How Wars are Won: In History and in Business

History is all about imminent risk of failure and what we do as a result of it. Take the battle of Marengo for instance. It took the Austrians 8 hours to win the initial battle; they took the field. Thanks to luck, it had rained hard and the rivers were swollen. Napoleon was able to recall Desaix who had marched east but was delayed by the rivers at flood. Because of Desaix's return and a timely cavalry charge, the French retook in 1 hour the field it had taken the Austrians 8 to capture. Napoleon took all the credit for this victory.

Closer to home is Gettysburg, the decisive battle of the American Civil War.

From Wikipedia: About 4 p.m. on July 2, 1863, Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's First Corps began an attack ordered by General Robert E. Lee that was intended to drive northeast up the Emmitsburg Road in the direction of Cemetery Hill, rolling up the Union left flank. Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood's division was assigned to attack up the eastern side of the road, Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws's division the western side. Hood's division stepped off first, but instead of guiding on the road, elements began to swing directly to the east in the direction of the Round Tops. Instead of driving the entire division up the spine of Houck's Ridge (the boulder-strewn area known to the soldiers as the Devil's Den), parts of Hood's division detoured over Round Top and approached the southern slope of Little Round Top.

In the meantime, Little Round Top was undefended by Union troops. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, had ordered Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles's III Corps to defend the southern end of Cemetery Ridge, which would have just included Little Round Top. But Sickles, defying Meade's orders, moved his corps a few hundred yards west to the Emmitsburg Road, the Peach Orchard, causing a large salient in the line, which was also too long to defend properly. His left flank was anchored in Devil's Den. When Meade discovered this situation, he dispatched his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, to attempt to deal with the situation south of Sickles's position. Climbing Little Round Top, Warren found only a small Signal Corps station there. He saw the glint of bayonets in the sun to the southwest and realized that a Confederate assault into the Union flank was imminent. He hurriedly sent staff officers, including Washington Roebling, to find help from any available units in the vicinity.

The response to this request for help came from Maj. Gen. George Sykes, commander of the Union V Corps. Sykes quickly dispatched a messenger to order his 1st Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. James Barnes, to Little Round Top. Before the messenger could reach Barnes, he encountered Col. Strong Vincent, commander of the third brigade, who seized the initiative and directed his four regiments to Little Round Top without waiting for permission from Barnes. He and Oliver W. Norton, the brigade bugler, galloped ahead to reconnoiter and guide his four regiments into position.[10] Upon arrival on Little Round Top, Vincent and Norton received fire from Confederate batteries almost immediately. On the western slope he placed the 16th Michigan, and then proceeding counterclockwise were the 44th New York, the 83rd Pennsylvania, and finally, at the end of the line on the southern slope, the 20th Maine. Arriving only ten minutes before the Confederates, Vincent ordered his brigade to take cover and wait, and he ordered Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, commander of the 20th Maine, to hold his position, the extreme left of the Army of the Potomac, at all costs. Chamberlain and his 385 men[11]waited for what was to come.

Battle of Little Round Top

Battle of Little Round Top, initial assault.

The approaching Confederates were the Alabama Brigade of Hood's Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Evander Law. (As the battle progressed and Law realized he was in command of the division, Col. James L. Sheffield was eventually notified to assume brigade command.) Dispatching the 4th, 15th, and 47th Alabama, and the 4th and 5th Texas to Little Round Top, Law ordered his men to take the hill. The men were exhausted, having marched more than 20 miles (32 km) that day to reach this point. The day was hot and their canteens were empty; Law's order to move out reached them before they could refill their water. Approaching the Union line on the crest of the hill, Law's men were thrown back by the first Union volley and withdrew briefly to regroup. The 15th Alabama, commanded by Col. William C. Oates, repositioned further right and attempted to find the Union left flank.

The left flank consisted of the 386 officers and men of the 20th Maine regiment and the 83rd Pennsylvania. Seeing the Confederates shifting around his flank, Chamberlain first stretched his line to the point where his men were in a single-file line, then ordered the southernmost half of his line to swing back during a lull following another Confederate charge. It was there that they "refused the line"—formed an angle to the main line in an attempt to prevent the Confederate flanking maneuver. Despite heavy losses, the 20th Maine held through two subsequent charges by the 15th Alabama and other Confederate regiments for a total of ninety minutes.

