How delusions on the part of the EU and Washington, DC, before war, lead to a summer to fall crisis as to Ukraine: Putin not a negotiating partner
Short memo, USA , the EU and to a lesser degree NATO blew it pre Ukraine war
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“We face three potential trainwrecks: Kosovo, [NATO membership action plans] for Ukraine/Georgia, and missile defense. We’ve got a high-priority problem with Iran that will be extremely hard…to address without the Russians. We’ve got a chance to do something enduring with the Russians on nuclear cooperation…and we’ve got an opportunity to get off on a better foot with a reconfigured Russian leadership after [Dmitry] Medvedev’s likely election, and to help the Russians get across the finish line into [the World Trade Organization (WTO)] this year…. I’d opt for plowing ahead resolutely on Kosovo; deferring membership action plans for Ukraine or Georgia until a stronger foundation is laid…” (p. 232).
This was an accurate reflection of the US realist thinking at that time, but in hindsight it seems absurd. Today we know that the top issue was the security of Ukraine and Georgia. None of the other issues were really important. The recognition of Kosovo did not solve any problem. The missile defense issue has become pretty irrelevant. Nuclear cooperation with Russia has ended, and a new military alliance between Russia, Iran and North Korea has emerged. Medvedev was of limited significance and then turned a hardliner. Russia’s accession to the WTO (which I supported) has had no impact.
Burns was adamantly against offering Ukraine and Georgia NATO membership action plans, which he blamed on “neoconservatives”: “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite… Today’s Russia will respond. Russian-Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze… It will create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine… The prospects for subsequent Russian-Georgian armed conflict would be high.” (p. 233).
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The reason why NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine was a bright red line is because such membership would have slammed the door shut on the sort of barbarity seen in the current invasion by Russia. It is as simple as that
Next
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1. “Short-term pain” for Ukraine’s air power as pilots train on new F-16s
The Russian Air Force is presently conducting 6-7 times more airstrikes along the frontline than its Ukrainian counterpart. Crucially, it can simultaneously deliver long-range missile and UAV strikes across all of Ukraine. Ukrainian combat aircraft play a crucial role in countering this threat.
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The placate the Kremlin crowd wants NO discussion as to Russia having 6-7 times the number of airstrikes
This is unregurgitated tankiedom
Finally
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Russia’s termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) marks an escalation of the war. The termination came as a conclusion of months of Russian sabotage of the agreement.
An analysis by?Black Sea News?showed that the BSGI was slowly being stopped because the Russian inspectors at the JCC were deliberately slowing inspections. The number of ships arriving at Ukrainian ports in June was only 15.3% from September 2022. At times, nearly?100 ships?were waiting for inspection in the Bosporus. In April, vessels were waiting for an average of over a month.
On 25 July, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) published a classified report for Russia’s top military and political leadership, containing information on the grain deal’s obstruction. .
DIU’s report was supported by the realities at sea and the findings of the Black Sea News.
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BOTTOM line, the present constitution of the Kremlin voids it as a negotiation partner
We need to get with it.
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OPINION:?How Washington Misunderstood Putin
Re-reading the memoirs of a top US diplomat who now heads the CIA, one understands how badly Washington, Berlin and France got Russia wrong – for which we are all now paying.
August 6, 2023, 12:03 pm |?Comments (12)
US Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns listens during a press conference at the US Department of the Treasury July 11, 2013 in Washington, DC. Officials from the United States and China are meeting to discus the two world powers' relationships during the 5th United States and China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. AFP PHOTO/Brendan SMIALOWSKI (Photo by BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI / AFP)
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Williams J. Burns is widely considered the most skillful?US?diplomat of his generation. He boasts a golden career, including ambassadorship to Moscow 2005-8, Undersecretary of State for Policy, and Deputy Secretary of State. He has served in top positions under both democrats and republicans.
Today, Burns is head of the CIA and US President?Joe Biden?just made him a member of his cabinet. He is often seen as Biden’s most important advisor on Russia’s war in Ukraine after national security advisor Jake Sullivan.
In 2019, Burns published his highly acclaimed memoir,?The Back Channel: American Diplomacy in a Disordered World. Given his current prominence, I have just finished reading it to try to figure out where he actually stands on Russia and Ukraine.
