The Hidden War in Yemen: The uprising of the Houthis and the Saudi Arabian offensive
Children play football behind towering accommodation blocks either side of the avenue known as Maala Straight in Aden, Yemen, June 2013. Image: Brian Harrington Spier/Flickr

The Hidden War in Yemen: The uprising of the Houthis and the Saudi Arabian offensive

(2016) The current crisis in Yemen is devastating for the civilian population, since it has left many homeless, dead and displaced, leaving the country in ruins. Even if the war ended today, the scars in the life of the civilians would not be erased and the state’s recovery would take years if not decades. The Houthis –a Shia Islam sect following Zaidism that makes up one third of the Yemeni population- are fighting against the government forces loyal to displaced President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who was forced to flee the capital Sanaa in February, last year after the Houthis took control over the city. On the back of this confrontation, Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (aka AQAP) is taking advantage of the turmoil resulted from the confrontation between the the Houthis and government forces and is flourishing again, gaining control of some cities by besieging them. In the following paragraphs, I will analyze the background, relevant actors, policy changes, and solution alternatives in regards to the poorly covered War in Yemen.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

The conflict between the Houthis and the the Yemeni government forces is nothing new. In 1990, North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (communist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen) unified to become the Republic of Yemen with Ali Abdullah Saleh as the President, who had been the President of North Yemen since then. From that time on, tensions between the North and South continue, since the South seeks for independence and has formed the Southern Separatist Movement. Three years later the Vice President Ali Salem al-Beidh resigns his position from Saleh’s government and goes back to Aden in Southern Yemen. The Southern Yemeni people claimed an end to economic marginalization of the south and political violence. In May 1994, Civil war broke out and lasted three months, ending with the victory of Saleh.

According to Ahmed Addaghashi, a professor at Sanaa University, it is believed that the Houthis began as moderate theological movement back in 1992, which preached tolerance and claimed a broad-minded view of the Yemeni people.1 Believing Youth was its first organization founded in 1992 in Saada. The foundation of such Houthi organizations can be considered as a reaction to the foreign intervention in Yemen, for promoting the Zaidi revival in response to the threat of Saudi-influenced ideologies in Yemen, the disapproval of the alliance between former Yemeni government and the U.S, along with the corruption of the regime as well as the marginalization of the Houthis home areas in Saada made up the group’s source of rage. The turmoil collapsed in 2004, when the founding leader of the Houthi movement, Hussain Badr al-Din al-Houthi, was assassinated, and such incident spurred an insurgency of the Houthies, which was the first out of six wars between Saleh’s government and Houthi rebels in their stronghold of Saada (northern city). 

In 2011, following the start of the Arab Spring, the Houthis took participation in the Yemeni revolution, with mass protests demanding the destitution of President Saleh, the end of corruption and repression. As a result, Saleh resigned and signed the power-transfer deal. The opposition agreed to allow Vice President Hadi to stand for the presidency in 2012 and took office in the same year for a two-year transitional period. During that time, the government forces continued violating human rights, including killings and disappearances, against the Southern secessionist movement. Furthermore, the Houthi armed group in the became active again and a conflict is renewed against them in the North. In 2014, the government decreased fuel subsidies and the Houthis called for mass protests against the government’s new policy. In a short time, the Houthis seized the capital city of Sanaa. In early February, 2015, the they dissolved the parliament and announced that a transitional government would be set out.2 Confrontation between the pro Houthis and Hadi loyal forces advanced and Hadi requested military intervention to the GCC Arab states. To his request, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched air strikes against the Houthi armed group in Sanaa and Saada strongholds while President Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia, and the conflict spread across the country, resulting in a civil war.

THE DOMESTIC FACTORS OF THE CONFLICT

To begin with, when analyzing the conflict in Yemen, we should take into consideration the following facts: Yemen is the poorest Arab state. Yemen has the fourth lowest Human Development Index ratings in the Arab World.3 Half of the Yemini population lives in extreme poverty and one third suffer from chronic hunger.4 Moreover, Yemen ranks 8th in the 2012 Failed States Index. Neither the government of former president Saleh nor displaced President Hadi has been capable of giving any option to the Yemeni citizens that can solve these social problems and give them any alternative or hope for progress. The discontent of the Yemeni population plus, the marginalization of some minority groups and tribes that feel they are left behind in the system, has led to sectarianism, fueled by the condition of the state under economic and political pressure.

The exclusion of members of the minority groups –like the Houthis- in the Parliament and political institutions has enraged those groups that feel they do not have a say on the policy making process, hence, leaving them vulnerable to the possible negative consequences of such policies and their impact.

Besides, the instability and large displacement, corruption, infirm governance, lack of resources and their low quality, and poor infrastructure have thwarted the development of this poor state. As a consequence, the unemployment rate has become high, plus inflation in food prices and limited social services has contributed to the discontent of the people and the failure of the state.

