Human Factors Insights: Cultivating a Safety Culture in Aviation
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Human Factors Insights: Cultivating a Safety Culture in Aviation

Welcome to this edition of "Human Factors Insights", a newsletter dedicated to exploring the critical aspects of human factors and safety culture in aviation. This newsletter aims to provide you with valuable information, best practices, case studies, and expert opinions that can help you cultivate a strong safety culture and optimise human performance in the aviation industry. By understanding and addressing human factors, we can enhance safety, productivity, and overall organisational success.

Feature Article: Understanding Human Factors in Aviation Safety Culture

Human factors is a broad term that encompasses the study of how humans interact with their environment. In the context of aviation safety culture, human factors can be understood as the factors that influence human behaviour and performance in the aviation workplace. These factors can include individual characteristics (such as personality, skills, and knowledge), the physical environment (such as the layout of the cockpit and the availability of safety equipment), and the organisational culture (such as the emphasis placed on safety and the way that safety incidents are managed).

A strong safety culture is one in which everyone in the aviation industry is committed to safety and takes responsibility for their own safety and the safety of others. A strong safety culture is built on a foundation of trust, communication, and cooperation. It is also characterised by a focus on continuous improvement and a willingness to learn from mistakes.

In the feature article, I will delve deeper into the distinction between safety culture and safety climate.

Best Practices for Cultivating a Strong Safety Culture

There are a number of best practices that organisations can adopt to cultivate a strong safety culture. These include:

  1. Leadership commitment: Demonstrate a strong commitment to safety from executives and managers.
  2. Clear safety policies: Establish and enforce concise safety policies and procedures.
  3. Open communication: Encourage employees to speak up about safety concerns.
  4. Blame-free environment: Foster a culture where mistakes are seen as learning opportunities.
  5. Effective communication: Establish transparent channels for reporting safety issues and sharing information.
  6. Regular safety training: Provide tailored training programmes for employees.
  7. Employee engagement: Involve employees in safety committees and projects.
  8. Robust safety reporting: Implement a fair reporting system that focuses on improvement.
  9. Safety audits and inspections: Conduct regular assessments to identify hazards and mitigate risks.
  10. Investing in safety equipment: Provide necessary safety equipment to prevent accidents.
  11. Continuous improvement: Regularly review and enhance safety processes and procedures.
  12. Monitoring safety performance: Keep track of safety metrics and identify areas for improvement.
  13. Collaboration and partnerships: Engage with industry organisations to share best practices.
  14. Safety promotion: Recognise and reward individuals and teams for their safety contributions.
  15. Regulatory compliance: Ensure adherence to safety regulations and standards.

By implementing these practices, organisations can cultivate a strong safety culture that prioritises the well-being of employees, passengers, and the industry's success.

Expert Opinions on Human Factors in Aviation Safety

Here are a few expert opinions on human factors in aviation safety:

  • "Human factors are a major factor in most aviation accidents." - Dr David Mayer, Professor of Psychology at the University of California, San Diego
  • "A strong safety culture is essential for preventing aviation accidents." - Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, retired US Airways pilot
  • "By understanding human factors, we can make aviation safer for everyone." - Dr James Reason, Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of Manchester

Case Studies: Learning from Real-Life Examples

The following are three case studies that illustrate the importance of human factors in aviation safety culture:

Case Study 1 (Flight 3407 Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ): On 12th February 2009, a Colgan Air flight crashed into a house in Buffalo, New York, killing all 49 people on board and one person on the ground. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the crash was caused by a combination of factors, including pilot fatigue, inadequate training, and poor communication.

The NTSB compiled 46 findings for the Colgan accident. These findings included concerns primarily in the following areas:

  • Captain's failure to effectively manage the flight
  • Breakdown of sterile cockpit discipline
  • Captain's weakness in aircraft control
  • Colgan lack of remedial training
  • Inadequate full stall training
  • Inadequate FAA oversight
  • Colgan unaware of captain's previous checkride failures
  • Pilot fatigue likely
  • Ambiguous low airspeed alerting systems

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A Bombardier Q400 similar to the aircraft involved in the accident (originally posted to Flickr as Continental Connection Bombardier Q400)
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Photograph of the crash site of Colgan Air Flight 3407, which occurred on 12 February 2009 in Buffalo, New York (originally posted to Flickr).


Case Study 2 (Flightnumber:4U9525, Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX): On 24th March 2015, a Germanwings flight crashed into the French Alps, killing all 150 people on board. The BEA found that the crash was caused by the actions of the co-pilot, who deliberately crashed the plane. The co-pilot had a history of mental health problems.

The following factors according to the BEA may have contributed to the failure of this principle:

  • The co-pilot’s probable fear of losing his ability to fly as a professional pilot if he had reported his decrease in medical fitness to an AME;
  • The potential financial consequences generated by the lack of specific insurance covering the risks of loss of income in case of unfitness to fly;
  • The lack of clear guidelines in German regulations on when a threat to public safety outweighs the requirements of medical confidentiality.

