The Historical Relevancy of Power Dynamics, Time, Information and Socio-Psychological Factors in International Conflict Negotiations and Diplomacy

Introduction

This paper aims to analyse the different factors that influence international negotiations and diplomacy examining conflict negotiations. Reviewing the impact and historical relevance of: power dynamics, socio-psychological factors, trust, time and information asymmetry through the negotiation process from pre to post-negotiation whilst determining their importance on negotiation outcomes and establishing how conflict negotiations hold similarities to common negotiation frameworks and equally diverge. This will be discussed alongside the negotiation tools and strategies that remain homogenous with standard negotiation literature and alternatives utilising a number of theoretical frameworks including, dependency theory, ripeness theory alongside Ghauri’s Negotiation Framework (2003) and Weiss’ RBC Model (1993) attempting to integrate the behavioural and strategic tendencies and conflict patterns into the typical stages of negotiation by considering conflict/war as an article of negotiation, viewing it as a tool utilised to achieve political objectives (Hobbs, 1979) in a bargaining model (Rubinstein, 1985; Ikle, 1991; Wagner, 1994). This essays assessment on conflict will focus on interstate conflict negotiations rather than terrorism or civil war conflicts which would go beyond the scope of this paper.

Distinctions of conflict (e.g. war) have to be made in order to properly examine the bargaining/negotiation process of these events between limited and absolute war (Kecskemeti 1958; Manwaring 1987; Wagner 2000) to discern how conflict itself fits into the bargaining process (Clausewitz, 1832). Although absolute war is a useful theoretical construct its occurrence is rare (Pillar, 1983) as even in instances of defeat both sides retained some ability to continue fighting however parties rationalised negotiating settlement and termination of conflict was preferred (Slantchev, 2003) (Appendix A: 1). What circumstances and factors underlie the decisions to cease conflict or continue it? This is the basis for what the author explores; grounding this examination through multiple case examples in modern, pre-modern and historical conflict negotiations.

Literature Reviews

Information Asymmetry and The Origins of Conflict

The origin of conflict is debated, however the main causes of conflict regard power dynamics, information asymmetries, uncertainty perception and the debate over finite resources (Reiter, 2003) as the core issues that lead to the justification for conflict. International conflicts arise due to incomplete information about a potential/perceived enemy (Hulquist, 2013) regardless of whether this perception is based on fact or merely a projection of fear (Spector, 1998; Klare, 1995). Such erroneous information may be the result of underestimations of power and subsequent opportunism (Blainey, 1973; Maoz, 1983) which leads to initiators attacking and finding defenders capable of resistance.

Following Clausewitz’s reasoning, conflict is considered part of the negotiation processes rather than negotiation failure as either can precede the other. Following from the uncertainty aspect, we can view war initiation as the result of conflicting expectations regarding the consequences of fighting and the opponents resolve (Wagner, 2004; Moul, 2003) and only as a result of fighting can these expectations converge following convergence theory (Slantchev, 2003). Perceived disparities can often be resultant from geographical proximity causing selective attention on neighbouring states where incomplete information leads to distrust (Boulding, 1962; Cohen, 1979). The impact of uncertainty is exemplified through the spiral model of war theory where conflict occurs due to fear (Kydd, 1997) leading to military preparation to maintain the status quo or rebalance of power; further increasing the uncertainty of intent, thus creating a security dilemma (Appendix A: 2). 

These outlined causes of conflict largely follow Fearon’s (1995) conditions for conflict. However, an immediate criticism is that these models follow highly materialist and rationalist perspectives regarding the onset and outcomes of war which, although applicable, cannot discount the relevancy of non-rationalist causations. Furthermore, these perspectives, under the basis of power, postulate that conflict should not occur between weaker and stronger state actors. This popular explanation in academic literature on conflict explains states of equal power are more prone to conflict than power asymmetric states due to uncertainty under parity and optimism regarding probable victory (Wittman, 2001; Reed, 2002). Historically however, conflicts occur between asymmetric parties potentially explained as a result of irrationality in decision making but, under the basis of information asymmetry, a party does not need to be optimistic regarding their chances of winning a conflict in order to benefit from one by inducing more favourable conditions under which to negotiate (Slantchev, 2003). Further, despite the prolific nature of interstate conflict throughout history (1940-90), two-thirds of interstate wars eventually resolved in negotiation/bargaining (Walter, 1997). Hence the importance in seeing how these specific factors and causes impact the negotiation model and what actions can lead to both the resolution of conflict or its failure and subsequent resumption.

Power, Asymmetry and Coercive Bargaining

Power itself has many definitions (Keltner et al., 2003) and scholars have argued the difficulty in its definability (Lukes, 1986). However, at its base it may be defined as the ability to influence another to induce a meaningful change as some psychological or physical aspect i.e. behaviour, attitudes, positions or actions (Vescio et al., 2003; Zartman, 1997) or the ability to control one’s own resources and outcomes (Fiske, 1993; Magee et al., 2007).

