On Hegel's 'Science of Logic' : A Realm of Shadows - part twenty eight.

'The?pity?of?the?things?around?me'

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by Fran?ois Coppée, (1842 — 1908)

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Pain sharpens the senses,

– Alas! my darling is gone! –

and in Nature I sense

a secret sympathy.

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I am aware that the quarrelsome nests

restrain themselves from respect for me,

that I make the flowers feel sorry for me

and that the stars mourn for me.

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The whitethroat seems truly ashamed

of her joyful song,

the lily knows the harm it does me

and the star takes note of it too.

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In them I hear, breathe and see

the absent beloved, and I regret losing

her eyes, her breath and her voice

that are stars, lily and whitethroat.

'Pitié des choses'

La douleur aiguise les sens;

- Hélas! ma mignonne est partie! -

Et dans la nature je sens

Une secrète sympathie.

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Je sens que les nids querelleurs

Par égard pour moi se contraignent,

Que je fais de la peine aux fleurs

Et que les étoiles me plaignent.

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La fauvette semble en effet

De son chant joyeux avoir honte,

Le lys sait le mal qu'il me fait,

Et l'étoile aussi s'en rend compte.

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En eux j'entends, respire et vois

La chère absente, et je regrette

Ses yeux, son haleine et sa voix,

Qui sont astres, lys et fauvette.

Condition. The Relatively Unconditioned. Complete Ground contained both the true and the externally imposed relationship. Hence, Complete Ground was the unity of the essential and the inessential. It leads directly to Hegel's theory of the Thing. A Thing, for Hegel, is a negative unity that really is, through the concatenation of all its appearances - here called Conditions. This Thing is 'the thing before the development of the properties and features that, so to speak, define the thing in question or that constitute its essence. It is the state where these properties and features exist potentially but not yet actually. It is the internal structure that grounds the properties and features of the particular thing', explains Justus Hartnack,?(1912 - 2005). Hegel would not, however, say that the properties of a thing constitute its essence. Rather, essence is simply not the being - not the properties - of the thing.

The German verb to condition (bedingen) is interesting, in English I suppose we would have to make up a word, to bethingify. And that is precisely what happens at this stage of the Logic as Conditions bring forth the Thing yet the Thing equally brings forth its Conditions. The Thing is a chiasmic exchange of properties between internal Thing and external Conditions as Burbidge unhelpfully puts it.. John Burbidge describes the transition from Complete Ground to Condition thus:

'Earlier we drew a distinction between a formal ground, with the same content in both ground and grounded, and a real ground, with a difference in content. The latter requires a middle term to introduce what is novel. When the logic explores this relationship in detail, the middle term becomes as much a ground of what ultimately emerges as the original real ground. On their own, neither of them can ground; only in combination do they do so. Then, they are no longer grounds, but conditions'.

- 'Real Process'

What Burbidge is impling is that the middle term of Complete Ground is the sophistic external reflection that can ground a Form of a thing in its Essence. External reflection is where the outward Forms reside. External reflection is the Conditions that make up the thing yet external reflection cannot ground the thing alone, it requires an outside thing just as much as the thing requires the external reflection in which the Conditions are reflected and the Conditions constitute and therefore are distinguishable from the Thing but somewhat paradoxically they are themselves equally things and in virtue of this a bad infinity arises. With each Condition a fresh condition is asked for and hence the usual infinite progress from condition to condition is introduced.

'The two sides of the whole, condition and ground, are therefore one essential unity, as content as well as form. They pass into one another, or, since they are reflections, they posit themselves as sublated, refer themselves to this their negation, and reciprocally presuppose each other. But this is at the same time only one reflection of the two, and their presupposing is, therefore, one presupposing only; the reciprocity of this presupposing ultimately amounts to this, that they both presuppose one identity for their subsistence and their substrate. This substrate, the one content and unity of form of both, is the truly unconditioned; the fact in itself. – Condition is, as it was shown above, only the relatively unconditioned. It is usual, therefore, to consider it as itself something conditioned and to ask for a new condition, whereby the customary progression ad infinitum from condition to condition is set in motion. But now, why is it that at one condition a new condition is asked for, that is, why is that condition assumed to be something conditioned? Because it is some finite determinate existence or other. But this is a further determination of condition that does not enter into its concept. Condition is as such conditioned solely because it is the posited in-itselfness; it is, therefore, sublated in the absolutely unconditioned'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Why, Hegel asks, does a condition prompt us to ask for a fresh condition? Because it is some finite determinate being or other. That is to say, it cannot succeed as a complete determining; there must be some other Condition that makes it determinate. The Thing is no-Thing without its outward Conditions. Yet the Thing is resilient. The Thing remains a Thing even if it loses one or more of its indifferent Conditions. Or if it loses too many of its conditions, it undergoes qualitative change, and becomes a different thing from what it was. Quantitative and qualitative change are the theme of Hegel's theory of Measure.

