On Hegel's 'Philosophy of Nature' : A Free Reflex of Spirit - part seventeen.

'O?let?us?howl,?some?heavy?note'

by John Webster (c. 1578 – c. 1632)?

O let us howl, some heavy note,

Some deadly-dogged howl,

Sounding as from the threat'ning throat

Of beasts and fatal fowl.

As ravens, screech-owls, bulls, and bears,

We'll bill and bawl our parts,

Till irksome noise have cloyed your ears

And corrosived your hearts.

At last when as our choir wants breath,

Our bodies being bless'd,

We'll sing like Swans, to welcome death,

And die in love and rest.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, (1770 - 1831). 'The Philosophy of Nature'.

Sir Isaac Newton, (1642 – 1726/27). Universal gravitation.

Bringing in Newton I suppose I must once again raise the question of an a priori science something that not many scientists or philosophers have much time for in virtue of modern science owing its progress to subjecting hypotheses to experimental tests considering nature to be too intricate and full of surprises for us to be determining anything concerning it without empirical investigation and philosophers endeavouring to investigate issues of substantial scientific doctrine or theory are little regarded, recent philosophers of science narrowing their vision to scientific method, and yet is it not the case that Hegel combines a priori science with a dialectical method purporting to derive concepts from each other in a manner bearing little connection with either experience or material processes? Some contemporary scholars have stressed the empirical elements in his text in the hope perhaps of making his philosophy of nature more agreeable against the many philosophers who peremptorily dismiss his philosophy of nature. Brigitte?Falkenburg, ('How to Save the Phenomena: Meaning and Reference in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature', 1998), contends that Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not a priori because it 'presupposes the concepts of phenomenological natural kinds which are suggested by physics' and aims to organize them 'into an adequate phenomenological system of natural kinds'. T. R. Webb, ('The Problem of Empirical Knowledge in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature', 1980), argues that Hegel’s philosophy of nature is neither a priori nor a posteriori because it takes up the results of empirical research and gives them an 'absolute form' by grasping them as contingent elements of a necessary whole. And one important justification for stressing the empirical dimension of Hegel’s 'Philosophy of Nature' is his declaration of the 'impotence of Nature even to comprehend never mind deduce the 'contingent products of Nature'. Hegel begins with a concept of nature that he derives from his Logic and he derives the subsequent categories of Nature from it dialectically and whether or not his derivations are successful and whether or not the entirety of his 'Philosophy of Nature' can be so derived are separate matters, and furthermore results from the empirical sciences will have suggested to Hegel the conceptual paths to go down but that does not make his derivations a posteriori any more than measurements of the sides of right triangles would render a proof of the Pythagorean theorem a posteriori. That his categories of nature align as well as they do with empirical science supports Hegel’s approach though Stephen Houlgate has pointed out that some though not all of Hegel's treatment of nature is a priori even if it was inspired by empirical evidence.

The present aversion toward a priori science is unwarranted however for many significant scientific achievements came from thinking through the implications of concepts through so-called thought experiments and other modes of non-empirical or at least not wholly empirical inference, and Samuel Sambursky, (1900 - 1990), at least values the insights Hegel arrives at through his a priori dialectical method and he credits Hegel with recognizing the identity of space and time, rejecting absolute space and time, and the dualism of inertia and gravity, all moves that anticipate Albert Einstein, (1879 - 1955), but he rejects Hegel’s method while lauding his results. Let us delve further into Hegel’s account of mechanics and in particular his criticism of Newtonian mechanics for Hegel not only discovered a contradiction in Newton or rather in Newton as might be plausibly interpreted but proposed a solution that won out in the tone it set if not so much in its substance and what is at issue here is not merely a particular problem in mechanics but also philosophy’s relation to and role in science and since Hegel believes that philosophy proceeds by finding and overcoming contradictions his contention that Newtonian mechanics is contradictory does not imply that it has little value, and his a priori science as outlined in the 'Philosophy of Nature' advances empirical science.

(Side note: I may have been inconsistent thus far in my usage of capital letters, usually they to refer to specific Hegelian categories whereas lower-case letters indicate more general concepts or predicative usages of the categories, hence Nature refers to one of Hegel’s categories and nature to whatever is usually meant by the physical world and it is not possible to make this distinction in German because all nouns are capitalized and Hegel himself in any case seems not to distinguish Nature from nature or to make the analogous distinctions).

