I could not have said it better: Russian Federation army acting like ISIS in Ukraine. If so how to treat their commanders should be the same: FTR

It is time to rip off the band aid off Putin's "special operation" in Ukraine

What is happening in occupied Ukraine deserves Hague trial status

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ISIS and its predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), started their "special military operation" to occupy parts of Syria and Libya in 2011 and 2014, respectively. The organization initially relied on covert operations to infiltrate both rebel and regime security and military structures, absorbing like-minded organisations and individuals, creating false-front civilian organisations, collecting intelligence (and "dirt") on community leaders in targeted areas, all while initially denying its existence on the targeted territories.

These operations were led by "agents-in-charge:" spymasters with kinetic assets and authority to assassinate, bomb, bribe, recruit, map-out targeted territories and designate local factions and communities.

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Whereas in Ukraine

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Rape, as a crime of war, was weaponised by elements of the Russian armed forces multiple times before, especially during the?first and second Chechen wars. The case of rapist-officer, Colonel Yuri Budanov of the 160th?Tank Guards Regiment, is perhaps the most infamous. Amnesty International, Memorial, and other human right organisation documented other alleged cases.

The interception of a?discussion about raping Ukrainian women?between a Russian soldier and his wife is quite an alarming development. The intensity of propaganda on official Russia TV and other media outlets likely contributes, either directly or indirectly, to this behaviour.

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Whereas

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Operational Victories, Strategic Defeat?

Like ISIS, Russian armed forces suffer from a structural crisis: limited manpower to achieve their strategic goals. ISIS was outnumbered and outgunned during the overwhelming majority of its battles, whether against state or nonstate forces.

Given its initial strategic objectives, Russia has suffered from a similar crisis. It cannot control 604,000 square kilometres with 130 battalion tactical groups, high rates of attrition, strong levels of local resistance and unprecedented NATO and international support to Ukraine.

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What we are seeing is state terrorism. And here is the kicker

D. Targeting the helpless

The World Health Organization?records 44 attacks?on health facilities, health supplies, health workers or patients in Ukraine. Of those, 34 attacks have impacted health facilities. Violence with heavy weapons as well as abduction, arrest or detention of health staff are recorded. The list updates as more reports come in.

The effects of such attacks go far beyond the tragic loss of life. Destroyed infrastructure, inability to refer to other health facilities, diminished access to technology, equipment and drugs, and lack of power or fuel for generators affect how hospitals function under such circumstances.

Such attacks also undermine the morale of health professionals and community members. They deter people who need health care from accessing remaining services. People may feel unsafe leaving bomb shelters to seek care if hospitals become targets or are insecure.

These attacks are deliberate

Despite the legal protections afforded to health facilities in wartime under?international law, we continue to see such attacks in many conflicts including Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Myanmar.

Given the sophistication of modern weaponry and laser-guided munitions, there are few who believe attacks on such facilities are “accidental”. Rather, history shows us they are part of a strategy of war and aim to achieve certain objectives.

In his book?Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War, UK academic and policy advisor Hugo Slim explores why parties to conflict might resort to such tactics.

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Call it what it is,/ state terrorism

https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2022/05/11/7139222/

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Putin’s Army Fights Like ISIS in Ukraine. Their Way to Lose Is the Same, Too

WEDNESDAY, 11 MAY 2022 — OMAR ASHOUR, FOR EUROPEAN PRAVDA VIA MIDDLE EAST EYE

Russia maintains a military presence in Syria and insists they're fighting against the Islamic State. But in fact, the Russian army follows the ISIS tactics. (picture: pro-Russian demonstration in Aleppo, 9.05.2022)

In February 1993, former CIA Director James Woolsey famously?described?the post-cold war environment by stating that the U.S. and its allies slayed a large dragon (the Soviet Union) but ended up in a jungle full of snakes (warlords in failed states, terrorism and various substate threats).

David Kilcullen argued in a?masterpiece?that "dragons" (international and regional powers) can fight like "snakes" (substate actors) to enhance military effectiveness.