Complete Ground was the statement, I'm not sure I'm Ground. This modest act of self-sublation had a double content. It was either Relative or Absolute Ground. But Relative Ground posited Absolute Ground by its nature. In Formal Content (Sufficient Ground), Relative Ground c withdrew into (and therefore posited and presupposed) Absolute Ground a. c was the moment of immediacy and relativity, and a, b is what it is related to. Ground therefore relates itself c to itself a, b as to a sublated moment, to an immediate by which it is itself mediated.

'Condition is therefore, first, an immediate, manifold existence. Second, it is this existence referred to an other, to something which is ground, not of this existence but in some other respect, for existence itself is immediate and without ground. According to this reference, it is something posited; as condition, the immediate existence is supposed to be not for itself but for another. But this, that it thus is for another, is at the same time itself only a positedness; that it is posited is sublated in its immediacy: an existence is indifferent to being a condition. Third, condition is something immediate in the sense that it constitutes the presupposition of ground. In this determination, it is the form-connection of ground withdrawn into self-identity, hence the content of ground. But content is as such only the indifferent unity of ground, as in the form: without form, no content. It nevertheless frees itself from this indifferent unity in that the ground connection, in the complete ground, becomes a connection external to its identity, whereby content acquires immediacy. In so far, therefore, as condition is that in which the ground-connection has its identity with itself, it constitutes the content of ground; but since this content is indifferent to form, it is only implicitly the content of form, is something which has yet to become content and hence constitutes the material for the ground. Posited as condition, and in accordance with the second moment, existence is determined to lose its indifferent immediacy and to become the moment of another. By virtue of its immediacy, it is indifferent to this connection; inasmuch as it enters into it, however, it constitutes the in-itself of the ground and is for it the unconditioned. In order to be condition, it has its presupposition in the ground and is itself conditioned; but this condition is external to it'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

This mediation is no external reflection. It is the native act of the ground itself. The ground-relation (by which Hegel means the pre-Thing) is therefore self-external reflection:

'Real ground shows itself to be the self-external reflection of ground; its complete mediation is the restoration of its identity with itself. But because this identity has in the process equally acquired the externality of real ground, the formal ground-connection in this unity of itself and real ground is just as much self-positing as self-sublating ground; the ground connection mediates itself with itself through its negation. The ground is at first, as the original connection, the connection of immediate content determinations. The ground-connection, being essential form, has for sides such that are sublated or are as moments. Consequently, as the form of immediate determinations, it connects itself with itself as self-identical while at the same time connecting with their negation; accordingly, it is ground not in and for itself but as connected with the sublated ground-connection. – Second, the sublated connection or the immediate, which in the original and in the posited connection is the identical substrate, is likewise real ground not in and for itself; that it is ground is rather posited by virtue of that original link'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

In Complete Ground, the relation between Relative d, f and Absolute Ground d,e contains a moment of immediacy g separate and apart from what it mediates - d, e, f. The Understanding sees this and names it Condition, which stands over against Ground. Conditions, on the one hand, posit that they are not the thing; the other (Ground) is the thing. This accords with Burbidge's suggestion that the Conditions are external reflection itself.

Conditions are therefore distinguishable from the thing. Hegel calls this the Relatively Unconditioned.

Condition, Hegel says, is an immediate manifold something. To the extent it is immediate, it is without a Ground. This immediacy is contradictory. It ought to be, as condition, not for itself, but for something else. But this other is not Ground to the Condition alone but is Ground in some other respect. By this last turn of phrase, Hegel hints that a thing - as negative unity of its conditions - is not Ground to one Condition but to many. The many conditions are the other respect to which Hegel refers. Though immediate, Condition a nevertheless presupposes and posits Ground. When Condition is for other, it is for itself, since the very job of Condition is to be for the Ground. In other words, Condition is by its nature for other, but if we isolate it, Condition is not for other. Its propensity to sublate itself is itself sublated, when Condition is isolated as an immediacy. A something is indifferent to its being a condition.

'Sfera con Sfera', 1986, Arnaldo Pomodoro, 'Pomodoro sphere', in front of The Berkeley Library, Trinity College Dublin

Andrzej Panufnik: Symphony No. 5 'Sinfonia di Sphere', (1974-75):

'Condition on its own is not a condition at all, but only one existing among many. There is nothing inherent that points to any particular combination of conditions within a grounding relation. The synthesis that transforms it from a being to a condition has to be introduced from the outside', explains Burbidge.

The Relatively Unconditioned

Condition, then, has withdrawn into identity with itself and is consequently the Content of the Ground. We know is because Content is the withdrawal of Form to a place outside it-self. So Condition is not the mere indifferent unity that Matter was in Form v Content. Rather, it inherently refers to its Ground {i.e., to the Thing). By now Condition is more advanced than Form.