The EASA Task Force recommendations:

  1. The principle of 'two persons in the cockpit at all time' should be maintained.
  2. Pilots should undergo a psychological evaluation before entering airline service.
  3. Airlines should run a random drugs and alcohol programme.
  4. Robust programme for oversight of aeromedical examiners should be established.
  5. A European aeromedical data repository should be created.
  6. Pilot support systems should be implemented within airlines.

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A file photo dated Oct. 16, 2014 of a Germanwings Airbus A320 plane taking off from the Cologne/Bonn Airport in Cologne, Germany (Rolf Vennenbernd, European Pressphoto Agency)
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Germanwings flight crashed into the French Alps (photo by Laurent Cipriani, AP).
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Rescue workers look over debris from the Germanwings jet at the crash site near Seyne-les-Alpes, France on 26 March 2015 (photo by Laurent Cipriani, AP).


Case Study 3 (China Airlines Flight CI611, Boeing 747-200, B-18255): On 25th May 2002, China Airlines, crashed into the Taiwan Strait shortly after takeoff from Taipei, Taiwan, en route to Hong Kong. All 225 passengers and crew members on board perished in the accident. The investigation conducted by the Aviation Safety Council (ASC) of Taiwan revealed that the accident was primarily caused by maintenance-related human factors.

Recommendations made by ASC for China Airlines:

  1. Follow approved methods for structural repairs as outlined in the Structure Repair Manual (SRM) or other regulatory agency guidelines. Ensure damage assessment is conducted according to approved regulations, procedures, and best practices.
  2. Review the record keeping system to ensure accurate documentation of all maintenance activities.
  3. Implement safety-related airworthiness requirements, such as the Repair Assessment Program (RAP), as soon as possible.
  4. Review self-audit inspection procedures to ensure compliance with approved maintenance documents, including fulfilling mandatory requirements for continuing airworthiness like Corrosion Prevention and Control Program (CPCP).
  5. Increase maintenance crew's awareness regarding the irregular shape of the aircraft structure and signs indicating potential hidden structural damage.
  6. Reassess the relationship with the manufacturer's field service representative to actively seek assistance and consultation, particularly in maintenance and repair operations.

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B-18255, the aircraft involved, was seen while on final approach at Hong Kong International Airport, in 2000 (From Wikipedia).


In reviewing these case studies, it becomes apparent that addressing human factors is crucial in preventing accidents within the aviation industry. The crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 highlights the significance of mitigating pilot fatigue, enhancing training programs, and fostering effective communication. The Germanwings tragedy emphasizes the need for comprehensive psychological evaluations, stricter regulations, and improved support systems for pilots. Furthermore, the China Airlines Flight CI611 incident underscores the importance of adhering to approved maintenance procedures, implementing rigorous inspection protocols, and raising awareness among maintenance crews. By understanding and proactively addressing these human factors, the aviation industry can create a safer environment for all stakeholders. Let us continue to learn from these occurrences and strive for a future where safety remains the utmost priority in aviation.

I hope this newsletter has provided you with valuable information on human factors and safety culture in aviation. By understanding and addressing these issues, we can all help to make aviation safer.

Stay tuned for future editions of "Human Factors Insights".

Safe travels! ????



References used for the newsletter:

  1. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) website (https://www.faa.gov/lessons_learned/transport_airplane/accidents/N200WQ)
  2. National Transportation Safety Board (Accident Report NTSB/AAR-10/01 PB2010-910401).
  3. BEA is the French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority (Accident Report n° BEA2015-0125.en).
  4. Aviation Safety Council (ASC) Aviation Occurrence Report Volume I ASC-AOR-05-02-001.
  5. European Aviation: Commission release Task Force's report on Germanwings incident (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_5392).
  6. International Civil Aviation Organisation ICAO Annex 13.
  7. Aviation Safety Network (An exclusive service of Flight Safety Foundation).
  8. The video used in the article is from Smithsonian Channel Aviation Nation.


Important to note: International Civil Aviation organisation (ICAO) Annex 13, Chapter 3, Section 3.1: The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.??

Disclaimer: Please note that the views and opinions expressed in this newsletter are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation or employer. The information shared is intended to provide insights and stimulate discussions within the LinkedIn Aviation Community.

It would be great to have practical examples as to how to start improving the use of the Best Practices for Cultivating a Strong Safety Culture. We are trying to demystify the topic for our African audience with among others this episode of the Focus Sessions - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIhLNcFOYso but very open to tons of new suggestions from your side!

Patrick Rijkelijkhuizen

Maintenance Manager EASA Part-145

1 年

The “human factor” is and will always be there. Training is a poor and temporary solution as a solution for a “problem”. It is more resilient to investigate why sombody made a decision and start improving on the factors that contributed to that decision. This way it might be harder in the future to do the “wrong” thing and easier to do the “right” thing. Processes and procedures are hardly readed and followed in practice, if they are not written in the way people work. If this is the case there mostly seen as a cover my a$# by the work force. James Reason was right as an explorer in safety, but the investigations were not very helpful due to there poor conclusion: the human factor. His way of investigating and pointing out the human error might only be useful is they are used as a starting point of a investigation on the individual errors. It is not about focusing on the human errors it is how to control them and learn from them by looking into the local rationality and up into the systemic role of the system. Johan Bergstr?m Anthony Smoker

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