WHY IS THE TERRITORY OF YEMEN IMPORTANT?

The territory of Yemen is strategically important because of its location. Is is located on the Bab al Mandab strait, which is waterway linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. The world’s oil shipments pass through this strait. Thus, it makes sense that Egypt and Saudi Arabia worry that a Houthi takeover of Yemen could threaten free passage through the waterway if the Houthis get control over the area. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition has been bombing the country indiscriminately, targeting civilian population and not only rebel-controlled areas.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE CONFLICT

           As a result of the chaos, the national security in Yemen has been weakened, since the confrontation between the Houthis against the government forces is still ongoing, as well as the secessionist group in the South. The Yemen military has split into two sides, one supporting the Houthis uprising and the other backing President Hadi’s regime. This is also one of the reasons why the Houthis have a source of weaponry as they are supported by certain army units and armed groups loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. On top of the conflict, Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula has taken advantage of the turmoil and remerged in Yemen. Now, At the same time that the Houthi and government forces are fighting each other, they are also fighting against AQAP. The United states has been launching air strikes against Al Qaida, however, due to the destitution of President Hadi –whose regime worked together with the U.S. to launch air strikes in AQAP strongholds-, the response to Al Qaida by air strikes is slowing down, and the diplomatic relations between the Houthi-controlled Yemen –after the Houthi takeover of Sanaa- and the United States has been strongly affected.

           Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the conflict has supposed a turning point in the events. It has been seen in many times that Saudi Arabia intervenes in states whose regimes are not Saudi-friendly. Just like in Egypt, the Saudis played their diplomacy skillfully through the turmoil and disorder during the Arab spring. Saudi Arabia seeks to maintain its regional supremacy. As a monarchy, Saudi Arabia feels threatened by uprisings seeking for democracy in neighbor Arab states, fearing that protests could arouse against the Saudi Arabian monarchy. It is not convenient for Saudi Arabia, with a vas majority of Sunni Muslims, to have a neighbor state with a Shia-led regime by the Houthis. These are also some of the several reasons why I believe that Riyadh (Saudi Arabia’s capital) decided to intervene militarily in Yemen in order to “restore the order” like they claim –while they have actually been bombing Yemen indiscriminately, both in rebel strongholds and also in heavily populated civilian areas according to Amnesty International.

CURRENT SIUATION OF THE CONFLICT (CASUALTIES, DISPLACED ETC)

           The most affected people in the conflict are the Yemeni civilian population, who have to bear the consequences of the war and violence. Poverty and the already existing serious humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by the conflict to the point that today, at least 83% of Yemenis today rely on some form of humanitarian assistance in order to survive.

           According to Amnesty International, the human toll of the conflict has reached over 6200 civilians killed (including 700 children) and over 3 million people internally displaced in Yemen as of this year.

Currently, Yemen peace talks have been delayed as fighting goes on despite ceasefire which was announced recently. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition has not respected the ceasefire and continues to launch air strikes without distinguishing military forces from civilians, and this is why the Houthis claim to be delaying the peace talks.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE SAUDI LED COALITION

More than 30 air strikes have been documented across six different governorates (Sanaa, Sada, Hajjah, Hodeidah, Taiz and Lahj) by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition that seem to have violated international humanitarian law – conformed by the rules that apply during a conflict or “laws of war” - resulting in 366 civilian deaths (more than half of whom were women and children) and 272 civilian injuries.5 Such attacks seem to have targeted civilians deliberately and facilities such hospitals, schools, markets and mosques, which might be regarded as war crimes.  

Amnesty International documented that the coalition’s used at least four types of cluster munitions (lethal explosives banned by the international law), including US-manufactured models.

Despite the evidence of violations of international law in Yemen many countries continue to sell weapons (worth more than $25bl in 2015) to mainly Saudi Arabia and its coalition, countries which are using these weapons in the conflict. Among the weapons providers, the United States and UK are two of the main ones, as well as France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. 6

On June 2ND, the secretary general of the United Nations Ban Ki Moon, announced that Saudi Arabia had been added to the list of Children’s Right Violators, after the annual report Children and Armed Conflict documented that the Saudi-led coalition was responsible for most of the child deaths and injuries in Yemen in 2015. However, just four days after the announcement, the secretary general released a statement saying that he was removing the Saudi-led coalition form the list until he receives a review conducted together with a team from the accused coalition.7 It appears that Mar. Ban has received intense pressure by Saudi Arabia, that threatens to cut off its funding of United Nation’s programs unless it was removed from the list. This shows the limits of Ban Ki Moon’s authority, but at the same time, it is true that millions of other children likely would suffer if funding for U.N. programs was cut off. Indeed, I can say this has not been the right decision that the UN could have made since it does not match its principles, but in such a difficult context, it may be the best one for the moment.

