On Hegel's 'Philosophy of Mind': the self-knowing, actual Idea - part seventeen.

'Psyche; or, the legend of Love'

by Mary Tighe (1772 – 1810)

CANTO II. (continued)

Twice, as with agitated step she went,?

The lamp expiring shone with doubtful gleam,?

As though it warned her from her rash intent:?

And twice she paused, and on its trembling beam?

Gazed with suspended breath, while voices seem?

With murmuring sound along the roof to sigh;?

As one just waking from a troublous dream,?

With palpitating heart and straining eye,?

Still fixed with fear remains, still thinks the danger nigh.?

Oh, daring Muse! wilt thou indeed essay?

To paint the wonders which that lamp could shew??

And canst thou hope in living words to say?

The dazzling glories of that heavenly view??

Ah! well I ween, that if with pencil true?

That splendid vision could be well exprest,?

The fearful awe imprudent Psyche knew?

Would seize with rapture every wondering breast,?

When Love's all potent charms divinely stood confest.?

All imperceptible to human touch,?

His wings display celestial essence light,?

The clear effulgence of the blaze is such,?

The brilliant plumage shines so heavenly bright?

That mortal eyes turn dazzled from the sight;?

A youth he seems in manhood's freshest years;?

Round his fair neck, as clinging with delight,?

Each golden curl resplendently appears,?

Or shades his darker brow, which grace majestic wears.?

Or o'er his guileless front the ringlets bright?

Their rays of sunny lustre seem to throw,?

That front than polished ivory more white!?

His blooming cheeks with deeper blushes glow?

Than roses scattered o'er a bed of snow:?

While on his lips, distilled in balmy dews,?

(Those lips divine that even in silence know?

The heart to touch) persuasion to infuse?

Still hangs a rosy charm that never vainly sues.?

The friendly curtain of indulgent sleep?

Disclosed not yet his eyes' resistless sway,?

But from their silky veil there seemed to peep?

Some brilliant glances with a softened ray,?

Which o'er his features exquisitely play,?

And all his polished limbs suffuse with light.?

Thus through some narrow space the azure day?

Sudden its cheerful rays diffusing bright,?

Wide darts its lucid beams, to gild the brow of night.?

His fatal arrows and celestial bow?

Beside the couch were negligently thrown,?

Nor needs the god his dazzling arms, to show?

His glorious birth, such beauty round him shone?

As sure could spring from Beauty's self alone;?

The gloom which glowed o'er all of soft desire,?

Could well proclaim him Beauty's cherished son;?

And Beauty's self will oft these charms admire,?

And steal his witching smile, his glance's living fire.?

Speechless with awe, in transport strangely lost?

Long Psyche stood with fixed adoring eye;?

Her limbs immoveable, her senses tost?

Between amazement, fear, and ecstasy,?

She hangs enamoured o'er the Deity.?

Till from her trembling hand extinguished falls?

The fatal lamp—He starts—and suddenly?

Tremendous thunders echo through the halls,?

While ruin's hideous crash bursts o'er the affrighted walls.?

Dread horror seizes on her sinking heart,?

A mortal chillness shudders at her breast,?

Her soul shrinks fainting from death's icy dart,?

The groan scarce uttered dies but half exprest,?

And down she sinks in deadly swoon opprest:?

But when at length, awaking from her trance,?

The terrors of her fate stand all confest,?

In vain she casts around her timid glance,?

The rudely frowning scenes her former joys enhance.

'Poster for Lipik thermal bath', 1910s, Géza Faragó

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich?Hegel?(1770 – 1831). 'Philosophy of Mind'. 'Subjective Mind'

CONSCIOUSNESS.

