPs in war conditions.
A week after the ChNPP seizure, nothing has changed: the defense functions of the National Guard units to protect the NPP have not been reinforced with military weapons and have not been transformed into the ability to actively defend the NPP and satellite cities. Nor have the Operator and the Regulator initiated such changes by appealing to the Government and the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.
The only thing the Head of the Regulatory body managed to do on the third day of the war was to send a letter No. 15-1/BC dated February 26, 2022, to the Moscow Regional Center of the World Association of Nuclear Operators, 109507, Moscow, Ferganskaya 25, WANO office, Tel: +7(495)376-1587, Fax: +7(495)376-0897, e-mail: [email protected] , in which they requested: "In connection with the military operation conducted by the armed forces of the russian federation on the entire territory of Ukraine, we request the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), as an international organization established to help its members achieve the highest level of operational safety by providing them with access to the world's treasure trove of operational experience:
1) to share experience in maintaining NPP operational safety in the context of military operations using all types of weapons, as well as in state regulation and supervision of nuclear and radiation safety in such conditions;
2) to inform about the ways to respond and provide assistance in case of emergencies at NPPs, regardless of their occurrence, in conditions when infrastructure (roads, bridges, transmission lines, airfields, power supply and communication facilities) is subjected to targeted destruction by the armed forces of the russian federation throughout Ukraine;
3) to inform about approaches to imposing liability for civilian nuclear damage in the conditions of aggression.
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We also ask the World Association of Nuclear Operators to provide a separate comment on the intentions of the russian federation to replace the ChNPP operational staff, who have not changed the shifts for five days at the plant, with the personnel of russian NPPs, who have no experience and appropriate training for the operation of new facilities constructed at the Chornobyl NPP site."
In his letter, the Chairman shyly did not inform his Moscow counterparts that the Chornobyl NPP had been seized by the russian military, but for some reason asked "to give a separate comment on the intentions of the russian federation to replace the operational staff of the Chornobyl NPP.... with the staff of russian NPPs,"
The Chairman could have received the answers to the first three questions from Energoatom – the Operator or the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear Safety. He did not ask for recommendations from the NRC, PNNL, ANL USA, he did not inquire about the experience of European regulators BMU Germany, STUK Finland and the Royal Institutions of Norway and Sweden, which have supported cooperation with the Ukrainian Regulator for almost all years of independence.
Let's assume that the President of the Operating company did not understand the military plans of the russian armed forces with regard to the Zaporizhzhya NPP, and had not clue about the plan of other russian units that for some reason moved in two directions to the South Ukraine NPP - through Yelanets to Oleksandrivka and through Nova Odesa to Voznesensk, and for his position this is not the competence required by the requirements.
Although, according to the personal license issued to the President of the Operating company, he is required to have an appropriate level of qualification that allows assessing the risks of external blackout of NPPs and time limits for power supply of own needs from emergency DGs, which, under pressure, will force the military and political leadership of Ukraine to make difficult decisions, and it is possible that on the terms of the russian federation, in order to avoid a severe accident at 9 reactors in southern Ukraine.
The responsibility of the head of the Operating company is to ensure compliance with the requirements of Ukrainian legislation, and in case of violation, to bring the NPP to the safest possible condition and inform the Regulator in accordance with the established procedure.
It is obvious that the President of Energoatom was very well aware of the threats for himself personally, otherwise he would not have evacuated to Khmelnytskyi NPP, leaving Kyiv without activating Energoatom’s Crisis Center. He could have relocated their position to a safer place, together with the staff who, by their official duties, must ensure coordination of emergency response of various divisions of the Company.
For the first time in the history of mankind, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and the second largest in the world was under military attack with the use of heavy weapons by the military units of a nuclear country. The situation was extraordinary, and no one could have predicted the consequences, especially after the loss of the emergency power supply system at ZNPP, where only one reactor was in a subcritical state and the rest were at power, for which the loss of heat removal function would threaten to damage the nuclear fuel in 3.5 hours.
It is obvious that this is not even a variant of Fukushima or a natural disaster, but a military machine that boldly, according to the plan, was shelling a nuclear power plant site with six reactors and spent fuel pools, two almost full fresh fuel storage facilities and an open dry storage site for spent fuel, where 4,152 nuclear assemblies are cooled.