The 'Philosophy of Nature' recall is the second part of Hegel’s three part system following the Logic followed by the 'Philosophy of Spirit' part of the Encyclopaedia a summary handbook written for his students and unlike the Logic and portions of 'Philosophy of Spirit' Hegel never produced a full version of Philosophy of Nature' and its central argument is compressed and the text was used as the basis for lectures that elaborated and illustrated the argument, and the text of 'Philosophy of Nature' is usually published along with a synopsis of lecture notes taken by his students. It is the least discussed portion of Hegel and not only is it supposed to have no scientific value but it is often said to be filled with errors that demonstrate Hegel’s scientific incompetence and yet such alleged errors stem from a failure on the part of the reader to appreciate his peculiar usage and his objective. The 'Philosophy of Nature' purports to be a dialectical unfolding of the categories of nature from the most abstract, Space and Time, to the most concrete, Animal Organism and development occurs by showing the existence of inner principles that are progressively richer. Whereas in 'Mechanics' the first of the three sections of 'Philosophy of Nature' Nature has no inner principle of motion in 'Physics' and 'Organics' the two subsequent sections the sources of motion are internal.

When Hegel speaks of Physics he has in mind the Greek term phusis and in particular Aristotle’s understanding of phusis as an internal principle of motion and this internal principle accounts for the motions characteristic of a particular natural kind as well as for its other essential attributes, hence it is in respect of its nature that fire rises. Whereas in 'Physics' Hegel confines himself to the primary substances with a limited range of motions, earth, air, fire, water, and inorganic derivatives of them that have uniform parts, in 'Organics' he focuses upon living beings, substances with multiple, complex parts that function together. The discussion of the former includes a treatment of chemistry, a subject that had only recently received a scientific treatment. Immanuel Kant, (1724 - 1804), apparently doubted that Chemistry could ever be made scientific. Hegel’s criticism of Newton features mainly in 'Mechanics'.

'Aeropittura', 1938, Olga Biglieri Scurto, (Barbara)

Aristotle's science makes its presence felt throughout a good deal of the 'Philosophy of Nature'. Alfredo Ferrarin contends that 'the case for the Aristotelianism of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature appears strong', but this is so for the last two parts of this work whereas Aristotelianism influences the first part of the work only indirectly. It is from Aristotle that Hegel derives the notion that an inner principle that unifies complex diverse parts through their common functioning is a higher principle than one that unifies simple uniform parts, the type of principle at work in 'Physics', and it is in contrast with Aristotle’s understanding of the inner principle of a phusis that Hegel conceives of Mechanics, a realm for which there is no Aristotelian analogue, as the realm of externality and otherness. Whereas an Aristotelian phusis has or is an inner source of motion the bodies of Mechanics are moved by external sources, other bodies. Whereas earth, fire, and other Aristotelian natures are distinguished by their qualities, bodies differ from one another only quantitatively, by size and position and this latter means that the science that studies bodies and their motions, mechanics, is more universal than Aristotelian physics, but also that it is, thereby, more abstract and undifferentiated, and so Hegel places 'Mechanics' before 'Physics' in his 'Philosophy of Nature' even though inasmuch as it includes modern physics mechanics was developed much later and Hegel’s treatment of material bodies in motion is the precursor to his discussion of Aristotelian nature and he believes that the former contains contradictions that are resolved in the latter.

Newtonian physics is flawed and that Aristotelian physics is superior to it. What are we to make of that? Hegel's alleged scientific incompetence is sometimes ascribed to his Aristotelianism. W. R., Shea accuses Hegel of equating mass with weight, as he thinks Aristotle did, in this remark:

'It is essential to distinguish gravity from mere attraction, which is simply the general sublation of juxtaposition, and yields nothing but continuity. Gravity on the other hand is the reduction of juxtaposed and yet continuous particularity into unity, into negative relation to self, singularity, a single subjectivity which is however still quite abstract. In the sphere of the primary immediacy of nature, the self-external being of continuity is still posited as subsistent however. Material introflection first occurs in physics, and although singularity is therefore certainly present here as a determination of the Idea, it is external to material being. Consequently the primary essence of matter is that it has weight. This is not an external property which may be separated from it. Gravity constitutes the substantiality of matter, which itself consists of a tendency towards a centre which falls outside it. It is however this externality of its centre which constitutes the other essential determination of matter'.

- 'The Philosophy of Nature'

And Shea also charges Hegel with endorsing Aristotle’s distinction between celestial and terrestrial mechanics here:

'The movement of the heavenly bodies is not a pulling hither and thither, but free motion; as the ancients said, they go their ways like the blessed gods. The corporeality of the heavens is not of a kind to have the principle of rest or of motion external to it. 'As the stone is inert, and the whole earth is composed of stones, the other heavenly bodies are precisely the same'. This syllogism puts the properties of the whole on the same level as those of the part, but impact, pressure, resistance, friction, attraction, and the like, are only valid in their application to an existence of matter distinct from that of heavenly corporeality. Matter is certainly common to them both, just as a good thought and a bad thought are both thoughts; but the bad is not good because the good is also a thought'.