However, in order to understand it in relation to negotiation one must explore the dimensions and impact power may have and the circumstances influencing said power. Under the situation of negotiation, we imply power relates to the bargaining strength of a particular party relative to another as opposed to merely the ability to induce an opponent to accept one’s terms which would infer dictation as opposed to negotiation (Boulding, 1990). These dimensions of power can be seen as: power as possession (Hobbes, 1962), power as relation (Locke, 1954) and power as relativity (Deutsch, 1973). The bases of these power dimensions have ramifications for negotiation, focusing particularly on coercive and reward power (Pfetsch & Landaum 2000; Gold & Raven, 1992; De Dreu, 1995). Overall, war can be considered an aspect of the negotiation process and be viewed as a coercive device (Blake & Mouton, 1964) to persuade an opponent to concede/settle on the conjected matter whilst encouraging an opponent to agree to a mutually acceptable termination of conflict or to improve one’s own bargaining position through the use of power/force (Wagner, 1994).

Despite the assertion of powers principal importance to negotiation i.e. influencing competitive behaviour (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Magee et al., 2007; Pinkley et al., 1994), other studies relay no relationship between relative capabilities and dispute outcomes (Maoz, 1982) and may indicate that it is often the materialist assumption of power that leads to advantageous bargaining strength (Pfetsch & Landau, 2000). In terms of resources or capabilities, it is useful in providing an overall conception of a country’s position in the international system but remains less effective for analysing the role of power in international negotiations (Habeeb, 1988) and should treat resources and power as relational phenomena alongside the dynamic or behavioural dimensions of actors and the surrounding environment (Baldwin, 1998). Solely using the materialist perspective fails to consider non-rationalist perspectives or explain occasions where weaker states/parties have gained despite asymmetry by inducing doubt and exploiting informational asymmetry to gain more concessions than it would under perfect information. 

The use of coercive diplomacy can be manifested as a strategy that combines the threat of force and, if necessary, the selective use of force (Appendix A: 3) in discrete and controlled increments (Schelling, 1966; George, 1991). Providing a useful mechanism for conflict negotiation viewable as a spectrum of potential actions dependent on changing opposition behaviour (Blenchman & Kaplan, 1978; Snyder & Diesing, 1977; George, 1991). The basis for the success of these actions relies on emotional fear, rational assessment of costs and benefits, uncertainty and risk (Morgan, 1977). These coercive behaviours seek to change/erode an opponent’s motivation, demands, incentive structures and induce negotiation by demonstrating the capacity to inflict damage (Lauren, 1972) aiming to prevent undesired military escalation through show-of-force to persuade discontinuation of perceived aggression and induce negotiations (Blechman & Kaplan, 1978). Research suggests power imbalances provide capacity for coercive diplomacy remain unconducive to integrative negotiation behaviour (Lusch & Brown, 1996; Rahim, 1983).

Additionally, despite the proposed utility of coercive diplomacy through power and force, most suggest that such actions are non-optimal under most conditions and can prove counter-productive during negotiations and in long term diplomatic relationships (Leng, 1993; George 2002) consequently weakening the maintenance of settlement terms (Perlmutter & Heenan, 1986). These findings contradict the popular notion of negotiation from strength and suggest that threats are detrimental to integrative bargaining as they beget retaliation (Deutsch & Krauss, 1962; Galinat & Muller, 1988; McClintock et al., 1987; Youngs, 1986). Furthermore, there remains significant debate over the effectiveness and legitimacy of the use of power and coercion in the bargaining process by questioning their legitimacy with regards to international law, norms and behavioural conduct (Craven, 2005).

However, the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy could be seen as dependent on the specific dimension of power. For the author, power during negotiations should be viewed as either relational or relative therefore the effectiveness of power intrinsically links with dependency theory (Emerson, 1972) in that the bargaining power of a party separate from the materialist perspective is based on the dependence of the opposing party. This dependence will be based on commitment and potential impacts of the benefits and negatives on a given negotiation/conflict and the availability of strategic alternatives which closely relates to popular negotiation frameworks concepts of BATNA as the more alternatives a party has, the lower its dependency on the other party (Fischer & Ury, 1981; Lee & Tiedens, 2001). This dependence framework treats ongoing negotiation relationships as a power struggle involving constant manoeuvring to gain a favourable power and bargaining position over their opponent (Bacharach and Lawler, 1986).

Surmising the dependence framework can be used to analyse long-term power struggles and negotiation relationships to explain the actions of individual parties within conflicts and specific negotiations such as counteractions in an attempt to alter the status quo of an existing power relationship (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). This explains how conflict can be simultaneous within ongoing negotiation and that power changes over time because of the latter hence tactical military action can have unintended but related effects on the power dynamics within a negotiation.