In Ukraine, Russian forces have employed both ways of warfare. It has employed tactics similar to those used by the so-called "Islamic State Organisation," whose defunct acronym was ISIS.

These tactics are ideology-free and combat-effective. Many of them are prohibited and?their results can amount to war crimes.

How ISIS Fights

ISIS and its predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), started their "special military operation" to occupy parts of Syria and Libya in 2011 and 2014, respectively. The organization initially relied on covert operations to infiltrate both rebel and regime security and military structures, absorbing like-minded organisations and individuals, creating false-front civilian organisations, collecting intelligence (and "dirt") on community leaders in targeted areas, all while initially denying its existence on the targeted territories.

These operations were led by "agents-in-charge:" spymasters with kinetic assets and authority to assassinate, bomb, bribe, recruit, map-out targeted territories and designate local factions and communities.

The modus-operandi paid off. By September 2013, ISIS became the dominant armed organisation in Raqqa City by relying almost exclusively on urban terrorism tactics and infiltration operations. These actions were followed by raiding and looting parts of both the Assad regime’s and armed opposition’s conventional arsenals, which ISIS then modified, converted, and upgraded.

Similar?modi operandi?were executed in the Libyan?City of Sirte?in 2015 and selectively in a range of towns and cities from the Southern Philippines to Western Libya, and more recently in West Africa.?

How Russia Similarly Fights in Ukraine

"Good people, bad authority does not work [in Ukraine]. Recognition of this fact is the basis of the policy of denazification…The name ‘Ukraine’ apparently cannot be preserved as the title of any fully de-nazified state…Denazification will inevitably be de-Ukrainianization."

These excerpts from an infamous?article?published in the Russian state-controlled news agency?RIA Novosti?represent a type of propaganda which legitimates mass-violence against non-conformist peoples and the liquidation of existing states. It is similar to types of propaganda employed in other modern historical contexts, including by ISIS.

The parallels between the tactics of Russia and ISIS do not end with propaganda, however. Other similarities can be found in ways of warfare employed by the Russian armed forces under Vladimir Putin and the combat units of ISIS.

As of February 2014 in Crimea and April 2014 in the Donbass, Russia and its local proxies relied on tactics that are very similar to those employed by ISIS and its predecessors between 2012 and 2014.

For instance, both Russia and ISIS have used false-front civilian organisations, kidnapping and assassinations, propaganda and disinformation campaigns, psychological warfare, and infiltrations of senior ranks. Initially, Russia didn’t admit to having employed these tactics (maskirovka), but neither did ISIS initially.

To secure its strategic gains, Russia executed one of the largest?air-assault operations?in the history of Eastern Europe in Crimea, a military capacity that ISIS never had.

Despite the gap in capacities, the combination of intense hybrid warfare followed by securing gains with a conventional force is a very ISIS-like modus operandi, executed several times in multiple cities, including Iraq’s Mosul in June 2014.

When Russia occupied the most important geostrategic region of Ukraine with minimum resistance by the end of March 2014, similar?modi operandi?were executed in several cities in Eastern Ukraine, including the Donbass region, in April 2014. These operations were led by some of the same GRU commanders who led the invasion of Crimea, the most infamous of whom is Colonel Igor Gurkin.

The outcomes of these operations in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and elsewhere ranged between partial and total failures. "Kharkiv People’s Republic" did not last 24 hours between 7 and 8 April 2014. Ukrainian Russian-speakers in Ukraine’s largest Russian-speaking city rapidly brought down Putin’s proxy republic.

Rape and other weaponry

Now, we fast-forward to 2022, and the similarities of ISIS and Putin’s ways of warfare are even more pronounced. The demonstration of extreme brutality on social media, alleged executions of prisoners of war, identity-based executions in Bucha and Irpin,?rape and other forms of sexual violence?are all war crimes. They were used as tools of psychological warfare by ISIS to either dominate or destroy a community, most notably the Yezidis in Northern Iraq.

Rape, as a crime of war, was weaponised by elements of the Russian armed forces multiple times before, especially during the?first and second Chechen wars. The case of rapist-officer, Colonel Yuri Budanov of the 160th?Tank Guards Regiment, is perhaps the most infamous. Amnesty International, Memorial, and other human right organisation documented other alleged cases.