- 'The Philosophy of Nature'

Ferrarin repeats the latter charge as does Houlgate though Houlgate defends Hegel against Shea’s charge that he does not understand inertial motion. In particular, scholars have alleged that Hegel misunderstands inertial motion as self-limiting because he models it on Aristotelian motion, the latter always comes to an end unless it is sustained by a perpetually acting cause such as an unmoved mover, and he has been accused of retaining Aristotle’s distinction between terrestrial motion and celestial motion yet such charges stem from a misunderstanding of the distinction between 'Mechanics' and subsequent sections of the 'Philosophy of Nature' as that between the motions that belong to bodies insofar as they are mere bodies and the motions that belong to them insofar as they are bodies of a specific type, such as, for instance, water, or charged particles, for the argument is that abstract and general claims about bodies do not give us an adequate understanding of nature and that the abstract and general account breaks down and collapses into an account of 'Physics' hence Aristotelian physics is not presupposed but argued for and the question of the nature or essence of matter, fundamental to Aristotle yet set aside by Newton, is always there in the background of 'Mechanics' and proves to be the principle factor in the criticism of Newton.

Another crucial respect in which Hegel also follows Aristotle is the notion that scientific knowledge does not consist of discovering new facts but in drawing connections between what is already known. Aristotle claims that all scientific inquiry aims to find the middle term of a syllogism.

'We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause, and?there are four causes: (1) the definable form, (2) an antecedent which?necessitates a consequent, (3) the efficient cause, (4) the final cause.?Hence each of these can be the middle term of a proof, for (a) though the?inference from antecedent to necessary consequent does not hold if only?one premiss is assumed-two is the minimum-still when there are two it holds?on condition that they have a single common middle term. So it is from?the assumption of this single middle term that the conclusion follows necessarily.?The following example will also show this. Why is the angle in a semicircle?a right angle?-or from what assumption does it follow that it is a right?angle? Thus, let A be right angle, B the half of two right angles, C the?angle in a semicircle. Then B is the cause in virtue of which A, right?angle, is attributable to C, the angle in a semicircle, since B=A and the?other, viz. C,=B, for C is half of two right angles. Therefore it is the?assumption of B, the half of two right angles, from which it follows that?A is attributable to C, i.e. that the angle in a semicircle is a right?angle. Moreover, B is identical with (b) the defining form of A, since?it is what A's definition signifies. Moreover, the formal cause has already?been shown to be the middle. (c) 'Why did the Athenians become involved?in the Persian war?' means 'What cause originated the waging of war against?the Athenians?' and the answer is, 'Because they raided Sardis with the?Eretrians', since this originated the war. Let A be war, B unprovoked raiding,?C the Athenians. Then B, unprovoked raiding, is true of C, the Athenians,?and A is true of B, since men make war on the unjust aggressor. So A, having?war waged upon them, is true of B, the initial aggressors, and B is true?of C, the Athenians, who were the aggressors. Hence here too the cause-in?this case the efficient cause-is the middle term. (d) This is no less true?where the cause is the final cause. E.g. why does one take a walk after?supper? For the sake of one's health. Why does a house exist? For the preservation?of one's goods. The end in view is in the one case health, in the other?preservation. To ask the reason why one must walk after supper is precisely?to ask to what end one must do it. Let C be walking after supper, B the?non-regurgitation of food, A health. Then let walking after supper possess?the property of preventing food from rising to the orifice of the stomach,?and let this condition be healthy; since it seems that B, the non-regurgitation?of food, is attributable to C, taking a walk, and that A, health, is attributable?to B. What, then, is the cause through which A, the final cause, inheres?in C? It is B, the non-regurgitation of food; but B is a kind of definition?of A, for A will be explained by it. Why is B the cause of A's belonging?to C? Because to be in a condition such as B is to be in health. The definitions?must be transposed, and then the detail will become clearer. Incidentally,?here the order of coming to be is the reverse of what it is in proof through?the efficient cause: in the efficient order the middle term must come to?be first, whereas in the teleological order the minor, C, must first take?place, and the end in view comes last in time'.

- 'Posterior Analytics'

This middle term is, paradigmatically, the essential character in respect of which the third term, an attribute, belongs to the first, a substance and all three terms would generally be known before inquiry commences, as would the syllogism’s conclusion, and what is new is the insight into how the terms are linked. Some scholars persist with the assumption that Aristotle proposes to deduce new scientific results from known premises, but his text is quite clear that scientific inquiry seeks the middle term and thereby the cause of a conclusion that is already known. New scientific knowledge is not the syllogism’s conclusion but that eureka moment of understanding a connection between terms that are already apparent, and similarly Hegel’s philosophy of nature does not aim to produce new scientific results but to deduce already established results by dialectical a priori argument. Sambursky contends that Hegel 'rejects, lock, stock, and barrel, the Newtonian dynamics ... including gravitation', and thereby anticipates Einstein’s general relativity. And H. Paolucci thinks Hegel anticipated Niels Bohr,?(1885?– 1962), here:

'... mechanics now constitutes a distinct whole. When Descartes said, 'Give me matter and motion and I will construct the world', he took the standpoint of mechanics as his first principle, and in these words he shows a greatness of spirit which we should not deny, despite the inadequacy of this standpoint. In motion, bodies are mere points, and gravity only determines the spatial relations between points. The unity of matter is simply the unity of place which matter seeks, it is not a single concrete unit. It is in the nature of this sphere that this externality of determinedness should constitute the peculiar determinateness of matter. Matter is weighted being-for-self seeking its being-in-self; in this infirmity the point is merely a place, so that the being-for-self is not yet real. It is only in the whole solar system that the totality of being-for-self is posited, so that what the solar system is as a whole, matter should be in particular. The complete form of the solar system is the Notion of matter in general; its self-externality should now be present in each determinate existence of the completely developed Notion. Matter should find its unity by being for itself in the whole of its determinate being, which is the being for self of being-for-self. Put in another way, the self-motivation of the solar system is the sublation of the merely ideal nature of being-for-self, of mere spatiality of determination, of not-being-for-self In the Notion, the negation of place does not merely give rise to its re-instatement; the negation of not-being-for-self is a negation of the negation, i.e. an affirmation, so that what comes forth is real being-for-self. This is the abstractly logical determination of the transition. It is precisely the total development of being-for-self which is real being-for-self; this might be expressed as the freeing of the form of matter. The determinations of form which constitute the solar system are the determinations of matter itself, and these determinations constitute the being of matter, so that determination and being are essentially identical. This is of the nature of quality, for if the determination is removed here, being also disappears. This is the transition from mechanics to physics'.

- 'The Philosophy of Nature'

Paolucci’s general thesis is that Hegel’s criticisms of Newton anticipated those of modern physicists and that his reconstructions anticipated Einstein and hence he views Hegel’s dialectical transformation of space into time as anticipating Riemann–Einsteinian space–time, (Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann?(1826 – 1866)), his doctrine of moving place as equivalent to the field, and his endorsements of circular motion as anticipating the curvature of space. Both Sambursky and Paolucci are correct in taking note of such anticipations but both regard Hegel as engaged in the same enterprise as physicists, for relativity physics stems from the same concerns that motivate Newton which is to say to describe and predict the movements we experience whereas Hegel’s 'Philosophy of Nature' has a rather different objective.

'In Flight', 1938, Olga Biglieri Scurto, (Barbara)

Another of Hegel’s predecessors who is also central to the Philosophy of Nature is Kant and in the 'Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science' Kant aimed to give an a priori deduction of the principles of Newtonian physics, and the extent to which Kant’s philosophy of nature is a priori is of course as much a matter of contention as claims regarding Hegel’s philosophy of nature. G. Buchdahl contends that both are concerned to demonstrate intelligible possibilities rather than a priori truths of nature and yet he recognises that it is a matter of more and less and proposes that Hegel’s derivation of the law of the acceleration of falling bodies, though not a strictly deductive account, is a search for intelligibility leading to conceptual explication. The basic assumption of Kant's argument is that any material entity would, insofar as it is movable, need to fall under each of his four groups of categories, hence a body will have some quantity, possibly zero, of motion it will occupy some volume of space with some qualitative degree of intensity, it will exert a causal force on another or exist self-subsistently and it will be capable of being experienced as possibly actually or necessarily moving. Kant identifies the capacity for each of these determinations as a distinct type of matter and accordingly there are four different types of matter, and with this framework Kant argues for Newton’s law of gravity and for his three laws of motion, and in addition he argues for the composition of motions based on the conservation of momentum and gives his own account of Newton’s bucket. If Kant is correct then much of Newtonian physics can be known a priori and Kant rejects Newton’s notion of absolute space and as a consequence, absolute motion, but he distinguishes circular motion as actual and true from the merely possible rectilinear motion and he refers to the reciprocal motions of two bodies according to Newton’s third law as necessary. In the cases of circular and reciprocal motions the motion belongs to the bodies rather than to something external. Michael Friedman has reconstructed the ways that Kantian principles ground some empirical constructions of the Principia.

Newton's Bucket.

'If a vessel, hung by a long cord, is so often turned about that the cord is strongly twisted, then filled with water, and held at rest together with the water; after, by the sudden action of another force, it is whirled about in the contrary way, and while the cord is untwisting itself, the vessel continues for some time this motion; the surface of the water will at first be plain, as before the vessel began to move; but the vessel by gradually communicating its motion to the water, will make it begin sensibly to revolve, and recede by little and little, and ascend to the sides of the vessel, forming itself into a concave figure... 'This ascent of the water shows its endeavour to recede from the axis of its motion; and the true and absolute circular motion of the water, which is here directly contrary to the relative, discovers itself, and may be measured by this endeavour. ... And therefore, this endeavour does not depend upon any translation of the water in respect to ambient bodies, nor can true circular motion be defined by such translation. ...; but relative motions...are altogether destitute of any real effect. ...It is indeed a matter of great difficulty to discover, and effectually to distinguish, the true motions of particular bodies from the apparent; because the parts of that immovable space in which these motions are performed, do by no means come under the observations of our senses'.

