How Policy Successes Happen

‘Can government do anything right?’ It’s the kind of rhetorical stock question that is popular at election time among political oppositions, commentators and the ‘person in the street’ alike. Skepticism about political machinations, bureaucratic power and bungled programs and projects is a healthy ingredient of any vibrant democracy – but only up to a point. When government stupidity, arrogance and perfidiousness become ingrained assumptions, healthy skepticism gives way to damaging and self-perpetuating cynicism. By that measure Australia may well be ‘at risk’ if we are to believe recent figures about public attitudes towards public office-holders and institutions.

For those still sitting on the fence, our new study, Successful Public Policy: Lessons from Australia and New Zealand may be a welcome antidote to the daily barrage of negativity about politicians, public servants and the spending of public money. The book presents 20 chapter-length case stories of governments actually getting it right and doing valuable things for the public across both sides of the Tasman. For Australia, think setting up Medicare. Think HECS. Think combatting smoking. Think curbing AIDS. Think the Child Support Scheme. Think gun control. Think - yes, even GST.

Success is often attributed to the right people doing the right thing in the right place at the right time. While this sentiment may contain seeds of truth, associating success with serendipity, luck, or the ‘perfect’ confluence of disparate threads heavily discounts the careful and detailed work that goes into creating, identifying, or seizing that ‘opportune’ moment. One recurrent theme deserves elaboration. This is the role and importance of timing and pacing the work of pushing an initiative and developing it into a smart, fair and effective policy intervention, in a manner that catalyses broad support for its enactment. Our cases suggest at least three scenarios for smart timing and pacing.

First, and in stark contrast to the current culture of frantic, real-time ‘issue management’ in government, our case studies show that often good things come to those that have the commitment to persevere, the wisdom to wait, to bide their time while preparing the groundwork, and strike while the iron is finally heating up again. For a long time, the GST story was one of false starts and blocking power. And yet underneath the ebbs and flows of the political manoeuvring, work on building up an ever more unassailable business case for it continued apace, ever so gently crowding out the space of its opponents until Howard felt confident enough to bite the bullet and run with it.

Likewise, the 2010 announcement that Australia would become the first nation to adopt tobacco plain packaging laws was the product of a long journey of evidence-building. The recommendation that tobacco products be sold in standardised packaging, without any branding, had a firm evidence base. Initial discussions about the policy reform can be traced back to the early 1990s. The recommendation remained a point of contention, largely because of the power and influence of the tobacco industry. While advocates promoted the solution over the course of two decades, certain conditions needed to be created to allow such a ‘radical’ idea to gain broad acceptance. By recognising that plain packaging was both legally possible and politically desirable, the government was able to successfully enact a policy that was previously considered too extreme.

Another route is about enabling progress by aligning hitherto separate streams of policy work. Take the development of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). From idea to adoption, this process took approximately 18 months. It was a highly innovative scheme which was justified on the basis of equity and access. While the idea itself was debated and refined over the course of the Scheme’s development, it remained unclear how it would work in practice. As the first of its kind, there was no solid evidence-base upon which to draw. During this time, the architects became aware of the Australian Taxation Office’s recent experience with the collection of childcare maintenance payments. By actively drawing from that experience, the architects of HECS were able to provide an answer to the practical feasibility of the Scheme.

Then there is the strategic exploitation of adversity. Other policies in the book arose in response to a sudden crisis, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s or the Port Arthur massacre in 1996. Crises are dreadful experiences for those caught up in them. But, by their very nature, they temporarily generate focused public and elite attention on hitherto hidden or stalemated issues. The shock and outrage they produce can be galvanised into path-breaking efforts that can be brought across the line fast. The need to do something big becomes a moral imperative and a political opportunity. Strategic actors in the bureaucracy and civil society always keep their bottom drawers well stocked in case such a window of opportunity comes along. This is precisely what enabled the very speed and effectiveness of Australia’s gun control scheme, which continues to be held up as a model worldwide.   

So yes, governments do get it right at least some of the time. And this study shows that the ballot box and the rhythms of rotating governments are not the only sources of policy change. There are other levers to pull for those ambitious and courageous enough to embark on the path of policy innovations that make a difference.

Joannah Luetjens and Paul ‘t Hart are at the Utrecht University School of Governance and Michael Mintrom is at Monash University and the Australia New Zealand School of Government. Together, they are the co-editors of Successful Public Policy: Lessons from Australia and New Zealand. Out now in online open access with ANU Press (see further at: https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/anzsog/successful-public-policy).