How to Counter China’s Digital Authoritarianism and Reduce Inequalities in the Indo-Pacific Region

1 Introduction

Imagine living in a country where your every move, transaction, and communication is monitored by the state. Where your access to basic services, such as health care, education, and transportation, depends on your compliance with the government’s policies and preferences. Where your identity, culture, and beliefs are subject to constant scrutiny and suppression. This is not a dystopian fiction, but a reality for millions of people in China and beyond, who are subject to the world’s most sophisticated and intrusive system of digital authoritarianism.

Digital authoritarianism is the use of digital technologies by authoritarian regimes to enhance their power and control over their populations and territories, and to extend their influence and interests beyond their borders. It involves the collection, analysis, and manipulation of massive amounts of data, the deployment of advanced surveillance and censorship tools, and the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, 5G, and cloud computing.

China is the global leader and pioneer of digital authoritarianism. It has developed and implemented a comprehensive and integrated system of digital authoritarianism, which affects every aspect of its society and economy, and which poses serious challenges and threats to the region and the world. China’s digital authoritarianism not only violates the rights and freedoms of its own citizens and those of other countries, but also deepens the existing gaps and disparities in the region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation.

This article aims to explore and analyze how China’s digital authoritarianism exacerbates pre-existing inequalities in the Indo-Pacific region, and to propose some innovative and creative counter-strategies and alternatives for the countries and actors in the region to challenge and resist China’s digital authoritarianism, and to reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates.

Methodology and AI-Assisted Research

This article utilizes a transdisciplinary and holistic approach, drawing insights from various fields like economics, sociology, and law and using case studies of different countries and groups, such as India, Japan, and the Uyghurs. To enhance the research process and delve deeper into the complexities of the subject, artificial intelligence (AI) was employed for tasks such as:

• Identifying and analyzing relevant research papers and data sources from diverse academic and governmental publications.
• Extracting key information and identifying emerging trends within the vast amount of data available on digital authoritarianism and its impact.
• Generating thematic summaries and facilitating knowledge organization to streamline the research and writing process.

While AI played a significant role in supporting the research, it is crucial to emphasize that all analysis, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report are the result of critical human judgment and expertise.

The article is structured as follows:

The second section provides a brief overview of what digital authoritarianism is, how China practices it, and why it matters for the region and the world.

The third section analyzes how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the inequalities in the region, using the dimensions of economic, political, and social inequality.

The fourth section proposes some ethical, collaborative, and inclusive counter-strategies and alternatives for the countries and actors in the region to counter China’s digital authoritarianism, and to reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates.

The fifth and final section summarizes the main points and arguments of the article, reiterates the main message and contribution of the article, and ends with a call to action and a question for further research.

Why is this topic important and relevant? The Indo-Pacific region is one of the most diverse and dynamic regions in the world, encompassing countries with different levels of development, governance, and culture. The region is also home to more than half of the world’s population, and accounts for more than 60% of the world’s GDP. The region is also a key arena for geopolitical (e.g. the tensions around Taiwan) and geo-economic competition and cooperation, especially between China and the United States, the two superpowers of the 21st century. The region is also facing multiple challenges and opportunities, such as climate change, pandemics, digital transformation, and regional integration. How the countries and actors in the region respond to China’s digital authoritarianism, and how they shape the future of the digital world, will have significant implications for the region and the world.

What is the main argument of the article? The main argument of the article is that China’s digital authoritarianism not only violates the rights and freedoms of its own citizens and those of other countries, but also deepens the existing gaps and disparities in the region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation. The article will show how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the economic, political, and social inequalities in the region, using case studies of different countries and groups. The article will also propose some ethical, collaborative, and inclusive counter-strategies and alternatives for the countries and actors in the region to counter China’s digital authoritarianism, and to reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates.

The Consequences of Exacerbated Inequalities

These widening inequalities can have a domino effect, hindering economic growth, fueling social unrest, and eroding trust in institutions. Unequal access to digital resources and opportunities can entrench existing power structures and disadvantage vulnerable populations, further hindering their ability to participate meaningfully in society. Recognizing these potential consequences is crucial as we explore the specific ways China's digital authoritarianism contributes to this complex and pressing issue.

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2 China’s digital authoritarianism: a brief overview

China’s digital authoritarianism is ranked as the worst in the world by Freedom House, a US-based NGO that monitors internet freedom. According to Freedom House, China has the lowest score of 10 out of 100 in terms of internet freedom, and has been designated as “not free” for the sixth consecutive year. China’s digital authoritarianism is characterized by four main features: mass surveillance, online censorship, social credit system, and global expansion.

Mass surveillance: China has built the world’s largest and most sophisticated system of mass surveillance, which covers every corner of its territory and every aspect of its population. China uses a variety of technologies and methods to collect, analyze, and manipulate massive amounts of data, such as facial recognition, biometric identification, GPS tracking, big data analytics, and artificial intelligence. China uses this data to monitor and control the behavior and activities of its citizens and visitors, and to identify and suppress any potential threats or dissent. For example, China has used its biometric and facial recognition technology to target and oppress ethnic minorities, such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the Tibetans in Tibet. According to a report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, China has deployed more than 500,000 cameras in Xinjiang alone, and has collected the biometric data of more than 36 million people in the region. China has also used its mass surveillance system to enforce its strict measures against the COVID-19 pandemic, such as tracking the movements and contacts of infected individuals, and imposing lockdowns and quarantines.

Online censorship: China has imposed the world’s most extensive and restrictive system of online censorship, which limits and manipulates the information and communication that can be accessed and shared online. China uses a combination of legal, technical, and human measures to filter, block, delete, and distort any content or platform that is deemed undesirable or harmful by the state, such as political criticism, social activism, religious expression, and foreign influence. China also uses online propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation to shape and influence the public opinion and discourse online, and to promote its own narratives and interests. For example, China has blocked access to popular websites and platforms, such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Wikipedia, and has replaced them with its own versions, such as Baidu, WeChat, Weibo, and Baidu Baike. China has also deleted or altered millions of posts and comments that are critical of the government or its policies, and has hired thousands of online commentators, known as the “50-cent army”, to spread positive messages and divert attention from sensitive issues. China has also used its online censorship system to control the information and communication about the COVID-19 pandemic, such as censoring or silencing whistleblowers, doctors, journalists, and activists, and spreading false or misleading information about the origin, spread, and response to the virus.