The book is substantial. Burns spells out his views in uncommon clarity thanks to ample access to his old reports to the State Department. But the more I read, the more disappointed I became by his view of Russia and Ukraine, but the problem was not only Burns.
Much of the US establishment, not to mention Germany and France, got Putin and his foreign policy wrong. They neglected the interests of friendly countries such as Ukraine and Georgia..
Russian President Vladimir Putin has actually been remarkably transparent, and Burns reports it well. When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Putin in Moscow in 2005, he stated: “Saakashvili is nothing more than a puppet of the United States.” He continued: “If Georgia causes bloodshed in Ossetia, I will have no alternative to recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and responding with force” (p. 202).?
As Russia’s aggressive acts unleash chaos and suffering amidst a desire to stay on top, there is an inherent madness as the serpent continues to bite its own tail.
Already then, Putin threatened to attack Georgia. One would have expected the US to respond forcefully and prepare measures against Russian expansionism (sharp statements, threats of sanctions, arms deliveries). Yet, Burns simply states: “Putin’s pugnacity left an impression.”
Burns expresses contempt for former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who launched Russia’s freedom and economic reforms, while he is respectful of Putin: “He seemed in many ways the anti-Yeltsin – half a generation younger, sober, ruthlessly competent, hardworking, and hard-faced, he offered promise for Russians tired of the Yeltsin-era chaos and disorder” (p. 206).
Burns continues: “Putin made a brutal object lesson of the billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003, seizing his oil and gas company, Yukos, and sending him to prison.” Putin’s absence of good values is mentioned just in passing where Burns states that he “has never been a democratizer” (p. 207). Burns rightly notices that by 2005, the Bush administration “saw a Russia uninterested in democratic values” (p. 209).?Burns evidently expressed no interest in any democratic agenda: “I urged realism about the unlikely prospects for broad partnership with Putin’s Russia, and pragmatism in our strategy… Pragmatism required that we draw clear lines around our vital interests, pick our fights on other issues carefully” (p. 210).
Burns’ main concern was that the US would provoke Putin, and he found great understanding in George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and Robert Gates.
Warning signs
As Burns reported from Putin’s meeting with Rice, the warning signs of Putin’s new aggressive foreign policy were abundant already in 2005. Putin just escalated. In his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, Burns states how Putin “bitterly criticized American unilateralism” (p. 224).
Instead of taking Putin’s new aggression seriously, Burns acts like a psychotherapist, seeing his speech as “the self-absorbed product of 15 years of accumulate Russian frustrations and grievances…Putin was giving voice to the pent-up frustrations of many Russians” (p. 224). Well, so did Adolf Hitler in Weimar, Germany, and we knew how that ended. No such thought could be further from Burns’ mind. He wanted to accommodate Putin.
One of the most interesting parts of his memoir is his analysis of the US policy options in early 2008:
“We face three potential trainwrecks: Kosovo, [NATO membership action plans] for Ukraine/Georgia, and missile defense. We’ve got a high-priority problem with Iran that will be extremely hard…to address without the Russians. We’ve got a chance to do something enduring with the Russians on nuclear cooperation…and we’ve got an opportunity to get off on a better foot with a reconfigured Russian leadership after [Dmitry] Medvedev’s likely election, and to help the Russians get across the finish line into [the World Trade Organization (WTO)] this year…. I’d opt for plowing ahead resolutely on Kosovo; deferring membership action plans for Ukraine or Georgia until a stronger foundation is laid…” (p. 232).
This was an accurate reflection of the US realist thinking at that time, but in hindsight it seems absurd. Today we know that the top issue was the security of Ukraine and Georgia. None of the other issues were really important. The recognition of Kosovo did not solve any problem. The missile defense issue has become pretty irrelevant. Nuclear cooperation with Russia has ended, and a new military alliance between Russia, Iran and North Korea has emerged. Medvedev was of limited significance and then turned a hardliner. Russia’s accession to the WTO (which I supported) has had no impact.
Burns was adamantly against offering Ukraine and Georgia NATO membership action plans, which he blamed on “neoconservatives”: “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite… Today’s Russia will respond. Russian-Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze… It will create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine… The prospects for subsequent Russian-Georgian armed conflict would be high.” (p. 233).
