Ice Curtain and Polar Silk Road The Pan Domain Threat to the North
In 1995, Richard Weber (Canada) and Misha Malakhov (Russia) completed first unsupported expedition to reach the North Pole and return on foot. The 108-day unsupported journey is unlikely to be repeated in our lifetime owing to global warming and the breaking up of the Arctic ice. It is fascinating that global warming would also break open a myriad of national security issues in the region.
?
The Canadian Armed Forces has maintained a presence in the high north for decades. The signals intelligence station Alert, located on the northeastern tip of Ellesmere Island, in the Qikiqtaaluk Region of Nunavut, Canada, is the northernmost continuously inhabited place in the world. Canada has been listening in the North since the cold war of the 1950’s. It has been quiet for most of our life. However, the region is now heating up.
?
Introduction
?
These days, when one brings up the topic of Arctic Security or Sovereignty, the conversation tends to focus on international shipping. But the threat is both complex and pan-domain. It is worth a strategic discussion.
?
The Arctic region, once considered remote and isolated, has now become of global interest owing to the rapidly changing environment and increased accessibility. As the Arctic ice continues to recede, the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage have gained preference as shorter routes for global shipping. Increased traffic poses environmental risks, including oil spills, and potential territorial disputes among Arctic states. The warming waters are drawing in fish species, leading to heightened competition among states and commercial interests. Overfishing in the Arctic could deplete marine resources and disrupt the local ecosystem. The vast reserves of untapped oil and gas in the Arctic attract multinational corporations and Arctic nations. Oil exploration has the potential to lead to environmental degradation and potential geopolitical conflicts. Environmental safeguards and responsible resource exploitation are critical to ensure the stability and security of this unique and fragile region.? There remain an array of security threats across multiple domains.
?
Pacing Threats
?
Canada's north is of strategic importance and has garnered the attention of competitors, including China and Russia. While both China and Russia do not pose a direct military threat to Canada in the traditional sense, there are a number of ways in which their actions in the Arctic pose clear and present challenges to Canadian interests.
?
Territorial Disputes
?
Canada and Russia have overlapping claims in the Arctic, particularly in the Beaufort Sea. Unresolved disputes over the North Pole and the extended continental shelf are increasing tensions. Russia has already planted flags on the Lomonosov ridge claiming sovereignty.
?
Russia's control over the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a key shipping lane through the Arctic - giving it significant influence over international trade and navigation. As the NSR gains importance, Canada ought to be concerned over access to this route and ensuring that international maritime laws are upheld.
?
The Arctic is also rich in natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals and fish. As Russia and China seek to exploit these resources, competition has led to disputes over access and conservation efforts. For example, the Kremlin has already laid claim to huge chunk of oil-rich North Pole.[1]
?
Ice Curtain
?
Russia continues to militarize the arctic with bombers, subs and bases. They have been actively expanding its military presence in the polar region, including the construction of new bases[2] and military facilities and established drift stations (40 since WW2). At this point, Russia has more arctic bases than NATO[3]. The Russian air force makes regular incursions with bombers into Canadian airspace. These actions contribute to an increased military presence in the region, which is meant to be perceived as a show of strength and intimidation. Russia has also been known to sabotage undersea cables in the arctic and electronically jam global positioning systems (GPS) of ships and aircraft.
?
Polar Silk Road
?
China has unequivocally stated its intentions to become a “polar great power”?by 2030.[4] Describing itself as a "near-Arctic state" and is expanding its presence and interests. ?China's ambitious "Polar Silk Road" initiative aims to establish a network of Arctic trade routes, telecommunications infrastructure, as well as ocean, terrestrial and space surveillance. China’s road and belt initiative is intended to shift the balance of economic, technological and military global power. The Polar Silk Road is a key part of this global strategy. The Thousand Talents Plan recruits leading international experts in scientific research, innovation, and entrepreneurship. United Front Work[5] gathers intelligence on, manages relations with, and attempts to influence or intimidate[6], individuals and organizations in Canada, using industry, government, military, intelligence services and organized crime. China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy[7] has companies become direct benefactors of intelligence. These companies have been active in Canada’s north. China’s Three Warfares strategy[8] is a political and information pre-kinetic warfare calculus of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) encompassing media or public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare – also active in the north. The Canadian North is a strategic target but lacks the resiliency or means to detect, deter or disrupt a pan-domain threat.
?
Surveillance
?
The Arctic's increasing strategic importance necessitates robust Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. A number of countries have sought to sense the environment from sea floor to space. China uses "dual-purpose technologies", to conduct surveillance both for research and military purposes. Canada's military has said it recently discovered evidence of Chinese surveillance efforts in the Arctic[9]. Months before Chinese spy balloons drifted across Alaska and Northern Canada, the Canadian military retrieved Chinese spy buoys. The buoys were monitoring U.S. submarines and the melting of ice sheets.[10] ?China plans massive listening programme at the North Pole after declaring success in Arctic test of underwater device.[11] Far overhead, China has launched advanced synthetic aperture radar satellites to surveil the arctic[12] The Arctic's strategic significance for global security and surveillance has led to increased military activities in the region, including foreign submarine patrols and surveillance aircraft.
?