- 'Philosophi? Naturalis Principia Mathematic'

A thought experiment presented as evidence for absolute space. The bucket is rotating with respect to space itself. The bucket is spinning rapidly, not only with respect to the experimenter, but also in relation to the water it contains. Although the relative motion at this stage is the greatest, the surface of the water remains flat, indicating that the parts of the water have no tendency to recede from the axis of relative motion, despite proximity to the pail. Eventually, as the cord continues to unwind, the surface of the water assumes a concave shape as it acquires the motion of the bucket spinning relative to the experimenter. This concave shape shows that the water is rotating, despite the fact that the water is at rest relative to the pail. In other words, it is not the relative motion of the pail and water that causes concavity of the water, contrary to the idea that motions can only be relative, and that there is no absolute motion.

A question: The relativist Gottfried Leibniz, (1646 – 1716), was of course ahead of the game here. Space, he said, is the spatial relations between things, space would not exist independently of the things it connects, if nothing existed, then no spatial relations. If the universe is destroyed, then no space. If now, at this precise moment, everything in the universe moved two feet (0.6096 metres) to the left would anybody notice?

___________________________

====

Penso che un sogno così non ritorni mai più

Mi dipingevo le mani e la faccia di blu

poi d'improvviso venivo dal vento rapito

e incominciavo a volare nel cielo infinito.

I think that a dream like that will never return

I painted my hands and my face blue

then was suddenly swept up by the wind

and started to fly in the infinite sky.

__________________________

Whereas the 'Critique of Pure Reason' uses the schema of the categories to lay out the transcendental conditions for the existence of objects of intuition, the 'Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science' uses the same schema to set out the a priori conditions for the possibility of material objects. The existence of material bodies cannot be proven a priori, it must be ascertained empirically, and therefore Kant distinguishes the a priori knowledge possible for natural science from the types of a priori knowledge found in metaphysics and mathematics, whereas the latter depend only on our faculties and the pure forms they grasp, the pure portion of natural science presupposes the existence of material bodies. Even if we cannot prove that there are material bodies and hence that there is any nature to know, Kant contends that we can know what must hold of material bodies if they do exist and this includes, besides the Newtonian laws, that nature must be known through mathematics and that any material object must have certain mathematically described characters.

Hegel responds in his philosophy of nature by extending the scope of what can be proven a priori and he would remove all empirical elements from the pure treatment of nature, so to Kant’s list of a priori scientific truths he adds an independent proof of Johannes Kepler's,?(1571 – 1630), laws, and he derives scientific categories from each other through dialectical reasoning that he takes to be intrinsic to the faculty he calls reason. These latter derivations allow Hegel to avoid Kant’s concession to experience for Hegel’s issue with Kant as with Newton is that both rely on the faculty of understanding, and this is evident enough in Kant’s case for his categories are categories of the understanding, and a central aim of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' is to reject the dialectic that the faculty of reason, uncritiqued, must generate. Kant derives his four kinds of matter from his four groups of these categories and so his treatment of matter is rooted in the faculty of understanding and Hegel sees a sign of Kant’s reliance on this faculty in the fact that his different kinds of matter co-exist without being unified, for the faculty of reason is synthetic and Hegel’s distinction between concepts belonging to these two faculties is elaborated upon in his his early Jaener piece, 'Verh¨ altniss des Skepticismus zur Philosophie, Darstellung seiner verschiedenen Modificationen, und Vergleichung des Neuesten mit dem Alten'. The same distinction appears in the 'Philosophy of Nature', and Hegel distinguishes the philosophy of nature from physics by the kind of metaphysics used by them both.

'In the theoretical approach (a) the initial factor is our withdrawing from natural things, leaving them as they are, and adjusting to them. In doing this we start from our sense-knowledge of nature. If physics were based only on perceptions however, and perceptions were nothing but the evidence of the senses, the activity of a natural scientist would consist only of seeing, smelling, hearing etc., so that animals would also be physicists. It is however a spirit, a thinking entity, which sees and hears etc. If we say that in the theoretical approach things are left as they are, we shall be referring only partly to the external senses, for these are themselves partly theoretical and partly practical (§ 358); only ideation or intelligence has this free relation to things. We can of course also look at them through the medium of the senses, but cognition will then be merely a means, not an end in itself. (b) In the second relation of things to us, they either acquire the determination of universality for us, or we transform them into something universal. The more thought predominates in ordinary perceptiveness, so much the more does the naturalness, individuality, and immediacy of things vanish away. As thoughts invade the limitless multiformity of nature, its richness is impoverished, its springtimes die, and there is a fading in the play of its colours. That which in nature was noisy with life, falls silent in the quietude of thought; its warm abundance, which shaped itself into a thousand intriguing wonders, withers into arid forms and shapeless generalities, which resemble a dull northern fog. (c) Both these determinations are opposed to both practical ones, and we also find that the theoretical approach is inwardly self-contradictory, for it appears to bring about the precise opposite of what it intends'.

