How Could a Nuclear Deal Change Iran’s Behavior?

Regardless of whether the bid to revive the JCPOA between the P5+1 countries and Iran could succeed, now or after the US midterm elections, the US administration and the governments of Germany, Britain, France, and the EU must stop to take stock of the implications of all possible scenarios, and not just fixate on panicking about the scenario of failure. Hoping that an international deal with Iran would soften the regime’s doctrine and activities of the IRGC, which implements the regime’s expansionist, belligerent foreign policies is wishful thinking, and not a credible policy. This opens a dangerous path even as Western capitals like to believe cutting a deal with Tehran serves the interests of European countries thirsty for Iranian oil and gas and fearful of Iranian nuclear blackmail.

It is possible that the European governments are just following the directions of the Biden administration – as some believe – or they could themselves be leading this path, complying with Iranian demands and even endorsing Iran’s positions and interests in the Vienna talks. What matters today is that the EU must quit its blinkered policy that refuses to consider the regional implications of cutting a deal with Iran, based on the assumption that the regime is no longer a threat to European security – either because of European wishful thinking or because of back dealings with Iran’s leaders.

The same can be said about the Biden administration, a faction within which seems desperate for a deal that would lift the sanctions on Iran without giving much thought to how this would empower the IRGC to implement the regime’s doctrine. Recall that this doctrine seeks to undermine Arab states, export Iran’s model to them, and foster paramilitary forces loyal to Tehran that erode Arab sovereignty, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Yet let’s say for the sake of argument that cutting a deal with Iran is necessary to avoid a devastating confrontation between Iran and Israel and prevent the Iranian nuclear program from reaching the stage of developing nuclear weapons. Let’s say that there are hidden benefits to international and regional understandings that gradually open a new chapter in Iran’s behavior and security alignments. What would then be the safeguards we should think of and adopt to avoid the negative repercussions of a nuclear deal in the region, and preserve US and European interests in the Arab states, especially since China and Russia’s strategic extension in the Middle East is now Iran through the troika of autocracy being built between them?

According to the impressions coming out of both Washington and Tehran, there is now a serious sprint to strike a deal, but obstacles remain threatening to thwart this bid. The Iranian leadership is studying the benefits and adverse consequences, and seeking definitive guarantees on removing the IRGC from the US terror list in the future in return for postponing this demand to facilitate an agreement. But can the Biden administration provide such guarantees to fulfil Iran’s request come autumn?

The formula being discussed would separate the issue of the IRGC from the nuclear issue, in a trilateral framework comprised of the United States, the European powers, and Iran. This framework doesn’t require the consent of Russia or China since both stand with Iran and are aware that the IRGC is a core component of the Iranian state and would benefit greatly from the lifting of sanctions. They are aware that the IRGC would be a direct party to any deal, even if it feigns surrender now because Iran needs the financial windfall of the deal. Russia and China gleefully believe the American deal would be with a party considered by Washington a terrorist entity, an assessment shared by the American opponents of Biden’s deal, especially among Republicans and Congress.

Some therefore believe that it would be difficult for the Democratic Party to sign an immediate agreement with Iran ahead of the mid-term elections in November. They do not expect an agreement before the elections, given the damage it could cause to the Democrats’ prospects. Others, however, believe in the opposite: That concluding a nuclear deal before the elections would be a win for the Democratic Party, especially if the Iranian leadership stops showing contempt for the US side, and refusing to publicly sit down with Biden’s team and insisting on indirect negotiations through the Europeans in closed rooms.

The IRGC issue is not currently the largest obstacle to the deal. Rather, the main knot now is the issue of monitoring of the Iranian nuclear program, on which Tehran has refused to compromise while Europe is seeking to find solutions for by pressuring the IAEA, with all the risks and dangerous precedents this sets.

We are seeing signs of a breakthrough that could lead to a nuclear deal with Iran and a major shift in US-Iran relations, possibly setting the clock back to the time of the 2015 deal struck by former President Obama with Tehran. So where should the concerned parties be vigilant to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past? And are there any serious prospects to prevent such a nuclear deal from becoming a project for the full destruction of sovereignty in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon?

Creative language may be used to address the issue of terrorist designation, to avoid obstruction, for example by condemning past actions while expressing hope for a different, better behavior in the future. Recent revelations of uncovering an Iranian plot to assassinate Trump’s National Security Adviser John Bolton is part of this ‘past’, and moreover the Biden administration would not sacrifice a deal in solidarity with one of the biggest hawks of the Trump administration.

The Europeans believe Iran’s ‘terrorism’ on their soil has stopped and are keen to keep things this way, even if the cost is the appeasement of Iran. Iran’s activities in the Arab region are not a priority for either the Europeans or the Americans. This is a huge mistake because Europe is separated from the Arab region only by the Mediterranean, which illegal immigration often traverses to Europe. It is therefore in the European interest to be alert to the regional repercussions of appeasing Iran for the sake of oil and gas, and in surrender to Iranian blackmail.