§413

'Consciousness constitutes the stage of the mind's reflexion or relationship, of mind as appearance. I is the infinite relation of mind to itself, but as subjective relation, as certainty of itself, the immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure ideal self-identity; the content of the natural soul is object for this reflection that is for itself. Pure abstract freedom for itself discharges from itself its determinacy, the soul's natural life, to an equal freedom as an independent object. It is of this object, as external to it, that I is initially aware, and is thus consciousness. I, as this absolute negativity, is implicitly identity in otherness; I is itself and extends over the object as an object implicitly sublated, I is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship- the light, that manifests itself and an Other too'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

Consciousness (Bewusstsein) in Hegel albeit not always in ordinary German is intentional, consciousness of something, or that something is the case, and reflexion does have the sense of reflecting on or thinking about something, but Hegel also has in mind the reflection of light by a surface. Consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §112Z. Relationship’ (Verh?ltnis, also ratio, proportion, denotes a close relationship between two things, here the mind and its object. The mind’s infinite relation to itself is a Beziehung, not a Verh?ltni.) Appearance (Erscheinung) does not mean seeming or semblance (Schein), it is literally shining forth and refers to the mind’s coming out of its shell, and is not dissimilar to the appearance or publication of a book, as in the appearance of the book is delayed, the book appeared last year, in contrast to, the book has an attractive appearance, the book appeared difficult.

Three stages of the mind are in operation.

First, the immediate identity of the natural soul or its natural life where it is aware only of its own sensations and not of external objects.

Second, the mind’s infinite self-relation, its pure ideal self-identity, where the mind is aware or certain only of itself, not yet of external objects.

Third, the mind of the second stage makes the content of the first stage its object (Gegenstand) and turns it into an self-subsistent object (Objekt), that is, it transforms the subjective sensations of the first stage into consciousness of external objects.

On he two words for object, Gegenstand and Objekt, consult §387. Here the difference is that a Gegenstand is in essence an object of a mind while an Objekt is independent, nonetheless the I is aware of this independent Objekt, the I is distinct from, other than, any and every Objekt, distinct even from itself, as the Zusatz makes clear, therefore it is absolute negativity but it establishes a kind of identity with the Objekt in that it extends over it thereby sublating it as an Objekt because it takes away its independence.

How can the I be both universal and individual: As the I, it is a universal, featureless, relating only to itself, and so on, but the I is also an individually [individuell, consult §412] determined universal and it it is distinct from any of the objects of its awareness and from other I’s albeit these have not yet come on the scene explicitly, consult §§430. The I is not a universal that turns into a determinate individual, it remains throughout both universal and individual and yet universality and individuality are not unproblematically compatible rather they are opposites and so the I somehow oscillates between them. It is an ‘immediately negative relation’ to itself as indeterminate universality, and is its ‘unmediated opposite’, ‘abstract, simple individuality’, that is, an individuality marked out simply by difference and not by any particular property that it uniquely possesses. The negative relation and the opposition are immediate, the I does not veer from one extreme to the other by stages or continuously, like a pendulum, it swings between universality and individuality with no intermediate steps.

The distinction between us or ‘we’ (Hegel and his readers who are paying attention) and the phase of the mind under consideration is important in the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' where Hegel takes care to distinguish between what we can see and what the form or shape of consciousness under consideration can see. This is a special case of a more general distinction between us or me and the object under consideration. For instance, in his 'Science of Logic', Hegel emphasises that the unfolding of a thought or category and its development into another thought or category is achieved by the category itself and not by Hegel, it is not normally the case that an object itself distinguishes the moments that we distinguish in it, it is we, not the pebble itself, who differentiate its smoothness, brownness, and hardness. But the I does so and to explain this Hegel directs his attention to the I’s individuality whereby this individuality is exclusive. consult §404. An individual is not this, not that, it excludes other individuals, but as an I this individuality relates to itself hence it turns its exclusivity against itself and excludes itself thereby reverting to universality. Different sorts of exclusion are brought together, an exclusive club excludes most people from membership but as long as it does not exclude everyone it does not exclude itself from being a club and even if exclusive individuality does exclude itself from individuality it becomes universality since universality is the opposite immediately joined together with it and the conjunction of individuality and universality is not a consequence of individuality’s self-exclusion but a constant background factor accounting for why going out from the one is automatically going into the other.