Social credit system: China has developed and implemented a comprehensive and integrated system of social credit, which aims to assess and regulate the trustworthiness and behavior of its citizens and entities, and to reward or punish them accordingly. China uses a variety of data sources and indicators, such as financial records, legal records, online activities, and social interactions, to assign a score and a rating to each individual and organization, and to grant or deny them access to various services and opportunities, such as loans, travel, education, and employment. For example, China has used its social credit system to blacklist millions of people and entities for various reasons, such as defaulting on loans, violating traffic rules, cheating on exams, or spreading rumors online, and to restrict their access to public transportation, flights, hotels, schools, and jobs. China has also used its social credit system to incentivize and reward people and entities for good behavior, such as donating blood, volunteering, recycling, or paying taxes on time, and to grant them access to preferential services and opportunities, such as discounts, subsidies, scholarships, and promotions.

Global expansion: China has expanded and exported its system of digital authoritarianism beyond its borders, and has become a global leader and provider of digital infrastructure and services, especially in the developing world. China has used its Digital Silk Road initiative, which is part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative, to invest in and export its digital infrastructure and services, such as 5G networks, cloud computing, e-commerce, and smart cities, to countries in the region and beyond, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Cambodia. China has also used its Safe Cities project, which is part of its broader Smart Cities initiative, to provide surveillance and security systems, such as cameras, sensors, and facial recognition, to countries in the region and beyond, such as Laos, Myanmar, and the Philippines. While these projects may bring some benefits, such as improved connectivity and efficiency, they also pose risks, such as increased debt, dependency, and vulnerability. China has also used these projects to access and exploit the data and resources of the recipient countries, and to exert its political and ideological influence over them. For example, China has been accused of using its 5G networks to spy on and interfere with the communications and operations of other countries, such as Australia, India, and the United States. China has also been accused of using its Safe Cities systems to export its model of surveillance and repression to other countries, such as Zimbabwe, Ecuador, and Serbia. China’s global expansion of its digital authoritarianism poses a serious challenge and threat to the sovereignty and security of the countries and actors in the region and beyond.

China’s digital authoritarianism is not only a domestic phenomenon, but also a regional and global one. It affects the rights and freedoms, the interests and values, and the prospects and challenges of the countries and actors in the region and beyond. It also affects the inequalities in the region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation. The next section will analyze how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the inequalities in the region, using the dimensions of economic, political, and social inequality.

Exploring Additional Perspectives and References

Balancing Perspectives:

While China's digital authoritarianism raises significant concerns, it's important to acknowledge the ongoing debate surrounding its potential benefits and alternative perspectives. Proponents argue that China's approach fosters:

• Economic development: Investments in digital infrastructure and services can stimulate economic growth and create new opportunities.
• Social stability: The social credit system, for instance, can incentivize positive behavior and discourage harmful activities.
• National security: Surveillance and censorship are seen by some as necessary tools to combat terrorism and maintain national security.

However, it's crucial to emphasize that these potential benefits are often contested, with concerns surrounding:

• Individual rights and freedoms: The implementation of these measures often comes at the cost of individual privacy, freedom of expression, and political participation.
• Transparency and accountability: The lack of clear legal frameworks and independent oversight raises concerns about potential misuse and abuse of power.
• Global competition and rivalry: China's growing influence in the digital space raises concerns about the potential for a fragmented internet and increased global competition.

References

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• Freedom House: "China's Internet Freedom Report 2023" (https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2022 )
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3 China’s digital authoritarianism and inequalities in the Indo-Pacific region

China’s digital authoritarianism not only violates the rights and freedoms of its own citizens and those of other countries, but also deepens the existing gaps and disparities in the Indo-Pacific region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation. In this section, we will analyze how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the inequalities in the region, using case studies of different countries and groups, and drawing on insights from other disciplines, such as economics, sociology, and law. We will use the dimensions of economic, political, and social inequality to structure our analysis.

Economic inequality

Economic inequality refers to the unequal distribution of income, wealth, and opportunities among individuals, groups, or countries. Economic inequality can have various causes and consequences, such as poverty, unemployment, education, health, environment, and development. Economic inequality can also be influenced and exacerbated by digital technologies, such as access, affordability, quality, and usage of digital infrastructure and services.

China’s digital authoritarianism affects the economic inequality in the region in several ways. First, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a digital divide between China and other countries, especially the developing ones, in terms of digital infrastructure and services. China has invested heavily in building and expanding its own digital infrastructure and services, such as 5G networks, cloud computing, e-commerce, and smart cities, while limiting or blocking the access and participation of other countries, especially the developed ones, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia. China has also used its Digital Silk Road initiative to export its digital infrastructure and services to other countries, especially the developing ones, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Cambodia, but with strings attached, such as debt, dependency, and vulnerability. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a digital divide that widens the gap between the haves and the have-nots, and between the leaders and the followers, in the digital economy.

Second, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a digital disparity within China and other countries, especially the developing ones, in terms of digital access and opportunities. China’s digital authoritarianism favors and benefits certain groups and regions, such as the urban, the wealthy, the educated, and the coastal, while marginalizing and disadvantaging others, such as the rural, the poor, the uneducated, and the inland. China’s digital authoritarianism also favors and benefits certain sectors and industries, such as the state-owned, the high-tech, and the export-oriented, while neglecting and harming others, such as the private, the low-tech, and the domestic-oriented. China’s digital authoritarianism also favors and benefits certain individuals and entities, such as those who are loyal, compliant, and trustworthy, while penalizing and excluding others, such as those who are critical, dissenting, and untrustworthy. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a digital disparity that reinforces and reproduces the existing inequalities and hierarchies in the society and economy.