While Burns understood well how Putin’s Kremlin would react, he effectively argued the US should allow Putin to set the US policy agenda. His stand was not based on any sympathy for Putin’s Russia. On the contrary, he noted “that Russia is a deeply authoritarian and overcentralized state today” (p. 233). But besides a brief mentioning of rising corruption (p. 226), Burns refrains from complaining about organized crime and kleptocracy being the essence of Putin’s system. Why?
Placating a war monger
Burns reports that Putin told him in early 2008: “Don’t you know that Ukraine is not even a real country?” which Putin has repeated incessantly since then. Rather than drawing the obvious conclusion that Putin did not recognize the rights of Ukraine and Georgia to be independent countries, Burns and the Bush administration tried to accommodate Putin, as if the problem was not that he was a neo-imperialist war monger but only in a bad mood.
Similarly, Burns did not call for US support for the reasonably democratic and Western-oriented countries Georgia and Ukraine, but he reports from August 2008: “Putin was determined to take Saakashvili down a peg, and perhaps also show in the wake of the Bucharest [NATO summit] statement, that the Germans and French were right to see Georgia’s not-so-frozen conflicts as a long-term obstacle to NATO membership” (p. 241).
Well, who was responsible for these so-called “frozen” conflicts? Russia’s military aggression! While Burns is wisely cautious, he does appear to put much of the blame on the war in Georgia on Saakashvili and the US.
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In spite of Russia’s aggression against Georgia, the US did not impose any sanctions on Russia, and US President Barack Obama started his reset as if nothing had happened. So Putin understood that he could go ahead and attack Ukraine in 2014. Since the Obama administration in 2014 imposed only limited sanctions and – incredibly – refused to deliver lethal weapons to Ukraine so that it could defend itself, Putin expressed his appreciation and launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
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Lessons learned?
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The Burns memoirs are a valuable testimony to the folly of US policy on Russia and Ukraine in the last two decades. First of all, the US got Putin wrong. After Putin declared his full animosity to the US and the West in his February 2007 Munich speech, the US Embassy in Moscow should have focused on predicting what wars Russia might be planning. Second, US policy should have planned what the US should do in response. Substantial arms deliveries to Ukraine should have been the very least.
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Needless to say, Burns was not responsible for these mistakes. He served his rulers eminently. The main responsibility rests ultimately with then US Presidents George W. Bush and Obama, who did not fathom Putin’s intentions. Bush tried to accommodate Putin with too much friendliness and with too many meetings, while Obama sensibly ignored?Putin, but did not stand up to him. France and Germany were far worse on all accounts, but that is another story.
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The Biden administration clearly understands far more and has done a great deal. Without its understanding and efforts, Ukraine might have fallen, but the final steps that need to be taken are to declare that Ukraine must win this war and the West, primarily the US, needs to deliver all the arms it takes for Ukraine to defeat Russia.
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Anders ?slund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”
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The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.
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Whereas
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Four unnerving signs for Ukraine as it heads for fall
The forthcoming fall and winter will be critical for Ukraine and, therefore, Europe. If Russia can destroy Ukraine’s air defense, the West will need to reconsider its stand on military intervention.
07/08/2023
7 MINUTE READ
Ukrainian soldiers during training. Credit: Ukraine’s general staff
While Ukraine is fighting for its right to exist and paying the price in blood, Europe has long realized that Ukraine is protecting European values and principles. There can be no security without an independent and sovereign Ukraine.
As previously argued, the?consequences?of a potential Russian victory in Ukraine are devastating for the continent.
Russian forces are presently?unable to achieve a decisive breakthrough?along the frontline. Despite the lack of military success on land, Russia is, unfortunately, making progress elsewhere. It is, after all, involved in a Hybrid War using both military and non-military means.
The military situation, however, is fluid and might be about to change. The next 6-8 months might prove to be critical.
The impact of the slow and incremental Western defense support has been thoroughly described by many experts during the last 17 months. Four factors, however, will have an increasing impact on the further development of the war.
1. “Short-term pain” for Ukraine’s air power as pilots train on new F-16s
The Russian Air Force is presently conducting 6-7 times more airstrikes along the frontline than its Ukrainian counterpart. Crucially, it can simultaneously deliver long-range missile and UAV strikes across all of Ukraine. Ukrainian combat aircraft play a crucial role in countering this threat.