It is clear that powers effectiveness and impact on negotiations, especially coercive diplomacy during conflict whether positive or negative, is highly context dependent (Tjosvold et al., 1984; Cousineau & Lacroix, 1986) just as the mode of exercising such power depends on societies shared understanding of power (Weber, 1978). With power being a social construct, it is only usable for the duration these conditions last and can either grow or decrease because of exogenous factors. However, the overall negative assessment of the use of power and coercion in negotiations involving conflict neglects equally potential integrative gains from these behaviours in context specific circumstances (Rubin & Lewicki, 1973; Boulding, 1990; Miles, 2000; Smith, 1987; Tedeschi et al., 1973) hence higher power asymmetry does not always breed distributive or competitive negotiation (McAlister et al., 1986).

Negotiator/Leader Socio-Psychological Factors:  Emotions, Culture and Personality

One of the surrounding contexts influencing conflict negotiations regards the negotiator or state leaders’ personality, emotion and background culture. The majority of negotiation and conflict literature is based on normal diplomatic situations and behaviours which are manageable through established negotiation procedures and maintain low-conflict levels (Jentleson & Lund, 1994). Prior research on emotion has asserted its influence on negotiator behaviour, the negotiation process and its intrapersonal and interpersonal effects (Morris & Keltner, 2000) such as negotiators experiencing positive effects are more cooperative, whereas those experiencing negative effects tend to be more competitive (Allred, et al., 1997; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Furthermore, academic literature is replete with examples of negotiation styles based on different cultural patterns (Ghauri & Usunier, 2003; Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Salacuse, 1999) and has demonstrated the influence culture has on negotiations and that national cultures can influence and be predictors for preferences in any given negotiation approach (Leung, 1988; Graham et al., 1994; Lin & Miller, 2003) and when conducting inter-cultural negotiations and diverse culture predispositions which affect negotiator interaction (Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998; Simintiras, 2000). 

However, these studies fail to take into account how these negotiation aspects are affected when confronted with extreme, prolonged and ideological differences with a perceived enemy. It is unclear how the factors change the decision making process or the circumstances under which one party may choose to negotiate with their opponent and the conditions for a peaceful settlement to be met (Spector, 1998, 2003). The immediate assumptions that can be made is that, given the nature of conflict, one can assume negotiators tend to take on a negative effect approach. Furthermore, regarding the various degrees of interest alignment, negotiators tend to assume their interests are diametrically opposed to their counterpart which increases a distributive negotiation approach (Bazerman & Neale, 1983) alongside that intercultural negotiations are found to be more competitive than intracultural and can have an increased potential to promote negative intergroup dynamics that can limit the negotiations progress or cooperation and negotiator cognitive flexibility (Graham, 1985; Baas et al., 2008). Under conflict situations, including time pressure, one could predict that such established issues become intensified amongst actors which could be the cause of initial hesitation to engage in negotiation or at least delay the starting of negotiations. 

The individual characteristics, emotions and behaviours of negotiators present a significant role within negotiations in terms of social function of conveying useful information towards a counterparty and have varying levels of impact on the negotiation process and outcomes and emotional intelligence which can be used to infer other parties limits and subsequently compose an acceptable offer (Ekman, 1993; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Van Kleef et al., 2004). The author views the most applicable emotions that might influence this particular negotiation context as pride, anger and fear particularly chosen due to their relation to power (Adler et al., 1998; Van Kleef et al., 2005).  Pride could be demonstrative through documented over confidence in negotiators abilities who can over-evaluate their potential success linking closely to a causation of conflict (Bazerman & Neale, 1982) and result in more competitive and high-risk taking negotiation approaches such as making excessive non-integrative demands whilst making minimal concessions (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). This subsequently can be one of the causes for anger and aggression (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Daly, 1991). The utilisation of anger has been shown as an effective strategic device during negotiations with research finding that negotiators make larger concessions and lower demands when their counterpart displays anger and displays of irrational outburst can be effective in breaking a potential impasse in a negotiation whilst increasing the perception of one’s attempt to intimidate an opponent through a supposed “madman’s advantage” (Schoonmaker, 1989).

Despite the perceived effectiveness of emotions in negotiations, broadly its limitations and factors that mitigate such actions need recognition. Firstly, the extent to which negotiators specific socio-psychological factors have all-encompassing influences on negotiation processes is debatable (Imai & Gefland, 2010; Wall & Blum, 1991; Greenhalgh et al., 1985). Secondly, negotiator power has been demonstrated to have a limiting effect on the opponents’ use of such emotive devices thus indicating that power influences the amount of attention that is devoted to one’s social environment, as per the situated focus theory (Guinote, 2007, 2010) whilst power is also indicative of negotiators propensity to use such devices (Galinsky et al., 2003). Demonstrating the level of effectiveness of these socio-psychological and cultural attributes, as well as power, are mutually dependent against more critical variables, such as the specific context that determines negotiation behaviour and outcomes (Gulliver, 1988; Brannen & Salk, 2000; Sharma et al., 1981). 