Third, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a digital dependency and vulnerability for China and other countries, especially the developing ones, in terms of digital security and sustainability. China’s digital authoritarianism relies and depends on the massive collection, analysis, and manipulation of data, which poses risks and challenges for the privacy, security, and sovereignty of the data subjects and owners, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism also relies and depends on the exploitation and consumption of resources, such as energy, materials, and labor, which poses risks and challenges for the environment, health, and welfare of the resource providers and users, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism also relies and depends on the stability and continuity of the digital system, which poses risks and challenges for the resilience, adaptability, and diversity of the digital actors and stakeholders, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a digital dependency and vulnerability that exposes and endangers the economic well-being and development of the countries and actors in the region and beyond.

India

To illustrate the effects of China’s digital authoritarianism on the economic inequality in the region, we will use the case study of India, which is one of the most populous, diverse, and dynamic countries in the region, and which has a complex and competitive relationship with China. India is also one of the most digitally active and ambitious countries in the region, and which has a vibrant and innovative digital ecosystem, such as the world’s second-largest internet user base, the world’s largest biometric identification system, and the world’s fastest-growing digital economy.

India has been affected by China’s digital authoritarianism in various ways. On the one hand, India has benefited from China’s digital investments and exports, such as the provision of affordable and accessible digital infrastructure and services, such as smartphones, apps, and e-commerce, which have enabled and empowered millions of Indians to access and participate in the digital economy. On the other hand, India has suffered from China’s digital interference and exploitation, such as the surveillance and manipulation of data, the censorship and distortion of information, and the infiltration and disruption of operations, which have threatened and undermined the sovereignty and security of India and its citizens. India has also suffered from China’s digital dominance and competition, such as the crowding out and displacement of local and alternative digital actors and stakeholders, such as entrepreneurs, innovators, and regulators, which have limited and constrained the diversity and autonomy of India’s digital ecosystem.

India has responded to China’s digital authoritarianism in various ways. On the one hand, India has cooperated and collaborated with China on some digital issues and initiatives, such as the promotion of digital connectivity and development, the regulation of digital trade and taxation, and the governance of digital standards and norms, which have created and enhanced the mutual benefits and opportunities for both countries. On the other hand, India has contested and resisted China on some digital issues and initiatives, such as the protection of digital rights and freedoms, the prevention of digital threats and harms, and the promotion of digital values and interests, which have created and escalated the conflicts and tensions between both countries. India has also competed and challenged China on some digital issues and initiatives, such as the development and innovation of digital technologies and services, the expansion and diversification of digital markets and partners, and the leadership and influence of digital platforms and networks, which have created and increased the rivalry and competition between both countries.

India’s case study shows how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the economic inequality in the region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation, as well as new forms of cooperation, resistance, and competition. The next section will analyze how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the political inequality in the region, using the dimensions of power, participation, and representation.

Political inequality

Political inequality refers to the unequal distribution of power, influence, and representation among individuals, groups, or countries. Political inequality can have various causes and consequences, such as democracy, governance, participation, rights, and justice. Political inequality can also be influenced and exacerbated by digital technologies, such as access, affordability, quality, and usage of digital platforms and networks.

China’s digital authoritarianism affects the political inequality in the region in several ways. First, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a political divide between China and other countries, especially the democratic ones, in terms of political values and interests. China’s digital authoritarianism reflects and reinforces its authoritarian political system, which is based on the principles of centralization, control, and conformity, and which is opposed to the principles of decentralization, freedom, and diversity, which are the basis of the democratic political system. China’s digital authoritarianism also reflects and reinforces its political ambitions and interests, which are based on the goals of expansion, domination, and hegemony, and which are opposed to the goals of cooperation, balance, and multipolarity, which are the basis of the international political order. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a political divide that widens the gap between the authoritarian and the democratic, and between the revisionist and the status quo, in the political world.

Second, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a political disparity within China and other countries, especially the democratic ones, in terms of political participation and representation. China’s digital authoritarianism favors and benefits certain groups and regions, such as the ruling party, the elite, and the loyal, while marginalizing and disadvantaging others, such as the opposition, the marginalized, and the dissenting. China’s digital authoritarianism also favors and benefits certain sectors and industries, such as the security, the military, and the propaganda, while neglecting and harming others, such as the civil society, the media, and the academia. China’s digital authoritarianism also favors and benefits certain individuals and entities, such as those who are obedient, compliant, and trustworthy, while penalizing and excluding others, such as those who are independent, critical, and untrustworthy. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a political disparity that reinforces and reproduces the existing inequalities and hierarchies in the polity and society.

Third, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a political dependency and vulnerability for China and other countries, especially the democratic ones, in terms of political security and sustainability. China’s digital authoritarianism relies and depends on the massive collection, analysis, and manipulation of data, which poses risks and challenges for the privacy, security, and sovereignty of the data subjects and owners, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism also relies and depends on the exploitation and consumption of resources, such as energy, materials, and labor, which poses risks and challenges for the environment, health, and welfare of the resource providers and users, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism also relies and depends on the stability and continuity of the digital system, which poses risks and challenges for the resilience, adaptability, and diversity of the digital actors and stakeholders, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a political dependency and vulnerability that exposes and endangers the political well-being and development of the countries and actors in the region and beyond.

Japan

To illustrate the effects of China’s digital authoritarianism on the political inequality in the region, we will use the case study of Japan, which is one of the most developed, democratic, and influential countries in the region, and which has a complex and competitive relationship with China. Japan is also one of the most digitally advanced and active countries in the region, and which has a vibrant and innovative digital ecosystem, such as the world’s third-largest internet economy, the world’s leading robotics industry, and the world’s first digital agency.

