How does the pursuit of security influence cooperation in the international system?

Introduction

Two interrelated ideas come to mind when attempting to answer this broadly framed question. First, the pursuit of security is crucial for the survival of states as politically independent units. Second, cooperation among states is contingent on the organizing principles of the international system.

This essay will narrow down the scope of the question by focusing on a single subject matter: nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation constitutes a particularly suitable empirical area for carrying out extensive research into how the pursuit of security influences cooperation in the international system. Having chosen a specific subject, the general question can now be reframed as follows: “How does the pursuit of nuclear capabilities influence cooperation in the international system?” To narrow the scope of this question even further, I will break it down into a series of analytical sub-questions, using two theoretical approaches: structural realism (also known as neorealism) and game theory.

Structural realism, as a state-centric approach, is a strand within realism that holds that as long as anarchy is the key organizing principle in the international system, each state will rely on its own capabilities or power resources to ensure its security and survival (The Open University, 2021a). As such, structural realism maintains that cooperation among states “will always be dependent on how far they serve the interests of the powerful” (Waltz, 1979, cited in Brown, 2014, p. 102). Turning to game theory, it can be defined as the “application of mathematical reasoning to problems of conflict and collaboration between rational self-interested actors” (Robertson, 2004, p. 201).

Methodology

When conducting research, the researcher must decide which case study method is suitable for exploring or testing a particular event or theory. Case study methods are directly related to the questions under consideration. For example, a descriptive question asks, “What has happened?” whereas an explanatory question asks, “How or why did something happen?” (Yin, 2012). Notwithstanding the question being posed, choosing a case study always depends on (a) the analytical strategy that reflects the analyst’s purpose, (b) whether it represents a broader phenomenon of a real-life situation, (c) drawing on analytical approaches that specify what the analyst is searching for in a case, and (d) making use of empirical data (The Open University, 2021b). ?

This essay will follow the explanatory research method and will use the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, as a critical case for cooperation under the anarchic international system. Anarchy, in this context, does not necessarily mean chaos or lawlessness, but the absence of a “world government”, where authority over the use of force in particular is dispersed among the constituent units of the international system (i.e., among states) (The Open University, 2021a).

With this state of affairs in mind, the essay will be evaluating the plausibility of the structural realist claim that states are less inclined to cooperate and prefer to pursue their own interests. It will discuss the JCPOA in the context of the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT), as it explores the nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Crucially, it will examine how the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated under what is known as the security dilemma, using a game theory payoff matrix to analyze how the two superpowers measured their gains from cooperation.

Background

In 2015, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Germany, known as P5+1, agreed to a long-term deal with Iran to limit its nuclear activities in return for the lifting of crippling economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic. The agreement was endorsed by the UNSC Resolution 2231, making it part of international law (Azodi, 2018).

The JCPOA was hailed as “conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran” (UNSC, n.d.). However, US President Trump withdrew from the Plan in 2018, calling it “a?horrible one-sided deal?that should never, ever have been made” (Landler, 2018). Trump reinstated the US sanctions on Iran and added at least 1,500 more (DeYoung, 2022). A year later, Iran began to increase its nuclear activities, violating the terms of the original agreement. France, Germany and the UK were critical of Trump’s move and tried to dissuade him from making it, urging him to renegotiate the deal, to no avail. By contrast, Iran’s arch-rivals in the Middle East – Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) – applauded Trump’s move, each for different reasons. For Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran posed an existential threat; for the Gulf States, the concern was more about Iran’s growing regional influence (Sen, 2015). ?

Last year, the Biden administration reopened indirect negotiations with Iran, and a revival of the JCPOA appears possible. However, many analysts and policymakers remain skeptical about whether the Plan would create rather than reduce insecurity in the Middle East, given that the JCPOA does not address the most significant security problem in the region, namely the possession of nuclear weapons by only one state: Israel.

Prominent structural realists, such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, dismiss the JCPOA altogether. According to the nuclear deterrence theory, as promulgated by Waltz (2012), it would be better if Iran were to possess nuclear weapons as that would bring more stability to the region: “If?Iran?goes nuclear, Israel and?Iran?will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have [e.g. India and Pakistan].” Similarly, Mearsheimer (2021a) argues that common insecurity, as understood by the concept mutually assured destruction (MAD), produces security and guarantees that such weapons will not be used.

How did the NPT come about, and what are its limitations?

In 1945, the US dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing about 214,000 people – more died from nuclear radiation in the days, weeks, and years that followed (BBC, 2020). Eight years later, US President Eisenhower highlighted the destructive power of nuclear weapons in a landmark speech to the UN General Assembly, proposing the creation of an international atomic agency that would ensure fissionable materials were used solely for peaceful purposes (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014, p. 49). In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) became the UN’s nuclear watchdog. The IAEA was tasked with promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, ensuring that nuclear programs were not used for military purposes. However, nuclear material and expertise became widely available within a few years. The fear of nuclear proliferation prompted the creation of the NPT in 1967, authorizing the IAEA to administer a system of controls to ensure that no countries other than the permanent members of the UNSC (all possess nuclear capabilities) would develop nuclear weapons. The NPT also committed all signatories to the treaty to eliminate their nuclear arsenals gradually.