Along with the power units, there were tanks with two thousand tons of diesel fuel for 20 emergency diesel engines, electrolysis plants with compressed hydrogen reserves, and five electric generators, each of which held 120 cubic meters of hydrogen at a pressure of 6 bar. In addition, there were more than 2,000 tons of diesel fuel reserves located 1.2 km from the NPP site, which, if detonated, could create a shock wave of more than 10 kg/m2.
Everything seems to be clear; the heads of the Operating company are obliged to activate all the emergency response tools provided for - in accordance with the threats that have arisen and in the manner prescribed by the Law and the current requirements of the nuclear legislation of Ukraine, particularly, in accordance with the Requirements for Internal and External NPP Crisis Centers: "The Operator, together with the NPP crisis centers, shall ensure management of mechanisms for effective response to events requiring protective measures on and off the NPP site to regain control over the emergency, prevent and mitigate its consequences, including events related to a combination of hazards, as well as events involving several or all nuclear facilities and other potentially hazardous objects on the NPP site and external impacts on it." In addition, according to Section IV. - Procedure for Activation of NPP Crisis Centers: the external Energoatom’s Crisis Center is activated within 30 minutes during working hours and no later than 60 minutes after working hours.
The threat of losing 9 power units out of 15 operating power units in Ukraine did not affect either the Regulator or the Operator: Ukraine's NPPs were left without crisis management, and this is already with seized Zaporizhzhya NPP and the potential threat of losing the South Ukraine NPP, 30 km from which the defenders of Voznesensk bravely protected it with their bodies.
It took almost 6 months to activate the Operator’s Crisis Center, and it seems that all this time the russian armed forces near our NPPs were not qualified as a threat, otherwise it is impossible to explain the inaction and irresponsible waiting, which resulted in the loss of physical protection of ZNPP, as well as the ability to protect its personnel through international IAEA safeguards, in order to have the conditions and opportunities to continue ensuring the safety functions of ZNPP management by Ukrainian licensed personnel.
Even if we assume that nuclear industry leaders were confident that none of the NPPs would be seized, given the intensity of hostilities it was not possible not think about station blackouts due to the? damage of substations and transmission lines. It is quite obvious that russian military units planned to simultaneously seize ZNPP and SUNPP in order to have a trump card for the March 3 talks in Istanbul, which is why the failure to activate the Crisis Center at the beginning of the war is a crime and an attempt to hide the real facts of what was done and what should have been done to avoid losing the ZNPP.
Operational safety experts are aware of other risks, such as the shutdown of a nuclear power plant due to the activation of emergency protection as a result of a seismic signal that could be caused by a powerful explosion near the site. After February 28, 2022, ZNPP management understood the enemy's plan, and therefore, to avoid false triggering of the emergency protection by the seismic parameter, they disabled the seismic protection for the signal. This was the right and timely decision - an example of high professionalism and foresight, as the probability of an earthquake was incomparable with the real threat of simultaneous shutdown of ZNPP power units and the possibility of a blackout of the Ukrainian power system. The ZNPP personnel tried to disrupt the enemy's plans, but after this was reported to the management of the Operating Company, they were forced to re-initiate the seismic protection automation.
So why was it so important for the Company’s management to re-initiate the emergency protection for seismic parameters? Its disabling was not a violation, it is allowed by the technological regulations for safe operation if the emergency protection is falsely triggered. Besides, in case of an earthquake other emergency protections are designed to actuate for duplication purposes in order to prevent damage to the secondary or primary coolant pipelines.
It was only a lucky accident that the seismic protection accelerometers did not actuate on February 4, when the russians with heavy weapons targeted all sectors and directions that the power supply to the ZNPP and activation of seismic sensors depended on.
Let me remind you that before the war started, Ukraine and russia had international agreements on nuclear cooperation. These were the agreements that had to be denounced immediately: The Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the russian federation on Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the russian federation on Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Materials Transportation, the Agreement between the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine and the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Supervision of russia on Information Exchange and Cooperation in the Field of Safety Regulation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.
Perhaps these were the very agreements that could later be turned into a tool to protect russia and Ukraine's internal enemies from the punishment in the International Court of Justice in the future.
Nothing prevented the Head of the Regulator from requiring the Operator to conduct a safety self-assessment and determine the safest state in case of loss of physical protection, as well as to establish appropriate restrictions to the terms of the license for operation of operating NPPs in Ukraine. It seems that the Operator lacked the Regulator's instructions to determine the safest state of ZNPPs, although according to the requirements of Ukrainian legislation, this has always been its duty.