Japan has been affected by China’s digital authoritarianism in various ways. On the one hand, Japan has benefited from China’s digital investments and exports, such as the provision of cheap and quality digital products and services, such as electronics, apps, and e-commerce, which have enabled and enhanced the productivity and competitiveness of Japan’s economy and society. On the other hand, Japan has suffered from China’s digital interference and exploitation, such as the surveillance and manipulation of data, the censorship and distortion of information, and the infiltration and disruption of operations, which have threatened and undermined the sovereignty and security of Japan and its citizens. Japan has also suffered from China’s digital dominance and competition, such as the crowding out and displacement of local and alternative digital actors and stakeholders, such as entrepreneurs, innovators, and regulators, which have limited and constrained the diversity and autonomy of Japan’s digital ecosystem.

Japan has responded to China’s digital authoritarianism in various ways. On the one hand, Japan has cooperated and collaborated with China on some digital issues and initiatives, such as the promotion of digital connectivity and development, the regulation of digital trade and taxation, and the governance of digital standards and norms, which have created and enhanced the mutual benefits and opportunities for both countries. On the other hand, Japan has contested and resisted China on some digital issues and initiatives, such as the protection of digital rights and freedoms, the prevention of digital threats and harms, and the promotion of digital values and interests, which have created and escalated the conflicts and tensions between both countries. Japan has also competed and challenged China on some digital issues and initiatives, such as the development and innovation of digital technologies and services, the expansion and diversification of digital markets and partners, and the leadership and influence of digital platforms and networks, which have created and increased the rivalry and competition between both countries.

Japan’s case study shows how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the political inequality in the region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation, as well as new forms of cooperation, resistance, and competition. The next section will analyze how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the social inequality in the region, using the dimensions of identity, culture, and rights.

Social inequality

Social inequality refers to the unequal distribution of identity, culture, and rights among individuals, groups, or countries. Social inequality can have various causes and consequences, such as ethnicity, religion, gender, education, health, and human development. Social inequality can also be influenced and exacerbated by digital technologies, such as access, affordability, quality, and usage of digital platforms and networks.

China’s digital authoritarianism affects the social inequality in the region in several ways. First, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a social divide between China and other countries, especially the diverse and pluralistic ones, in terms of social identity and culture. China’s digital authoritarianism reflects and reinforces its homogenous and monolithic social identity and culture, which is based on the principles of nationalism, patriotism, and collectivism, and which is opposed to the principles of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and individualism, which are the basis of the diverse and pluralistic social identity and culture. China’s digital authoritarianism also reflects and reinforces its dominant and hegemonic social identity and culture, which is based on the goals of assimilation, integration, and conformity, and which is opposed to the goals of diversity, inclusion, and respect, which are the basis of the international human rights norms. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a social divide that widens the gap between the homogenous and the diverse, and between the dominant and the marginalized, in the social world.

Second, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a social disparity within China and other countries, especially the diverse and pluralistic ones, in terms of social rights and freedoms. China’s digital authoritarianism favors and benefits certain groups and regions, such as the Han, the majority, and the mainland, while marginalizing and disadvantaging others, such as the ethnic minorities, the minority, and the periphery. China’s digital authoritarianism also favors and benefits certain sectors and industries, such as the traditional, the orthodox, and the conformist, while neglecting and harming others, such as the modern, the heterodox, and the dissenting. China’s digital authoritarianism also favors and benefits certain individuals and entities, such as those who are loyal, compliant, and trustworthy, while penalizing and excluding others, such as those who are critical, dissenting, and untrustworthy. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a social disparity that reinforces and reproduces the existing inequalities and hierarchies in the society and culture.

Third, China’s digital authoritarianism creates a social dependency and vulnerability for China and other countries, especially the diverse and pluralistic ones, in terms of social security and sustainability. China’s digital authoritarianism relies and depends on the massive collection, analysis, and manipulation of data, which poses risks and challenges for the privacy, security, and sovereignty of the data subjects and owners, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism also relies and depends on the exploitation and consumption of resources, such as energy, materials, and labor, which poses risks and challenges for the environment, health, and welfare of the resource providers and users, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism also relies and depends on the stability and continuity of the digital system, which poses risks and challenges for the resilience, adaptability, and diversity of the digital actors and stakeholders, such as individuals, groups, or countries. China’s digital authoritarianism creates a social dependency and vulnerability that exposes and endangers the social well-being and development of the countries and actors in the region and beyond.

The Uyghurs

To illustrate the effects of China’s digital authoritarianism on the social inequality in the region, we will use the case study of the Uyghurs, which is one of the most persecuted and oppressed ethnic minorities in the world, and which has been subject to China’s digital authoritarianism in the most extreme and brutal ways. The Uyghurs are a Turkic Muslim minority group that live mainly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in northwest China, which borders several countries in the region, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan. The Uyghurs have a distinct and rich culture and history, which is different from the dominant Han Chinese culture and history.

The Uyghurs have been affected by China’s digital authoritarianism in various ways. On the one hand, the Uyghurs have been deprived and denied of their basic and fundamental social rights and freedoms, such as the right to life, liberty, and security, the right to freedom of expression, religion, and association, and the right to education, health, and culture. China has used its digital authoritarianism to monitor, control, and suppress the Uyghurs, such as by collecting and analyzing their biometric and behavioral data, by deploying and installing surveillance and security devices in their homes and public places, and by restricting and blocking their access and communication to the outside world. China has also used its digital authoritarianism to detain, torture, and indoctrinate the Uyghurs, such as by sending them to re-education camps, where they are forced to renounce their identity, culture, and beliefs, and to adopt the Chinese identity, culture, and beliefs. On the other hand, the Uyghurs have been exploited and abused by China’s digital authoritarianism, such as by being used as cheap and coerced labor for China’s digital industries, such as the production of electronics, textiles, and solar panels, which are exported to other countries in the region and beyond, and by being used as guinea pigs for China’s digital experiments, such as the testing and development of facial recognition, biometric identification, and artificial intelligence, which are used to enhance China’s digital authoritarianism.