Additionally, a significant challenge facing negotiations may be potential negotiator irrationality where the adversary could prove undeterrable from their specific goals if they possess specific risk-acceptant attitudes (Levy, 2008) (Appendix A: 4) This uncompromising position can be detrimental to effective negotiation and the utilisation of negotiation power strategies with coercive diplomacy, thus potentially leading to a psychological reaction justifying renewed struggle and resistance (Zartman, 2008; Nicolson 1960, Snyder & Diesing 1977).  Stohl (1979) would argue the madman depiction of an opposing adversary as fallacious given these figures inevitably retain specific goals or factors where they are willing to negotiate. 

The Impact of Time, Uncertainty and Learning on Termination

The connecting factor between these dimensions and the initial causation of conflict remains information asymmetry. However, if conflict originates from disagreement over superior strength, why not fully disclose? As Fearon’s “Rationalist Explanations for War” states, if one is able to agree on the probable outcomes of war, negotiations would be likely to commenced without the necessity for war (Fearon, 1995). However, states possess the strategic imperative to not disclose and misrepresent their capabilities in order to attempt to extract better offers when negotiation occurs and for potential military advantage. This decision highlights the impact of uncertainty with neither party’s power benefitting from exploitation of information asymmetries in conjunction with external conflict patterns to improve their negotiation strength without material power (Forster, 1941; Goemans, 2000) thus increasing opponent uncertainty whilst influencing their emotions (such as fear and subsequently behaviour (von Clausewitz, 1832)).

However, usage of uncertainty and informational asymmetry risks escalation to war (Powell, 1990). When this occurs, conflict as part of the negotiation process can be viewed as a screening tool or learning process prior and during negotiation. Fighting takes on informational properties as private information is revealed over time through conflict converging, opponents’ expectations about the chances of victory reducing uncertainty dependent upon the results. Opponents continually learn more and update beliefs and positions as information is revealed through manipulable negotiation behaviour and non-manipulable battlefield outcomes (Wagner, 2000; Smith, 1998).

Although this assumes a rationalist perspective, in actuality, learning depends on party interpretation and behavioural characteristics influencing the relative impact of such events (Ikle, 1964). However, in the authors opinion, this merely influences the time horizon by which convergence of expectations may occur as fighting continually reduces uncertainty until there is sufficient agreement on capabilities and probabilities to create bargaining room and to permit war termination. Relating to war attrition over time, wars exhibit positive duration dependence where wars/conflict become increasingly likely to end in a draw the longer they endure (Vuchinich & Teachman, 1993; Bennett & Stam, 1996)

This research supports the proposition of a Ripeness Theory (Zartman, 2000; Crump et al., 2017) which congruent with public choice notion of rationality and studies of war termination and negotiation (Sen 1970, Arrow 1963, Brams 1990, 1994; Wright 1965) explains when, parties to a conflict will commence negotiation toward resolution. The conjecture that as wars continue, the chances of a draw increase contributions towards Ripeness theory’s requirement of perception of a mutually hurting stalemate in which both parties are locked in conflict where escalation to victory is not foreseeably possible and deadlock merely creates enduring pain, hence seeking a way out (Touval & Zartman, 2001; Zartman, 2008; Touval, 1982). What can be synthesised from this is that the successful initiation of conflict negotiations is dependent on the rate at which information accrues and the parties’ perception of the conflict situation and their chances for victory which will be moderated by their socio-psychological factors (Gartner, 1997) (See Appendix A: 5).

Analysis of The Negotiation Process

Non-Negotiation Decision

Despite the general consensus that it should be undertaken regardless of a situation (Fisher et al., 1991), non-negotiation has been a guiding principle in a number of extreme international conflict situations (Atkinson et al., 1987). Bell (1962) presents a conjecture that negotiation will be avoided due to two possibilities in which the weak cannot afford to and strong do not need to. Although conceptually useful in providing some basis for why parties may delay negotiating, this does not provide a holistic explanation.

An alternative explanation may originate from the ethical standpoint which originate from the villainisation of the opposing party where negotiate could be perceived as legitimising the opponents’ demands and behaviours and a sign of weakness by the initiating party by demonstrating a willingness to accept a solution with an aggressor (Spector, 1998). This would conform to the ideas of role power and the emotion of fear plays within the negotiation process, particularly as to negotiate could imply that violent methods are an effective strategy in gaining concessions. This decision may further influence third parties, particularly for elected officials as a result of the constituency effect who exert pressure for the party to represent their interests (Walton & McKersie, 1965) which could lead to more aggressive and competitive negotiation tactics or, in this case, non-negotiation (Carnevale et al., 1979; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984).

Another potential explanation of intractable conflicts and differences is based on the irrationality, indivisible objectives and conflicting expectations about the outcomes of war in which the benefits of total victory outweigh the possibilities that lie in negotiating. The author believes that in specific situations involving conflict, non-negotiation can be an initial stage in the negotiation process, as outlined by Ghauri, which require a specific focal point in order to move beyond an impasse (Druckman, 2001). The inescapable reality of this situation is that, despite research, violence is a significant obstacle to the resolution of conflict and the dynamics of the negotiation process (Darby & MacGinty, 2000). It is, in fact, potentially the impact of a dramatic act of violence that is required in order to shift decision maker’s perspectives regarding the future to re-evaluate the consequences of peace against the consequences of continued conflict (Ramsbotham & Schiff, 2018).