- 'The Philosophy of Nature'

He criticizes the metaphysics used by physics on two grounds. First, its Universal determination is abstract or only formal, whereas, on the other side, second, its Particular content stands outside the Universal and is, therefore, splintered and destroyed and he is certainly describing a metaphysics of the understanding because its contents remain distinct from each other, and in contrast, the metaphysics used by 'Philosophy of Nature' synthesizes these components into a unity and later on he identifies the metaphysics of empirical science as the metaphysics of the understanding.

'The understanding creates substrata for itself which we do not recognize through the Notion. Sound and heat do not exist on their own account as does weighted matter, and the postulated materiality of heat and sound is a mere fiction, introduced into physics by the metaphysics of the understanding. Sound and heat are conditioned by material existence, and constitute their negativity; they are no more than moments, but as determinations of what is material they are quantitative, and may therefore be determined by degrees, according to their intensity'.

- 'The Philosophy of Nature'

In Kant’s treatment of matter the same four senses of matter appear in the same sequence in Hegel’s account albeit he assumes some of Kant’s arguments without setting them out or so much as indicating his source but he does discuss Kant’s treatment in the Logic in a remark on Attraction and Repulsion (see my article on that although can't remember which number it is in the series and what is new is that Hegel derives them from each other and sees them consequently as aspects of a single concept of matter. The issue Hegel has with Kant is not just his having separate matters but his more or less renouncing the explanatory function of philosophy of nature for insofar as these matters are distinct there is no explanation for why all four matters belong to a single physical entity nor in fact is there properly a single entity, and a metaphysics of the understanding can only be analytic whereas the faculty of reason can be explanatory because it is synthetic.

'Pensieri in carlinga', ('Thoughts in cockpit'), 1938, Olga Biglieri Scurto, (Barbara)

Hegel believes that the separation of types of matters was also a mistake Newton made for Newton thought that mathematical principles could be read directly from nature without making hypotheses, hypotheses non fingo?indeed:

'I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction'.

- 'General Scholium'

In the Logic Hegel objects that mathematical (quantitative) manipulations cannot prove qualitative claims about the physical world and Paolucci believes that Hegel’s point is to deny that 'mathematics of itself, or mathematically conducted experiments, can lead to true knowledge of the realities of Nature'. The distinction between gravitational and inertia/mass is implicit in Newton’s laws: the m in the second law F=ma is inertial mass; the m in the law of gravity F = G Mm/r2 is gravitational mass, more commonly called weight. Newton argues that a pendulum experiment shows that they are proportional. Recent measurements have shown them to be equal to a high degree. P. M. Kluit argues against a challenge to the equivalence of the two matters. Hegel also criticizes Newton’s optics on parallel grounds whereby Newton analyses white light into lights of distinct colours that are each simple and indecomposable whereas Hegel contends that coloured lights are each complex and transformable into different colours. Hegel’s discussion of the Optics I will cover in a future article, for now just to mention that Newton’s error lies in relying on the faculty of understanding rather than reason. As for Hegel’s criticism of Newton’s notion of matter and his mechanics this criticism requires recognizing Newton’s unstated assumptions, the simplest formulation of the problem is that Newton’s understanding of the character of matter in his three laws of motion is at odds with his understanding of matter in his law of gravity for in the former, matter is passive in the sense that it does not cause motion and is only with difficulty put out of its state either of resting or moving. (His third definition is that to every action there is always opposed an equal reaction). In the latter matter is active causing other bodies to move toward it and accelerating itself toward other bodies albeit Newton does not mention the nature of matter in his laws and without this there is no explicit contradiction yet there is good reason to think that Newton does regard the laws as expressing fundamental characteristics of matter.

Newton’s first law commonly called the law of inertia asserts that matter in motion or matter at rest would remain so unless compelled to change its state by forces impressed, that is yo say, unless acted upon by an outside body and the implication is that matter does not move itself or interfere positively or negatively with any motion that it has no matter how large or small that motion is, and likewise setting a body in motion does not increase or diminish its matter, a body’s matter is inert in the sense that its quantity remains unaltered by whatever motion it receives and in the sense that the body does not diminish or increase its own motion. On the matter of this inertness comparing it with Aristotle’s understanding of matter as potential for a form whereby his motion consists of the actualization of this potential and motion ceases when the potential is fully actualized.

'The physicists on the other hand have two modes of?explanation. The first set make the underlying body one either one of the three?or something else which is denser than fire and rarer than air then generate?everything else from this, and obtain multiplicity by condensation and?rarefaction. Now these are contraries, which may be generalized into 'excess?and defect'. (Compare Plato's 'Great and Small'-except that he make these?his matter, the one his form, while the others treat the one which underlies?as matter and the contraries as differentiae, i.e. forms). The second set assert that the contrarieties are contained in the?one and emerge from it by segregation, for example Anaximander and also?all those who assert that 'what is' is one and many, like Empedocles and?Anaxagoras; for they too produce other things from their mixture by segregation.?These differ, however, from each other in that the former imagines a cycle?of such changes, the latter a single series. Anaxagoras again made both?his 'homceomerous' substances and his contraries infinite in multitude,?whereas Empedocles posits only the so-called elements'.

