Here is a laugh on Brexit if you can smile at 30 suicides and thousands of bankruptcies!

"The Council of Lloyd’s and the Franchise Board have carefully considered the question of British EU membership in the context of the interests of the Lloyd’s market. We have unanimously concluded that the best outcome is for the UK to remain a member of the EU..."

... A message from Lloyd's Chairman (Fri 26 Feb 2016) to the market on the Brexit referendum.

Lloyd's announced a profit of ï¿¡3.2bn for 2013 and has a return on capital of 16%. 

Cast your eyes back to their legacy:

 LONDON, April 26 1979 headlines were:  "Many Lloyd's Investors Facing Loss of Fortunes"

Saturday 19 February 1994 - "Lloyd's losses 'led to 30 deaths': Financial ruin is blamed for suicide and illness of underwriting members"

"AT LEAST 12 members of Lloyd's of London, including four foreigners, have killed themselves because of massive losses, according to campaigners mounting a legal fight against the insurance market.

Lloyd's Names Association, which co-ordinates the legal operations of more than 30 underwriters' action groups, said yesterday that fatalities rose to 30 when taking into account members who died prematurely from the pressures of being financially ruined.  Christopher Stockwell, chairman of Lloyd's Names Association, said that the pressures on heavy losers were often intolerable.

'Most of the suicides have been by shooting, hanging or carbon- monoxide poisoning using a car exhaust,' he said. 'But we don't know the hidden toll of those who have died early from strokes or heart attacks brought on by the stress of being financially ruined. ''Lloyd's says it tries not to make people bankrupt and it has a hardship fund people can apply to. But that means it takes control of all your financial affairs and there are those who still believe they will be bankrupted - some already have been.

'Of the thousands of people who have been ruined, the elderly in particular see a lifetime of work going down the drain and a future too short to start again. It can be all too much for some people.'  https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/lloyds-losses-led-to-30-deaths-financial-ruin-is-blamed-for-suicide-and-illness-of-underwriting-1394997.html 

Many names -- who reaped regular profits from their association with Lloyd's over the years -- clearly were no longer laughing. Thousands sued Lloyd's and the underwriting syndicates, charging mismanagement, and in some cases fraud. Many names,  asserted that they were recruited by Lloyd's without being informed of the huge potential liabilities they could face from asbestos-related cases in the United States, leading to billions of dollars of insurance payouts. Lloyd's fought the allegations with impunity - protected by English Law.

Recent research shows a very high level of awareness of the Lloyd's brand globally, with the world’s oldest insurance market the second most spontaneously mentioned brand of insurers and reinsurers after AIG. Those polled said they would consider Lloyd's first or equally to other carriers. Among the reasons for selecting Lloyd's were its capacity and range of cover and ability to take on 'hard’ and specialised risks. 

Butch Cassidy: Who are those guys?

Few members of the public appreciate the history of the Brand at all - so here is a brief summary of the facts. Before giving any credence to this organization - review their background - Google "Lloyd's names"

THE BACKGROUND FACTS: For many of Britain's wealthy, some of whom had land holdings that had been in their families for five hundred years, Lloyd's was an ideal investment. By investing in Lloyd's, income could be produced from land holdings, without selling any land. If there were no claims early on in the life of the insurance policy, reserves could be built up, so any claim on the policy would not force a sale of assets.

The British Inland Revenue even gave special tax treatment to the capital kept on reserve. In 1982, Lloyd's persuaded Parliament to pass a Private Act, the Lloyd's Act of 1982, granting Lloyd's immunity from most lawsuits (much like government agencies have). The Lloyd's Act of 1982 also gave the Council of Lloyd's the power to unilaterally and even retroactively change Lloyd's by-laws, which formerly could only be done by majority vote of the Names at a General Meeting. The extent and implications of Lloyd's (effectively complete) legal immunity, and the Council's by-law-changing powers were kept secret from the Names for another nine years, until 1991 (the year that losses for the 1988 year of account first became public knowledge). In late 1986, for the upcoming 1987 year of account, Lloyd's required all Names to sign a new General Undertaking, that included "choice of forum" and "choice of law" clauses in which the Names unwittingly agreed that any legal disputes with Lloyd's would be brought in English courts under English law. Lloyd's explained the new Undertaking as a procedural technicality, and did not tell the Names that Lloyd's was by fiat of Parliament effectively immune from suit in England.

For nearly three hundred years, Lloyd's of London insurance policies were backed by wealthy British investors, who came to be known as "Names" because, in the early days, their signatures were written on the face of each Lloyd's policy. The Names participated in one-year venture syndicates, to insure risks, chiefly in maritime insurance. Each Name pledged his entire personal wealth to back up his share in the syndicate's policies. The syndicates accepted business for one year, then allowed two more years for claims to come in and be settled. Each syndicate closed its "year of account" and wound up its affairs after the end of the third year. The Names received their share of the profits, or paid their share of the losses, and their liability ended. If, however, all claims could not be settled by the end of the third year, the syndicate had to remain "open" and the profits or losses could not be shared among the Names until all claims were finally settled. This system was efficient and profitable in maritime business; the outcome of any given voyage was almost always known within the year of account, and settled within three.

