Hezbollah and The Syrian Democratic Forces: Case Studies in the Application of Intent and Distribution of Responsibility of Surrogate Forces

Hezbollah and The Syrian Democratic Forces: Case Studies in the Application of Intent and Distribution of Responsibility for Surrogate Forces and Their State Sponsors

Surrogate, or local partner forces have been a key option for special operation forces (SOFs), throughout modern history[1]. The focus of this essay will be to first define surrogate forces and to discuss where the responsibility lies for the actions taken by said surrogate forces. Baker (2016) defines surrogates as “someone who stands in for or acts on behalf of another”[2] Based on this definition the question arises “the use of surrogates and proxies effectively relocates many of the most serious costs of warfare outside the Clausewitzian triangle of political authority (the state), political agent (the soldier), and the people”[3]. this essay will explore the question of where the responsibility of the actions of the surrogate forces falls and how this ethical question equate to an ethically sound partnership.

Two prime examples of where such SOF driven operations have worked well are Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and later IRGC-QUDs Force, development, and use of Hezbollah[4], and the US-led International Coalition’s support of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

When we look at the history of Hezbollah we can see that although they began a core group of Lebanese militants with external support[5] , they have managed to evolve beyond a guerilla or local partner/proxy force and into an institution that has managed to win over a massive portion of the populations via the Construction Jihad, largely funded by Iran but nevertheless winning over support of people who had never identified with Hezbollah[6]. What started as a guerilla movement engaged in armed struggle against the West, along with all Lebanese militias from Amal Movement, etc..[7] Hezbollah made its first signature attack with the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines Beirut barracks. This attack targeted a multi-national military peace keeping force resulting in the deaths of 241 US military personnel, 58 French military personnel, six civilians and the 2 suicide bombers[8]. ?2007 report documents countless other Hezbollah operations that deliberately targeted civilians[9]. It advanced into a legitimate entity that created a parallel alternative to the state that also simultaneously managed to win and become a major legitimate political bloc inside the Lebanese government[10].

On the other end of the spectrum are the SDF. Its roots begin with the expansion of ISIS in 2013/14 when all other defenses fled, the PKK and its militant branch the HPG brought a critical military and defensive aide to all people in the region along with their ideology based on Democratic Confederalism, an ideology based on women’s liberation, radical direct democracy, multi-culturalism, pluralism, and ecology[11]. These forces would later form and train what Gen. Votel described “as the most effective force on the ground in Syria against ISIS.[12]” The Kurds in Syria became named by their US-led IC partners as the SDF, their civilian equivalent became know as the Autonomous Administration of Northern and East Syria (AANES). The AANES with the protection of the SDF have managed to set up a system of government that offers an alternative to all that which has passed in the region historically and a far cry from the “democracy in a box” that the Bush era and strives to implement the ideals of the social contract and democratic confederalism, which has many parallels with the ideals of humanity in international human law and the Geneva conventions.

The IRGC and Quds Force, via Iran have committed fully to the success of their local partner force. Having a powerful, capable, combat proven both in wars with Israel and continuing operations in Syria that involve advanced coordination with Russian regular and SOF, for both target acquisitions (TA), close air support, among many other tactical and strategic skills that will benefit Hezbollah’s military capabilities and compatibility with Iran has had massive benefits for Iran[13]. However, to achieve this status, Hezbollah engaged in numerous operations that deliberately targeted both combatants and non-combatants.

However, the SDF has established a social contract with its the civilian counterpart the AANES and has taken every measure to respect the Geneva conventions and claims from Amnesty International[14]. The SDF although technically considered a militia, immediately enforced a mandate that all combatants wear clearly marked uniforms and treat prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention and continues to address complaints against it despite being in under constant threat from ISIS, Turkey, and the Assad Regime. Amnesty International criticized the liberation of Raqqa for the strategy of former Secretary of Defense James Mattis “a war of annihilation against IS”[15]. This author participated in the campaign to liberate Raqqa and can confirm that while there may have been excessive use of airstrikes, our forces took every effort in my experience to treat ISIS prisoners within the parameters of the Geneva Conventions. Mattis addressed criticism of the campaign with a statement acknowledging the errors and death of noncombatants and assumed responsibility with his “we are the good guy and the innocent people on the battlefield know the difference” June 30, 2018 press release[16].