The interception of a?discussion about raping Ukrainian women?between a Russian soldier and his wife is quite an alarming development. The intensity of propaganda on official Russia TV and other media outlets likely contributes, either directly or indirectly, to this behaviour.

Reliance on improvised explosive deviances (IEDs) and IED-based weapon-systems especially during manoeuvres and retrogrades was a hallmark of ISIS’ innovative way of warfare.

Between January 2014 and December 2015, Russia and Russian-led separatist forces (RLFs) used IEDs well-over 600 times.

In 2022, the intensity, scale, scope, and locations of IEDs and ordnances left behind by the Russian combat units in urban areas, including children parks and school yards, are both shocking and inexplicable in military terms.

"We thought Iraq was bad, but Ukraine is gargantuan," said Major Chris Hunter, Britain’s most experienced terrorist-bomb disposal expert. So far, officials in Ukraine’s state emergency services claim that demining specialists have cleared more than 70,000 explosive devices, including thousands of IEDs and boobytraps. More than 18,000 of these items were destroyed in the Kyiv Oblast (province) alone.

?(Ab)Using Religion(s)

ISIS is also well-known for abusing and weaponizing religious texts to mobilise, recruit, and justify aggression and mass-violence. The organisation is versed in creating narratives based on false and/or selective versions of historical events, mixing them with out-of-context religious texts and then widely disseminating them using multimedia effects. As a result, ISIS was able to mobilise thousands of dedicated foreign fighters and transnational support networks.

Religious legitimation of the aggression against Ukraine was not absent in the Russian propaganda as well.

Patriarch Kirill of Moscow has not only?legitimated?the "special operation" but also gifted General Viktor Zolotov -?Rosgvardiya’s?(national guard) Commander-in-Chief – an icon to bless the soldiers and the war.

Among the soldiers of?Rosgvardiya?are the followers of Ramzan Kadyrov. Ramzan posted on his telegram account a video of soldiers shouting "Allahu Akbar" in the ruins of Mariupol, where they had combat roles.

Operational Victories, Strategic Defeat?

Like ISIS, Russian armed forces suffer from a structural crisis: limited manpower to achieve their strategic goals. ISIS was outnumbered and outgunned during the overwhelming majority of its battles, whether against state or nonstate forces.

Given its initial strategic objectives, Russia has suffered from a similar crisis. It cannot control 604,000 square kilometres with 130 battalion tactical groups, high rates of attrition, strong levels of local resistance and unprecedented NATO and international support to Ukraine.

ISIS had multiple tactical and (almost miraculous) operational victories in between 2013 and 2015, and so did Russia in 2014 and 2022. ISIS could not secure any of these victories, however, due in part to limited manpower, local resistance, external support to its enemies and the overall illegitimate and criminal behaviour.

Putin’s army is facing similar structural, military, moral and legal challenges. It is likely to face the same fate in Ukraine that ISIS faced in Iraq, Syria and Libya: spectacular operational victories, but ultimately strategic defeat.

by Professor Omar Ashour

Omar Ashour is the Founding Chair of the Critical Security Studies Programme at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies and the Director of the Strategic Studies Unit at the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies.

First published at?Middle East Eye

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Whereas in ISIS fashion we see this:

https://www.humanrights.unsw.edu.au/research/commentary/attacks-ukraine-hospitals-world-must-respond

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Attacks on Ukraine’s hospitals are deliberate and brutal. The world must respond to these acts of terror

Anthony Zwi?is a?Professor of Global Health and Development, and an Associate at the Australian Human Rights Institute, UNSW Sydney.

Professor Zwi focuses on global health and development policy and has interests in their interface with equity, social justice and human rights.?

Reports earlier this week of Russian attacks and siege of a major hospital in the Ukraine city of Mariupol indicate a particularly bleak and dark phase of the war.

Sergei Orlov, the city’s deputy mayor,?told the BBC?how Russian forces had entered the building, preventing doctors and nurses from leaving. About 400 people had been effectively taken as “hostages”.