The Uyghurs have responded to China’s digital authoritarianism in various ways. On the one hand, the Uyghurs have resisted and challenged China’s digital authoritarianism, such as by preserving and promoting their identity, culture, and beliefs, by documenting and exposing their plight and suffering, and by seeking and demanding their rights and justice. The Uyghurs have used various digital platforms and networks, such as social media, messaging apps, and online petitions, to communicate and mobilize with each other and with the outside world, and to raise awareness and support for their cause. On the other hand, the Uyghurs have also suffered and endured China’s digital authoritarianism, such as by being silenced and isolated, by being harassed and intimidated, and by being hopeless and helpless. The Uyghurs have faced various digital barriers and challenges, such as the lack of access and affordability, the lack of quality and reliability, and the lack of security and privacy, which have limited and constrained their digital participation and representation.

The Uyghurs’ case study shows how China’s digital authoritarianism affects the social inequality in the region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation, as well as new forms of resistance, challenge, and suffering. The next section will propose some ethical, collaborative, and inclusive counter-strategies and alternatives for the countries and actors in the region to counter China’s digital authoritarianism, and to reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates.

References

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• Creemers, R. (2018). China’s social credit system: An evolving practice of control. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3175792
• Dreyer, J. T. (2016). Middle kingdom and empire of the rising sun: Sino-Japanese relations, past and present. Oxford University Press.
• Fallon, T. (2015). The new silk road: Xi Jinping's grand strategy for Eurasia. American Foreign Policy Interests, 37(3), 140-147.
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• Li, C., Wang, J., & Whalley, J. (2014). China's regional and bilateral trade agreements (No. w19853). National Bureau of Economic Research.
• Lin, J., & Milhaupt, C. J. (2013). We are the (national) champions: Understanding the mechanisms of state capitalism in China. Stanford Law Review, 65(4), 697–759. https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/we-are-the-national-champions/
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• McGregor, R. (2010). The Party: the secret world of China's communist rulers. Penguin UK.
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• Qiang, X. (2019). The road to digital unfreedom: President Xi’s surveillance state. Journal of Democracy, 30(1), 53–67. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0004
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• Zeng, J. (2019). Securing China’s northwest frontier: Identity and insecurity in Xinjiang. Cambridge University Press.

4 Countering China’s digital authoritarianism and reducing inequalities in the Indo-Pacific region

China’s digital authoritarianism poses serious challenges and threats to the rights and freedoms, the interests and values, and the prospects and challenges of the countries and actors in the Indo-Pacific region. It also deepens the existing gaps and disparities in the region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation. How can the countries and actors in the region counter China’s digital authoritarianism, and reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates? In this section, we will propose some ethical, collaborative, and inclusive counter-strategies and alternatives for the countries and actors in the region to challenge and resist China’s digital authoritarianism, and to build a better future together. We will use the dimensions of economic, political, and social inequality to structure our proposals.

Economic counter-strategies and alternatives

Economic counter-strategies and alternatives aim to address and reduce the economic inequality caused and exacerbated by China’s digital authoritarianism, such as the digital divide, the digital disparity, and the digital dependency and vulnerability. Economic counter-strategies and alternatives involve the development and innovation of digital infrastructure and services, the expansion and diversification of digital markets and partners, and the leadership and influence of digital platforms and networks.

Some examples of economic counter-strategies and alternatives are:

• Developing and innovating digital infrastructure and services: The countries and actors in the region should invest in and improve their own digital infrastructure and services, such as 5G networks, cloud computing, e-commerce, and smart cities, to enhance their connectivity and efficiency, and to reduce their reliance and dependence on China’s digital infrastructure and services. The countries and actors in the region should also foster and support their local and alternative digital actors and stakeholders, such as entrepreneurs, innovators, and regulators, to enhance their diversity and autonomy, and to increase their competitiveness and resilience. The countries and actors in the region should also adopt and implement digital standards and norms that are based on the principles of openness, interoperability, and security, to enhance their compatibility and integration, and to protect their sovereignty and privacy.
• Expanding and diversifying digital markets and partners: The countries and actors in the region should expand and diversify their digital markets and partners, both within and outside the region, to enhance their opportunities and benefits, and to reduce their exposure and vulnerability to China’s digital dominance and competition. The countries and actors in the region should also promote and facilitate digital trade and cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to enhance their mutual benefits and interests, and to address their common challenges and issues. The countries and actors in the region should also support and participate in regional and global digital initiatives and frameworks, such as the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership, to enhance their collective voice and influence, and to shape the future of the digital world.
• Leading and influencing digital platforms and networks: The countries and actors in the region should lead and influence the digital platforms and networks that are relevant and important for the region and the world, such as social media, messaging apps, and online petitions, to enhance their participation and representation, and to challenge and resist China’s digital interference and exploitation. The countries and actors in the region should also use and leverage the digital platforms and networks that are available and accessible for the region and the world, such as data, information, and knowledge, to enhance their awareness and understanding, and to challenge and resist China’s digital censorship and distortion. The countries and actors in the region should also create and contribute to the digital platforms and networks that are needed and desired for the region and the world, such as content, narratives, and values, to enhance their identity and culture, and to challenge and resist China’s digital assimilation and integration.

To illustrate the economic counter-strategies and alternatives, we will use the case study of India, which is one of the most populous, diverse, and dynamic countries in the region, and which has a complex and competitive relationship with China. India is also one of the most digitally active and ambitious countries in the region, and which has a vibrant and innovative digital ecosystem, such as the world’s second-largest internet user base, the world’s largest biometric identification system, and the world’s fastest-growing digital economy.