Unlike Form, Condition has a selfsubsistence. The externality introduced in Real and Complete Ground implies that Condition (i.e., appearance of the Thing) has self-identity and independence from the essential thing. In short, Condition is itself a thing - i.e., Ground. As such, Condition is only implicitly the content of the thing. Condition constitutes material for the ground. (b) The Absolutely Unconditioned Condition ought to be for another. That is what Condition is in and for itself. But Condition, like a bad soldier, is in part indifferent to this relation. As such, it is the Absolutely Unconditioned. In the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' unconditioned absolute universality is the moment at which mere perception gives way to the Understanding, which sees past the appearance of objects and into the laws by which the objects function.

'Thus the object in its pure determinatenesses, or in the determinatenesses which were supposed to constitute its essential being, is overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being. From a sensuous being it turned into a universal; but this universal, since it originates in the sensuous, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is not truly a self-identical universality at all, but one afflicted with an opposition; for this reason the universality splits into the extremes of singular individuality and universality, into the One of the properties, and the Also of the 'free matters'. These pure determinatenesses seem to express the essential nature itself, but they are only a being-for-self that is burdened with a being-for-another. Since, however, both are essentially in a single unity, what we now have is unconditioned absolute universality, and consciousness here for the first time truly enters the realm of the Understanding'.

- 'Phenomenology of Spirit'

Dialectical Reason sees that a thing is not what it is because of its Conditions. Condition is not the Ground of a Thing. Condition is the moment of unconditioned immediacy for the ground.

'Something is not through its condition; its condition is not its ground. Condition is for the ground the moment of unconditioned immediacy, but is not itself the movement and the positing that refers itself to itself negatively and that makes itself into a positedness. Over against condition there stands, therefore, the ground-connection. Something has, besides its condition, also a ground. – This ground is the empty movement of reflection, for the latter has the immediacy which is its presupposition outside it. But it is the whole form and the self-subsistent process of mediation, for the condition is not its ground. Since this mediating refers itself to itself as positing, it equally is according to this side something immediate and unconditioned; it does indeed presuppose itself, but as an externalized or sublated positing; whatever it is in accordance with its determination, that it is, on the contrary, in and for itself. – Inasmuch as the ground connection is thus a self-subsisting self-reference and has within it the identity of reflection, it has a content which is peculiarly its own as against the content of the condition. The one content is that of the ground and is therefore essentially informed; the other content, that of the condition, is on the contrary only an immediate material whose connecting reference to the ground, while at the same time constituting the in-itself of the latter, is also equally external to it; it is thus a mingling of a self-subsisting content that has no reference to the content of the ground determination and of the content that enters into the latter and, as its material, should become a moment of it'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

As c, Condition is diverse from the Thing - the Relatively Unconditioned [unbedingt]. Notice that Condition, as Absolutely Unconditioned, is now the Form that endures - on the side of Being.

The Absolutely Unconditioned

Remembering that Conditions are themselves Things, there is now an independence of the Thing from its conditions, Something has, apart from its condition, also a ground. When Conditions are seen as separate from the Thing, the Thing can only be externally related to the Conditions. The Thing is accordingly an externally combined unity of Conditions. The Thing displays "the empty movement of reflection, because reflection has the immediacy that is its presupposition, outside it. In other words, the Thing (or, more precisely, pre-Thing) is a combination of its Conditions, and, as such, is a negative, external combination. Yet the Thing has an essential integrity separate and apart from its Conditions, which is now brought to the fore. As a negative unity, it is self-subsistent. This negativity mediates all the Conditions that make up the Thing. When this negativity is isolated from the Conditions, and when its positing/presupposing activity is suppressed or sublated, it is the Absolutely Unconditioned.

To the extent a Thing is a self-subsistent relation-to-self c, it has a content peculiar to itself, compared to the content of its Conditions. The Thing announced, I am not the Conditions. Rather, I am essentially formed. The Conditions are only the immediate material of the Thing. The relation of the material a is supposedly external to Ground/Absolutely Unconditioned c. Yet, in spite of this conceit, the Conditions are really the in-itself b of Ground. A Condition is a mixture of self-subsistent content with no relation to the Thing and, as its material, is meant to become a moment of it.

The two sides of the whole are Condition and the Relatively Unconditioned. At one moment the two sides are indifferent, unconditioned, and externally conjoined. But the two sides are also mediated. Condition b is the in-itself of Relatively Unconditioned c. But, for now, this is sublated. This in-itself is only a positedness - inessential to the moment portrayed in c of The Absolutely Unconditioned. The immediate determinate being c is indifferent to the fact that it is Condition b.