We eventually managed to see the Regulator's request No. 15-23/03/6880-7611 dated 24.06.2022 and received the long-awaited results of the Operator’s self-assessment No. 01-9057/18-vs dated 15.07.2022, which did determine further permits from the Regulator – To not restrict the license to operate ZNPP Units 3, 4, 5, 6 in the "Operation at Power" state, which were approved by the Order No. 501 dated 18.08.2022. However, the result of the Operator’s self-assessment looked cynical - no less than a justification for the armed aggression of the russian federation, according to which "Threats from military operations to NPPs are similar to threats from external natural and man-made hazards".
Regarding the loss of physical protection of ZNPP, this fact was not considered a critical event, as evidenced by the Operator's application to introduce changes to licenses No. EE 001052 and No. EE 001055 for the right to carry out the activity "operation of a nuclear facility" of power units 1 and 2. According to the application, it was proposed to amend the licenses with restrictions on operation in subcritical states of the reactor unit "shutdown for fuel overload" and "cold shutdown" (for power unit No. 1) and "cold shutdown" (for power unit No. 2), as well as to remove from the license conditions the requirements for ensuring physical protection of nuclear facilities of power units No. 1 and 2. In addition, the application provided for additional changes regarding the possibility of obtaining a "Separate permit for the startup of a nuclear facility after the withdrawal of military equipment from the premises of ZNPP Units 1 and 2".
The shelling and disconnection of the 750 kV Dniprovska power line, the de-energization of ZNPP with emergency shutdown of power units 5 and 6 on 25.08.2022 was a particularly illustrative example of the irresponsible actions of Energoatom and the Regulator, which crossed out any hopes for the transfer of power units to a safe state, which provoked further power outages of power units No. 5 and No. 6 operated at power, which was repeatedly corrected by ZNPP personnel in the fall of 2022 - until their final transfer to the "Cold Shutdown" state.
The deployment of military equipment and ammunition at the industrial site, mining of buildings, equipment and routes for technological maintenance of safety-related systems and components, presence of personnel of the russian armed forces in the area of operating equipment and its maintenance systems are factors that are unacceptable for NPP operation at power.
The loss of local administration made it impossible to take measures to protect personnel and the public in the event of a nuclear or radiation accident at ZNPP. Therefore, the transfer of all power units to the "Cold Shutdown" state would minimize possible risks and consequences of accidents.
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The conduct of active hostilities and the presence of the russian military directly at the ZNPP site is an act of terrorism and a threat to nuclear and radiation safety, because:
1.??? They made it impossible for the personnel to perform direct functions of nuclear reactor control under conditions of normal operation, abnormal operation, design and beyond design basis accidents;
2.??? They prevented the use of additional technical means of mobile power supply;
3.??? They made it impossible for the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to extinguish fires and respond to other possible accidents;
4.??? The threatened to pose severe damage to nuclear fuel, radiation contamination of the environment and exposure of personnel and the public;
5.??? They made it impossible to protect personnel and population on the temporarily occupied territory from the consequences of the nuclear power plant accident.
For those who perceive only formal signs of responsibility, I propose to familiarize themselves with how the activities of the nuclear industry leaders were coordinated with the current legislation of Ukraine, international IAEA standards and the provisions of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
In accordance with the provisions of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, SNRIU Board Resolution No. 4 of April 3, 2022, states that the seizure of NPP sites by russian troops is an act of nuclear terrorism. Accordingly, this is a direct violation of the fundamental principles of nuclear power plant safety and the defense-in-depth strategy provided for in the General Safety Provisions for Nuclear Power Plants in Ukraine, as well as in international and generally recognized IAEA standards provided for in the Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1 and Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation, SSR-2/2 (Rev. 1).
According to part 8 of Article 24 of the Law of Ukraine "On Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety" The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine "carries out state supervision over compliance with the legislation, conditions stipulated by permitting documents, norms and rules on nuclear and radiation safety, requirements for physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, radioactive waste, other sources of ionizing radiation, accounting and control of nuclear materials and other sources of ionizing radiation, including emergency preparedness of entities operating in the field of nuclear energy use; in case of violations, it applies coercive measures to legal entities and individuals within its authority in accordance with the law.”
According to Article 81 of the Law, violations are "failure to comply with the terms of permits issued by the state nuclear and radiation safety regulatory authorities; failure to comply with the instructions of the state nuclear and radiation safety regulatory authorities".