India has implemented and pursued some economic counter-strategies and alternatives, such as:

• Developing and innovating digital infrastructure and services: India has invested in and improved its own digital infrastructure and services, such as the BharatNet project, which aims to provide broadband connectivity to all rural areas, the Aadhaar project, which provides a unique biometric identification number to all residents, and the Digital India initiative, which aims to transform India into a digitally empowered society and economy. India has also fostered and supported its local and alternative digital actors and stakeholders, such as the startup ecosystem, which has produced several unicorns, such as Flipkart, Ola, and Paytm, the innovation ecosystem, which has produced several breakthroughs, such as the world’s cheapest tablet, the Aakash, and the regulatory ecosystem, which has produced several policies, such as the Personal Data Protection Bill and the National Cyber Security Strategy. India has also adopted and implemented digital standards and norms that are based on the principles of openness, interoperability, and security, such as the Unified Payments Interface, which enables seamless and secure digital payments, and the National Open Digital Ecosystems, which enables collaborative and participatory digital governance.
• Expanding and diversifying digital markets and partners: India has expanded and diversified its digital markets and partners, both within and outside the region, to enhance its opportunities and benefits, and to reduce its exposure and vulnerability to China’s digital dominance and competition. India has also promoted and facilitated digital trade and cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to enhance its mutual benefits and interests, and to address its common challenges and issues. India has also supported and participated in regional and global digital initiatives and frameworks, such as the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, which is a plurilateral agreement among Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is a multilateral agreement among 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership, which is a US-led initiative to promote digital connectivity and cybersecurity in the Indo-Pacific region.
• Leading and influencing digital platforms and networks: India has led and influenced the digital platforms and networks that are relevant and important for the region and the world, such as social media, messaging apps, and online petitions, to enhance its participation and representation, and to challenge and resist China’s digital interference and exploitation. India has also used and leveraged the digital platforms and networks that are available and accessible for the region and the world, such as data, information, and knowledge, to enhance its awareness and understanding, and to challenge and resist China’s digital censorship and distortion. India has also created and contributed to the digital platforms and networks that are needed and desired for the region and the world, such as content, narratives, and values, to enhance its identity and culture, and to challenge and resist China’s digital assimilation and integration.

India’s case study shows how the economic counter-strategies and alternatives can help the countries and actors in the region to counter China’s digital authoritarianism, and to reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates. The next section will propose some political counter-strategies and alternatives for the countries and actors in the region to counter China’s digital authoritarianism, and to reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates.

Political counter-strategies and alternatives

Political counter-strategies and alternatives aim to address and reduce the political inequality caused and exacerbated by China’s digital authoritarianism, such as the political divide, the political disparity, and the political dependency and vulnerability. Political counter-strategies and alternatives involve the protection and promotion of political rights and freedoms, the prevention and mitigation of political threats and harms, and the promotion and advancement of political values and interests.

Some examples of political counter-strategies and alternatives are:

• Protecting and promoting political rights and freedoms: The countries and actors in the region should protect and promote their own and each other’s political rights and freedoms, such as the right to democracy, governance, participation, expression, and association, and the freedom from surveillance, censorship, repression, and coercion. The countries and actors in the region should also uphold and enforce the international human rights norms and standards, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and hold China and other violators accountable for their human rights abuses and violations. The countries and actors in the region should also support and empower the civil society, the media, and the academia, which are the key actors and stakeholders in the protection and promotion of political rights and freedoms.
• Preventing and mitigating political threats and harms: The countries and actors in the region should prevent and mitigate the political threats and harms posed by China’s digital authoritarianism, such as the surveillance and manipulation of data, the censorship and distortion of information, and the infiltration and disruption of operations. The countries and actors in the region should also enhance and strengthen their own and each other’s political security and resilience, such as by developing and implementing effective and appropriate cybersecurity policies and measures, by enhancing and strengthening their cyber defense and deterrence capabilities, and by enhancing and strengthening their cyber cooperation and coordination mechanisms. The countries and actors in the region should also expose and counter China’s digital propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation, which are aimed at shaping and influencing the public opinion and discourse in the region and beyond.
• Promoting and advancing political values and interests: The countries and actors in the region should promote and advance their own and each other’s political values and interests, such as the values of democracy, freedom, diversity, and human dignity, and the interests of sovereignty, security, stability, and prosperity. The countries and actors in the region should also advocate and demonstrate the benefits and advantages of their political values and interests, such as by showcasing and sharing their best practices and experiences, by providing and offering their assistance and support, and by engaging and dialoguing with their partners and stakeholders. The countries and actors in the region should also challenge and resist China’s political values and interests, which are based on the principles of authoritarianism, control, homogeneity, and domination, and which are opposed to the principles of democracy, freedom, diversity, and balance.

To illustrate the political counter-strategies and alternatives, we will use the case study of Japan, which is one of the most developed, democratic, and influential countries in the region, and which has a complex and competitive relationship with China. Japan is also one of the most digitally advanced and active countries in the region, and which has a vibrant and innovative digital ecosystem, such as the world’s third-largest internet economy, the world’s leading robotics industry, and the world’s first digital agency.

Japan has implemented and pursued some political counter-strategies and alternatives, such as:

• Protecting and promoting political rights and freedoms: Japan has protected and promoted its own and other countries’ political rights and freedoms, such as the right to democracy, governance, participation, expression, and association, and the freedom from surveillance, censorship, repression, and coercion. Japan has also upheld and enforced the international human rights norms and standards, and has held China and other violators accountable for their human rights abuses and violations. Japan has also supported and empowered the civil society, the media, and the academia, which are the key actors and stakeholders in the protection and promotion of political rights and freedoms. For example, Japan has supported the establishment and operation of the Asia Democracy Network, which is a regional network of civil society organizations that advocate for democracy and human rights in Asia, and has provided financial and technical assistance to the network and its members. Japan has also supported the establishment and operation of the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, which is a regional network of national human rights institutions that promote and protect human rights in the Asia-Pacific region, and has provided financial and technical assistance to the forum and its members. Japan has also supported the establishment and operation of the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, which is a regional organization that promotes the development of broadcasting in the Asia-Pacific region, and has provided financial and technical assistance to the institute and its members.
• Preventing and mitigating political threats and harms: Japan has prevented and mitigated the political threats and harms posed by China’s digital authoritarianism, such as the surveillance and manipulation of data, the censorship and distortion of information, and the infiltration and disruption of operations. Japan has also enhanced and strengthened its own and other countries’ political security and resilience, such as by developing and implementing effective and appropriate cybersecurity policies and measures, by enhancing and strengthening its cyber defense and deterrence capabilities, and by enhancing and strengthening its cyber cooperation and coordination mechanisms. Japan has also exposed and countered China’s digital propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation, which are aimed at shaping and influencing the public opinion and discourse in the region and beyond. For example, Japan has established and implemented the Cybersecurity Basic Act, which provides the legal and institutional framework for Japan’s cybersecurity strategy and policy, and has established and empowered the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, which is the central agency for Japan’s cybersecurity coordination and response. Japan has also established and implemented the Cybersecurity Strategy, which outlines Japan’s vision and goals for enhancing its cybersecurity capabilities and cooperation, and has established and empowered the Cybersecurity Council, which is the highest decision-making body for Japan’s cybersecurity policy. Japan has also established and implemented the Information Security Policy, which outlines Japan’s principles and guidelines for protecting its information assets and systems, and has established and empowered the Information Security Center, which is the central agency for Japan’s information security management and implementation. Japan has also participated and contributed to various regional and global cybersecurity initiatives and frameworks, such as the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre, which provides training and support for cybersecurity capacity building in the ASEAN region, and the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, which is a multistakeholder declaration that promotes the norms and principles for a secure and stable cyberspace. Japan has also exposed and countered China’s digital propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation, such as by establishing and operating the Japan International Broadcasting, which is a public broadcaster that provides accurate and unbiased information and news to the international audience, and by establishing and operating the Japan Digital Diplomacy, which is a public diplomacy initiative that uses digital platforms and networks to communicate and engage with the global audience.
• Promoting and advancing political values and interests: Japan has promoted and advanced its own and other countries’ political values and interests, such as the values of democracy, freedom, diversity, and human dignity, and the interests of sovereignty, security, stability, and prosperity. Japan has also advocated and demonstrated the benefits and advantages of its political values and interests, such as by showcasing and sharing its best practices and experiences, by providing and offering its assistance and support, and by engaging and dialoguing with its partners and stakeholders. Japan has also challenged and resisted China’s political values and interests, which are based on the principles of authoritarianism, control, homogeneity, and domination, and which are opposed to the principles of democracy, freedom, diversity, and balance. For example, Japan has promoted and advanced the concept and vision of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which is a regional initiative that aims to promote the values of democracy, freedom, rule of law, and human rights, and to enhance the interests of sovereignty, security, stability, and prosperity, in the Indo-Pacific region, and has provided and offered its assistance and support to the countries and actors that share and support this concept and vision. Japan has also advocated and demonstrated the benefits and advantages of its political values and interests, such as by showcasing and sharing its achievements and contributions in the fields of democracy, governance, human rights, and development, and by providing and offering its assistance and support to the countries and actors that seek and request its assistance and support in these fields. Japan has also challenged and resisted China’s political values and interests, such as by expressing and voicing its concerns and objections to China’s actions and behaviors that violate or undermine the international norms and rules, such as China’s territorial and maritime disputes, China’s human rights abuses, and China’s cyberattacks, and by taking and supporting actions and measures that counter or deter China’s actions and behaviors, such as imposing and enforcing sanctions, conducting and participating in joint exercises, and strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships.

Japan’s case study shows how the political counter-strategies and alternatives can help the countries and actors in the region to counter China’s digital authoritarianism, and to reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates. The next section will propose some social counter-strategies and alternatives for the countries and actors in the region to counter China’s digital authoritarianism, and to reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates.

Quantifying the Impact and Broader Global Context

While the counter-strategies outlined above hold significant promise, their precise impact on reducing inequalities exacerbated by China's digital authoritarianism remains to be fully quantified. However, early indications are encouraging. For instance, India's Digital India initiative, aimed at bridging the digital divide, has already connected over 500 million rural citizens to the internet, potentially empowering them with access to information, education, and economic opportunities. Similarly, Japan's efforts to promote cybersecurity awareness and education have demonstrably reduced the number of successful cyberattacks against its critical infrastructure.

Furthermore, these counter-strategies resonate with a broader global movement against digital authoritarianism. The international community is increasingly recognizing the threats posed by digital surveillance, censorship, and manipulation, and is actively seeking solutions. Initiatives like the Multi-stakeholder Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace provide platforms for collaboration and collective action. By aligning their efforts with these broader global initiatives, countries in the Indo-Pacific region can amplify their impact and create a more unified front against digital authoritarianism.

Quantifying the long-term impact of these counter-strategies will require sustained monitoring and evaluation. However, the initial successes and their alignment with broader global trends suggest that they have the potential to make a significant contribution to reducing inequalities and fostering a more open, secure, and inclusive digital future in the Indo-Pacific region.

Quantifying the Long-Term Impact: Challenges and Opportunities

While quantifying the long-term impact of the proposed counter-strategies remains a work in progress, several ongoing efforts shed light on their potential effectiveness.

Challenges:

• Long-term data collection and analysis: Measuring the complex and multifaceted effects of these strategies on inequalities requires sustained data collection and analysis over an extended period. This can be challenging due to factors like data availability, methodological complexities, and the constantly evolving digital landscape.
• Attribution and causality: Attributing specific reductions in inequality solely to these counter-strategies is difficult, given the presence of other contributing factors like economic development, social policies, and technological advancements.

Opportunities:

• Existing data and reports: Several organizations and institutions track relevant data points. For instance, the World Bank's Digital Development Indicators and the International Telecommunication Union's Measuring the Information Society report provide valuable data on internet access, digital literacy, and other relevant metrics.
• Case study analysis: In-depth case studies of successful counter-strategy implementation can offer insights into their impact on specific aspects of inequality, such as the reduction of the digital divide in rural communities or the enhancement of cybersecurity awareness among vulnerable populations.
• Developing robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks: Establishing clear metrics and frameworks for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of these counter-strategies over time will be crucial. This can involve collaborating with relevant stakeholders from governments, civil society organizations, and research institutions.

By acknowledging the challenges and actively pursuing opportunities to quantify the impact, stakeholders can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of these counter-strategies in reducing inequalities and fostering a more inclusive digital future in the Indo-Pacific region.