Health workers, operating from the basement of the hospital,?were apparently?trying to provide health services despite the dire situation.

This comes after attacks on a?maternity hospital?in the same city the previous week.

While these examples made headlines around the world, there have been many more attacks on health facilities and health workers since the start of the war.

The World Health Organization?records 44 attacks?on health facilities, health supplies, health workers or patients in Ukraine. Of those, 34 attacks have impacted health facilities. Violence with heavy weapons as well as abduction, arrest or detention of health staff are recorded. The list updates as more reports come in.

The effects of such attacks go far beyond the tragic loss of life. Destroyed infrastructure, inability to refer to other health facilities, diminished access to technology, equipment and drugs, and lack of power or fuel for generators affect how hospitals function under such circumstances.

Such attacks also undermine the morale of health professionals and community members. They deter people who need health care from accessing remaining services. People may feel unsafe leaving bomb shelters to seek care if hospitals become targets or are insecure.

These attacks are deliberate

Despite the legal protections afforded to health facilities in wartime under?international law, we continue to see such attacks in many conflicts including Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Myanmar.

Given the sophistication of modern weaponry and laser-guided munitions, there are few who believe attacks on such facilities are “accidental”. Rather, history shows us they are part of a strategy of war and aim to achieve certain objectives.

In his book?Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War, UK academic and policy advisor Hugo Slim explores why parties to conflict might resort to such tactics.

He says this includes attempts to annihilate certain groups, efforts to demonstrate extreme power and to dominate and subjugate others, and/or to inflict revenge and collective punishment.

In some cases, he says such ruthlessness is strategic or tactical. Terror and atrocity magnify a party’s power and control. It also undermines the public’s morale, and trust in the reliability and safety of health services.

Australian academic Michael Humphrey, in his book?The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From Terror to Trauma, says those who seek to terrify are willing to go to extremes to achieve their objectives, even if they may be committing war crimes.

This is what health workers face

Health workers in Ukraine are members of families and communities; they experience what the community experiences, but have additional stressors.

They are?under pressure?to serve their communities under physically and psychologically challenging circumstances. They are driven to provide care to those who need it; this may even include wounded enemy personnel.

This pressure mounts over extended periods of conflict, sieges and deteriorating conditions, exerting a?heavy toll.

In situations of ongoing brutality and violence, morale will be undermined given the inability to deliver the quality of care they know is required and in normal circumstances they could deliver.

Exhaustion, lack of materials and back-up support, distress among colleagues and overwhelming needs will take a toll on even the strongest and most positive professionals.

How do we help?

First, these attacks must stop.

We also need to provide health workers with?psychological and moral support. Where available, communication technologies from Zoom to WhatsApp would enable health workers access to skilled advisors and health consultants to help manage difficult conditions or resolve dilemmas.

Appreciating the importance of mental health care and self-care ought to be reinforced and supported. Strategies to reduce stress, get rest and debrief with colleagues will play a part. COVID has shown the importance of supporting health care workers this way. These challenges are intensified in periods of conflict.

Health workers need extra supplies of medicines and medical equipment, personal protective equipment, power generators and sterilisation equipment. Countries of the European Union, and other supportive authorities operating through the United Nations and non-government organisations, can help provide these when there are lulls in the conflict.

Unequivocal demands to?end attacks on health-care facilities?are crucial. These play some part in deterring perpetrators, educating community members, health professionals and armed forces.

We must document health workers’ stories and challenges. Efforts by the?World Health Organization, International Committee of the Red Cross, a range of human rights organisations (such as?Physicians for Human Rights?and?Human Rights Watch), researchers and academics can play a valuable role in documenting in real time the impact of conflict and violence on health, health personnel and health care.

Key will be?prosecuting war crimes?and crimes against humanity – for which detailed evidence and documentation will be required.

We?also need?independent, robust and transparent investigations into attacks on hospitals to facilitate such prosecutions. Trusted health agencies, human rights organisations, and health researchers in and outside Ukraine should assist.

This article is republished from?The Conversation?under a Creative Commons license. Read the?original article.

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Andrew Beckwith, PhD