On the final charge, knowing that his men were out of ammunition, that his numbers were being depleted, and further knowing that another charge could not be repulsed, Chamberlain ordered a maneuver that was considered unusual for the day: He ordered his left flank, which had been pulled back, to advance with bayonets in a "right-wheel forward" maneuver. As soon as they were in line with the rest of the regiment, the remainder of the regiment charged, akin to a door swinging shut. This simultaneous frontal assault and flanking maneuver halted and captured a good portion of the 15th Alabama. However, Lt. Holman S. Melcher yelled at his fellow soldiers to initiate the charge before the order was given. Chamberlain is credited by some historians with ordering the advance, however most historical research shows that Chamberlain did order the advance but Melcher was the first person to engage with the opposition. Although Chamberlain decided to order the charge before Lt. Melcher requested permission to advance the center of the line toward a boulder ledge where some of the men were wounded and unable to move, Melcher did engage first. As Melcher returned to his men, the shouts of "Bayonet!" were already working their way down the line. It is widely accepted that Chamberlain ordered the advance and Melcher was the first to engage.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain ordered the bayonet charge on Little Round Top.

During their retreat, the Confederates were subjected to a volley of rifle fire from Company B of the 20th Maine, commanded by Captain Walter G. Morrill, and a few of the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters, who had been placed by Chamberlain behind a stone wall 150 yards to the east, hoping to guard against an envelopment. This group, who had been hidden from sight, caused considerable confusion in the Confederate ranks.

Thirty years later, Chamberlain received a Medal of Honor for his conduct in the defense of Little Round Top. The citation read that it was awarded for "daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the Little Round Top against repeated assaults, and ordering the advance position on the Great Round Top."

Battle of Little Round Top: final assault.

Despite this victory, the rest of the Union regiments on the hill were in dire straits. While the Alabamians had pressed their attacks on the Union left, the 4th and 5th Texas were attacking Vincent's 16th Michigan, on the Union right. Rallying the crumbling regiment (the smallest in his brigade, with only 263 men) several times, Vincent was mortally wounded during one Texas charge and was succeeded by Colonel James C. Rice. Vincent died on July 7, but not before receiving a deathbed promotion to brigadier general.

Before the Michiganders could be demoralized, reinforcements summoned by Warren—who had continued on to find more troops to defend the hill—had arrived in the form of the 140th New York and a battery of four guns—Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery, commanded by Lt. Charles E. Hazlett. (Simply maneuvering these guns by hand up the steep and rocky slope of the hill was an amazing achievement. However, this effort had little effect on the action of July 2. The artillerymen were exposed to constant sniper fire and could not work effectively. More significantly, however, they could not depress their barrels sufficiently to defend against incoming infantry attacks.)

The 140th charged into the fray of the battle, driving the Texans back and securing victory for the Union forces on the hill. Col. Patrick "Paddy" O'Rorke, who personally led his regiment in the charge, was killed. Reinforced further by Stephen Weed's brigade of the V Corps, Union forces held the hill throughout the rest of the battle, enduring persistent fire from Confederate sharpshooters stationed around Devil's Den. General Weed was among the victims, and as his old friend Charles Hazlett leaned over to comfort Weed, the artilleryman was also shot dead.

Later that day, Little Round Top was the site of constant skirmishing. It was fortified by Weed's brigade, five regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserves, and an Ohio battery of six guns. Most of the stone breastworks that are currently visible on the hill were constructed by these troops after the fighting stopped. Troops of the II, V, VI, and XII Corps passed through the area and also occupied Round Top.

Little Round Top was the starting point for a Union counterattack at dusk on July 2, conducted by the 3rd Division of the V Corps (the Pennsylvania Reserves) under Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, launched to the west in the direction of the Wheatfield.

Little Round Top viewed from near Devil's Den.

On July 3, Hazlett's battery (six 10-pound Parrott rifles, now under the command of Lt. Benjamin F. Rittenhouse) fired into the flank of the Confederate assault known as Pickett's Charge. Near the end of that engagement, General Meade observed from Little Round Top and contemplated his options for a possible counterattack against Lee.

Business Application

"Nail it, then scale it."

Nathan Furr provides this excellent explanation of how business platforms evolve from products.