Being (Sein) contrasts primarily with thinking and in the case of most things a distinction can be drawn between their being on the one hand and thought about them on the other. We think of a pebble, for instance, first as smooth, then as hard and finally as brown but the pebble itself has all three qualities at the same time and immediately and it would have them even if we did not think about it, consult §413. Conversely the thought of or thinking about pebbles or this pebble does not guarantee the existence or being of pebbles, or of this pebble the thought of a hundred dollars as Immanuel Kant contended does not guarantee their reality, consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic', §51. I can distinguish in these ways even between myself as an embodied individual and my thought about it, I might exist as an embodied individual even if I lacked or had lost the capacity to think of myself as such and I may conceivably think of myself as an embodied individual without being one. In a manner similar to René Descartes (1596 – 1650) (consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §64) Hegel contends that in the case of the I no such distinction between the I itself or the being of the I and thought about it or the I itself can be drawn. The uncertainty over whether the I is being or alternatively thinking has its roots in the disappearance of the usual distinction between thought and being but here the I is identified with thinking hence the ‘determination of abstractly universal individuality’ is a thought, a thought about or applicable to the I.

Does this thought guarantee the existence of the I?

Does it exhaust and thereby constitute the being of the I?

One may think of a pebble as an ‘abstractly universal individual’, as merely ‘this (individual), but this thought does not constitute the being of a pebble because there is much more to a pebble’s being than simply individuality. And yet the I is just an abstractly universal individual and its being is therefore exhausted,and also guaranteed by this thought but a distinction of sorts can be drawn between being and thinking. Being is ‘absolutely immediate, etc.’ ans what is in mind here is not so much the concrete being of, for instance, a pebble, which is somehow ‘immediate’, flat, just there, in contrast to thinking about it, as the abstract concept of being with which Logic begins and which thus has no mediating antecedents within Logic. Consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §§84–6.

Why not concrete being?

Well, abstract or pure being appears ill-matched to the bare I. Thinking on the other hand is not just there, it differentiates and mediates itself, by, for instance, thinking about thinking, or by moving from premisses to a conclusion. In a similar manner so too does the I. I am aware of myself, of me, but the me of which I am aware is identical with the I that is aware. And so the I is identified with thinking rather than with being but thinking is not sheer movement without pause, it settles on the conclusion it has reached, it resolves a problem and focuses upon the solution. The conclusion or the solution is in some way immediate, it has an intrinsic nature of its own that can be regarded independently of the process by which it was reached and this stage of thinking is being. Hence thinking and consequently the I involves beingand this accounts for how the I can be self-aware. The I qua thinking posits the I qua being as its other but also as identical to itself and we go further than Descartes here in endeavouring to account for how one and the same I is aware of itself and we can employ the thought–being contrast to do so. Awareness is Wissen, certainty is Gewissheit, introduced both because of its affinity to Wissen and in recollection of Descartes and his epistemological worries.

'Woman with an Orange', Jules Lefebvre (1834–1912)

'... certainty is related to the I as freedom is to the will. Just as certainty constitutes the nature of the I, so freedom constitutes the nature of the will. Initially, however, certainty is to be compared only with subjective freedom, with wilfolness; only objective certainty, truth, corresponds to genuine freedom of will. Accordingly, the I certain of itself is, initially, still wholly simple subjectivity, the quite abstractly free, the completely indeterminate ideality or negativity of all limitation. Repelling itself from itself, the I attains, therefore, at first only to something that is formally, not actually, distinct from it. But as is shown in Logic, the difference that is in itself must also be posited, must be developed into an actual difference. This development regarding the I proceeds in this way: the I does not fall to the anthropological level, to the unconscious unity of the mental and the natural, but remains certain of itself and maintains itself in its freedom; it lets its Other unfold into a totality like the totality of the I, and just in this way makes it change from something bodily belonging to the soul into something independently confronting it, into an object in the strict sense of this word.6 The I is at first only wholly abstract subjectivity, the merely formal, contentless distinguishing-itself from itself, and so the actual difference, the determinate content, is found outside the I and belongs to objects alone. But since in itself the I already has difference within itself or, in other words, since it is in itself the unity of itself and its Other, it is necessarily related to the difference existing in the object and immediately reflected out of this its Other into itself The I thus overarches what is actually distinguished from it, is together with itself in this its Other, and remains, in all intuition, certain of itself. Only when I come to apprehend myself as I, does the Other become an object to me, confront me, and at the same time get posited ideally in me, and hence brought back to unity with me. That is why in the above Paragraph the I was compared to light. Just as light is the manifestation of itself and its Other, darkness, and can reveal itself only by revealing that Other, so too the I is revealed to itself only in so far as its Other becomes revealed to it in the shape of something independent of it'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