In short, it is possible for a surrogate force find an ethical solution to the question of responsibility. In the case of the SDF, both the SDF and the US-led IC, accepted responsibility for any ethical errors that both the surrogate force and the sponsor State force may have made. The intent of the SDF was to demonstrate responsibility ?through words and actions as a surrogate force that aimed to follow the Geneva Conventions and address all complaints issued by legitimate human rights organizations. The objective of the US-led SDF and AANES is to foster the development of an organically grown, preexisting system of direct democracy.

Hezbollah and the IRGQ/QUDS Force have made no efforts to address the countless reports and claims against them and have in fact encouraged ultra-violence against combatants and non-combatants who stand in opposition to them or who are their primary targets i.e. Israel and the US. The responsibility for the actions of both the surrogate force and the sponsor is determined by intent, words, and actions.

To conclude, the US-led IC’s support of the SDF remains one of the few modern case studies where the responsibility has been spread across the surrogate and the sponsor and where the intent is to create a humanitarian situation that earnestly strives improves the condition of the people, with the consent of the people and respect the code of military laws and ethics. The use of surrogate forces will continue as UW strategies become more attractive in a multipolar global struggle ethicists will need to the discussion of jus ad bellum issues becomes something of a checklist of the problems surrogate warfare raises for issues such as just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, proportionality, last resort, and reasonable prospects of success”.[17] As this shifts with the almost non-linear generations of warfare “crucially, what is lacking is a sense that there is a two-way street, with the revolution Krieg and Rickli see in the complementary neotrinitarian and technological transformations of surrogate war producing an innovation in ethical thinking about war and peace.”[18]

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[1] Baker, Deane-Peter. 2016. “SOF and Surrogates: Rethinking the Ethical-Strategic Challenge of ‘Through, With, and By.’” The Strategy Bridge. October 21, 2016. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/10/21/sof-and-surrogates-rethinking-the-ethical-strategic-challenge-of-through-with-and-by.

[2] Ibid., para. 3

[3] Williams, John, Jean-Marc Rickli, and Andreas Kreig. 2020. “Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century.” Ethics & International Affairs. October 1, 2020. https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2020/surrogate-warfare-the-transformation-of-war-in-the-twenty-first-century/.

[4] Azizi, Arash. 2020. The Shadow Commnder: Soleiman, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions. Tantor Media Inc.

[5] Blanford, Nicholas. 2011. Warriors of God : Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel. New York: Random House.

[6] Kilcullen, David. (2013) 2015. Out of the Mountains : The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[7] Norton, Augustus R. (2007) 2018. Hezbollah : A Short History. USA: Princeton Princeton University Press.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Roth, Kenneth. 2007. “Civilians under Assault | Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War.” Human Rights Watch. August 29, 2007. https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/08/28/civilians-under-assault/hezbollahs-rocket-attacks-israel-2006-war.

[10] Blanford, Nicholas. 2011. Warriors of God : Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel. New York: Random House.

[11] Abdullah Ocalan. 2013. Democratic Confederalism. Cologne: International Initiative Ed.

[12] Schmitt, Eric, and Rod Nordland. 2018. “Amid Turkish Assault, Kurdish Forces Are Drawn Away from U.S. Fight with ISIS.” The New York Times, February 28, 2018, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/middleeast/syrian-kurds-isis-american-offensive.html.

[13] Levitt, Matthew. 2021. “Hezbollah’s Regional Activities in Support of Iran’s Proxy Networks.” Middle East Institute. July 26, 2021. https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks.

[14] SDF Press Office. 2018. “A Response Statement to Amnesty International’s Accusations against Syria Democratic Forces (SDF).” SDF-Press.com. March 4, 2018. https://sdf-press.com/en/2018/03/a-response-statement-to-amnesty-internationals-accusations-against-syria-democratic-forces-sdf/.

[15] Amnesty International. 2018. “Nowhere to Run.” Raqqa-Syria.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 2018. https://raqqa-syria.amnesty.org/.

[16] Ibid., para. 26

[17] Ibid., para. 4

[18] Ibid., para. 4