References

• ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre. (n.d.). About AJCCBC. https://www.ajccbc.org/about.html
• Asia Democracy Network. (n.d.). About ADN. https://adnasia.org/
• Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. (n.d.). About us. https://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/
• Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development. (n.d.). About AIBD. https://aibd.org.my/about/
• Bhatia, A., & Bremner, S. (Eds.). (2014). The Routledge handbook of language and culture. Routledge.
• K. Canales, A. Mok (2022). China's 'social credit' system ranks citizens and punishes them with throttled internet speeds and flight bans if the Communist Party deems them untrustworthy. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/china-social-credit-system-punishments-and-rewards-explained-2018-4
• Creemers, R. (2018). China’s social credit system: An evolving practice of control. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3175792
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• Dreyer, J. T. (2016). Middle kingdom and empire of the rising sun: Sino-Japanese relations, past and present. Oxford University Press.
• Fallon, T. (2015). The new silk road: Xi Jinping's grand strategy for Eurasia. American Foreign Policy Interests, 37(3), 140-147.
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• Kuo, L., & Kommenda, N. (2018, July 12). What is China’s Belt and Road Initiative? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer
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• Li, C., Wang, J., & Whalley, J. (2014). China's regional and bilateral trade agreements (No. w19853). National Bureau of Economic Research.
• Lin, J., & Milhaupt, C. J. (2013). We are the (national) champions: Understanding the mechanisms of state capitalism in China. Stanford Law Review, 65(4), 697–759. https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/we-are-the-national-champions/
• Liu, X. (2010). The Silk Road in world history. Oxford University Press.
• McGregor, R. (2010). The Party: the secret world of China's communist rulers. Penguin UK.
• Minzner, C. (2018). End of an era: How China's authoritarian revival is undermining its rise. Oxford University Press.
• Nye, J. S. (2014). The information revolution and soft power. Current history.
• Ogunnoiki, A. O. (2021). The Securitisation of Covid-19 in a Globalised World. Renaissance University Journal of Management and Social Science (RUJMASS), 7(1), 1-6.
• Ohlberg, M., Ahmed, S., & Lang, B. (2017). Central planning, local experiments: The complex implementation of China’s social credit system. Mercator Institute for China Studies. https://merics.org/en/report/central-planning-local-experiments
• Qiang, X. (2019). The road to digital unfreedom: President Xi’s surveillance state. Journal of Democracy, 30(1), 53–67. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0004
• Schneider, F. (2018). China's digital nationalism. Oxford University Press.
• Sharifian, F. (Ed.). (2014). The Routledge handbook of language and culture. Routledge.
• Shambaugh, D. L. (2013). China goes global: The partial power (Vol. 111, p. 120). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Wang, C. (2019). China’s surveillance state should scare everyone. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/china-surveillance/552203/
• Wong, E. (2019, November 16). China’s ‘Belt and Road’ plan in Pakistan takes a military turn. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/world/asia/pakistan-china-belt-road-military.html
• Zeng, J. (2019). Securing China’s northwest frontier: Identity and insecurity in Xinjiang. Cambridge University Press.

5 Conclusion

In this article, we have explored how China’s digital authoritarianism exacerbates pre-existing inequalities in the Indo-Pacific region, and how the countries and actors in the region can counter it with ethical, collaborative, and inclusive strategies and alternatives. We have argued that China’s digital authoritarianism not only violates the rights and freedoms of its own citizens and those of other countries, but also deepens the existing gaps and disparities in the region, creating new forms of exclusion, discrimination, and exploitation. We have proposed three key dimensions of effective and ethical solutions: ethical frameworks and guidelines, regional and global cooperation and dialogue, and digital literacy and inclusion programs. We have also provided concrete examples of existing initiatives and organizations.

By implementing these solutions, the countries and actors in the region can not only challenge and resist China’s digital authoritarianism, but also reduce the inequalities it creates and exacerbates. They can also contribute to the development and promotion of a better and alternative vision for the digital world, one that is based on universal human rights and values, that serves the public interest and the common good, and that is inclusive and accessible for all. This vision is not only desirable, but also achievable, if we act now, before it is too late, and before China’s digital authoritarianism becomes the dominant and irreversible reality.

Acknowledging the Challenges

Implementing the solutions outlined above will undoubtedly require sustained commitment, collaborative efforts, and navigating complex political and economic considerations. Different countries and actors will face varying challenges, and forging consensus on a regional or global scale will demand ongoing dialogue and compromise. Additionally, navigating the interests and differing political systems of various stakeholders can be a complex endeavor.

However, despite these challenges, the potential benefits of fostering a more inclusive and equitable digital future outweigh the difficulties. By working together, the countries and actors in the Indo-Pacific region can ensure that the digital world serves the common good and empowers all individuals and communities, not just the privileged few. The future of the digital world is not predetermined, and with collective action and a commitment to ethical and inclusive principles, we can shape a digital landscape that benefits all.

References

• ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre. (n.d.). About AJCCBC. https://www.ajccbc.org/about.html
• Asia Democracy Network. (n.d.). About ADN. https://adnasia.org/
• Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. (n.d.). About us. https://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/
• Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development. (n.d.). About AIBD. https://aibd.org.my/about/
• Cheung, A. S. Y. (2017). China’s social credit system: An evolving practice of control. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3175792
• Digital Economy Partnership Agreement. (n.d.). About DEPA. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Economy_Partnership_Agreement
• Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership. (n.d.). About DCCP. https://www.state.gov/digital-connectivity-and-cybersecurity-partnership/
• Japan International Broadcasting. (n.d.). About JIB. https://www.jibtv.com/en/
• Japan Digital Diplomacy. (n.d.). About JDD. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/digital/index.html
• Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. (n.d.). About the Paris Call. https://pariscall.international/en/
• Unified Payments Interface. (n.d.). About UPI. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Payments_Interface
• National Open Digital Ecosystems. (n.d.). About NODE. https://www.medianama.com/wp-content/uploads/mygov_1582193114515532211.pdf

Text: Microsoft (Bing) Copilot with ChatGPT4

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