'The two sides of the whole, condition and ground, are thus, on the one hand, indifferent and unconditioned with respect to each other: the one as the non-referred-to side, to which the connecting reference in which it is the condition is external; the other as the connecting reference, or form, for which the determinate existence of the condition is only a material, something passive whose form, such as it possesses on its own account, is unessential. On the other hand, the two sides are also mediated. Condition is the in-itself of the ground; so much is it the essential moment of the ground-connection, that it is the simple self-identity of the ground. But this also is sublated; this in-itself is only something posited; immediate existence is indifferent to being a condition. The fact, therefore, that condition is the in-itself of the ground constitutes the side of it by which it is a mediated condition. Likewise, the ground-connection has in its self-subsistence also a presupposition; it has its in-itself outside itself. – Consequently, each of the two sides is this contradiction, that they are indifferent immediacy and essential mediation, both in one reference – or the contradiction of independent subsistence and of being determined as only moments'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

In The Absolutely Unconditioned, each of the two sides was Absolutely Unconditioned. That is, each side announced that it is not Condition. Though denying it, each side reflected itself into the other. There are now two Things before us. There is the Thing that is the negative unity of all its Conditions c. This is now unconditioned and immediate. In contrast, there are the Conditions of the Thing, each one of which is a Thing that is immediate and distinguishable from the Thing itself.

Fact

These moments of immediacy and independence are what Hegel calls the truly unconditioned, the fact in its own self. Fact {Sache) is sometimes translated as the Heart of the Matter - the true Thing. Fact has two moments: (a) positedness and (b) the in-itself. According to its posited side, Fact is material, a moment of the ground. The posited side represents Condition d, e, f. The in-itself g represents Ground, its simple reflection into itself. In the Absolutely Unconditioned g, the extremes of Fact are external. Ground-relation is therefore sublated; the Thing exists as an immediacy g.

From the perspective of g, Fact has seemingly adopted the primitive position of Being, and so Hegel drops back to compare Determinate Being to Fact. The function of Determinate Being was only this: to sublate itself in its immediacy and fall to the ground. In making itself negative and hence correlative, Being became a positedness - an identity which, through negation of itself, is the immediate. The forms of positedness and self-identity, which Essence has borne all along, were therefore implicit in Determinate Being. Indeed, this structure of othering (I am not that) and simultaneous self-identity is Reflection itself. Hence, Hegel concludes, Being is what it is through negation of itself. It only is - it only fulfils its destiny - through Ground. And Ground has shown itself to be self-erasure tout court.

Because of this history, one can't say that Condition is just mutual indifference and external combination into the Thing. These features of Determinate Being have been sublated. Condition is therefore posited as that which it essentially is, namely, as moment, hence as moment of another.

'Condition is at first immediate existence; its form has these two moments: that of positedness, according to which it is, as condition, material and moment of the ground; and that of the in-itself, according to which it constitutes the essentiality of ground or its simple reflection into itself. Both sides of the form are external to immediate existence, for the latter is the sublated ground-connection. – But, first, existence is in it only this: to sublate itself in its immediacy and to founder, going to the ground. Being is as such only the becoming of essence; it is its essential nature to make itself into a positedness and into an identity which is an immediacy through the negation of itself. The form determinations of positedness and of self-identical in-itself, the form through which immediate existence is condition, are not, therefore, external to that existence; the latter is, rather, this very reflection. Second, as condition, being is now posited as that which it essentially is, namely as a moment and consequently as the being of an other, and at the same time as the in-itself of an other; it is in itself but only through the negation of itself, namely through the ground and through its self-sublating and consequent presupposing reflection; the in-itself of being is thus only something posited. This in-itself of the condition has two sides: one side is its essentiality as essentiality of the ground, while the other is the immediacy of its existence. Or rather, both sides are the same thing. Existence is an immediate, but immediacy is essentially something mediated, namely through the self-sublating ground. Existence, as this immediacy mediated by a self-sublating mediating, is at the same time the in-itself of the ground and its unconditioned side; but again, this in-itself is at the same time itself equally only moment or positedness, since it is mediated. – Condition is, therefore, the whole form of the ground connection; it is the presupposed in-itself of the latter, but, consequently, is itself a positedness and its immediacy is this, to make itself into a positedness and thereby to repel itself from itself, in such as way that it both founders to the ground and is ground, the ground that makes itself into a positedness and thereby into a grounded, and both are one and the same'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Heretofore Hegel has not emphasized that momentness is always correlative. It should be apparent, however, that, if we say any given stage of the Logic is a moment, then we are obviously implying that there are other moments as well.

Condition is the whole form of the Thing. Without Condition, the Thing is no-Thing. Outward Condition is the presupposed in-itself of the Thing. Yet Condition is by definition not the Thing. Condition must therefore repel itself from itself, in such a manner that it both falls to the ground and is ground. In this pun, according to Charles Taylor, (1931 - ), 'Hegel refers both to the demise of all finite things, and their necessary reference to an underlying ground, a necessity which deploys them'.

