Human Element is not Human Factors

Human Element is not Human Factors.

Element is a particular part of something, an essential characteristic. Factor is something that helps produce or influence a result. Human Element concerns what the humans do and looks at how to maximise what they can do, hopefully making them perfect. Human Factors, on the other hand, is about recognizing humans have (capabilities and) limitations; they cannot be made perfect and so we build around them a work environment that influences them to do their best to achieve goals.

Human element is a very maritime phrase that was (probably) coined by IMO sometime in late 1990s. IMO recognizes it as a key element of life onboard ships and a contributing factor to most of the casualties in the shipping sector. And by strengthening the focus on the Human Element, IMO says, we can enhance maritime safety and safety of navigation.

I parsed the web to see how IMO defines Human Element. I could not find a clear definition leaving its meaning open to interpreation. In ResolutionA 1130 (30) that lays out the strategic plan for a 6 year period starting 2018, IMO ?says that the expansion of the global fleet and the acceleration in the development of new and advancing technologies increase the demands on the seafarers. And for this IMO will take into account the human element in the review, development and implementation of new and existing requirements, including skills, education and training, and human capabilities, limitations and needs (IMO A 30/Res.1110 Page 4). This leads me to interpret that Human Element is about upskilling the seafarer and enhancing the seafarer’s capabilities.

IMO, in a resolution adopted in 1997 setting out its vision, principles and goals for the human element, says that Human Element is a complex multi-dimensional issue that affects (how?) maritime safety, security and marine environmental protection involving the entire spectrum of human activities performed by ships' crews, shore-based management, regulatory bodies and others. All need to co-operate to address human element (which is?) issues effectively. And in the list of activities that they list are being undertaken includes a review of the STCW convention which is the convention that is concerned with the standards of training. Among its principles, the IMO includes developing regulations to develop safeguards so that a single error (human or organizational) will not cause an accident. And among its goals, IMO also intends to provide educational material for seafarers to increase their knowledge and awareness of the impact of human element on ship operations to help them do the right thing.

The Assembly resolution A.850(20) “Human Element Vision, Principles and Goal” goal (a) states: “to have in place a structured approach for proper consideration of human element issues for use in the development of regulations and guidelines by all Committees and Sub-Committees” for which a tool is provided as described in MSC/Circ.1022 MEPC/Circ.391. The tool: Human element analyzing process (HEAP) will be used by the?IMO after a Formal Safety assessment in the rule making process. A review of the example (MSC/ Circ. 1022 page 5) provided in the guidance shows that the HEAP committee screens the proposal by a (technical) subcommittee to determine actions to be taken by crew and management which includes instructions, training and drills onboard - all elements intended to improve the human. And so after a review of the available documents, I interpret that Human Element has got to do with equipping the seafarer to reduce "human error".?

The Nautical Institute though, in an article dated 18th September 2013, says that The human element is a generic term to describe what makes humans behave the way they do and the consequences that result. That article considered Human Element important because we all rely on the contributions of each other to succeed in our business. And that ?a large part of it revolves around understanding the contribution of everyone in the ship's management team and taking these into account for day to day operations. I couldn't find a clear definition here either. But this article has a reference to this research project by UK MCA and a 120 page document published by the MCA

This 120 page document makes reference to circular causality, and also lists in its bibligraphy, authors who find regular mention in the current safety discourse : Hollnagel, Woods, Dekker, Hofstede, Gary Klein, Milgram, Amalberti and maybe is the document closest to what Human Factors is. Despite references from these authors, ‘Training’ appears 202 times in this document. While many recent concepts find room in this document, it also suggests that our ability to share situations, goals and meaning depends on two key human properties (yes! that is the word): Empathy and Communication (Gregory & Shanahan, 2010 page5). While largely a ‘progressive’ document, here again there is an expectation to develop "human properties", and it seems to me that the authors may not have been able to completely break away from traditional moorings. While there is an acceptance in this document the human element is 'misnamed', there is again no clear definition of What is the human element? even in the section by that name on page one

The closest we come to a recognition that Human Element is different from Human Factors is in ‘The Human Factors approach 2020’ where the OCIMF recognizes that ‘Human Element’ is focused on changing the person and is a phrase that may not be recognized outside the maritime industry. Instead believes that ?Human Factors, used across the oil and gas, aviation, nuclear, space and military, is the correct term to be used. In page 6, they list 5 pillars that are the focus areas which will help the ‘Human Factors approach’. Among these pillars ‘Situational Awareness’ finds itself nestled in two of them, and, team communication and building skills is among the topics that are listed as examples falling under these pillars. While there are many other examples, most of them are not easy for organisations to implement, for example ( I have cherrypicked three here) :