For over two hundred years Lloyd's had returned a handsome profit to its investors, who underwrite the insurance policies issued by the Lloyd's insurance market. The beauty of investing with Lloyds is that the investor still has use of the money placed on deposit to back an insurance policy. For example, if a policy is backed by a portfolio of stocks and bonds, the investor retains ownership and collects any interest and dividends. Only if there is a claim against the policy that cannot be covered by reserves, might the investor have to sell assets to pay the claim. This allows the Lloyd's investor to leverage their investments, although at some risk.

In order to carve out a share of the U.S. insurance market while a "buy-American" attitude prevailed in the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's, syndicates at Lloyd's issued many broadly worded policies, without monetary limits, insuring and reinsuring risks in the United States. The loose language of these policies gave Lloyd's a temporary competitive advantage over many U.S, carriers; however, these overly generous policies eventually came back to haunt them. By the 1960's and 1970's it was clear to a handful of the highly placed working Names that claims due to asbestosis, pollution and other health hazards (so-called "APH" losses) were ripening into lawsuits in which unanticipated large damages were being awarded by American courts. American companies turned to their insurers, and their insurers turned to their reinsurers, who in very many cases were syndicates at Lloyd's.

In the 1970s and 1980, Lloyds greatly expanded its membership to increase its available capital pool. Well to do professionals were recruited, some of whom pledged their houses to back the letter of credit required by Lloyd's. No longer was there a social compact between Lloyd's and its names, who were not part of the "old boy" network. At the same time, the insurance industry entered an era where risk became much more difficult to estimate and where some risks could truly incur "unlimited liability". The new investors were attracted to Lloyd's by its prestige. The "Names agents" that recruited Names from among British, Canadian and American professionals seduced them. The prospective Names where wined and dined, while the Names agents played up Lloyds reputation as a safe, lucrative, investment.  There were about 6,000 Names in 1970. In 1990, although nearly 31,000 new Names had been recruited, the total number had only risen to about 33,000. Two thirds (over four thousand) of the "old" Names had quietly got out of harm's way. Syndicates continued to under-reserve and/or inadequately reinsure for incurred but not reported losses, thus hiding the coming losses and maintaining an illusion of profitability.

Many of the Lloyd's syndicates underwrote reinsurance policies that insured massive, virtually open ended, asbestos and pollution liability. The companies that these policies insured acted in nothing less than a criminal fashion, which cost the lives of thousands of workers in the asbestos industry. Since the American juries that tried these civil cases could not put the executives of companies like Johns-Manville in jail, they levied huge judgements against them. Part of these judgements ended up being covered by Lloyd's syndicates, although the Names who underwrote the reinsurance policies knew nothing of the liability they were shouldering when they invested with Lloyds. These asbestos and pollution liabilities are referred to as "long-tail" liabilities, since liability lasts for many years.

Everyone who invested money with Lloyd's was told that they were not merely a passive investor, but an insurance underwriter and the "unlimited liability" of Lloyds placed all of their assets at risk. Why did people who were not looking for risky investments, invest under these conditions, which financially ruined many of them. Since many who invested with Lloyd's were experienced business people, some of whom were from the insurance industry, ignorance cannot be the explanation.

Since 1991, thousands of Names have been bankrupted, and more than 30 have committed suicide. Lloyd's has continued to make cash calls, and English courts have continued to issue rulings in Lloyd's favor, making it easier for Lloyd's to collect more and more money from the remaining Names and/or their estates. English Justices, even at the appeals level, have acknowledged on the record that there was ongoing fraud at Lloyd's, but they nonetheless have thus far decided every case and every point of law in Lloyd's favor. The U.K. courts have even gone so far as to rule that Names cannot use fraudulent non-disclosure and/or fraudulent misrepresentation as a defense or counter-claim to offset Lloyd's collection efforts.

Ian Hay Davison, appointed by the Bank of England to clean up Lloyd's, acted as the first non-insider chief executive officer of Lloyd's from 1983 to 1985. During his tenure, Davison took prima facie evidence of fraud at Lloyd's to the England's Serious Fraud Office. Then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made it British government policy not to prosecute any executives at Lloyd's, and the Serious Fraud Office therefore refused to bring charges against anyone involved. In the late 1980's, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission began an investigation into Lloyd's fraudulent recruitment of U.S. investors. Thatcher's successor John Major came to the U.S. in 1992 to meet with George Bush. After their meeting, the active SEC investigation was quietly dropped.

American investors, known as "Names," have found themselves defendants in an English court because American courts have closed their doors to them. Starting in 1992, seven United States Courts of Appeal have ruled that the investors' claims that they were defrauded by Lloyd's must be heard in English courts under English law. The U.S. Courts ruled that clauses in the investors' Lloyd's subscription documents from 1987 onward required this, notwithstanding that the investors were not told:

1. before they signed the documents that Lloyd's is exempt from securities regulation and immune from most lawsuits under English law;
2. it is U.S. law that U.S. citizens investing in securities cannot waive their right to protection under the Securities Acts passed by Congress in 1933 and 1934; and
3. no similar or adequate remedies exist under English law to address the damages U.S. Names would eventually suffer.

How much credibility should the Market give to anything Lloyds says about anything? 

 As Lloyds have done their research and favour Britain remaining - based on the fraud and track record of the organization which way would you prefer to vote on BREXIT?