The Ground of the Thing makes itself into a positedness and is also a Grounded - all at the same time. What is present is the one whole of form, but equally only one whole of content.

'What we have here, therefore, is only one whole of form, but equally so only one whole of content. For the proper content of condition is essential content only in so far as it is the self-identity of reflection in the form, or the ground-connection is in it this immediate existence. Further, this existence is condition only through the presupposing reflection of the ground; it is the ground’s self-identity, or its content, to which the ground posits itself as opposite. Therefore, the existence is not a merely formless material for the ground-connection; on the contrary, because it has this form in it, it is informed matter, and because in its identity with it it is at the same time indifferent to it, it is content. Finally, it is the same content as that possessed by the ground, for it is precisely content as that which is self-identical in the form connection'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

The Things that a Thing posits are its Conditions, which Hegel calls the immediate determinate being of the Thing. Yet Condition is obviously not mere Determinate Being. It is only condition through the presupposing reflection of the ground. Yet the Thing is equally indifferent to Condition, which signals that the Thing has Self-Subsistence, even if it were to lose a few of its posited Conditions.

'Vrouwe Fortuna?op het Muntplein te Amsterdam' (Lady Fortune on the Muntplein in Amsterdam'), Hildo Krop, (1884 - 1970)

To summarize, Fact has two sides - Condition and Ground. The two sides erase themselves and transport themselves into their other. Thus, the Conditions of a Thing are themselves Things. As such, they are reflections; they (1) posit themselves as sublated, (2) relate themselves to what they negate, and (3) reciprocally presuppose one another.

Reflection is the common content of both Condition and Ground; in this movement they are united. Each side of the Fact - Condition and Ground - is the fact in its own self.

'The two sides of the whole, condition and ground, are therefore one essential unity, as content as well as form. They pass into one another, or, since they are reflections, they posit themselves as sublated, refer themselves to this their negation, and reciprocally presuppose each other. But this is at the same time only one reflection of the two, and their presupposing is, therefore, one presupposing only; the reciprocity of this presupposing ultimately amounts to this, that they both presuppose one identity for their subsistence and their substrate. This substrate, the one content and unity of form of both, is the truly unconditioned; the fact in itself. – Condition is, as it was shown above, only the relatively unconditioned. It is usual, therefore, to consider it as itself something conditioned and to ask for a new condition, whereby the customary progression ad infinitum from condition to condition is set in motion. But now, why is it that at one condition a new condition is asked for, that is, why is that condition assumed to be something conditioned? Because it is some finite determinate existence or other. But this is a further determination of condition that does not enter into its concept. Condition is as such conditioned solely because it is the posited in-itselfness; it is, therefore, sublated in the absolutely unconditioned'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Yet these two sides presuppose the totality of the Absolutely Unconditioned. Fact - the Thing, as negative unity of all Conditions - seems to arise from its Condition and from its Ground. These two sides have shown that they share an identity. When this identity is brought to the fore, the relation of Condition and Ground has vanished. These are reduced to an Illusory Being. The Fact, in its movement of positing and presupposing, is the movement in which this Illusory Being sublates itself. It is the Fact's own act to condition itself - and to put forth a material existence d, e, f - and, simultaneously, to oppose itself g to its Conditions.

Emergence of the Fact [Sache] into Existence. In this final section of Reflection, Hegel introduces his concept of Existence. Existence is the state of a Thing over time. When all the conditions of a fact are present, it enters into Existence.

'When all the conditions of a fact are at hand, the fact steps into concrete existence. The fact is, before it exists concretely; it is, first, as essence or as unconditioned; second, it has immediate existence or is determined, and this in the twofold manner just considered, on the one hand in its conditions and on the other in its ground. In the former case, it has given itself the form of the external, groundless being, for as absolute reflection the fact is negative self-reference and makes itself into its presupposition. This presupposed unconditioned is, therefore, the groundless immediate whose being is just to be there, without grounds. If, therefore, all the conditions of the fact are at hand, that is, if the totality of the fact is posited as a groundless immediate, then this scattered manifold internally recollects itself. – The whole fact must be there, within its conditions, or all the conditions belong to its concrete existence; for the all of them constitutes the reflection of the fact. Or again, immediate existence, since it is condition, is determined by form; its determinations are therefore determinations of reflection and with the positing of one the rest also are essentially posited. – The recollecting of the conditions is at first the foundering to the ground of immediate existence and the coming to be of the ground. But the ground is thereby a posited ground, that is, to the extent that it is ground, to that extent it is sublated as ground and is immediate being. If, therefore, all the conditions of the fact are at hand, they sublate themselves as immediate existence and as presupposition, and the ground is equally sublated. The latter proves to be only a reflective shine that immediately disappears; this coming forth is thus the tautological movement of the fact to itself: its mediation through the conditions and through the ground is the disappearing of both of these. The coming forth into concrete existence is therefore so immediate, that it is mediated only by the disappearing of the mediation'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Fact is Ground that is identical with (yet different from) its Condition. As Ground, the Fact relates itself negatively to itself, makes itself into a positedness, that is, Ground announces that it is not Condition, thereby proving that it is Condition. Hence, Ground is a positedness, made up of Ground and Condition.