Ukraine might start operating F-16 in 2024. Acknowledging its capacity to maintain a degree of air control and provide some air support with its Soviet legacy combat aircraft despite facing a superior Air Power, its ability to close the sky will increase dramatically once it starts operating modern, western-made combat aircraft. That’s the good news.
On the downside, qualifying its personnel to fly, maintain and support the F-16 – will probably force the Ukrainian Air Force to temporarily withdraw some of its pilots and technicians from their crucial role of upholding Air Control and supporting the counteroffensive.
While it might take 4-6 months for an experienced fighter pilot to operate an F-16 effectively, it might take 1-2 years to get all pilots and technicians through the training program.
Depending on the ratio between available fighter pilots and combat aircraft, the process of introducing F-16s into the Air Force might temporarily leave Ukraine with a reduced availability of MiG-29 Fulcrum and Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker jets. This will affect Ukraine’s ability to close the sky and support the ground offensive.
The introduction of F-16 into the Ukrainian Air Force will bring long-term relief but short-term pain.
2. Gaps grow in Ukraine’s air defenses as missile stocks dwindle
This happens as the Ukrainian Air Defence is being depleted. Ukraine has?lost?more than 118 Surface-To-Air Missile Systems since the full-scale war started.
At the end of February,?89%?of Ukraine’s air defense systems consisted of Soviet legacy systems like S-300 and Buk, and was already slowly running out of missiles. Fortunately, the West has been able to help replenish some of the missiles from some of the many users of the systems globally.
Ukraine’s ability to maintain air control might gradually be reduced in the next 6-8 months because of dwindling stocks of missiles and reduced availability of Ukrainian combat aircraft. This coincides with a Russian push to increase the production of both long-range cruise missiles and drones.
As stressed in the article?“Ukraine’s Need for Fighter Aircraft Has Not Gone Away,” Ukraine is already suffering the consequences of a lack of air defense systems. Ukrainian cities, villages, settlements, and not least, Ukrainian frontline positions remain exposed to daily airstrikes. Ukrainian ports have been subject to multiple missile and drone strikes. The Ukrainian Land Forces are conducting a counteroffensive with scarce protection from Russian combat aircraft and attack helicopters.
In July, Russia conducted more than 1,552 airstrikes against Ukraine. Russia lost no combat aircraft and only three helicopters during the same period.
Modern, western air defense systems will be unable to replace the old methods for years due to the number of systems needed. While more Western Air Defence means are forthcoming, many are still under production and will be delivered next year.
An already struggling Ukrainian Air Defence network might stumble and fall as Ukraine awaits the F-16s.
This might happen as Ukraine prepares for its second winter at full-scale war, less than a year after its energy sector was subject to massive missile and UAV strikes.
According to the?UNDP, an alarming 42 out of 94 (45%) vital high-voltage transformers in government-controlled territories have been damaged or destroyed due to missile or drone strikes since 22 February 2022. More than half of these transformers have endured repeated attacks, thwarting attempts at repair. Power generation capacity has been reduced to nearly 50% of its pre-2022 levels. Out of nearly 37 GW of installed capacity, over 19 GW have been destroyed, damaged, or occupied. The situation is aggravated by the significant decline in maneuvering capacities, including the loss of more than 67% of thermal power generation capacity.
The risks must be seen in the context of?UAV production facilities?being built in both Russia and Belarus, increasing Russia’s future ability to launch waves of UAVs against Ukraine. Ukraine is also experiencing a temporary “lull” in missile strikes compared to April and May. Russia can only?produce 60-70 missiles?a month and might, therefore, have started rebuilding its missile stocks in preparation for yet another winter season.
3. Western military aid slows to a trickle as Ukraine’s needs mount
The temporary decrease in Ukrainian Air Power happens in conjunction with a?reduced inflow of Western weapons and ammunition. According to the Ukraine Support Tracker:
“Despite some larger support packages, the total amount of new bilateral support commitments to Ukraine by other countries has been low in spring 2023 compared to previous periods. Most of the new pledges were military aid. However, despite the Ukrainian offensive, new pledges are not as large as at the beginning of the year, and military equipment deliveries are well below commitments.”