Cyber Power
?
Canada’s north faces numerous challenges for even basic communication coverage and broad-band data services. Northern peoples face all the same cyber threats as most Canadians but without a mature security ecosystem. The growing importance of the Arctic for global telecommunications and data routing will be exploited for cyber-espionage and attacks on critical infrastructure, potentially impacting national security. China is expanding communications infrastructure in the arctic with radio stations, underwater submarine communications, global positioning systems, high-speed Internet and communications satellites[13] Meanwhile, Russia Plans to Launch Nine dual-use Polar-orbiting Satellites for navigation, weather surveillance and communications the Arctic by 2026[14]
?
Chinese telecoms giant Huawei has committed to connecting Canada’s North. “We also believe that every Canadian deserves access to a fast, reliable network, no matter which part of Canada they call home. Huawei Canada is proud to help our partners connect those living in rural and remote communities, bringing people together from coast to coast to coast.”[15]
?
Foreign cyber infrastructure in the north presents a serious exposure to deliberate interference, manipulation and shaping. China has already established major internet points of presence in Canada which they used to highjack traffic at scale.[16] Experts have been warning that a Huawei monopoly in North would leave residents vulnerable to China.[17] Additionally, the proliferation of Chinese mobile devices and apps used by Canadians opens up opportunities for the collection of sensitive data and tracking of individuals.
?
Although, Canada can ban new domestic projects involving Huawei, legacy information infrastructure remains, Canada no jurisdiction in space or the ability to prevent northerners from connecting to Chinese or Russian satellites for communications or navigation. Huawei announced in 2019 that it will be partnering with local telecommunications to expand satellite coverage to 70 communities in the north.[18] Researchers at China’s Space Engineering University, which operates under the People's Liberation Army, recommended suppressing Starlink using own satellite constellation.[19] China has started rolling out 5G satellite network to cover remote areas like the arctic.[20] The Chinese megaconstellation will launch 13,000 satellites over the next decade.[21]
?
领英推荐
Foreign Ownership Control and Influence
?
Canada is home to many indigenous communities in the Arctic. Actions by Russia or China that might impact these communities or their traditional lands should be perceived as a threat to Canadian sovereignty and indigenous rights. Foreign investment in Arctic infrastructure projects and natural resources can shape the socio-political landscape and raise concerns about potential interference in local governance. For example, in 2011, a Chinese-owned multinational mining corporation, expressed interest in building a road to open up some of the Arctic’s remote but lucrative mineral reserves.[22] China has been active in the overt and covert acquisition mining resources supported by state espionage campaigns.[23] ?Note that, Chinese state-owned-enterprises have significant ownership stakes ranging from 10-26% in several of Canada's largest mining companies.[24] The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has warned Inuit leaders that foreign adversaries could gain a foothold in Canada by offering to fill?infrastructure gaps in the North.[25] A pattern of behavior would appear to show this to be the case.
?
Perhaps the most insidious threat to the north is that of maligned influence, which takes the form of interference and control supported Mis-Dis-Mal information (MDM) campaigns. Arctic communities are particularly vulnerable to deception and disinformation campaigns and propaganda that can manipulate public opinion and influence policies. China, through various proxies, has been active in cultural initiatives in the North that can be used to exploit political influence as part of a soft-power strategies. China has been openly critical of Canada's treatment of Indigenous peoples in order to strain relations in Arctic governance.
?
Hostile intelligence services and militaries will continue to exploit, interfere with and influence Canadian interests in the arctic. China and Russia maintain vast disinformation ecosystems and run sophisticated operations-at-scale against global target audiences. The open nature of liberal society and democratic institutions makes it difficult to effectively counter grey-zone operations.[26] Both Russia and China[27] have been implicated in foreign influence and political interference.[28] Canada should be on high alert.[29]
?
Foreign influence is the enemy of a True North Strong and Free.
?
Conclusion
?
As the Arctic region becomes more accessible owing to climate change, the interests of multiple stakeholders will converge, and these pan-domain threats to Arctic security will continue to evolve posing a serious threat to Canada's interests. The Russia’s Ice Curtain and China’s Polar Silk Road will most likely contest the environment from sea floor to space while continuing to conduct cyber, influence and interference campaigns against Canada. The Arctic demands a delicate balance between harnessing its opportunities and addressing the complex security concerns that threaten the environmental, economic and political future of the region. Arctic states, are generally committed to peaceful cooperation and the rule of international law with diplomacy, negotiation, and cooperation remain the preferred approaches. It is unlikely that Russia and China will abide by world order norms, if they don't get their own way. Therefore, it is crucial for Canada to stand on guard, remain vigilant and protect its interests, to ensure the stability, security and prosperity of the region across all domains.
?
?
CEO Clairvoyance Cyber Corp
1 年https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2024/jan/25/how-russia-is-taking-control-of-the-arctic-video
CEO Clairvoyance Cyber Corp
1 年https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/2024/01/03/russia-china-partnership-prompts-new-us-arctic-strategy-00132560
Executive in the Government of Canada | Transforming the public service to serve us better #Leadership #Technology #NationalSecurity
1 年Great piece, Dave. Love the Arctic. Love reading about Arctic security issues.