'The absolutely unconditioned is the absolute ground that is identical with its condition, the immediate fact as the truly essential. As ground, it refers negatively to itself and makes itself into a positedness; but this positedness is a reflection that is complete in both its sides and is in them the selfidentical form of connection, as has transpired from its concept. This positedness is therefore first the sublated ground, the fact as an immediacy void of reflection, the side of the conditions. This is the totality of the determinations of the fact, the fact itself, but the fact as thrown into the externality of being, the restored circle of being. In condition, essence lets go of the unity of its immanent reflection; but it lets it go as an immediacy that now carries the character of being a conditioning presupposition and of essentially constituting only one of its sides. – For this reason the conditions are the whole content of the fact, because they are the unconditioned in the form of formless being. But because of this form, they also have yet another shape besides the conditions of the content as this is in the fact as such. They appear as a manifold without unity, mingled with extra essential elements and other circumstances that do not belong to the circle of existence as constituting the conditions of this determinate fact. – For the absolute, unrestricted fact, the sphere of being itself is the condition. The ground, returning into itself, posits that sphere as the first immediacy to which it refers as to its unconditioned. This immediacy, as sublated reflection, is reflection in the element of being, which thus forms itself as such into a whole; form proliferates as determinateness of being and thus appears as a manifold distinct from the determination of reflection and as a content indifferent to it. The unessential, which is in the sphere of being but which the latter sheds in so far as it is condition, is the determinateness of the immediacy into which the unity of form has sunk. This unity of form, as the connection of being, is in the latter at first as becoming – the passing over of a determinateness of being into another. But the becoming of being is also the coming to be of essence and a return to the ground. The existence that constitutes the conditions, therefore, is in truth not determined as condition by an other and is not used by it as material; on the contrary, it itself makes itself, through itself, into the moment of an other. – Further, the becoming of this existence does not start off from itself as if it were truly the first and immediate; on the contrary, its immediacy is something only presupposed, and the movement of its becoming is the doing of reflection itself. The truth of existence is thus that it is condition; its immediacy is solely by virtue of the reflection of the ground-connection that posits itself as sublated. Consequently, like immediacy, becoming is only the reflective shine of the unconditioned inasmuch as this presupposes itself and has its form in this presupposing, and hence the immediacy of being is essentially only a moment of the form'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Each side of the positedness - Condition and Ground - is a complete, immediate identity. In this immediacy, Ground sublates itself. This is the side of the Conditions, which are the totality of the determinations of the fact - the fact itself, but cast out into the externality of being. In the Conditions, the sphere of Being is restored. The Thing comes into Existence. To the essential Thing g, Condition d, e ,f is the sphere of being itself. The truth of determinate being is to be condition; its immediacy is, solely through the reflection of the ground-relation g which posits itself as sublated - into d, e, f.

It would be a mistake, however, to view Condition as passive material spun off by the Thing itself, in order that the Thing (or, as Hegel now calls it, ground-relation) may exist. Condition makes itself a. moment of the other through its own act. Its being-for-other is its being-for-self. The Conditions, then, are "the whole content of the fact, because they d, e, f are the unconditioned g in the form of formless being. Yet Conditions have another shape. They appear as a multiplicity without unity, mixed with non-essentials. Thus, the Thing is many Conditions, some of which are unessential. Conditions are manifold: the form, as a determinateness of being, goes on to multiply itself and thus appears as a manifold content distinct from and indifferent to the determination of reflection.

The side of Ground other than the Conditions is the ground-relation as such - the Thing as negative unity of all the Conditions g. This is determined as form over against the immediacy of the conditions and the content. How is it that the Thing is Form, when the appearance of the Thing is in its Conditions? Because Form is appearance and Conditions are the real content of the Thing. This remark vindicates the view that, with Hegel, it is appearances all the way down. g must appear in the guise of d, e, f.

This Form of the Thing possesses within itself the unity of its form with itself, or its content. That is, the Form of the Thing has the constitution of Reflection. It is what it is by its own act (of self-sublation). And this is its Content - to assign its content to the Conditions. In this assignation, the Form of the Thing reduces the Conditions to be a moment, just as, conversely, as essenceless form it gives itself the immediacy of a subsistence in this self-identity. In this act, the Conditions - immediate in themselves - are related to the Thing and actually become what Conditions are supposed to be: conditioned. In announcing that content is in the Conditions, the Form of the Thing is itself the unconditioned fact.