Both the US and Europe failed to mobilize their defense industries when the war started in 2014. The effort to ramp up the production of weapons and ammunition only started last spring. The US defence industrial base requires, however,?18-36 months?to get ready for conflicts, which helps explain why the output of 155 mm ammunition has only increased from 15,000 to?30,000?a month, while the required – and only achievable in the long-term – is?70,000. This reflects the overall production problems the West faces 9.5 years into the war.
4. Termination of Black Sea grain deal signals dangerous escalation by Russia
Russia’s termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) marks an escalation of the war. The termination came as a conclusion of months of Russian sabotage of the agreement.
An analysis by?Black Sea News?showed that the BSGI was slowly being stopped because the Russian inspectors at the JCC were deliberately slowing inspections. The number of ships arriving at Ukrainian ports in June was only 15.3% from September 2022. At times, nearly?100 ships?were waiting for inspection in the Bosporus. In April, vessels were waiting for an average of over a month.
On 25 July, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) published a classified report for Russia’s top military and political leadership, containing information on the grain deal’s obstruction. According to the report, Russia actively used the JCC to minimize the volume of grain exported under the grain agreement. “High-quality inspection of vessels”, temporary suspension of the agreement (with the consequential follow-on effects), restriction of access of ships to the port of Pivdennyi, reduction of the number of inspection teams, and the stop of registration of grain carriers were some of the tools used to reduce the outflow of Ukrainian grain to the world markets.
DIU’s report was supported by the realities at sea and the findings of the Black Sea News.
While Russia’s “war on food” has a tremendous impact on the more than 345 million people who face high levels of food?insecurity?in 2023, it has also has a huge impact on both Ukraine and the West.
As previously argued, both Ukraine and the West are exposed to a Hybrid War. Russia is trying to bring about a Ukrainian defeat through the parallel and synchronized use of both military and non-military means. Due to both the direct and indirect consequences of the full-scale war – including (but not limited to) the destruction of critical infrastructure and the industrial and agricultural base, and the maritime embargo – Ukraine is only a “donor conference” away from collapse.
The maritime blockade is:
It is, therefore, time to refocus attention from the situation on the battlefield on land to the broader strategic situation.
Converging crises threaten to overwhelm Ukraine’s precarious defenses
A reduced inflow of main battle tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, MLRS, and ammunition, combined with a temporary reduction of Air Power and increasing problems in upholding Air Control for lack of Ground Based Air Defence, will have a negative impact on the battlefield.
The fact that this coincides with Russia re-establishing its supremacy in the Black Sea, using food to blackmail the world and block maritime trade to/from Ukraine, further undermines Ukraine and its international partners.
It all happens as the US increasingly focuses on the presidential election, and President Putin sees a glimpse of hope, seeing a potential?Republican win?as a chance for the United States to withdraw or further reduce its support for Ukraine.
In parallel, the political landscape in Europe is slowly being transformed because of dissatisfied electorates resulting from increased living costs, as well as food and energy insecurity. Europe sees?far-right parties?of different flavors – nostalgic nationalist, populist nationalist, ultra-conservative with neo-fascist roots, and more – enjoying a notable resurgence. This development will probably serve Russia far more than the EU and NATO.
Equally crucial, all of the above will have a huge impact on the Russian appraisal of the strategic environment.
At a critical juncture, Ukraine requires urgent course correction to survive
Russia’s attempts to occupy Ukraine by military power failed before it even started. This should, however, not be translated into a strategic defeat. Russia is, after all, conducting a hybrid – not a conventional – war. Seen in this context, its outlook is not all bad.
The next six-eight months might change the balance on the battlefield. If Russia can destroy the remaining Ukrainian Air Defense network, the war’s nature will dramatically change.
The West, therefore, urgently needs to reconsider its stand on military intervention.
If Ukrainian Air Defence shows signs of collapsing, a coalition of the willing must be ready to intervene (and do what it should have done 530 days ago).
In the meantime, Ukraine urgently needs more Ground Based Air Defence systems to protect all major cities and ports, as well as support the efforts of the Ukrainian Land Forces.
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Andrew Beckwith, PhD