Part 3 of clause 23 of the Procedure for State Supervision of Compliance with Nuclear and Radiation Safety Requirements, approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 824 dated 13.11.2013, states: "In case of impossibility to eliminate violations of nuclear and radiation safety requirements and/or inability of the nuclear energy entity to ensure compliance with such requirements, which has led or may lead to additional (above the established levels) exposure of personnel, the public or environmental pollution, state inspectors shall issue orders to restrict, terminate or suspend the operation of state supervision facilities."
Pursuant to Article 16 of the Law "On Permitting Activities in the Field of Nuclear Energy Use", a license to carry out activities at certain stages of the life cycle of a nuclear facility may be suspended by the state nuclear and radiation safety regulatory authority in the event of "violation by the licensee of the license terms, norms and rules on nuclear and radiation safety; the licensee's inability to comply with the conditions for carrying out the declared type of activity established by the norms and rules on nuclear and radiation safety".
According to part 7 of Article 16 of this law: "If the state nuclear and radiation safety regulatory authority decides to suspend the validity of a ... license, the licensee shall immediately cease carrying out previously authorized activities, notify the said authority and take measures to maintain the conditions necessary to ensure occupational safety, personnel health, and environmental protection."
On March 04, 2022, the occupation forces of the russian federation used heavy weapons and seized Zaporizhzhya NPP, which led to the destruction of its physical protection system, disabling of the emergency response system, and deployment of the aggressor's military, heavy weapons and ammunition at the NPP site, violation of the requirements for safe operation (violation of nuclear, radiation, fire safety standards) of power units and gross violation of the terms of licenses for their safe operation, in which the licensee is unable to comply with the declared type of activity established by the rules and regulations on nuclear and radiation safety.
Under the circumstances, urgent actions were required in accordance with the rights and obligations granted by the State to the independent regulatory body for nuclear legislation of Ukraine. According to Article 20-1) of Section 4 of the Regulation on the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (Resolution No. 363 of 20.08.2014), the SNRIU "organizes work on determining the design risk for nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation in Ukraine".
In the context of the war, neglect of the requirements of the nuclear legislation of Ukraine, primarily the Laws "On the Use of Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety" and "On Permitting Activities in the Field of Nuclear Energy Use", the violation of which creates additional nuclear and radiation risks that devalue Ukraine's efforts to fulfill its international obligations in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The above factors of military capture and loss of physical protection of ZNPP required the heads of the Regulator and the Operator to immediately review the design threats to Ukrainian NPPs, and therefore, answer the questions that have no statute of limitations:
Question 1 -??? After the seizure of ChNPP and ZNPP, how did the Regulator determine the Design Threats for Ukrainian NPPs and in what timeframe?
Question 2 -??? Why didn’t the Operator provide clear technical instructions (Orders) on how to act in case of loss of physical protection and seizure of ZNPP, if the technological regulations for safe operation did not provide direct directives and definitions of the safe state of NPP in case of loss of physical protection?
Question 3 -??? Why, after the loss of physical protection and the seizure of ZNPP, did the Operator not immediately transfer all ZNPP power units to the "Cold Shutdown" state and notify the Regulator of Ukraine?
Question 4 -??? Why, after the loss of physical protection and the seizure of ZNPP, did the Chief State Nuclear Safety Inspector not issue an order to immediately shut down and transfer six ZNPP power units to the "Cold Shutdown" state?
Question 5 -??? Who and when made changes to the terms of the ZNPP operating license due to the problems in ensuring emergency preparedness of ZNPP, and what changes were made to the Emergency Plan of ZNPP and when according to the current state of loss of physical protection, occupation of the territory and risks of hostilities?
Question 6 - ?? Why, in the context of the loss of physical protection and occupation of ZNPP, based on the requirements of Article 6 of the Law of Ukraine "On Permitting Activities in the Field of Nuclear Energy Use" (regarding the licensee's inability to ensure physical protection of nuclear facilities, accounting and control of nuclear materials), based on Article 61 of the Law of Ukraine "On Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety" (regarding the prohibition of operation of a nuclear facility and work with nuclear materials, unless measures are taken to meet the requirements for ensuring physical protection), no decision was made to suspend the licenses for operation of ZNPP Units 1-6 and dry spent fuel storage facility in accordance with Article 16 of the Law “On Permitting Activities in the Field of Nuclear Energy Use”?