'The other side of this reflective shining of the unconditioned is the ground-connection as such, determined as form as against the immediacy of the conditions and the content. But this side is the form of the absolute fact that possesses the unity of its form with itself or its content within it, and, in determining this content as condition, in this very positing sublates the diversity of the content and reduces it to a moment; just as, contrariwise, as a form void of essence, in this self-identity it gives itself the immediacy of subsistence. The reflection of the ground sublates the immediacy of the conditions, connecting them and making them moments within the unity of the fact; but the conditions are that which the unconditioned fact itself presupposes and the latter, therefore, sublates its own positing; consequently, its positing converts itself just as immediately into a becoming. – The two, therefore, are one unity; the internal movement of the conditions is a becoming, the return into the ground and the positing of the ground; but the ground as posited, and this means as sublated, is the immediate. The ground refers negatively to itself, makes itself into a positedness and grounds the conditions; in this, however, in that the immediate existence is thus determined as a positedness, the ground sublates it and only then makes itself into a ground. – This reflection is therefore the self-mediation of the unconditioned fact through its negation. Or rather, the reflection of the unconditioned is at first a presupposing, but this sublating of itself is immediately a positing which determines; secondly, in this positing the reflection is immediately the sublating of the presupposed and a determining from within itself; this determining is thus in turn the sublating of the positing: it is a becoming within itself. In this, the mediation as a turning back to itself through negation has disappeared; mediation is simple reflection reflectively shining within itself and groundless, absolute becoming. The fact’s movement of being posited, on the one hand through its conditions, and on the other hand through its ground, now is the disappearing of the reflective shine of mediation. The process by which the fact is posited is accordingly a coming forth, the simple self-staging of the fact in concrete existence, the pure movement of the fact to itself'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

'Sphere of Good and Spiritual Renaissance', (a sphere created from 3,000 wooden Easter eggs painted in traditional Ukrainian style), Oksana Mas, (1953- )

Mike Oldfield, Music of the Spheres (2008):

Two things follow from this moment of mediated immediacy. First, the immediate Form sublates its own positing (since positing implies otherness). This is the vanishing of the illusion of mediation. Second, positing is sublated and yet successful. The Form of the Thing becomes its content - the Conditions. Of this becoming, Hegel explains that the process by which the fact is posited is accordingly an emergence, the simple entry of the fact into Existence, the pure movement of the fact to itself.

Hegel now defines what he means by Existence - a state far in advance of primitive Being. When all the conditions of a fact are present, it enters into Existence. Existence, then, is about presence, or about immediacy. In Existence, the immediate Being of the Thing is restored in more adequate Form. Hegel emphasizes that the fact is, before it exists. Herbert Marcuse,?(1898 – 1979), calls this 'Hegel's famous proposition'. He interprets the fact is, before it exists in aid of his left wing politics. All facts are conditions: 'Within the constellation of existing data. The existing state of affairs is a mere condition for another constellation of facts, which bring to fruition the inherent potentialities of the given'. While it is generally true that Hegel emphasizes the finitude of all states of affairs, it is not clear that Marcuse is correct in attributing this meaning to Hegel's famous proposition that a fact is before it exists. Rather, the point is better interpreted as a restatement of Hegel's basic theme that there is no inaccessible thing-in-itself. There are only phenomena all the way down.

The fact is before it exists. It should be clear what this means. Fact (Sache, the heart of the matter, or the thing) is the negative unity of all the Conditions. It posits the Conditions and therefore precedes them. Yet until it posits its Conditions, it does not exist.

In its Conditions, the Thing has given itself the form of external groundless being because it is, as absolute reflection, negative self-relation. At this moment, it makes itself into its own presupposition. For a moment, the Thing seems to be groundless and self-identical. It just is, (And, at this moment, we have the unreflective metaphysics by which most people live their lives.) At this moment, this scattered multiplicity that is, the multitude of diverse Conditions inwardizes itself in its own self. That is to say, the Thing really is all its Conditions. The Form of the Thing erases itself. The whole fact is present in its conditions for all of them constitute the reflection. When the Conditions inwardize, they fall to the ground. The Conditions, then, posit the Ground, just as much as the Ground (i.e., the Form of the Thing) posits the Conditions. As a group, the Conditions sublate themselves and announce that the Being is in a single, negative unity. Ground likewise sublates itself and announces there is nothing but the Conditions.

Accordingly, this emergence is the tautological movement of the fact to itself, and its mediation by conditions and ground is the vanishing of both. The emergence into Existence is therefore immediate in such a manner that the emergence into Existence is therefore immediate in such a manner that it is mediated only by the vanishing of mediation. Fact has now emerged from the Ground. But Ground does not remain behind as a mere substrate. It comes along into Existence (and hence vanishes as such). Ground is sublated - erased and preserved. Through its union with the conditions, ground receives an external immediacy and the moment of being. But this union is not externally imposed on it.