1. Manning and workload management: I don’t see the industry accepting that we have a fatigue (and therefore manning and workload) issue mainly because of the meticulously clean records maintained by seafarers so that the Port State Control don’t detain them. (A classic goal conflict – 'do I accurately record my hours worked or avoid the vessel getting detained' - that is left on the shoulders of the seafarer). How do we think that operators are going to manage 'manning and workload'? I see the ships being asked to 'plan better'. And that in effect is more email correspondence and very soon an acceptance by the captain that it is better to just 'manage'.
2. Human machine interfaces: Ships are retrofitted whenever any new regulations come. How often do we consider human machine interface? The industry has had many existing ships being retrofitted with BWTS and EGCS – how much time did the designers invest in trying to see how these are going to affect the workload of the crew (whose number remains same) or how they interface with it. When anything new comes into the industry, it is fitted into whereever room is available (on the bridge console). This may have happened when BNWAS was fitted on the Beaumaiden (a reference in the DMAIB investigation report (DMAIB, 2022, p. 14) where the distance from the BNWAS is among the factors that the report considers for a grounding.
3. Learning from people who do the task, to get ahead of incidents. This is the classic bridging of the WAI-WAD gap and reducing / recognizing drift into the edges of acceptable functional performance, that the 'new view' practitioners advocate. But just how? While American Airlines has their Line Operations Safety audit program (LOSA ) where their Learning Improvement Team (auditors) conduct methodical observations, I doubt if there is a viable maritime solution. American Airlines moved from auditing to understanding (Flight Safety Foundation, 2021). They are working with commercial flights which can be no longer than 18 hours. And long haul flights usually have 4 pilots and around 24 hours between their periods of rest (and recreation). The Learning Improvement team can complete their methodical observations in less than a day. We will need a maritime 'Learning Team' to spend time with the ship crew observing their operations. How does the OCIMF propose we do this on vessels with long voyages? Will operators be willing to increase the headcount of their auditors so they can sail longer on ships and yet complete the mandatory compliance requriements? The operations on the longest commercial aircraft ends in 18 hours (24 at max?) before they have an opportunity for rest and recreation, but for a seafarer that period is from sign on to sign off which is at the least around 3 months. How do you compress these 3 months into a 4 or 5 day observation by a learning team?

The OCIMF publication has a list of 14 recommended books of which I can say that I have read 6 and bits of 5 others. (The not so Humble brag). But the point is, we need to read them to have some context to what the 8 page publication (with 3 pages to read) is about.

What makes me skeptical?

The OCIMF published the 4th Edition of Mooring Equipment Guidelines (MEG4) in 2018. That is a very thoroughly researched publication having the best intentions, just like I am sure the Human Factors (and SIRE 2.0) has. The MEG 4 was (and still is) far ahead of its time. During the MERMF OCIMF conference* in 2018 on MEG 4, I gathered from the speakers that a core element of the MEG 4 is human centred design. This also finds a mention in MEG4 where they speak about the application of human factors in design to avoid exposure to crew during mooring operations(page 6, 17) . And also the very ambitious intent of having ship operators, rope manufacturers and terminals sit around a table and exchange notes and learn. (p37, 94)

(Digression: Here again, the publication uses Human Element and Human Factors ostensibly to mean the same thing. While page 17 of the MEG 4, requires ' taking account of human factors as laid out in section two and IMO resolution A947 (23) , the latter refers to Human Elements and not Human Factors. The MEG 4 also refers to Human Element in atleast two locations quite likely meaning Human Factors)

But since these recommendations ( psst… they are mandatory) have been in force, I have not known of a ship that has been designed taking such an approach to design. Instead we have more plans and (OCIMF SIRE) inspectors asking questions around them, adding administrative burden on the operator and the ships' staff without achieving as much for safety. (And there is the perennial confusion around Residual Strength Testing). Who is to say that the Human Factors approach won’t go this way. The SIRE 2.0, another ambitious program, with its heart in the right place, has already set the hearts of the operators (and maybe even inspectors) beat as if they were chased by a monster. The OCIMF is allaying everyone’s fear saying the inspectors will be well trained which is antithetical to the Human Factors approach that looks at making the system robust enough to allow for humans being human and not training them to perfection.