The NPT is considered “[o]ne of the early fruits of international attempts to limit the danger of nuclear warfare” (Robertson, 2004, p. 352). Although there is no central authority in the anarchic international system capable of enforcing agreements, the NPT shows that when states have a shared interest in security, such as preventing nuclear weapons from getting into the “wrong hands,” states are inclined to cooperate (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014, p. 50). However, the NPT has at least three serious shortcomings: (1) the permanent members of the UNSC (all signatories to the Treaty) did not relinquish their nuclear weapons; (2) India, Israel, and Pakistan (non-signatories states) developed nuclear weapons after the Treaty became effective in 1970; and (3) North Korea withdrew from the NPT. These limitations reinforce the view that states are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for “fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a significant advantage” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 57). ?

How did the JCPOA come about, and what are its limitations?

A primary sticking point over the JCPOA concerned Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its soil. Iran argued that Article IV of the NPT bestows on it “the inalienable right … to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” (Biswas, 2016). The US disagreed, arguing that the language of Article IV remains open to interpretation since it does not directly refer to uranium enrichment. The JCPOA resolved this contentious issue by acknowledging Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, but restricted its ability to do so by limiting its holdings of low enriched uranium (LEU) to only 300 kilograms, requiring it not to exceed 3.67% enrichment. “These limitations will stay in place for eight to 13 years. The most important limit, on Iran’s holdings of LEU, will stay in place for 15 years” (Pickering, 2017). The purpose of these steps is to reduce the potential production of plutonium from 8kg per year to 1kg per year (the possession 8kg would enable Iran to develop a nuclear bomb).?

Another sticking point concerns monitoring and verification of Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran has agreed to voluntarily implement the NPT’s additional protocol that significantly increases the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful use of all its nuclear material. The then Director-General of IAEA, Yukio Amano, said that the Iran nuclear deal is “the strongest verification regime” and that the likelihood of a violation being detected is extremely high (Azodi, 2018). US President Obama was equally assertive when he said that Iran had agreed to “the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history” (The Washington Post, 2015). All those restrictions made the JCPOA “the most salient example of the international community filling that vacuum with a set of constraints and inspection arrangements” (Pickering, 2017). However, concerns remain about the time limits of the deal, namely the 15-years duration of the limitation on the quality and quantity of enriched uranium. ?

How do the intentions of states influence cooperation?

Not knowing other states’ intentions is a major obstacle to cooperation in the international system. Although Iran (a signatory state to the NPT) consistently maintained that its nuclear program is for peaceful, non-military use and has no intention of possessing nuclear capabilities, the international community, as represented by the UNSC, remains skeptical of Iran’s intentions. When US President Obama spoke about the developments of the Iran nuclear talks on April 2, 2015, he said: “this deal is not based on trust. It’s based on unprecedented verification” (The Washington Post, 2015).

This statement has raised many question about the viability of cooperation between Iran and the international community. Structural Realists, mainly Waltz and Mearsheimer, think that states should seek to maximize their own capabilities and are better off if they do not cooperate, given the possibility of cheating.? By contrast, Schelling and Halprin argue in Strategy and Arms Control?that the risks of cheating must be weighed against the benefits the agreement would provide: “Dangers of cheating depend on probability of detecting violations … and strategic implications of given degree of cheating” (Azodi, 2018).

Structural realism is sub-divided into two factions: defensive realism and offensive realism. In an area such as nuclear proliferation, states’ intentions is particularly problematic, because “state actions are often driven by fear (defensive motivation) or hostile intention (offensive motivation), and … national policies tend to be characterized by secrecy and competition” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014, p. 56). A series of declassified intelligence records from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supports this claim. For example, a 1977 CIA report correctly estimated that South Africa was capable of producing nuclear weapons. However, a 1982 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which represents the views of US intelligence agencies, “wrongly concluded that Argentina was trying to develop nuclear weapons” (Burr, 2013). In 2007 and 2012, the NIE concluded that Iran was pursuing research that could enable it to develop nuclear weapons (Bromley, 2014, p. 171). ?

How does a failed JCPOA create a security dilemma?