If we do not think philosophically about the I but use pictorial representation we are inclined to represent the I’s certainty as a property (Eigenschaft: consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §§125- 6) of the I or a ‘determination in [an] its nature’. If certainty were a property of the I or in its nature the I could exist without being certain of itself but the I cannot exist without self-differentiation and self-identification, nor therefore without self-certainty, and furthermore self-certainty is not merely one among several essential features of the I, it is its whole nature, there is nothing more to the I than such self-differentiation and self-identification. The I is in essence and exclusively self-certain, as the will is in essence and exclusively free yet there are at least two sorts of freedom, subjective and objective. Subjective freedom, the freedom to do what one likes, is more properly described as ‘wilfulness’ (Willkür) than ‘will’ (Wille), consult §§443, 473 ff. Genuine (echten) freedom is objective involving acquiescence in an objectively rational order in particular the ethical and political order and the self-certainty of the I has more affinity to subjective freedom than to objective freedom, it does not at once involve acknowledgement of an objective order whether in logic or in the world fot indeed Descartes, decided that he existed prior to inferring that God and an objective world existed.

Upon the I being aware of itself it is free because it is related only to itself, the I of which it is aware is only formally not actually distinct from itself so the ‘difference’ is only ‘in itself ’ or implicit but an implicit difference must be posited, become actual, consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §§116 ff so the I has to become aware of something that is actually distinct from itself and it cannot achieve this by reverting to the anthropological level for there the mind is not conscious of an object distinct from itself but merges into the natural. The I must remain a distinct, self-certain I, yet conscious of an ‘object in the strict sense’, a Gegenstand, something that stands over ‘against’ (gegen) the I. Objekt also carries this connotation in accordance with its Latin roots, iectum, ‘thrown, and ob, ‘against’ but this is less evident to a German speaker. The object is a Totalit?t since like the I it is a self-contained independent whole.

The distinction is between the I and the object and not between one object and another but only the object has a ‘determinate content’ while the I lacks content hence the difference lies on the side of the objects but since the I has a non-actual difference within itself the I relates to the actual difference, that is to say, the object, and is then reflected back into itself and has the object posited ideally within itself. Hence now there is an actual difference between the pure I and the I qua consciousness of an object, awareness of oneself as an I is both sufficient and necessary. ‘Only when I apprehend, etc.’, for consciousness of an object. The light-analogy implies that I am only genuinely self-aware when I am conscious of objects, light is only visible when it encounters darkness or a dark object (consult the 'Philosophy of Nature' §275Z.). Consciousness of objects and self-consciousness are in need of each other, recall the underlying logic here, consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §413, n. 6). We may suppose that a potential difference must become actual although it is not so evident why the distinction between the I and itself is an sich in the sense of potential.

'La Coiffure', 'Combing the Hair', c. 1896, Edgar Degas

§414

'The identity of the mind with itself, as it is first posited as I, is only its abstract formal ideality. As soul in the form of substantial universality, mind is now subjective reflection-into-itself, related to this substantiality as to the negative of itself, something dark and beyond it. Hence consciousness, like relationship in general, is the contradiction between the independence of the two sides and their identity, in which they are sublated. The mind as I is essence; but since reality, in the sphere of essence, is posited as in immediate being and at the same time as ideal, mind as consciousness is only the appearance of mind'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