The union is immanently produced. To be sure, externality of late has played a major role in the Thing. But Speculative Reason has turned the tables on the external element present in the Absolutely Unconditioned. In the Absolutely Unconditioned, Condition and Ground could not tell which was which. Seemingly, it needed an outside determination to settle the matter. Now Speculative Reason says, That's exactly the point. There is no meaningful distinction between Conditions and Ground. They are the same Thing. As Hegel summarizes the matter, the Thing or Fact is not only the unconditioned but also the groundless, and it emerges from ground only in so far as ground has fallen to the ground and ceased to be ground: it emerges from the groundless, that is, from its own essential negativity, or pure form. The self-identical Thing now exists.

'The fact proceeds from the ground. It is not grounded or posited by it in such a manner that the ground would still stay underneath, as a substrate; on the contrary, the positing is the outward movement of ground to itself and the simple disappearing of it. Through its union with the conditions, it obtains the external immediacy and the moment of being. But it does not obtain them as a something external, nor by referring to them externally; rather, as ground it makes itself into a positedness; its simple essentiality rejoins itself in the positedness and, in this sublating of itself, it is the disappearing of its difference from its positedness, and is thus simple essential immediacy. It does not, therefore, linger on as something distinct from the grounded; on the contrary, the truth of the grounding is that in grounding the ground unites with itself, and its reflection into another is consequently its reflection into itself. The fact is thus the unconditioned and, as such, equally so the groundless; it arises from the ground only in so far as the latter has foundered and is no longer ground: it rises up from the groundless, that is, from its own essential negativity or pure form. This immediacy, mediated by ground and condition and self-identical through the sublating of mediation, is concrete existence'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

In the three chapters on 'Reflection' the way forward was taken from the simple idea of the Measureless to the realm of the Thing - Existence and the theme at every stage in the journey has been self-erasure, the very self-subsistence of Essence has been the inability to self-subsist and Ground is Reflection sublated. Reflection may have sublated itself in the end but the result is not nothing for if it were knowledge of Essence would be separate from the result and the emerging Thing would not be a spontaneous emergence, an act starting only from itself, instead it would be an essentialist Thing that merely appears which is to say, there would be a thing-in-itself beyond appearance and also the appearance. Hegel's Copernican revolution if I may borrow from Immanuel Kant, (1724 - 1804) who thoughtt he had accomplished such a feat (complete change of perspective that is, Nicolaus Copernicus, (1473–1543), who proposed that the Earth revolved around the Sun) however, is to redefine Ground as the act of self-erasure and the Thing-in-itself or Ground erases itself and only by erasing themselves do Things-in-themselves come into existence. And so we come to the world of discrete Things but as the next part will demonstrate self-erasure is still the theme for Things are finite and they must pass away and when they do the realm of Actuality and self-consciousness will have been reached..

'Integration', 1976, Hans Dieter Bohnet

'Love makes the world go around'. I do not know if the song writers were aware of this but that is pure Aristotle, (384 – 322?BC), for whom love literally makes the world go around:

'That a final cause may exist among?unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For?the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and?(b) something at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists?among unchangeable entities though the former does not. The final cause,?then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being?moved. Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than?as it is. Therefore if its actuality is the primary form of spatial motion,?then in so far as it is subject to change, in this respect it is capable?of being otherwise,-in place, even if not in substance. But since there?is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually, this?can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first?of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial?motion; and this the first mover produces. The first mover, then, exists?of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being?is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has?all these senses-that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary?to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and?that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way'.

- 'Metaphysics'

Dedicated to my muse who keeps my world spinning.

You know love makes the world go around

And love, baby, makes the seesaws go up and down

And it makes trees grow tall

And the most important thing of all

It makes a boy and girl, oh

Say they feel so fine, now (feel so fine)

Without love, flowers wouldn't grow in spring

And without spring, yeah, the birdies just couldn't sing

Yeah, everybody needs love

And to watch the twinkling stars above

It makes a boy and girl, yeah

Say they feel so fine, now, yeah (feel so fine)

Whoa-oh, everybody needs love

Just to watch the twinkling stars above

It makes a boy and girl, oh

Say they feel so fine, now (feel so fine)

Oh, love makes you cry, now

That goes for Billy, Sherry, Bobby and Marsha

And baby, you and I

Oh, I can prove to you

That these facts of love are so true

It makes a boy and girl, yeah

Say they feel so fine, now (feel so fine)

Love, love, sweet love

Love is so good, child

Ooh, it's so fine, ooh

Coming up next:

And so we reach the end of the second section of the three sections of 'The Doctrine of Essence' and henceforth on to new territory:

Appearance.

To be continued ...