Question 7 -??? After the loss of physical protection of ZNPP, what safety assessments of the current state were performed and when, and how was it consistent with Articles 4, 5, 15, 33, 46, 47, 60, 62, 63, Article 22 - parts 3 and 4, Article 23 - part 2, Article 24 - parts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Article 25 - parts 1, 3, Article 26 - parts 4, 5, 6, of the Law of Ukraine on Nuclear Energy Use and Radiation Safety
Question 8 -??? Why the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the russian federation on Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the russian federation on Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Materials Transportation, and the Agreement between the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine and the Federal Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of russia on the Exchange of Information and Cooperation in the Field of Safety Regulation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy were not denounced after the seizure of the Chornobyl NPP and then Zaporizhzhya NPP, and who should but didn’t convey this information to the military and political leadership of Ukraine in time?
Question 9 -??? Based on which legal provisions and justifications, on August 18, 2022, the Regulator adopted Order No. 501 on amending the licenses with restrictions on the operation of ZNPP Units 1 and 2 in the "Cold Shutdown" state and did not apply these amendments to the licenses of ZNPP Units 3, 4, 5, 6?
Question 10 -? Why did the Regulator issue an Order to restrict the operation of ZNPP Units 3, 4, 5, 6 at power levels only on 11.02.2023 and why did it allow the operation of Units 5 and 6 in the "Hot Shutdown" state?
Question 11 -? On what grounds, after ZNPP operational personnel transferred the reactors to subcritical condition on 4.03.2022 and 25.08.2022, did the Regulator authorize the commissioning of ZNPP power units?
Question 12 -? Why the Operator did not initiate and the Regulator did not insist on changing the license conditions during 385 days of loss of ZNPP physical protection, and did not determine the "Cold Shutdown" of all ZNPP units as safe, and why did it take time until the Regulator's Order No. 338 of 28.06.2023 was issued?
Question 13 -? On the basis of what documents/grounds were various regulatory decisions made to limit the safe operation of ZNPPs for the period from March 4, 2012 to June 28, 2013?
Question 14 -? Why was there no proposal to convene a conference to revise the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of May 21, 1963 (Article XXVI of the Convention) to establish absolute liability for nuclear damage on a Contracting Party that has committed an act of nuclear terrorism against a nuclear facility of another Contracting Party?
Answers to these questions will not be able to hide the inaction and removal of the officials from their positions who failed to maintain the physical protection of ZNPP and did not timely transfer ZNPP to a safe state, did not activate the Energoatom’s Crisis Center in the early days of the war and wasted time with the presence of IAEA experts at ZNPP, and as a result, did not protect Ukrainian ZNPP personnel, which allowed Rosatom to seize control of ZNPP, whose return now also means an uncertain risk and lost opportunities.
No explanation can justify criminal acts against the interests of Ukraine, which have no statute of limitations, and therefore there will be responsibility for inaction.
Georgiy Balakan, December 22, 2020
P.S. I do not want readers to get the impression that Ukraine's NPPs were left unprotected. On the contrary, these were impressive examples of statesmanlike behavior of NPP managers in conditions of war and uncertainty - without exception. Even though they remained autonomous centers of resistance at the beginning of the war, NPPs continued to operate in extremely difficult conditions, demonstrating not only the ability to operate for their own needs in an isolated mode from the power system, but also showed other technological capabilities and high professional training of personnel in the face of the shocks to the Ukrainian power system, in which NPPs repeatedly demonstrated resistance to new phenomena of transients, which Ukrainian licensed operators successfully coped with without violating operational safety limits.
In the next publication "Responsibility for Actions and Consequences. Part 3 "We are capable of making everything fall into its place" - we will talk about how and why we managed to destroy the enemy's plans not only at ZNPP, but also in the most critical area of the SUNPP and the nearest to the enemy's border RNPP, by the way, whose Director General acted decisively and proactively, realizing the risks and level of threats, did not hide, did not remain silent, but made responsible actions and statements that destroyed the enemy's plans, which neither the head of the Operator nor the russian invaders liked. We will learn more about those details from Pavlo Pavlyshyn's memoirs, and how Energoatom’s management thanked him for his leadership and statesmanship, and how he was honored for the fortress that the city of Varash and the RNPP turned into, and how local communities and self-defense forces carried out the necessary filtration measures to protect the city of Varash and the RNPP from enemy provocations and sabotage.
The same were the extremely difficult days at the dear to me - SUNPP, the safety of which has always been a priority for me, because I have dedicated to it most of my professional life and chose it as the closest to my native village of Troitske in Odesa region and Odesa Polytechnic Institute, where I received my higher education in nuclear power plant operation.
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