A Hollow Alliance: 2016's Top Risk

US presidential candidates, especially the Republicans, have plenty to say about foreign policy these days. It’s time to destroy ISIS. Iran is not to be trusted. China must be checked. Aggressive action from Russia’s Putin makes clear why America’s president must be tough. The Obama administration, meanwhile, continues to keep foreign policy costs and risks at arm’s length. On neither side is there any serious discussion of the future of the Trans-Atlantic alliance, the cornerstone of Western foreign policy since World War II. 

Across the ocean, Europe has an historic number of headaches. With the rise of ISIS and Europe’s proximity to the warzones of the Middle East, the threat of terrorist attacks on European cities has never been higher. The popularity of anti-EU political parties in many European countries is on the rise. Britain will hold a referendum later this year to decide whether the UK should exit the EU. There are more troubles ahead for Greece. Middle Eastern migrants keep coming, exposing dangerous divisions among European governments over how to share the burden of welcoming and resettling them. The Trans-Atlantic alliance can’t help much there.

Yet, for all its limitations and shortcomings, the collective political, economic, and military power of the United States and Europe has created a lot of stability since the Cold War’s end. The US and Europe have worked together at key points to steady the global economy. They’ve limited the fallout from Middle East conflict. They’ve promoted values like democracy and rule of law that have strengthened a lot of developing countries that needed it.

But beyond Europe’s many distractions and the US preoccupation with its elections, there’s a growing divergence in US and European opinions on how best to advance their respective national interests. In Washington, both Obama and the Republicans worry that the expansion of China’s influence will undermine the democratic and free market values that the Western alliance has promoted for decades. Many European governments, however, see the need to diversify their economic partnerships for the long-term good of their economies. From this point of view, China is a partner that must be courted. We saw this US-European difference most vividly last year as Britain, Germany, and France ignored loud US objections and signed on as members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The next fight will be over a European debate about whether to acknowledge China as a “market economy,” a move with big commercial implications.

There will also be more obvious divisions in 2016 in approaches toward Russia. The risk and sacrifice the US accepts in imposing sanctions on the Russians is much less than for Europe, which hopes that Putin’s bombing in Syria can provide enough stability in that country to sharply slow the flow of refugees toward Europe’s borders. Later this year, the Europeans are likely to ease their Russian sanctions. The Obama administration, frustrated by this approach, will keep sanctions in place.

Syria is also the chief point of Trans-Atlantic difference over the Middle East, ground zero for the G-Zero world. Washington will continue to insist that President Bashar al-Assad has committed unpardonable crimes and must go. Many European governments will argue that it’s foolish to try to target ISIS and the militant group’s main adversary in Syria at the same time. Europeans are much more directly threatened than the United States by Russian adventurism, ISIS, and the tidal wave of refugees. It’s no wonder that the two sides will adopt different approaches.

This hollowing out of the Trans-Atlantic alliance won’t generate the dramatic headlines that we’ll see from stock market panic in Shanghai, the Saudi-Iran standoff, or the latest bomb blast in Europe or the Middle East. But it’s still the biggest political risk story of 2016 because, in a world of wildfires, we’ve never had greater need of willing, capable, and like-minded firemen.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, global research professor at New York University and foreign affairs columnist at TIME. You can also follow him on Twitter and Facebook.

photo h/t: Number 10