Critics have been very vocal in their opposition to the revival of the JCPOA, arguing that it merely postpones, rather than halts Iran’s path to nuclear weapons. For them, the Biden administration is repeating what they consider Obama’s biggest mistake: reintegrating Iran into the global economy. The fear is that a revived JCPOA would allow the Islamic Republic to gain access to petrodollars, which it would use to continue funding its proxies in the Middle East, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen. Proponents of the Deal, by contrast, argue that the issue is not whether the international community should cooperate with Iran or not; rather, it is about deciding what is more important, uranium enrichment or Iranian enrichment: “If you are more concerned about uranium enrichment, then this deal is better than the alternative” (Lynch, 2022).

Iran’s rivals in the Middle East are certainly more concerned about Iran’s uranium enrichment. The Gulf States have relied on the US for many decades to deal with threatening regional states, such as Iraq and Iran, in what is known in international studies as buck-passing, by which “states are tempted to not balance a powerful state but to leave the job to others” (The Open University, 2021a). Now the Gulf States are pursuing a different security strategy: balancing. As a sub-theory of structural realism, balancing refers to the measures that states take against a threatening state by forming a balancing alliance to check what they perceive as an aggressive or dangerous state (Mearsheimer, 2021b).

On March 27, 2022, an unprecedented summit brought together the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco and the UAE to discuss how to coordinate against Iran, setting the stage for full-fledged cooperation in several areas, chiefly in security. Since then, many security agreements have been made between these new partners, from memorandums of understanding that made it easier for Israel, Bahrain and Morocco to trade military equipment and for their armies to coordinate, to establishing a communication system that allowed them “to warn each other in real time about incoming drones from Iran and its proxies” (Kingsley, 2022).

However, many analysts warn that a no-deal with Iran may force the Islamic Republic to develop nuclear weapons. Such a move would increase the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, just as it targeted the nuclear facilities of Iraq and Syria in 1981 and 2007, respectively, to maintain its nuclear monopoly in the region. If Iran managed to attain nuclear capabilities, that would risk triggering a nuclear arms race in the region: “states won’t just sit quietly … They’ll buy [nuclear weapons] directly off the shelf from Pakistan or whoever they can” (Zilber, 2021), or they may develop nuclear capabilities on their own.

An arms race would create a security dilemma, where an increased military capacity of one state would prompt a rival state to match its military capacity to that state, leading to an overall decrease in security for both countries and an increase in the likelihood of pre-emptive nuclear strikes or mistakes (Zakheim, 2021). Structural realists disagree, however, arguing that “[m]utual fear gives rise to power balancing and power balancing, in turn, produces order” (Bromley, 2014, p.181). In his Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, Waltz (1988) says that if we want to know why there has been a “long peace” between the US and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era, “we must look to that other great force for peace: nuclear weapons.” Nuclear deterrence prevented the Cold War from becoming a “hot” war, according to Waltz.

How do states cooperate under the security dilemma?

Although the security dilemma seems to fit particularly well with the two competing superpowers during the Cold War (1945-1991), it is not restricted to a specific historical era; instead, “it reflects the fundamentally tragic nature of international life: state actors strive for peace and stability but end up in military conflict” (Wivel, 2019). In his article Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma, Robert Jervis (2001, p. 58) acknowledged that the Cold War did contain elements of a “deep security dilemma,” as manifested by the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union, but that the root of the conflict was “a clash of social systems.” For Jervis, much of international politics is driven by fear, and when the security dilemma is at work, states may desire mutual security, but their own behavior makes this very goal unattainable. In his work Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, Jervis argued that (a) the security dilemma is vital for understanding how in an anarchic international system states that share the same goals still end up in conflict, and (b) the extent and nature of the security dilemma depend on two variables: “the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation” (Glaser, 1997, p. 171).

The security dilemma can be modelled using game theory, which analyzes cooperation problems (that is, how states measure their gains from cooperation against the gains of other states) to understand how states behave in strategic situations, where decisions are based on what others are likely to do and how others might respond to what they do (Bishop, 2004, pp. 108-9). As such, game theory is compatible with structural realism in the sense that both are structural, strategic, and rational. Thus, when analyzing the concepts of anarchy and security dilemma, game theory shows how the international system not only permits conflict, but can also generate it: “actors may refuse to cooperate with others, not so much because they seek the positive gains of exploitation, but because they fear that their own cooperative initiatives will be mistreated” (Jervis, 1988, p. 349).

During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union faced a choice of whether to cooperate (C) or defect (D). Both nations preferred a denuclearized world, but since each nation was rationally motivated by the need to increase its own security, it chose to keep its nuclear arsenal. The rationale behind this thinking is that a state can defend itself with nuclear weapons rather more easily than with conventional weapons. However, the security dilemma creates a coordination problem known in game theory as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), where players who cannot enforce a cooperative strategy are driven to defect or make competitive choices, leading to a worse off situation for both players (The Open University, 2021c). This scenario can be illustrated on a payoff matrix. The ranking of the payoffs is given in “util,” which is an arbitrary assignation of utility numbers that measures states’ preferences (Heap and Varoufakis, 1995).

