How to commit Credit Card Fraud in South Africa.
Charles Hein Wroth
I headhunt Vuln Researchers and OffSec Engineers | BSides Cape Town Director | Hack South Founder
First and foremost, this is not a smear, this is not throwing rocks. This is me trying to resolve a serious matter, urgently. I have friends at most of these companies, and this is not aimed at any of you. It is also, quite interesting from a Cyber/Risk Perspective.
This article talks through how someone managed to commit credit card fraud, how interesting it is, and also the challenges we are facing to get R40k returned. We have tried all the usual channels, and been beyond patient. We need answers now though.
On the 17th of Sept, my mother, who works overseas received a notification from her Absa Group App that a sim swap had been detected and her app had been frozen. She asked me to look into it. This is a great response and awesome that sim swaps are scanned and detected.
Later that afternoon she received an sms notification that her Credit Card had been swiped at Makro Business Germiston. For a total of R60000 (3 Transactions of R20000). When seeing this she notified my sister Maryke Taljaard and I . We immediately contacted Absa Group to shut down her cards.
I contacted a Manager at Makro Business with the possibility that the assailant might still be there. It was later reported back to me that a individual had swiped for "Services" to the amount of R20k, twice. On the 3rd attempt their fraud check flagged it. The assailant was then asked to fill in some paperwork. He then said he has to fetch something in his car, they let him, and he left the scene. Makro mentioned there had recently been a similar incident and one of their Risk people would contact me. They did not. My concern is they do not save their 4k Footage of the assailant, and it expires, rendering it innefective.
Absa Group put a freeze on the card. The first 2 transactions were still in limbo, and the 3rd had been stopped. Thankfully we caught this. Unfortunately despite getting police report, affidavits and all...ABSA still released the money. We investigated the statements and found something strange. ?????? ???????????? ???????? ???????????? ????????'?? ?????????? ???? ?????????????? ????????. We later found out that the assailant had managed to double her Credit Limit.
I then recalled that there had been a Sim Swap. I called Vodacom...well, I called 12 times and got passed around until I spoke to someone in the Fraud Dept of sort. They stated that they could only "Soft Lock" the sim (Meaning assailant could still receive SMS and calls). My mother had to come inton a branch to hard lock. What we also learned was the Sim Swap occurred late August and was done via the ???? ???????? ??????, ????????. Vodacom initiated a Fraud Investigation and advised 7-14 days to completion. This was 34 days ago roughly. I was informed that if my mother can go into a branch, they can share all the info with her, this was not true. She went to a Vodacom branch twice to get a new sim, number and a contract but no info could be shared, only that the swap happened on the TOBI Chat bot.
On the same day of all this happening my mother checked her emails and saw a CCD Couriers email about a Credit Card that had been shipped to her, only, it was not her address, but a School in Randfontein, GP.
How to create a case with SAPS, or not
Being the military man that I am, I realised I needed some boots on the ground. I asked my good friend Nuno to look into this. He went to MAKRO Germiston, got more info then was told Makro need a police case number in order to release the footage.
Seeing as the fraud had happened at Makro Germiston, Nuno went to SAPS Germiston. When attempting to open a case on our behalf, with a signed-off sworn statement and power of attorney, Germiston SAPS said that Makro Germiston was outside their jurisdiction. They referred him to Bedfordview SAPS. They also said they can't do anything as the victim needs to come forward with a case. Despite advising them of the special circumstances they refused.
In the end, this did not sit well, so I went to my local SAPS, in my small farmer's town and managed to open a case. This was then forwarded to Germiston SAPS and under investigation.
Do I suspect foul play or a bigger syndicate, yes, to some extent. Alternatively, maybe they just did not want to do the paperwork. It's frustrating cause they had a case on a silver platter, ID scan, High Def CCTV footage, etc.
What's the Challenge?
Interestingly, here is what I believe is the kill chain
Now, once the initial trauma of this was dealt with, the Hacker in me thought, "Damn, this is interesting, how on earth did they do this? Well, this is how it went down.
Someone conducted a fraudulent Sim Swap with Vodacom in late August. This was done via their customer service Chat Bot. Bear in mind, how much of a pain it is to get a Sim Activated with FICA/RICA. Somehow this person did it with none of this info?
Between that time and 17 Septemeber this person managed to;
The person then went to Makro Business in Germinston, swipped the card;
Sadly this great fraud check let the man in question flee the scene.
ABSA were notified of the Fraud, put a hold on everything and 3-4 days later still released the money to the fraudulent assailant.
What do I need?
Wins... or Partial Wins
Lessons learned
Anything worth having is worth fighting for
3 个月Thank you for sharing and putting light on this, it's absolutely shocking complete disgrace that you are not getting the help you need here Vodacom Absa Group Makro Business
Compliance Specialist | Data Privacy (GDPR & POPIA) Expertise | RegTech | Transforming Data into Actionable Compliance Insights
3 个月once my wife was scammed for R3500 for a holiday booking. I went to Lenasia South police station where they tried to convince me that its not a crime if you made the payment. After fighting with them they realised they're not winning here, but because the eft was made in sandton that I have to go to sandton saps to open the case. Sandton saps were very helpful. I went to nedbank to try to recover the money as the scammer was with nedbank. They said they could not do anything as the scammer had withdrawn the funds. The saps were provided with the scammers banking details and when I was at nedbank I saw that they opened his KYC info, so that was already all there and so easy to move forward with the case, however as you can imagine nothing was done.
Information Security professional, with an award-winning track record. Deep experience in supply chain management and Information Technology. Looking for a senior role in Information Security.
4 个月Good luck Charles ????
I'm really devastated on your behalf as this affects your direct family and has no proper resolution. I can empathize with you as having gone through a similar situation. Thank you very much for releasing this targeted attack timeline. I know it must be hard and wish you all the luck with a successful resolution.
Penetration Tester | Ethical Hacker
4 个月Seems to me that most of the blame here lies with ABSA and Vodacom, good luck hope you get this resolved