With regard to the soul’s substantial universality consult §396Z. The soul is universal in a manner in which the I is not: it is not developed into a distinct individual. ‘Substantial(ity)’ contrasts with ‘subjective’, the soul as such is not a subject confronting an object but rather a substance with accidents, that is to say, sensations or feelings. onsult 'Encyclopadia Logic' §§150-1. These sensations are transformed at the stage of consciousness into independent objects correlative to the mind’s reflection-into-itself, this is the self-division of the mind discussed in §414, and so the relation of the mind to its objects is similar to its relation to the soul’s substantial universality. The latter is its ‘negative’, ‘dark and beyond it’, so consciousness is related to its objects as its negative, dark and beyond it, hence consciousness does not involve the identity of itself and its objects for that would either be a return to the anthropological stage or an advance to a higher stage, consult §414. Consciousness and its objects are joined by a relationship (Verh?ltnis), the two sides of which hover uneasily between independence and identity. Another such relationship is the relationship of the parts to the whole, to be parts of the whole they have to be identical to it but to be parts they have to be separated from each other and from the whole, and thus independent, consult 'Enyclopaedia Logic' §§135–6. Essence (Wesen) contrasts with appearance (das Erscheinen) which is quite different from semblance (Schein(en) ). ‘The essence must appear’ (consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §131), that is, manifest itself in external phenomena, only then is it really an essence. The I is the essence of mind, consciousness its appearance. Reality (die Realit?t) refers to the mind’s objects which are involved in the ‘contradiction’, they are ‘posited’ as both ‘in immediate being’ (unmittelbar seiend), that is, mind-independent, and as ‘ideal’, that is, objects of consciousness. and so mind is here only (nur) appearance, an uneasy combination of ‘reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another, . . . still divided against itself and without intrinsic stability’ ('Encyclopaedia Logic', §131Z.). In 'Encyclopaedia Logic' the deficiency of appearance is repaired at the stage of actuality’, (consult §§142), maybe an analogue of ‘psychology’ in 'philosophy of Mind' §§440 ff.

'Zusatz. The negativity which the wholly abstract I, or mere consciousness, exerts on its Other is a still thoroughly indeterminate, superficial, not an absolute negativity. Consequently, at this standpoint there arises the contradiction that the object is, on the one hand, within me, and on the other hand, has an independent status outside me, like the darkness outside the light. To consciousness the object appears not as an object posited by the I, but as an immediate, given object that just is; for consciousness does not yet know that the object is in itseifidentical with the mind and is released to seemingly complete independence only by a self-division of the mind. That this is so, only we know, we who have got as far as the Idea of mind and have therefore risen above the abstract, formal identity of the l'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

The Zusatz expands upon the contradiction referred to in the passage, the contradiction depends upon the expressions within me (in mir) and outside me (ausser mir). For something to be literally in me and outside me and not just half in and half out) would be contradictory and yet the object is not literally in me, I am simply conscious of it, it might be said to be in my consciousness and yet then it is not at the same time outside my consciousness. That the contradiction is only apparent is suggested by Hegel’s mployment of the light-analogy. What is the darkness (das Dunkle) outside the light?

Is it:

... a dark area or object not illuminated by the light,

... an object illuminated by the light but not inside the light or inside the source of the light,

... those parts of an illuminated object that the light does not reach, its inside and its back?

An evident contradiction requires that it be the first, giving an object that is both illuminated and not illuminated and yet that does not apply to consciousness whose object as an object of consciousness is illuminated.

If the darkness is the second there is no contradiction as an illuminated object need not be inside, rthat is to say, a part of, the light that illuminates it.

The third holds out more hope because it is true that illuminated opaque objects have unilluminated parts and aspects, that illumination is usually only partial and this also appertsains to conscioysness given that my knowledge of an object independent of myself is usually only partial. There is the difference that when I am conscious of for instance a rock by observing it, I am normally also conscious of, or conscious that it has, parts and aspects that I cannot at the moment onserve. Light on the other hand does nothing to illuminate those parts that it leaves in darkness albeit it may by illuminating some parts indicate to an observer the presence of other parts left in the dark. That an object has parts of which I am not completely conscious indicates the independence of the object from myself and my hazy consciousness of such unknown parts sustains my belief that the object is independent of myself. If the I were to exert ‘absolute negativity’ on its ‘Other’ there would be no such contradiction or incongruity as the Other would either be wholly outside the I and not known to it at all or, more likely, entirely dependent on the I and known through and through.

Hegel indeed suggests the object is posited by the I, ‘in itself ’ identical to the mind, and projected by the mind’s ‘self-division’ (Selbstteilung). Hegel and his readers, that's us, can see this, since we have reached the ‘Idea’ (Idee) of mind, that is, the stage at which the gulf between the mind and its objects is closed. On the Idea as the unity of concept (in this context, consciousness) and reality (objects) consult §410. On the distinction between ‘we’ or ‘us’ and the stage of mind under consideration, consult §413. Hegel may be thought of as proposing an idealism of a Kantian sort, which is to say, that the objects that I normally take to be independent of myself are really constructions of my own. If this be the case we may wonder even if we allow that we become conscious of objects by means of a ‘self-division’ of the mind, does it follow that the objects are not independent of the mind? We can allow also that our consciousness of objects is iin need of a large contribution from the mind itself, particularly of general concepts or thoughts, such as causality, but does it follow that objects do not intrinsically conform to such concepts? For instance, are not really causally related to each other? Nonetheless at bottom Hegel is in agreement here for he does not think that objects are constructed by ourselves, he does not a la Kant, suppose that things-in-themselves elude our thoughts and our sensory apparatus. For one thing Kant wishes to leave room for a world-transcendent God accessible to faith whereas Hegel’s God is not transcendent. And recall that mind for Hegel, extends far beyond individual minds so that what objects are and do can be attributed to the mind without being attributed to the mind of the individual.