Figure 1 illustrates how the outcomes for both countries are interdependent: the best action for each one depends on what the other country does. For example, if the Soviet Union chooses C, the US can choose either C or D, gaining 3 or 4 utils, respectively. Since 4 utils is better than 3 utils, the US would choose 4 utils. If the Soviet Union chooses D, the US can choose either 1 util or 2 utils; since 2 utils is better than 1 util, the US would choose 2 utils. This suggests that whatever the Soviet Union chooses, it is best for the US to defect. If the roles of the players were reversed, the Soviet Union would follow the US’s suit – that is, it would defect, regardless of what the US would have chosen. This position is shown on the matrix’s lower-right box (2–2). By contrast, when both countries cooperate, as shown on the upper-left box (3–3), we get the optimum nuclear disarmament scenario with benefits to both countries. However, this position cannot be reached because each country will have an incentive to maintain its nuclear deterrent power, resulting in both sides losing the benefits from a world free from nuclear weapons. The solution of this game is called the Nash equilibrium: It is “a combination of strategies from which no player has an individual incentive to deviate” (Anand, 2014, p. 307). The idea that arms competition can reduce countries’ military capabilities highlights an important issue: “the compatibility of the intrinsic goals of states involved” (Glaser, 1997, pp. 176-77).

How does game theory explain the dynamics of cooperation, and what are its limitations?

The PD deepens our understanding of how arms competition comes about when states are interested solely in the pursuit of security and shows that “there are offensive as well as defensive incentives to defect … and, if the game is to be played only once, the only rational response is to defect” (Jervis, 1978, p. 171). However, when the same players repeatedly play the game and make an ongoing series of decisions, then cooperation becomes possible through reward and punishment strategies, such as “tit for tat” – for example, one player would start by “choosing low arms but then match the strategy chosen by the other player in the previous round” (Perlo-Freeman, 2020). This type of game is called iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). It is different from the PD in that the players can learn about the behavioral tendencies of their counterparts. This is very important because the locus of decision-making in international relations resides, according to Waltz and Mearsheimer, in “the systemic-structural constraints and not contingent on any fixed assumptions about human nature” (Krieger and Roth, 2007, p. 371).

While game-theoretical analysis depicts a grim picture of the prospects for cooperation if states acted in a self-interested manner, it explains a complicated scenario in a simple way, and highlights essential features (that is, actors, strategies, payoffs) where “prospects for further cooperation … can be investigated in terms of the strategic possibilities facing states” (Snidal, 1986, p. 40). However, applying game theory to international relations often demand more information than can feasibly be obtained, raising many questions about the relevant actors, the rules of the game, the choices available to each actor, the payoffs in the game, and whether the issue best characterized as single-play or repeated play (Snidal, 1986, pp. 44-46). Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2021) argues that game theory ignores many constraints on decision-making and assumes that states “operate as ‘human calculators.’” By separating actors from their environments, game theory presents a motionless view of the world, where preferences are static and not influenced by interaction.

Conclusion

The need for international cooperation in the area of nuclear proliferation arises because states have a shared interest in security. The NPT and the JCPOA can be used as case studies to challenge the structural realists’ claim that states are less inclined to cooperate unless cooperation serves their own interests, given the anarchic nature of the international system and the ever-existing possibility of cheating. However, these two international agreements have serious shortcomings. For example, the NPT does not provide enforcement mechanisms for ridding the world of nuclear weapons, and the severe constraints on Iran’s nuclear program may constitute an incentive for Iran to try to break out of these limitations rather than abide by them, not to mention the short restriction period that postpones rather than halts its path to nuclear capabilities. These shortcomings reinforce the structural realist view that the anarchic conditions of the international system limit the political options available for states and undermine the cooperative policies in significant ways.

Many analysts think that failing to revive the JCPOA would force Iran to seek to attain nuclear weapons, which may trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, create a security dilemma, and increase the likelihood of pre-emptive nuclear strikes. Waltz and Mearsheimer disagree. They think that a nuclear-armed Iran would lead to a more stable region and guarantee that rival states will not use such weapons. Their argument is supported by how the US and the Soviet Union cooperated under the security dilemma during the Cold War, where the deterrence of nuclear weapons produced security and guaranteed that such weapons would not be used.

Jervis argues that the security dilemma depends on the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation. This creates a coordination problem known in game theory as the prisoner’s dilemma, where players who cannot enforce a cooperative strategy are driven to make competitive choices, leading to a worse off situation for both players. When modelled on a payoff matrix, game theory showed that nuclear-armed states prefer to maintain their nuclear deterrent power rather than cooperate and negotiate some sort of nuclear disarmament. As long as there is no absolute authority that can maintain security among states, cooperation will always be dependent on how far it secures the survival of states as politically independent units. Attaining security is always the highest goal for states.??

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