Pre-Negotiation & Face-to-Face Negotiation Process

Despite a growing body of research which has attempted to identify the dynamics of the negotiation process, settlement and war termination have only established the conditions under which they are likely to succeed. However, it has often failed to establish the specific stages or conditions that allow disputants to successfully negotiate a settlement (Bennet & Stam, 1996, 1998). The author recognises that there is an inherent inseparability between pre-negotiation and face-to-face negotiation. Firstly, during the course of the negotiation, it is not uncommon for conflict to remain ongoing and hence the tactics used during the pre-negotiation period continue to be used in the face-to-face negotiations. Secondly, negotiation failure often causes parties to return to the conflict/pre-negotiation period as well as potentially the initial inability to negotiate is possible due to the cause of the conflict (Stam, 1999). Following on from the constructivists’ perspective of the limitation that too much emphasis is placed on face-to-face interaction, negotiation between these two stages will be largely integrated to account for the cross-over between them (Weiss, 2004). 

When evaluating the pre-negotiation stage of our framework, initial and ongoing conflict based on our outline relates to the necessary factors to stimulate parties to engage in negotiation (Stein, 1989).  This idea relates that conflict is viewable as first contact between parties with opposing interests and objectives and an information gathering tool from which parties’ expectations on the capacity to achieve their goals through force converge. This principle of convergence suggests that once they converge sufficiently and conflict loses its informational content hostilities can terminate/minimise and negotiation can be considered (Slantchev, 2003). Alternatively, negotiation settlement may not occur due to a desire for peace but because the military and political condition compel cessation (Stedman, 1991). Hence an agreement for ceasefire cannot be reached unless there is either an implicit or explicit agreement that both parties expected utility from continued conflict is less than the expected utility of settlement (Coser, 1961).

Stalemate is a deceptively hard concept to operationalise (Licklider, 1993) and therefore questions the concept of ‘waiting for a ripe moment’ may be unacceptable to a party given the circumstances of warfare. Instead, it helps to identify obstacles and suggests ways of handling them whilst managing the problem until a resolution becomes possible. Under this position, there are two alternatives to induce the opposing party to open negotiations by providing potential terms that are relatively enticing enough to encourage discussions or to increase the other party’s costs to force capitulation e.g. utilising debatably effective economic sanctions (Galtung 1967; Barber 1979; Baldwin 1985; Hufbauer et al. 1990; Pape 1997). Although as explained through the role of power, if the opposing party acquiesces to the demands of the opponent, they could look weak to both their negotiation opponent and to third parties (constituents that could affect their maintenance of the status quo (Schultz, 1998)).

In the failure of economic strategies to force cooperation, states may resolve to use what the author defines as the spectrum/continuum of power negotiation tactics (Snyder & Diesing, 1977) revolving around the tactical use of power that is determined as a dynamic capability based on relativity, relationships and, to a more limited extent, material power with the aim of maximising their interests and positions during negotiations. The most common distinction among the negotiation strategies are: fighting, problem-solving, yielding, avoiding and compromising (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Rahim, 1983, 2002; Van de Vliert, 1997). We specifically highlight these due to their close relations to the role of power as previous studies have demonstrated (De Dreu et al., 1998; Dunbar & Abra, 2010; Lawler, 1992).

A party may undertake either deterrence demonstrations of the potential costs of continuing conflict, as demonstrated with gunboat diplomacy, or pursue more aggressive actions which increase the cost of pursuing war. An example of this would be the bombardment of non-military areas (e.g. industrial production zones), for if a country faces greatly increased costs, its minimal acceptable agreement will be reduced making settlement is more likely (Wittman, 1979). The basis for utilising such force based strategy stems from the intuitive notion that parties will consider negotiation once the costs of war exceed the expected benefits of its continuation.

However, this remains dependent on the relative position over the course of the war (such as achieving victory immediately prior to negotiation to secure stronger negotiation strength and increase uncertainty (Slantchev, 2003). Hence, benefits and demands from the negotiation may not remain fixed and are endogenous to the conflict itself (Filson & Werner, 2002).  The issue with such strategies remains that if both parties attempt to increase the other’s costs, thereby ‘strengthening’ one’s bargaining position, the obvious consequence is a threat-counter-threat sequence (Katz, 1965) and a ‘conflict spiral’ (North et al., 1964).

Despite such actions potentially leading to a desire for negotiation and settlement by the opposing parties, resistance to peace can arise from the public. Due to state leaders/negotiators being elected by constituents, they are accountable and visible to these constituents and must respond accordingly to public opinion which has been shown to have as strong impact as the opponents’ behaviour and can lead to either a non-negotiation policy or increased use of force and competitiveness in negotiations making them more distributive and imposes limitations to the pursuit of peace (Kelman, 1977; Frey & Adams, 1972; Tjosvold, 1977).