'Ung pige i haven med orange parasol' ('Young Girl in a Garden with Orange Umbrella'), Anna Ancher?(1859 – 1935)?

§415

'Since I is for itself only as formal identity, the dialectical movement of the concept, the progressive determination of consciousness, does not look to it like its own activity, but is in itself and for the I an alteration of the object. Consciousness therefore appears differently determined according to the difference of the object given, and its progressive formation appears as an alteration of th?? determinations of its object. I, the subject of consciousness, is thinking; the progressive logical determination of the object is what is identical in subject and object, their absolute interconnexion, that in virtue of which the object is the subject's own'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

To the I, the development of consciousness does not appear to be of its own doing and for itself the I is merelyy formal identity and hence too emaciated and frail to engender and direct, the development, the I considers the development as dependent upon changes in its object. The syntax and meaning of ‘the progressive determination . . . is in itself [an sich], etc.’ are not so evident, and it does not mean that the determination really or in fact is alteration of the object but instead that to the I it appears to be actually (an sich) alteration, and so on, and/or that at this undeveloped stage (an sich) it is alteration, and so on. The final sentence of the passage presents Hegel’s own take on it instead of that of the I, the object develops but its development is logical (logische), that is, determined by the dialectical movement of the concept. This development is driven by the subject because this is thinking, but the object shares the same logical development, shadowing the subject so to speak, and since the object has the same underlying structure and development as the subject it is the subject’s own (das Seinige des Subjekts), that is, its object. Consult §417.

'[Remark] Kantian philosophy may be most determinately considered as having conceived the mind as consciousness, and as involving determinations only of phenomenology, not of philosophy of mind. It considers I as relation to something lying beyond, which in its abstract determination is called the thing-initself; and it conceives both the intelligence and the will solely according to this finitude. If, in the concept of the faculty of reflective judgement, it does get to the Idea of mind, subjectivity-objectivity, an intuitive intellect, etc., and even the Idea of nature, still this Idea itself is again demoted to an appearance, namely to a subjective maxim (see §58, lntro.). Therefore Reinholdhad what is to be regarded as a correct sense of this philosophy when he conceived it as a theory of consciousness, under the name faculty of representation. Fichte' s philosophy takes the same standpoint, and Non-I is determined only as object of the I, only in consciousness; it remains an infinite impetus, i.e. a thing-in-itself Both philosophies therefore show that they have not reached the concept and not reached the mind as it is in and for itself, but only as it is in relation to an Other'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

On Hegel’s view of Immanuel Kant, consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §§40–60. Consciousness (Bewusstsein) was not a word enjoying special favour with Kant, albeit in the 'Critique of Pure Reason' he explored the conditions of our objective experience or experience of objects and this is to a greater or lessed degree what Hegel is thinking of by consciousness. In the Critique Kant did not consider other stages of mind that fall within the scope of Hegel’s philosophy of mind, in particular the soul, objective mind, and absolute mind. Kant does elsewhere discourse upon morality and political institutions but he does not regard them in the manner that Hegel does as a phase of the mind’s objectification or as aiding in closing the gap in consciousness between subject and object and hence rising towards the Idea of mind. Consult §§410 and 414. The object of our experience is not for Kant straightforwardly the thing-in-itself, the thing in itself is the thing or object as it is quite independently of the I or the knowing subject, it is known by us in so far as we know it at all only as it manifests itself to us through our subjective forms of space and time and through the categories that we apply to our intuitions.