- 'Physics'

Since matter is always a potential for a specific form not only does the motion cease when the form is realized but except for several important cases the potential to receive a form ceases once that form comes to be present. When the acorn realizes its potential it becomes an actual oak and it loses the potential to become an oak, and matter is used up or at least radically altered in the course of motion. Aristotle defines motion as the actuality of a potential qua potential and he explains that the actuality of the buildable lies in the building, for when the house would be, the buildable no longer is.

'Further it is evident that motion is an attribute of a thing just?when it is fully real in this way, and neither before nor after. For each?thing of this kind is capable of being at one time actual, at another not.?Take for instance the buildable as buildable. The actuality of the buildable?as buildable is the process of building. For the actuality of the buildable?must be either this or the house. But when there is a house, the buildable?is no longer buildable. On the other hand, it is the buildable which is?being built. The process then of being built must be the kind of actuality?required But building is a kind of motion, and the same account will apply?to the other kinds also'.

- 'Physics'

L.A. Kosman speaks of the auto-subversive and tragic dimension of motion: 'Its whole purpose and project is one of self-destruction'. Kosman distinguishes the actuality that is the motion from the actuality that results from the motion; for example, housebuilding from the house built, indeed Aristotle argues that matter persists through change so one might be inclined to insist that his matter is, to this extent as inert as Newton’s yet in fact, Aristotle alternates between first speaking of matter as the substrate that persists through the acquisition of a form (or of its privation) and as, second, a composite that contains both this substrate and a privation (or a form) in contrast with the form (or privation) it becomes. In the latter sense Aristotle affirms that matter does come to be and cease to be and an instance of this latter matter is the boards and bricks that are potentially the house because they contain the privation of the form of the house. Once they receive the house form they no longer have the potential to lose this form hence this matter is altered when it loses its potential to become a house though they now have, and further in order to claim that a material substrate persists even through substantial change Aristotle proposes that the matter is the seed but the seed or the acorn does not persist as such, it is radically altered as the organism develops and so again Aristotle’s matter changes as its potential is realized.

'Aeroplanes in flight', 1935, Olga Biglieri Scurto, (Barbara)

Newton’s matter does not alter when it moves nor does it affect whatever motion it receives and it follows that any motion that it has would have come to it from an outside source and there is no obstacle to a matter’s receiving any quantity of motion or to its continuing indefinitely in motion, and likewise, Newton’s second law, that matter is accelerated in accordance with the force it receives, depends upon the matter’s not itself interfering with a force that is imposed on it, again a mark of its passivity and inertness. The force moves the matter without altering it as matter and the third law that action equals reaction asserts that when A acts on B, B acts on A with the same force in the opposite direction and this is possible if the matter that is acted upon by a force from A does not alter insofar as it is matter. In fact it is because B is as much matter as A that an impact of A on B is also an impact of B on A and the ideal model for the three laws consists of rigidly hard balls (no jokes please) that remain unchanged by impact or by motion. Measured deviations from the laws are explained either by a ball’s interaction with other bodies, by friction, or by alterations to the internal structure of the ball’s matter on the assumption that this structure is itself composed of real bodies, which do conform to the law, could we but measure them, which is to say, in a good deal of our experience the character of a matter does appear to affect the motion it has or receives but the effects are slight, and they are plausibly explained and discounted. Such cases make it evident enough that the Newtonian notion that matter is inert and does not affect motion is an idealization and it is a consequence of this idealization that each material body that moves requires some external source of motion and consequently the entire universe requires an external agency as the source of its initial motion, hence, Newton posits God.

'This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the centres of other like systems, these, being formed by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially since the light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with the light of the sun, and from every system light passes into all the other systems: and lest the systems of the fixed stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other mutually, he hath placed those systems at immense distances one from another. This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God ************, or Universal Ruler; for God is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and Deity is the dominion of God not over his own body, as those imagine who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants. The Supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect; but a being, however perfect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God; for we say, my God, your God, the God of Israel, the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords ; but we do not say, my Eternal, your Eternal, the Eternal of Israel, the Eternal of Gods; we do not say, my Infinite, or my Perfect : these are titles which have no respect to servants. The word God usually signifies Lord; but every lord is not a God. It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God: a true, supreme, or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme, or imaginary God. And from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent, and powerful Being ; and, from his other perfections, that he is supreme, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity to infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures for ever, and is every where present ; and by existing always and every where, he constitutes duration and space. Since every particle of space is always, and every indivisible moment of duration is every where, certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be never and no where. Every soul that has perception is, though in different times and in different organs of sense and motion, still the same indivisible person. There are given successive parts in duration, co-existent parts in space, but neither the one nor the other in the person of a man, or his thinking principle; and much less can they be found in the thinking substance of God. Every man, so far as he is a thing that has perception, is one and the same man during his whole life, in all and each of his organs of sense. God is the same God, always and every where. He is omnipresent not virtually only, but also substantially ; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him are all things contained and moved; yet neither affects the other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies ; bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God. It is allowed by all that the Supreme God exists necessarily ; and by the same necessity he exists always and every where. Whence also he is all similar, all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all power to perceive, to understand, and to act; but in a manner not at all human, in a manner not at all corporeal, in a manner utterly unknown to us'.