I wanted to write this because I hear Human Factors being used to mean what it may be not.

“But we should look at human factors, people don’t know anything”

“But we should add Human Factors to the investigation report”

“But…. their attitude I say”

“But….. fools they are. How can they not know this”.

Human element and Human Factors and sometimes Human Performance are often used interchangeably.?It is just that all these have different meanings for all of us. We construct something in our minds when we hear these words. And if we are to take the well intentioned Human Factors approach forward, we need to have a common understanding and construct the same concept in our heads.

We created a monster with the ISM code. And a smaller one with the MEG4 which I hope time will repair. OCIMF is driving Human Factors. Rightly so. We shouldn’t start off on the wrong foot with Human Factors. But when credible and popular maritime websites publish articles that lists “self management” “motivation” “confidence and initiative” “conflict management”, “situational awareness” etc., among soft skills that will deal with “Human Factor Root Cause Categories”, it makes me uneasy. (Safety4Sea Editorial Team, 2021)

OCIMF in, their explanation includes psychological and social characteristics that affect human interaction (OCIMF. (2020) p 4). Psychology is the study of mind and behavior. And Human Factors are anything but. Human Factors is?trying “to ensure that any designed artefact, ranging from a consumer product to an organisational environment, is shaped around the capacities and aspirations of humans, such that performance and well-being are optimised” (Hollnagel, 2014). And so while we should understand human capabilities (and limitations), the manner of influencing should be by shaping the environment around the person. The only other place where I saw individual ?characteristics included in the definition is in the UK HSE regulator's definition "Human factors refer to environmental, organisational and job factors, and human and individual characteristics, which influence behaviour at work in a way which can affect health and safety" .

It isn't what a 'human' brings to the work place. It isn't their attitude, situational awareness, fatigue, skills. It isn't their psychology. Instead it is the study of interactions between people and technology and the factors that affect the interactions. It is about managing risks by designing the hardware and software interfaces and the where and the how work takes place so as to avoid adveerse outcomes.

IEA uses the terms?ergonomics?and?human factors?interchangeably or as a unit and defines it as a scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance. Ergonomists contribute to the design and evaluation of tasks, jobs, products, environments and systems in order to make them compatible with the needs, abilities and limitations of people. The Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Humand Factors are quite aligned to what IEA says: The Human Factors, also called Ergonomics, is an evidence-based scientific discipline and profession that uses a design-driven systems approach to achieve two closely related outcomes of performance and wellbeing. Human Factors applies elements of other disciplines such as psychology, anatomy and physiology, social sciences, engineering, design and organisational management, and combines them to better understand the nature of human-technology-systems interactions. These systems, and the context within which they operate, include people, products, technology, organisations and environments.

The FAA thinks that human factors entails a multidisciplinary effort to generate and compile information about human capabilities and limitations and apply that information to equipment, systems, facilities, procedures, jobs, environments, training, staffing, and personnel management for safe, comfortable, effective human performance.

And so, Human Factors is an evidence based science that uses an understanding of human capabilities and (more importantly) limitations to design a work place that helps them perform to their best. The human practitioners expertise is required to recognise and bridge gaps when things don't go as planned.

*(There were so many questions during this conference, that the organisers promised to get back to us with the answers over email. Despite following up, I didn't get any answers and that maybe because of just how complex MEG 4's expectations are).

References:

DMAIB. (2022). Marine accident report on grounding 18 OCTOBER 2021 2. 1–25. https://dmaib.com/media/10326/beaumaiden-grounding-on-18-october-2021.pdf

Flight Safety Foundation. (2021). Learning From All Operations: Expanding the Field of Vision to Improve Aviation Safety.

Gregory, D., & Shanahan, P. (2010). The Human Element: a guide to human behaviour in the shipping industry. 1–120. https://www.standard-club.com/fileadmin/uploads/standardclub/Documents/Import/publications/standard-safety/2013/51854-MCAGuidev10ae_2010.pdf

Hollnagel, E. (2014). Human factors/ergonomics as a systems discipline? “The human use of human beings” revisited. Applied Ergonomics, 45(1), 40–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.APERGO.2013.03.024

OCIMF. (2020). The OCIMF Human Factors Approach. A Framework to materially reduce marine risk.

Safety4Sea Editorial Team. (2021, December 30). Key soft skills for effective Human Factors Management - SAFETY4SEA. Safety4Sea. https://safety4sea.com/cm-key-soft-skills-for-effective-human-factors-management/