Resultant from this pressure can come the necessity for the use of alternative negotiation strategies and communication methods both for pre-negotiation and during face-to-face negotiation, such as the involvement of third-party facilitators/mediators and informal mechanisms such as back channel discussions and third parties (Zahar, 2003). These informal channels accommodate for the circumstance where preconditions for negotiations are not met and deniability is required for engagement without public scrutiny or posturing due to constituency effects. These methods can be used as an adjunct to front-channel negotiation during severe conflicts (Pruitt, 2008; Wanis-St. John, 2006) and aid with cultural necessities i.e. face-saving (Sherif, 1967). 

Once engaging in face-to-face negotiations, the three dimensions can reflect in negotiators behaviour and strategies through the use of ultimatums as a variant of coercive diplomacy (George & Simon, 1994) (Appendix A: 6). Making a specific demand whilst applying a time limitation for compliance with a credible threat of punishment for non-compliance reinforced through the ongoing background conflict and potentially supported by the use of emotions such as anger (Sinacuer & Tiedens, 2006). The use of such threats is propagated on the basis of brinkmanship to extract concessions from the opposing party in a more distributive based negotiation (Schwartz & Sonin, 2007), with its success largely based on the credibility of the threat (Shavell, 1993; Lauren, 1972).

Such a strategy is non-specific to the power position of a party, can be utilised by either high or low power parties and be redirected, such as weaker states signalling a willingness to devolve negotiations rather than bend to the demands of the stronger opponent in order to set limitations to their power (Pfetsch & Landaum 2000). This questions the non-negotiation stage as to whether it is a tactic of incapacity related to an ultimatum, forcing the opponent to comply to demands or accept the negative consequences of renewing conflict (Spector, 1998; Gul & Sonnenschein, 1985; Ott, 2016).

The inherent issue with coercive diplomacy and these various strategies is that, although being effective on occasion, such tactics limit the means of finding a solution. Furthermore, the efficacy of “Tit for Tat” strategies ignores political and social contexts of interactions, presumes parties are able to determine whether an action is confrontational or cooperative, is largely idealistic and fails to consider psychological factors such as behaviour or attribution error that could distort meaning or interpretation of actions (Risse-Kappen, 1991) provoking unpredictable reactions. 

This aligns with the terms of dependency theory as a matching tactic by parties to maintain the status quo of the relational power positions. This maintains the face-to-face negotiation period that competitive mores where real or perceived by the opponent will lead to counter negotiator competitiveness (Axelrod, 1984; Esser et al., 1990). Such actions may result in the breakdown of negotiations and renewal of conflict where the two sides cannot reach a bargain and both prefer war. Both sides proceed to fight to improve their chances of getting their desirable settlement for the disputed issue when negotiations eventually resume. War eventually ends when either one side is defeated militarily or when one party alters their negotiating position sufficiently such that the opposing party is willing to accept the proposed settlement (Reiter, 2003). The model of conflict as a whole hence revolves around parties having two alternatives: to continue the conflict or terminate it through a negotiated settlement.

The author recommends a change to the typical negotiation strategies which is necessary to align the negotiation process to that propagated by Fisher and Ury (2012), Ghauri (2003) and Weiss (1993) to move towards a more integrative approach for the initiation of negotiations, as well as securing its maintenance throughout the process and to pre-emptively change or minimise this cycle of conflict from occurring. An aspect of this is to keep an aggressive opposition in a negotiation which may include the extension of the mutually hurting stalemate which compels parties to initiate and persist in negotiation in addition to the existence of a mutually enticing opportunity (MEO) which’s benefits fully outweigh the benefits of resuming conflict as a requisite condition for achieving agreement, resolving the conflict and preventing the parties from abandoning the negotiation and pursuing a unilateral solution through escalation (Zartman,, 2012). This extension of the ripeness theory derives from the fact that, due to the dynamic nature conflict and manoeuvring has on the power relationships and time scale of negotiations, negotiations solely undertaken due to the presence of a MHS may be insufficient to keep both parties at the negotiations dependent on the dynamic external environment.

Regardless of the MEO in order for it to be fully recognised requires trust but the issue is for conflict is how this can be developed under high levels of uncertainty especially where not committing to trusting internal negotiations can reap benefits in the external conflict environment and this fear of betrayal can create significant hurdles for negotiation, and hence ambiguity over the opponents credibly committing to an agreement makes negotiations far less attractive. In particular, the need for mutual reassurance, reciprocity and credibility of actions is required to overcome fears derived from uncertainty from the three dimensions discussed in our literature review.  The use of incentives, such as concessions or pre-emptive appeasement, may foster reassurance of the non-hostile desires of one party to the opposing party and reciprocity to these actions can mutually reassure the parties intentions based on the social exchange model of human interaction and decrease tensions (Blau, 1968; Homans, 1961) 11.

