HUMINT, SIGINT, and Strategy in the New Afghanistan Crucible.

In a recent speech President Biden referred to the current administration's future efforts in stemming the possible proliferation of Islamic terror networks in Afghanistan as an "over the horizon" approach. That is, thinking long term and proactively as opposed to simply acting in a reactionary mode, bringing kinetic force to bear on a threat before it achieves the operational ability to carry out any attack upon the United States or its interests. The current Afghani theater, however, has devolved to the extent that this doctrine will be virtually impossible to achieve effectively and will assuredly lead to missteps and tragedies on several fronts, many of which will be impossible to hide from the world's eyes, leading to further loss of American prestige and soft power coercion, as well as diplomatic efforts.

The recent collapse of the Afghan National Army, along with the fleeing of President Ashraf Ghani, led to the Taliban takeover of the country at a mind numbing pace, with events on the ground occurring so fast as to negate the ability to counter it or create contingencies to deal with them. The removal of all U.S. personnel from the country, first relatively slowly, and then at a breakneck pace when the progress of Taliban advances became too apparent to ignore, led to the removal of any and all networks of Intel gathering and intelligence operatives that served the efforts against Islamic terror networks. This will, obviously, leave any operations against the terror groups that will spring up organically in the region, as well as already well established ones such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, severely limited in operational efficacy. And, it is an absolute certainty that such groups will reemerge and proliferate there. Afghanistan will, again, become a veritable nurturing garden of Islamic terror groups and foot soldiers.

The speed with which this loss of operational ability has already been exposed, as evidenced by the two recent drone strikes against supposed ISIS-KP (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province) HVTs. The first occurred in Nangarhar Province targeting three suspected ISIS-KP traveling by car, killing two and wounding a third. They were described by the Biden administration as "planners and facilitators." This strike was carried out approximately 24 hours after the deadly bombing at Kabul Airport that killed thirteen US Servicemen and scores of Afghan nationals. How the administration concluded so quickly that these targets were, indeed, ISIS-KP operatives is a feat of actionable intelligence gathering that would have been profoundly difficult to ascertain, due to the aforementioned loss of human intelligence assets on the ground (HUMINT) As well as the loss of accurate signal intelligence acquisition (SIGINT) Or, at least, the personnel local to the region to accumulate it, decipher it, and declare it as actionable. As an aside, the administration warned for days leading up to the attack at the airport that such an event was imminent, even going so far as to warn all potential evacuees to stay away from a certain gate at the airfield. If they had the Intel that this was actually going to occur, than the wiser move would have been to take such action before the event, thus saving nearly 200 lives. This issue alone sheds doubt on the accuracy of the first strike, along with the lack of any identifying information on those killed. The lack thereof adds considerable suspicion that this drone strike was carried out against an actual ISIS-KP HVT, or if it even occurred at all.

The second strike took place in Kabul proper, and was even more specious, apparently killing Afghan aid worker Zemari Ahmadi, along with seven Afghan children. Ahmadi was seen loading bottles of water into the back of his vehicle which were thought to be explosives, thus leading to the tragic case of misuse of lethal action. The lack of intelligence assets on the ground that could have provided accurate information, whether US personnel or indigenous operatives recruited into service, led to this outcome.

In order to achieve this "over the horizon" aspect to counter terrorism many things have to be in place, none of which are currently available to US intelligence agencies. First, we would need a local group to act as an ally or partner to work with towards a common operational goal, whether long or short term. This is not available to any great degree, seeing as how the Taliban will surely not be a reliable cohort in any anti-terror campaign. In addition, the US has no effective operational base from which to conduct kinetic operations against such terror networks, as Afghanistan is literally surrounded geographically by American antagonists such as Iran, Russia, China and Pakistan. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan would also not be considered viable options even with Russian acquiescence (Which would surely be out of the realm of possibility) Preferring to not be party to what would be perceived in the region as new attempts at American hegemony and expansionism. Also, even if such actions were to be launched from these nation \ states clandestinely, it could open the door to significant attacks of retribution if exposed, whether by well known terror networks or even an offshoot of one, comprised of local, homegrown Muslims disenchanted with their own economic status or corrupt government. A lesser spark than aiding and abetting American drone strikes has lit firestorms of agitated populations all over the Muslim world before, and would surely do so again.

This leaves the United States with limited options in any efforts to thwart terror groups in the new Afghan crucible. Launching drone strikes from any of our bases in the Persian Gulf region, as well as from naval platforms in the Indian Ocean would be necessitated. With such long distances involved, this would severely limit loitering time over the target, thus leading to significant loss of operational efficacy.

The loss of intelligence infrastructure in the theater (HUMINT and SIGINT) As well as the loss of asset deployment options in the region will lead to a difficult road ahead for all agencies devoted to countering terror groups that will always pose a threat to the homeland, and offer challenging obstacles to those same agencies.