Europe has many instruments to influence Iran’s behavior, but it is only considering a limited set of them. Firstly, Europe believes that Iran’s reliance on European technology and companies in the Iranian economic recovery phase would guarantee a period of Iranian peaceful behavior away from corrosive adventures.

Secondly, Europe and the United States believe that the reintegration of the Iranian economy into the world economy would force Tehran to curb its political ambitions, including the expansionism in the Arab region.

Thirdly, a nuclear/oil deal will lead not only to avoiding an oil crisis, but to collaboration between Europe and Iran – in the European view – that would convince Tehran of the benefits of pivoting West, instead of full immersion into the project of pivoting East. This shows Europe’s fantastical thinking, but who really knows? Iran is adept at leveraging both a tactical Westward move and a strategic Eastward pivot. Regardless, Europe is hoping and wishing, focusing on immediate interests given its oil crisis and fear of Iran’s nuclear activities.

Fourthly, Europe is convinced that Iran today will not threaten it now or in the future as it had done before. A nuclear deal would reassure Europe, which is what matters to Europe. Europe today is not prioritizing Israel, and believes itself unconcerned by Iran’s threats against Israel. Europe sees Iran as merely a troublemaker, not an enemy. Such a shift gives the Europeans leverage over Iran, if they have the courage to use it or even think about it.

Fifthly, the shift away from appeasement of Israel is clear in the European warning to the latter that if it impedes the nuclear deal, it will pay the price. The price lies in Israel’s relations with the European powers, bearing in mind that Israel, if it loses the United States and Europe as partners, as well as Russia, becomes much weaker. On the other hand, the United States and Europe could provide further security guarantees in return for greenlighting the nuclear deal with Iran, alongside regional and bilateral benefits.

Sixthly, the Biden administration continues its bid to consolidate and expand the Abraham Accords between Arab states and Israel, hoping Iran would later join indirectly when the time comes, either through Arab parties normalizing relations with Israel or through security arrangements in the Gulf. Europe is also party to these efforts.

Seventh, the Biden administration and the European powers believe that bringing Iran in as a party to negotiations for a new security architecture in the Gulf and the Middle East would help resolve regional disputes in the future. Their view is that the nuclear deal is an international deal that can be developed into a new roadmap for regional relations. Negotiations and realignments in the process of building a new security architecture mean involving Iran in the process, which influences its behavior, in the US, European and even Russian assessment.

What about using a country like Lebanon to test Western hopes and show the limits of this wishful alternative to developing a coherent policy and safeguards to guarantee the sovereignty of the state, the independence of the judiciary, and its sovereign investment in hydrocarbon resources?

The first stop must be the issue of the demarcation of maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel. Iran is not currently hindering this process, but Hezbollah has entered the fray through threats, deployment of drones, and inserting the ‘resistance’ as a party to oil and gas exploration and extraction. Perhaps this is a good cop-bad cop routine between Iran and Hezbollah, but those seeking the nuclear deal must work to guarantee that an Iranian triumph after lifting the sanctions must not lead to fuelling Hezbollah’s domination over Lebanon. These countries must take measures to strengthen the sovereignty of the Lebanese state to safeguard any agreements signed with Israel and guarantee Lebanon’s right to extract its oil and gas.

Europe must stop considering Lebanon an annex of its interests while feigning concern for its independence. A US-European deal with Iran does not give any of these parties the right to place Lebanon under Iranian tutelage, and likewise Russia has no right to outsource Lebanon or Syria to Iran. If these are the features of the international deal with Iran, then the devil lies in such details as Lebanon.

There are many instruments of leverage over Iran available to Western capitals, if these countries are truly honest in their stated concern for the independence of a democratic country. Failing to move to secure justice after the port explosion, protect the independence of Lebanon’s justice system, and impose reforms on all Lebanese parties, the Western powers did not act with responsibility. The Shia Duo continues to obstruct investigations into the port crime and is preventing the government from cooperating with the International Monetary Fund. Such matters must be met with international outrage, not passivity or empty diplomacy.

The US role in demarcating maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel is important. It is an example of the necessary kind of multilevel engagement needed to ensure the euphoria after the nuclear deal does not turn into cries of regret when it is too late.

Of course, the Lebanese parties are responsible for the corruption and collapse. But the coming phase of events requires the major powers to stop blaming the Lebanese exclusively for the problem. They have a major responsibility on their shoulders to protect a country like Lebanon from the repercussions of an international deal with Iran. The United States and Europe in particular must pause to ensure that their regional wishes for a deal with Iran become a policy with rules and consequences. Otherwise, everyone will pay the price down the road, no matter the illusion of safety felt in Western capitals.