This model of reassurance, credibility, trust and reciprocity emphasises that each party has control over potential rewards and costs for the opposing party and is capable of providing rewards or exacting costs throughout the interaction which will dependent on the action alter the other’s behaviour but inevitably they will find themselves to an extent reciprocally under the control of the other party which highlights a mutual dependence during the course of the negotiation (Smith, 1987). Negotiations will entail dependence on each other (Kelman, 1996; Druckman, 1986) regardless of power position and each is dependent upon the other in achieving its preferred outcome as without conflict. Such would discourage coercive or forceful negotiation pursuits as the approach represents a distribution “win-lose” orientation (March & Simon, 1958) whether with increased the mutual dependence and hence commitment the relation should be considered so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Greenhalgh, 1987). Despite the proposed superiority of the more conciliatory strategy for negotiation, issues still remain with this negotiation approach, as although suggesting gradual reciprocation is a beneficial method for negotiation, its applicability to resolve complex, contentious or indivisible issues have received little scholarly attention is suspect (Diehl, 1992; Hensel, 1996).

Post-Negotiation

Once settlement is reached, it is important to analyse the post-negotiation and post-conflict environment with the recognition that peace treaties or agreements do not always end the conflict cycle therefore questioning why peace sometimes lasts and sometimes fails and what might enhance its durability? Limited theoretical or empirical work has explored this question (Fortna, 2003), with research suggesting that this integrative model contributes towards post-war peace stability (Lindskold & Han, 1988). In addition, settlements based on tactical material advantages, coercive diplomacy and deception prove to be unstable and increase the likelihood of future conflict. However, some literature does countervail with one ideation postulating that greater conflict length results in greater convergence and information revelation contributing to increased stability in post-conflict peace developed from the war-weariness hypothesis (Smith & Stam, 2004; Maoz, 1984; Licklider, 1995; Senese & Quackenbush, 2003). The underlying implication of these ideas is that post-negotiation peace continuation is dependent on the strength of the agreement itself and the factors utilised during the negotiation process.

This affords an important distinction between short and long-term post-negotiation as peace agreements can be temporary, is often dependent on environmental factors for their continuation and may require further follow-up conferences in which agreements are further refined or expanded in post-agreement negotiations. Nonetheless, even the most sophisticated strategies ensure compliance with agreements as fallible as states may take advantage of a shift in power dynamics by changes in relative capabilities over time causing the breakdown of peace to increase their prospects from the original agreement (Werner, 1997, 1999).

Although we are beginning to understand why peace is harder to maintain in some cases over others, there is little in the way of solid understanding to support lasting peace with existing work largely only tangentially addressed whether deliberate mechanisms to try to maintain peace have been effective and a lack of systematic studies exploring how the specific content of an agreement is impactful on constructing peace (Werner, 1997, 1999). Realist tradition would likely speculate that peace agreements are at best epiphenomenal and lasting peace simply remains idealistic (Mearsheime, 1994). The fact remains that, regardless of the potential for recurrence with maintenance of military capabilities, a state would be no worse off than before the settlement (Walter, 1997). However, this does infer the pessimistic adage of “if you want peace, prepare for war”.

The question of war often occurs as a result of expectations and uncertainty, yet the only way to gain peace is through preparation for war, are we therefore stuck in a vicious cycle in which lasting continuous peace is impossible? The author optimistically speculates that the answer is no and that peace may be precarious, but it is possible, maintaining that peace in the aftermath of negotiations/conflict is dependent upon: cooperation, credibility, reciprocity, mutual dependence/deterrence and reduction of uncertainty and intentions through decreasing information asymmetry and ensuring cost of reinitiating conflict outweighs the incentives to attack.

Conclusion and Similarities to Typical Negotiations, Divergences

Negotiation Similarities and Divergences to Standard Frameworks

The author observes that, despite the violent context of conflict, negotiation itself retains large semblance with “mainstream” negotiation frameworks and research including: Ghauri (2003), Lewis (2006), Salacuse (1998), Fisher and Uri (1981), Weiss (1993). Regarding Ghauri, we propose a re-prioritisation of Ghauri’s Atmosphere Factors into the central points of our argument of conflict/cooperation, power/dependence and expectations as highlighted by our use of convergence theory. Furthermore, background factors are similarly established as key to the negotiation.

The main divergences the author sees from Ghauri’s particular model is a failure to observe the implications of a time dimension where, although establishing a post-negotiation section within the process, fails to consider short/long term implications for post-negotiations and, by not considering information as an atmosphere factor which this author considers instrumental to the negotiation process, highlighting the established reasons regarding trust and uncertainty. Additionally, regarding the cultural frameworks of Salacuse and Lewis, the author considers that although there are demonstrable cultural differences between parties in international negotiations and their negotiation style preference is how these differences react to situations like conflict which can involve situational factors which may change cultural reactions and stereotypical characteristics and equally be mutually effective towards the opposing party and should be further explored.

Finally, regarding Fisher and Ury’s (2011) Principled Negotiation Methodology, the author finds some relevancy within their work, such as the use of BATNA where in the authors assessment can see that renewing conflict to achieve a party’s objectives through force can be seen as the BATNA within conflict negotiations which effectively ties in with ripeness theories influence on the point at which negotiations occur (Zartman, 2000). If negotiations can facilitate pragmatic accommodation that yields better results than a BATNA, it benefits the party (Fisher et al., 1991) Furthermore, such work also aligns with the authors discussion regarding information asymmetry and its influence on positional/relative power where it is not in either parties’ best interest to reveal their specific BATNA. 