Platforms can be a strong source of competitive advantage. But how do you build a successful platform if you only have products? In our recent HBR article, we explain the fundamentals of transforming products into platforms. Like riding a bike, it’s easy to describe the physics but hard to actually do. What are the “best practices” of building platforms from products? In our research, we found that platforms emerge and grow akin to companies, people, and products. They don’t just appear — they evolve. Thoughtful management on both the demand side and the supply side can smooth the transition.Demand-Side EvolutionCreating a new platform out of your product involves attracting a large number of users, but our research suggests that user growth isn’t linear. It occurs in stages:

 Structuring an external product “love group”

II. Transforming the love group into early platform adopters

III. Leveraging early adopters to accelerate platform adoption

Makerbot, the 3D-printer developer, followed this approach by first attracting a group of devoted product fans among the maker community and rallying them to the cause of making desktop 3D printing accessible to all. Makerbot structured and expanded this group through a series of projects, conferences, and events that built momentum for the product (phase 1). For example, many of the early product fans helped build printers for Makerbot when demand began to overwhelm the company’s production capabilities.

After this, companies transform the enthusiasm of the love group into early adopters for the platform (phase 2). For example, the enthusiasm of the Makerbot love group propelled the growth of its then-new Thingiverse — an online platform where makers can post designs and users can download them to print.

Finally, with the early platform in hand, Makerbot leveraged the work and devotion of their early adopters to create broader momentum for their platform, their product, and for 3D printing (phase 3).

Makerbot’s cultivation of its users as it moved from product to platform was immensely successful. As you consider the demand-side evolution, note the role of emotion and support: Companies nurture their users’ enthusiasm and support them through these different stages. Both familiar players like Google, Apple, and Microsoft and lesser-known companies like Minecraft, Valve, and Id Software have gone through similar stages on the user side to get their platforms off the ground. That Makerbot has faltered lately, however, has everything to do with the fact that its core product was difficult to defend — demonstrating one reason that so many product-to-platform attempts fail.

Supply-Side Evolution

As firms move from product to platform, the company also evolves through several stages:

1. Internal product R&D + external complementors
2. Internal platform R&D + blended complementors + community management
3. Hybrid business model management

During the first phase of company evolution it is appropriate to have an internal development team focused on creating momentum for a great product through continuous refinement of the core product so that it inspires customer adoption and enthusiasm. But as companies start the move to platforms they often benefit from including outsiders in the process. For example, Lego benefited from the Stanford graduate student who saw the opportunities in opening up the code for the company’s Mindstorm robots to create a platform, transforming a toy into a tool for schools for education and experimentation. In these early stages, firms don’t necessary need to sweep out their development teams but they do need to engage external complementors to explore new opportunities to create value through a platform (stage 1).

In the next stage, firms typically have to expend a fair amount of internal R&D effort to create the platform itself from the initial seeds of ideas from complementors. But at the same time, not all this effort is exclusively internally focused. Instead, platform project leaders find themselves increasingly managing two key groups: complementors who may be outside the company or transitioning to internal roles inside the company and a growing community that can benefit from an internal function inside the company devoted to promoting and managing it.

Nest, the smart thermostat that has become a home products platform, has to actively work with other companies to develop Nest compatible products, deciding which complementors to keep outside the company (nurturing them without scaring them away) and which to bring inside the company. To illustrate, Nest recently acquired Dropcam, which produces cameras that allow customers to see and monitor their home — ensuring that Dropcam would become a complementor rather than a competitor to Nest.

In the final stage, companies embrace a hybrid business model and reallocate revenue streams to optimize for total value creation and capture rather than focusing on one — the product or the platform — at the expense of the other. Qihoo, one of China’s most successful internet firms, started as a security software product that cross-subsidized the development of a new platform with products that they gave away for free, creating more value in the end for the entire platform.

The real challenge is to create the business model flexibility to iterate on a well-established product and turn it into a platform. Several of the companies we studied appeared to have developed potentially viable platforms out of their products, but struggled to move from capturing value based on products to capturing value based on the combination of products and platforms through a hybrid business model that combined both product and platform elements.

Like many transformational strategic moves, the successful transition from product to platform should happen in stages that demand flexibility. The reward is that they are hard for others to imitate and create enduring growth.

Heroes:

I have many business heroes just as I admire many military heroes. Chief among my military heroes is Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, the future president of Bowdoin College, the scholar who led the Union bayonet charge at Little Round Top. He got the Medal of Honor, but was not the only hero on 2-3 July 1863. He was one of many heroes at Gettysburg. Just as in war, business involves leadership, the application and concentration of resources at the appropriate place, at the appropriate time. Successful platforms and businesses are not solely the result of the utilization of some new technology. It is the concentration of cross-disciplinary firepower to solve a problem or s slew of problems with appropriate and timely solutions.

Nathan Furr is my new business hero.                                   

Nathan Furr is an assistant professor of strategy at INSEAD. His research focuses on innovation and technology strategy, particularly how new and established firms adapt to technology changes and enter new markets.