And so it is that what I primarily stands in relation to is not the thing in itself as such but an appearance or ‘phenomenon and an appearance is not conceived by Kant as entirely dependent on the particular individual who experiences it, like a dream image or an illusion, for that would be a Schein, illusion, semblance rather than an appearance, Erscheinung. An appearance can, for instance, be experienced by others, and has an inner depth, for instance, an atomic structure, that may only be discovered after lengthy investigation. Kant’s idealism differs in this respect from that of Bishop Berkeley whose idealism requires the rejection of such entities as matter and atoms. Hence there is a sense in which the objects of our experience are in themselves, an sich, independent of any particular mind and its current experiences, albeit they are not strictly things in themselves. Perhaps the meaning is that the I for Kant stands in an essential relation to the thing in itself strictly conceived, the I could have no object at all and could therefore not be an I unless it were affected in some way by the thing in itself. Or maybe the idea here is that for the sake of brevity the two types of object are conflated. The intelligence (Intelligenz) is roughly the theoretical mind, consult §§387 and 443. And so it more or less coincides with the subject matter of Kant’s Critique other than that Kant is charged with considering it only in relation to its object, and so 'according to [nach] this finitude’, because it contrasts with and is bounded by an object different from itself and does not have itself as its object, consult §406. The will is the subject matter of Kant’s 'Critique of Practical Reason' where it is less obviously related to phenomenal objects than the intelligence is, because albeit it does will particular, phenomenal actions such as repaying a debt it is, if it is operating properly, directed by the ‘categorical imperative’ to for instance act only on a maxim that it can will to be a natural law.

For Hegel on the other hand the truly free will wills itself or wills freedom not anything other than itself, consult 'Philosophy of Right' §§21 and 'Philosophy of Mind' Enc. III, §481-2. The general notion is that intelligence and will should be regarded in the manner in which they overcome the cleavage between themselves and their objects so that in dealing with their objects they are in some way dealing with themselves. In his Critique of Judgement Kant brought in several ideas that in Hegel’s view put right some of the deficiencies in his first two Critiques. The ‘faculty of reflective judgement [Urteilskraft]’ is at work according to Kant in our judgements of nature as a purposive system, of beauty, and of organic natural wholes. While the ‘faculty of subsuming judgement’ (subsumierende Urteilskraft) is our ability to decide whether something stands under a certain universal rule, concept,and so on, reflective judgement is the capacity to think of the particular as contained in a universal (a rule, law, concept, and so on) that is not immediately given: consult 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §55, where Hegel with good reason but in oppsition to Kant’s intention asserts that Kant ascribes to reflective judgement the ‘principle of an intuitive intellect’. An ‘intuitive intellect’ or understanding which Kant also refers to as ‘intellectual intuition’ is an intellect that supplies not only concepts but also the ‘intuitions’ needed for the application of them, and does not depend as our intellect does on intuitions supplied from outside. On Kant’s view the concept of an intuitive intellect is not contradictory but we do not have such an intellect ourselves nor do we know whether there is a God who has such an intellect albeit it may well be reasonable to view nature as if it were the creation of an intuitive intellect. For an intuitive intellect a concept would at once guarantee its realization in intuition. Therefore it involves ‘subjectivity-objectivity’ (Subjekt-Objektivit?t), the automatic realization (objectivity) of a concept (subjectivity) and this in turn amounts to an Idea (Idee) where the concept (subjectivity) involves its own reality (objectivity), consult §377. A reflective judgement is therefore a judgement that presents a concept or universal as entailing its own realization. It is distinct from what 'Encyclopaedia Logic' §174 designates a ‘judgement of reflection’ which is a judgement that relates something such as a plant to something else such as a disease as in ‘This plant is medicinal’ in contrast to a ‘qualitative judgement’ such as ‘This rose is red’.

