HIGH STANDARDS NEED STRONG SOURCES: THE CASE FOR A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE TO DEFEND HUMAN RIGHTS

It would seem that a philosophical perspective is not required to defend the concept of human rights, and that we should altogether avoid grounding it in philosophical foundations. The unique role of philosophy, is that it deepens our understanding of theoretical and practical matters. The notion of human rights, which exists at the congruence of theory and practice, presents an opportunity for the exploration of its philosophical underpinnings.?

Some theorists however would not entirely agree with this view. For instance, some favour a practice-dependence approach, where the justification of fundamental normative principles, such as human rights, is grounded in an account of existing social practises.[1]?Thus, rather than prescribing what?ought?to exist, normative principles are viewed as constraints on practices in which we are already engaged.?

This paper will however mainly discuss and critique the anti-foundationalist stance by Richard Rorty, who argues that instead of delving into the discourse of philosophical foundations, human rights should be justified through a human rights culture.[2]?This essay argues against Rorty’s position in favour of a philosophical perspective.?

ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS?

Rorty asserts the claim that we should put aside the quest for metaphysical foundations for human rights, and elaborates the idea of advancing a human sensibility to consolidate a human rights culture,?[3]?that calls for passion and courage, rather than reason and theory.[4]?Hence, a philosophical defense of human rights, especially one that appeals to the common rationality of human beings as the foundation of which we should respect one another, is futile in helping people to uphold human rights, especially in a setting where human rights violations occur systematically.?

It is therefore inefficacious to appeal to the human commonalities of our true selves, and reason, as discussed in Platonic and Kantian foundationalism respectively, to people who are uninterested in seeing the humanity in the people they consider to be pseudo-human, or sub-human.[5]?In fact, people would be offended if they are appealed to see commonalities between themselves and the people they perceive to be unlike them. While the validity of implementing human rights as per international standards is unquestioned, this view rejects human rights foundationalism as outmoded and irrelevant.[6]

THE NEED FOR A PHILOSPHICAL PERSPECTIVE?

While the human rights struggle is unquestionably motivated by passion and courage, as per Rorty, it is also influenced by argument.[7]?While these non-rational qualities, are important for human rights activism, we also need to know, at a deeper level, why we stand for human rights, because human rights without reasons are vulnerable to denial and abuse.[8]Consequently, we must engage in the intellectual responsibility of finding the grounding for human rights. This is why a philosophical perspective is important.?

Firstly, a philosophical perspective helps us to interpret the definition of human rights, together with its precepts. International law outlines that human rights are based on human dignity, and are inherent, inalienable, universal and indivisible. These qualities outwardly distinguish human rights from other legal rights such as property rights. Through philosophy, however, we can go in-depth, and conceptually engineer and clarify these concepts, that are likely to remain obscure unless one understands the philosophies that shape them.[9]?Within this hermeneutical discussion, we can better comprehend the nature of rights, and further consider the degree of protections available, and the nature of derogations or exceptions.[10]

Secondly, through philosophy, we can analyse and justify the legal basis for human rights. Through jurisprudential discourse, we understand why there are human needs that are secured and protected by legal institutions. Law is one of the paradigms of political authority.[11]?This fact is useful in an arena that requires formal enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, we appreciate the promulgated standards in international instruments, and have a stronger orientation and passion towards advocating for efficient democracy, and the rule of law in our systems in order to efficiently promote and protect human rights.?

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Thirdly, philosophy is useful in participations in constructive debates on theoretical disagreements about human rights, and can in the long run give solutions that can be used in practice. These include disputes over what may be legitimately be included in the category of human rights – civil and political; economic, social and cultural; and collective rights, or discussions around cultural relativism.?

CONCLUSION

It is easy for granted the concepts presented in human rights discourse. Instead, it is important to consider the philosophical attributes that exist therein. On one hand, we must not ignore the lack of consensus about approaches to human rights, but on the other, we should not assume that there is really no need for a philosophical basis. High standards need strong sources.[12]

BIBLIOGRAPHY?

Freeman M, ‘The philosophical foundations of human rights’ 16(3) Human Rights Quarterly, 1994.?

Rorty R, ‘Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality’ in?Truth and progress: Philosophical papers, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 167-185.?

[1]?Fr?slee M, ‘Global justice and two conceptions of practice-dependence’?Raisons Politiques, 2013, - <?https://www.cairn.info/revue-raisons-politiques-2013-3-page-81.htm?> on 15 July 2021.?

[2]?Rorty R, ‘Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality’ in?Truth and progress: Philosophical papers, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 170.?

[3]?Barreto J-M, ‘Rorty and human rights: Contingency, emotions and how to defend human rights telling stories’ 7(2)?Utrecht Law Review, 2011, 94.??

[4]?Freeman M, ‘The philosophical foundations of human rights’ 16(3) Human Rights Quaterly, 1994, 493.?

[5]?Rorty R, ‘Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality’, 177.?

[6]?Rorty R, ‘Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality’, 170.

[7]?Freeman M, ‘The philosophical foundations of human rights’ 493.?

[8]?Freeman M, ‘The philosophical foundations of human rights’ 493.?

[9]?Shestack JJ, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights’ 20(2)?Human Rights Quarterly, 1998, 201.?

[10]?Shestack JJ, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights’, 204.?

[11]?Finnis J, ‘The authority of law in the predicament of contemporary social theory’?Notre Dame Journal of Law?1(1), 1984, 119.?

[12]?Taylor C,?Sources of the self: The making of modern identity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989, 339, 516.?