- 'Philosophi? Naturalis Principia Mathematica'?

The constant assumption is that matter alters only when an outside force is impressed upon it and contrast this notion of matter as inert with the notion of matter that is implicit in the law of gravity, according to this law every bit of matter exerts a force of attraction toward every other bit of matter, we do not hover above the earth and the limits upon how far we can leap demonstrates how we are gravitationally attracted to the earth but earth’s gravity is noticeable only because it is so large and from a conceptual point of view there is no difference between earth’s gravity and the gravitational force exerted by any other body. Experimentally gravity is measured by calculating how much a close heavy object slows down an oscillating ball and discussing the first law Newton alludes to the gravity of the earth as a force that could be impressed upon a body and cause it to alter its motion, and due to its size earth’s gravity is apt to seem like an outside force and yet this is not quite correct for both bodies are moving toward each other because of their matter and it is no more true that the one attracts the other than that each moves itself by its own nature toward the other matter even the earth’s motion is imperceptible. The point is that all matter by its nature falls or rather propels itself toward other matter and gravity is characteristic of all matter and as such matter does move itself. It has been proposed that in formulating his notion of gravitational attraction Newton drew on his study of alchemy and was motivated by theology, according to M. J. Osler Newton thought that 'gravitation results from God’s direct action on matter', and this account absolves Newton of the contradiction Hegel ascribes to him even while it implicitly acknowledges that gravity would conflict with inertia were gravity as it is generally taken characteristic of matter, and further it implies that those who reject Newton’s theology are left with the contradiction.

So questions arise on the matter of whether or not matter is inert or if it moves itself or if it is independent of motion neither altering motion nor being altered by it or whether matter rather causes a body to move itself toward other bodies and them to move toward it, in brief the nature implicitly ascribed to matter by the three laws is at odds with the nature of matter presupposed by the law of gravity and scientists are unlikely to be concerned because the contradiction if there is one turns upon the nature of matter and does not undermine or even affect predictions about the motions of bodies. As for the matter of predictions in terms of the way that Newtonian physics is used the law of gravity does not come into conflict with the other Newtonian laws, in fact rather than causing difficulties the two cohere and operate together for the law of gravity is used to determine one vector component of a body’s motion and then add vectors for the motions that the body has in other directions. The resultant is the body’s overall path which is to say that a body’s motion is calculated by treating gravity and inertia as distinct and independent components though there is a persisting question in Newtonian physics as to whether the mass in the formula of gravitational attraction is equal to the mass in the second law, which is to say, whether, gravitational mass is equal to inertial mass and yet this is taken to be an empirical question that needs to be resolved with precise measurements and these have supported a high degree of identity. In brief not only do no empirical anomalies result from Newton’s distinguishing two types of matter but his treating them independently was one of his outstanding successes so one wonders why Hegel choose matter to set the ball rolling with his critique ... the plot thickens ...

'L'aeroporto abbranca l'aeroplano', ('The airport catches the airplane'), 1938, Olga Biglieri Scurto, (Barbara)

This one is for you toots as they all are: let's fly away, wherever you want to go ???

Come fly with me, let's fly, let's fly away

If you could use some exotic booze

There's a bar in far Bombay

Come fly with me, let's fly, let's fly away

Come fly with me, let's float down to Peru

In llama-land there's a one-man band

And he'll toot his flute for you

Come on fly with me, let's take off in the blue

Once I get you up there

Where the air is rarefied

We'll just glide

Starry-eyed

Once I get you up there

I'll be holding you so near

You may hear

Angels cheer, 'cause we're together

Weather-wise, it's such a lovely day

Just say the words and we'll beat the birds

Down to Acapulco Bay

It is perfect for a flying honeymoon, they say

Come fly with me, let's fly, let's fly away

Once I get you up there

Where the air is rarefied

We'll just glide

Starry-eyed

Once I get you up there

I'll be holding you so near

You may hear

Angels cheer, 'cause we're together

Weather-wise, it's such a lovely day

You just say the words, and we'll beat the birds

Down to Ac-apulco Bay

It is perfect for a flying honeymoon, they say

Come fly with me, let's fly, let's fly

Pack up, let's fly away .... ???

++++

Coming up next:

More Hegel and Newton.

To be continued...