The Hidden Accords Between Extortion and Provocation

The features of the anticipated deal between the United States and Iran have become almost fully clear, meaning the coming few weeks will see a hurried workshop to finalise the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by Washington, Beijing, Moscow, London, Paris, and Berlin, to get it signed by Tehran before the inauguration of the new Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi on 8 August.?

Here, it appears that keeping Mr Raisi on the US sanctions list is not an obstacle to the deal, despite the heavy symbolism, particularly since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself is also under sanctions. Iran’s current mode of pragmatism pays no attention to symbolism, and is focused on lifting sanctions as a priority to rescue its economy. But Tehran will likely have secured most of its demands in this regard, including lifting sanctions on its crucial oil exports, in light of the deals signed with China, India, and others. Thanks to the Biden administration, Iran has also secured the exclusion from the talks of two issues crucial to its policy red lines: Its ballistic missile program and Iran’s regional activities that seek to replicate the Iranian model in Arab countries – for example with the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon forming paramilitary armies loyal to Tehran, and the agenda of its Revolutionary Guards Corps.

?Tehran also seems to have new instruments that give it leverage over Washington, retaining the initiative in a way that allows it to push back against any US pressure on the issue of its missiles and foreign policy. Most likely, extortion will continue to dominate Iran’s tactics in the present time by increasing nuclear activities and regional hostilities against US troops, to intimidate and pre-empt Washington after the latter decided to forgo all of its ‘toothy’ leverage by dropping sanctions as an instrument.

To sell the deal, President Biden will seek to beautify it in the eyes of the American people, claiming the US has secured the containment of Iran’s nuclear threat, and the substitution of confrontation with direct influence over Iran’s policies. He will pay lip service to concerns about Iran’s theocratic model by calling for curbing tyranny and authoritarianism inside Iran. He will implement further ‘cosmetic’ measures such as shutting down Iranian state websites to give the Iranian people the impression that he continues to care about human rights, and that democracies will stand up to theocracies. In fact, neither the repressed public opinion in Iran will be able to challenge Mr Biden’s claims, nor will the American public opinion care whether or not a Faustian deal is made as long as they are given the nuclear ‘pill’.

The history of the hardline, extremist Iranian president is of no consequence to the average American, despite Mr Raisi’s involvement in the bloody crackdown against protesters, and in the torture and mass execution of nearly 5,000 people, including women and children, from an opposition group in 1988. The Europeans and Americans do not care about the rigging of Iran’s presidential elections, through the exclusion of moderate candidates. Iran has dropped the ‘moderate mask’ it not long ago found expedient, invalidating the electoral process completely. Thus Mr Raisi was ‘appointed’ at the decision of Ayatollah Khamenei and the IRGC, which oversees foreign policy and is now directly in charge in Iran.

Following the signing of the nuclear deal, Iran will commit to a ‘grace period’, during which the regime will refrain from stepping up its regional activities and ballistic missile program, giving the impression that the revival of the JCPOA has indeed influenced its behavior. But this grace period is not likely to last more than a few months, until the impression is solidified that guarantees were given by Iran as part of the deal.

In essence, there are no written long-term guarantees, however. The Iranian regime is categorically opposed to giving permanent security guarantees to parties like Israel, or to committing to curbing Hezbollah as part of a formal deal. Iran is also refusing to disengage from Yemen except on its own terms and timing, and in the context of the ongoing Iranian-Saudi dialogue which covers the future of security arrangements in the Gulf region. Iran is also refusing to allow the PMF in Iraq to be integrated into government institutions, and to refrain from provocations and extortion against Iraq and the United States. Indeed, the PMF is a precious instrument for Iran in the framework of its relationship with Washington. In Syria, Iran’s project is ongoing and permanent, despite some Russian objections. In Lebanon, Hezbollah remains the most important ammunition in the arsenal of the IRGC in the region, and is determined to domesticate Lebanon and consolidate its dominance over the country and along its borders with Israel and Syria.

There have been some verbal reassurances issued by Iran, whereby it would have promised to reduce its overt activities and postpone its major foreign policies in the three months that follow the signing of the new nuclear deal in Vienna. One reason behind this could be to avoid embarrassing President Biden and European leaders who have given Iran everything it wanted in the nuclear negotiations. Another reason is Iran’s post-election strategy.

But ‘the economy first’ is the cornerstone of Iran’s current strategy, and this requires first the lifting of sanctions to allow the new president in Iran to collect the dividends of the investments made by his predecessor Hassan Rouhani in the nuclear deal, without taking responsibility for the costs of the political deal. It also requires avoiding making provocations in the region in the coming phase, albeit for a limited time. However, the essence of Iranian foreign policy will remain unchanged. While there may be a grace period, it will not be a radical shift in the regime’s doctrine.

Russia is playing a role in the context of securing Iranian guarantees needed by the Biden administration, especially with regards to Israel. According to Russian estimates, the Kremlin can guarantee Iranian de-escalation for 2 to 3 months. But what will happen after? Only time will tell.

The Vienna deal being concluded observes nothing with regards to a timetable or a working program to tackle the issues of Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional activities. Only Iran’s rulers know for sure the long-term trajectory of Iran’s foreign policy. They are giving tacit reassurances but it is them who are deciding the limits of any détente. They are insistent on rejecting to commit to written memoranda on these subjects. Yet for now, their decision is to not take risks to guarantee the lifting of the sanctions, because their priority is the economy. As for foreign policy, that can come later.

The Vienna talks are still progressing well after the election of Raisi, despite the US seizure of 33 Iranian websites and the continuation of US sanctions on the new president, on account of his extremist, if not criminal track record as many Iranians see it.

Military sanctions will not be lifted, but there is a proposal on reaching a compromise whereby Iran would be allowed to buy defensive weapons, while sanctions would continue on offensive arms. According to informed sources, a security and military meeting will convene at the highest level next week to address these issues and resolve any remaining obstacles before signing the deal ahead of the 8 August date.

What about Israel in the midst of the rapprochement between the US and Iran, and the incoming deal that will end sanctions as a leverage to stop Iranian aggression and the continuation of its nuclear program, beyond the revival of the nuclear deal? The ancient historic truce as far as a direct confrontation between the Persians and the Jews is concerned continues to shape present relations between the Jewish state and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and there are silent accords in the tug of war between the ruling far right in Israel and the theocratic hardliners ruling Iran.

The Biden administration and the European governments, and Israel to a lesser extent, have concluded that there is no choice but to yield to IRGC control of Iranian foreign policy and the ‘appointment’ of President Raisi through rigged elections. But this fatalism will be judged harshly by history, because its implications could be terrible. As for now, the divine victory that Iran’s rulers will claim thanks to the Europeans and Joe Biden, will be the weapon wielded in the equation of provocation and extortion mastered by the Iranian revolutionary regime.