HEW: Overinflated Case for Cuts
The BoE, ECB and Fed have likely finished hiking despite unsustainably high wage increases helping economies resist recessions. The resulting second-round effects are particularly problematic in the UK, where we still expect them to support the persistence of above-target inflation. That delays rate cuts into the distance, even if they are the next move, while elevated neutral rates discourage policy cuts (see HEM: Stay Tight for Long Haul).
The BoE had supported its assessment of cyclical inflationary pressures by raising its NAIRU estimate, but it still sees that contribution and effective inflation expectations easing. We believe stickier expectations are supporting wages, which would better fit the gloomier recruitment surveys and stability in structural determinants of unemployment. Excessive wage settlements may prove surprisingly resilient, encouraging the BoE to stay on hold longer than it currently envisages. We see the first BoE cut in 2025 (see UK Pain More Persistent Than BoE Thinks).
On the political front, Alastair Newton looked to Taiwan’s 13 January 2024 elections, where history, popular sentiment, and opinion polls suggest that the outcome will not be as consequential to cross-strait relations as some believe. For a real game-changer, look instead to the possible result of the 2024 US presidential election (see Taiwan Elections: Plus ?a change…).
The Reserve Bank of Australia raised the policy rate by 25 basis points to 4.35%, a move anticipated by the economic consensus, to address persistent inflation, particularly in the services sector, and ensure a timely return to the 2-3% target range. Future rate decisions will hinge on data and risk assessments, particularly concerning global economic conditions, domestic demand, persistent service price inflation, and the tight labour market's implications on wages and pricing. The RBA maintains its determination to control inflation, balancing the need for further tightening against the backdrop of below-trend growth and the potential rise in unemployment while navigating significant domestic and global uncertainties.
Banco de México maintained the overnight interbank interest rate at 11.25%, in line with the economic consensus, responding to the ongoing high levels of headline and core inflation, which continue to decrease gradually. The decision reflects a balance between Mexico's robust economic growth and labour market strength versus global economic uncertainties, including the volatility in financial markets and sovereign interest rate movements. Future interest rate decisions will hinge on a range of factors, including the persistence of core inflation, foreign exchange fluctuations, global economic trends, and the effectiveness of current monetary policy in steering inflation towards the 3% target within the projected timeline.
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru reduced its reference rate to 7.00%, in line with the consensus, driven by a significant decrease in both month-on-month and year-on-year inflation rates, signalling easing inflationary pressures. Future interest rate decisions will be influenced by the trajectory of inflation and its determinants, with current trends indicating a continued downward movement towards the target range, moderated by external and climatic risks. The Board remains vigilant, ready to adjust monetary policy in response to new economic data and global economic conditions, emphasising its commitment to maintaining inflation within the targeted range.
Only Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas is set to announce an interest rate decision next week. However, the thunder of its 16 November outcome was arguably stolen by a surprise rate hike on 26 October, outside the regular policy schedule (see here).
The inflation release calendar is much more interesting, with Wednesday’s UK data a highlight for us, plus Friday’s final EA print. We agree with the consensus on both outcomes, with the UK CPI and RPI slowing to 4.8% and 6.2%, respectively. The CPI’s fall would be a whopping 190bp, but the bulk of that is a readily predictable base effect from housing energy, and food prices.
Figure 1: Contributions to m-o-m UK CPI inflation
A potential wildcard here is the seasonality of recent surprises. The two latest surprises matched the equivalently timed misses last year, so the 0.4pp surprise in Oct-22 UK CPI inflation looms ominously. Moreover, the 0.3pp upside in Oct-21 and 0.2pp in Oct-20 only add to that worrying post-pandemic seasonal tendency to shock (see UK: Hawkish Service Resumes). We don’t see a solid fundamental justification to expect a repeat, not least because energy prices may have caused some of those previous surprises and the latest performance is much lower.
The EA’s flash estimate for Oct-23 delivered another substantial downside surprise to the consensus, albeit within 0.1pp of our forecast again (see EA: Doves Near Inflation’s Trough). Significant national revisions would be necessary to shift that outcome because the EA is not close to the rounding point (2.908 to 3dp). Of the big-4, only Germany has printed a final update so far, and that was unrevised. Overall, we don’t currently see a case to expect a revision this month. That could change after Wednesday’s releases for France and Italy (Spain is on Tuesday), but we don’t expect that to be the case. The economic consensus shares this bland assessment.