However, the author's main criticism of both Fisher and Ury and Ghauri’s Frameworks is the prescriptive negotiation strategies the advice and their limited applicability to conflict negotiations with their specific focus on building trust, confidence, open and developing a positive problem-solving atmosphere in addition to how they propose to treat the opposition, with this criticism stemming from the limited feasibility during conflict. Specifically, Fisher and Ury’s approach to resolving disputes/negotiations is highly contestable based on our discussion and context. 

The author finds the model most congruent with this authors outline of what influences negotiations within conflict and the variables involved remains Weiss’s RBC Model due to its focus on Relationships, Behaviours and Conditions and highlights the potential influences of symmetric and asymmetric relationships that affect negotiation interaction. The model also highlights the independent and dependent variables involved within negotiations particularly highlighting how the intensity of conflict may be particularly influential. Furthermore, it retains its integrity when considering complex multi-level and multi-party negotiations which this essay would cover in more depth given wider scope and refrains from being a prescriptive framework whilst merely providing a representation of the influencing conditions which will determine the negotiation process by focusing on the cognitive domain of how such factors are moderated by negotiators frame, perception, information-processing and judgement.

Final Comments and Limitations

Although this paper explores and outlines what the author considers the three dimensions principal in affecting negotiations and conflict, this study remains limited in its assessment of conflict negotiation. Future research should focus on topics including: attempted integration between game theory and behavioural decision theory to account for non-rationalist dimensions with decision making; multi-case reviews looking to synthesise commonalities within successful conflict negotiation processes; inter-team and multiparty negotiation dynamics within conflict given the increased complexity of our current global system with supranational bodies influences increasing analysis of the influence secondary and third parties, increased focus on the influence of cultural intelligence for interstate conflict negotiations; assessing the feasibility of integrating Thomas-Kilman Conflict Modes Matrix (Thomas & Kilmann, 2008) with a life cycle process model to assess whether negotiations strategic dispositions progress/change as parties negotiate. Finally, game theoretical models into the analysis focusing on incomplete information non-cooperative games with both static and dynamic solutions analysing such decisions on a long and short term basis to explore the implications these factors have on decision making focusing upon the idea of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992) and calculable risk against unknowns (George & Smoke, 1974; Camerer, 1995).

Aligning closely with George’s (1983) theoretical and methodological integrated research, the author concurs with the general belief regarding the infeasibility of a universal theory for negotiations as a whole and regards that frameworks based on conditional generalizations remain the most effective tool for allowing negotiators and policy makers to assess their negotiation decisions and processes. The important insight the author stems from this belief is a cautious observation that not all negotiations provide the opportunity for completely integrative payoffs (Wall & Blum, 1991). Instead negotiations under conflict need to remain historically grounded considering previous interaction and altercations (Knorr, 1976; Booth, 1977) and sensitive to contextual environmental and situation specific factors e.g. culture (Baron, 1990; Levin, 1975; Kressel & Pruitt, 1989) and the influence these factors possess for the negotiations process expanding beyond pure negotiator-opponent bargaining. With the aim of specifying conditions under which the limited use of force/power might be appropriate; recognising that these three dimensions outlined and their related strategies usage closely follow the Goldilocks principle that they possess dual possibilities and that there are specific points within each dimension that can either lead to progress or regression decided by the specificities of the particular negotiation.

Appendix A: Case Examples

1. This can be seen by Japans early surrender to the US as well as Germany’s Surrender in WW1 and WW2 (Butow, 1954; Ikle, 1965; Craig, 1958)
2. As was seen during the Cold War Arms Race between the US and USSR (Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995)
3. The selective use of force could be seen as demonstrated in the U.S. Atomic Bombing of Japan which achieved its successful aim of shortening the length of the war and inducing capitulation (Stimson & Truman, 1947)
4. A classic example of this would be seen in Hitler who despite previous attempts at appeasement initial negotiation attempts were unsuccessful due to his irrationality/unwillingness to negotiate (Kuehn, 2008; Jablonsky, 2014; Spector, 1998; Ripsman & Levy, 2008)
5. Without seizure it can hasten its passing as parties lose faith in their opponents’ willingness to negotiate and ability to reach an understand as could be seen in the Israel/Palestine conflict (Lieberfeld, 1999). 
6. For example, in 1914 the British delivered an ultimatum to Germany, demanding that the German ground forces cease their forward progress short of an invasion of Belgian territory to prevent the violation of guaranteed neutrality. At the outset of World War II, Britain and France similarly issued Nazi Germany an ultimatum, which demanded that all aggressive action against Poland stop, that territorial occupation be undone, and that all German forces be withdrawn from Polish territory which demonstrates the effectiveness of such coercive diplomatic strategies is highly context dependent (Lauren, 1972)