 

 

CONCLUSIONS AND HIPHOTETICAL REASONS FOR THE CHANGE IN POLICIES

           First, Hadi’s administration was far from being inclusive and did not cover the needs nor the reforms that it had promised. He did nothing improve sectarianism in Yemen, and did not make new policies to bring the minorities into equal participation in society, like the Houthis who had been marginalized in Yemen since its unification. The sectarian problem has developed more through the years to get to the nowadays crisis. The government is absolutely corrupted and it was a dictatorship under the regime of former President Saleh during thirty years. The transitional government of President Hadi did not include the Houthis in the any official post in the government, so the Houthis an other minorities did not have any political representation.

           Second, the decision of President Hadi to ask for Saudi Arabia’s intervention was the worst choice, given that Yemen is already divided and adding one more actor to the conflict with individual interests like Saudi Arabia has only worsened the crisis. The intervention of the Saudis and its coalitions cannot be considered as humanitarian intervention in Yemen, because they have violated the international humanitarian law by targeting civilian population indiscriminately. Instead of calling for help to the Saudis, he and his party should have opened direct talk with the Houthis and the other uprising groups, proposing them more participation in the government and allowing them to have their representatives in the Yemeni political institutions so that they could present their claims pacifically –by saying this, I am not justifying the violent actions of the Houthis either.

           Despite the claims of Hadi’s and the gulf countries stating that several presidential envoys have failed to persuade the Houthi leader to accept peaceful arbitration, this is not totally true. Al-Islah party (Hadi’s Sunni party) has refused to accept that they are part of the conflict for over a year already and have not been eager to sit on a table with the Houthis to negotiate and talk about the possible solutions of the conflict. Ansar Allah (Houthis movement political wing) states that Al-Islah party are the ones turning down their calls for national dialogue8. If this is true, it proves that Hadi has no will to cooperate either, in fact, he has seemed indifferent to his country's deteriorating situation and instead has allied with Saudi forces who seem to have a plan to restore Yemen with a “Saudi-friendly” new government.

           Third, the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia have been claiming that the war in Yemen is some sort of a proxy war (between Saudi Arabia and Iran) halted by Iran, who is supposedly backing the Houthis in Yemen due to their shared Shia Islam belief. But this is not true and it is just a claim made by the Saudi-led coalition. I believe that this claim is not true. Like it was specified in the background section, the conflict between groups in Yemen comes from the establishment of the state, back in 1990. Yemen is a failed state and has been collapsing in the border of civil war for years, it has been governed by corrupted leaders under its weak policy, weak economy, weak health care and education. Iran conspiracy has no role to play in the conflict.

PROSPECTS FOR SOLUTIONS

           First of all, the United States and other countries weaponry providers should stop supplying Saudi Arabia with arms because it is proved that they are using them against Yemen and its civilian population. Saudi Arabia should leave the conflict, because its intervention has only worsened the situation. The Houthis, who have taken over Sanaa and are controlling the country, have to fight now against Hadi loyal government forces, Saudi Arabia and the separatists of the South, while also Yemen should fight against Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula –one of the biggest threats to international security- which is reemerging in the midst of the conflict in Yemen as well as IS. If the intervention of Saudi Arabia was to help, they should play a real humanitarian intervention and not a mass killing. The United States should push Saudi Arabia (US Arab ally) to withdraw its forces from Yemen, however, that does not seem to be happening soon. Even the US media hasn’t covered the conflict in Yemen as it has covered the Syrian war. I believe that even if Saudi Arabia leaves the scene and the conflict between the Houthis and other minorities and the government remains severe and do not seek any talk, then the United Nations must actively intervene in the conflict in order to stop the violations of human rights in Yemen and work as a mediator in such a complex conflict.

 REFERENCES 

1.    Aljazeera.com War And Conflict,. (2015). Who are the Houthis in Yemen?. Retrieved  from the original 23 August 2014, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/yemen-houthis-hadi-protests-201482132719818986.html

2.    Amnestyinternational.org News Armed Conflict,. (2015). YEMEN: THE FORGOTTEN WAR. Retrieved December 2015, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/

3.    "Human Development Index and its components" (PDF). Hdr.undp.org. Retrieved 7 November 2012.

4.    "The World Factbook: Yemen". The CIA World Factbook. 23 June 2014. Retrieved 11 April 2015.

5.    Amnestyinternational.org News Armed Conflict,. (2015). YEMEN: THE FORGOTTEN WAR. Retrieved December 2015, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/

6.    Amnestyinternational.org News Armed Conflict,. (2015). YEMEN: THE FORGOTTEN WAR. Retrieved December 2015, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/

7.    The New York Times. Middle East,. (2016) Saudis Pressure U.N. to Remove Them From List of Children’s Rights Violators. Retrieved 6 June 2016, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-arabia-children-war.html?_r=0

8.    Aljazeera.com Politics,. (2014). Q&A: What do the Houthis want? Retrieved 2 October 2014, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/qa-what-do-houthis-want-2014101104640578131.html

 

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