The concept of a plant, for instance, involves its own realization, a claim that Hegel endows with plausibility by identifying the concept with the plan or code embedded in the seed while by contrast Kant regards a reflective judgement as a substitute for such claims. We would do well according to Kant to consider a living organism as if its realization were secured by its concept, as if it were the product of an intuitive intellect, but this is a ‘subjective maxim’ for our inquiry and not a genuinely objective contention. And furthermore, we can think of God as having an intuitive intellect but not ourselves and Hegel by contrast is inclined to attribute an intuitive intellect to us. We can derive nature from its concept and mind from its concept albeit we do so by a sequence of stages and not immediately as Kant supposes God would do. Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758–1823) published Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsverm?gen ('Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation') in 1789. Motivated by Kant’s claim that ‘The I think must be able to accompany all my representations’ ('Critique of Pure Reason', B131), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) endeavoured in particular in his Wissenschaftslehre ('Theory of Science') (1794), to derive the fundamental characteristics of the world from the I or ego and in doing this he endeavoured to dispense with the unknowable thing-in-itself that like many of Kant’s contemporaries and successors he had objections to. But the initial thing that the I has to do is posit a ‘Non-I’ (Nicht-Ich) that gives the I an impetus, impulse, or shock (Anstoss), goading it into activity. The I then develops in interaction with the Non-I and the impetus is infinite in that it is total and all-embracing and not one localized impetus among others and that it impels the I to endless activity. As for hegel;s criticism of Fichte whereas Reinhold gives a subjective psychological turn to Kant’s doctrine and is dealing with the individual I, Fichte’s I is not an individual I. Individual I’s emerge only later as a result primarily of the practical or moral requirements of the I, moral restraints and prescriptions presuppose another I. And so the Non-I is not an object (Gegenstand) of the I in the ordinary sense nor is it ‘in consciousness’. Unlike Kant’s thing in itself the Non-I is not independent of the I, it is a product of the I itself and has no intrinsic nature beyond what the I posits in it. By analogy an actual rival may spur me on in my academic, or women chasing or other activities but so may an adversary whom I dream up or imagine maybe for this very purpose; Fichte’s Non-I is more like an imaginary competitor than an actual rival. Whereas for Kant, God, if he exists, is a thing-in-itself, for Fichte God, if he exists, is the I, not the Non-I. Fichte’s I is not the mind and the Non-I is not really ‘an Other’ standing ‘in relation’ to the I, which is to be borne in mind when considering Hegel's gripe with Fichte.

'As regards Spinozism, it is to be noted against it that in the judgement by which the mind constitutes itself as I, as free subjectivity in contrast to determinacy, the mind emerges from substance, and philosophy, when it makes this judgement the absolute determination of mind, emerges from Spinozism'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

In his 'Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata' ('Ethics demonstrated in geometrical order') (1677) Benedict or Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) argued that there is only one substance, with two attributes known to us, extension and thought. A human body is a mode of substance in the attribute of extension while the human mind is a mode of substance in the attribute of thought and because the attributes and their respective modes run parallel to each other in every detail Hegel infers that the mind could not on this account be an I, a unitary self. it must be as dispersed as the body is somewhat similar to the self as David Hume, (1711 - 1776), saw it, a bundle of impressions and ideas. According to Spinoza, the mind is in its usual state not free, it gets its ideas from the impacts of other bodies on its own body but we can nonetheless attain a certain freedom by acquiring philosophical knowledge of the whole of substance, hence breaking loose from our immediate surroundings. This is the third and highest of the grades of cognition described in S[inoza's Ethics, II. 40, Scholium 2, the scientia intuitiva that ‘proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God [that is, substance] to adequate cognition of the essence of things', and the mind views everything sub specie aeternitatis, and has what Spinoza calls amor Dei intellectualis, ‘intellectual love of God’.

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.—The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.

Note.—In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premisses are plain.

PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.

Proof.—From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions, xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the intellectual love of God.

PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

- 'Ethics', V.

The intellectual love of God, which is, since the mind is still a mode of God or substance, ‘part of the infinite love by which God loves himself ’ (Ethics, V. 36). Hegel refers to this intellectual love of God in the 'Encyclopaedia Logic', §158., agreeing with Spinoza’s view that freedom is the understanding of necessity and he may have that in mind here.

'The ethical person is conscious of the content of his action as something necessary, something that is valid in and for itself; and this consciousness is so far from diminishing his freedom, that, on the contrary, it is only through this consciousness that his abstract freedom becomes a freedom that is actual and rich in content, as distinct from freedom of choice, a a freedom that still lacks content and is merely possible. A criminal who is punished may regard the punishment meted out to him as a restriction of his freedom; in fact, however, the punishment is not an alien violence to which he is subject, but is only the manifestation of his own deed; and it is when he recognises this that he behaves as a free person. Generally speaking, the highest independence of man is to know himself as totally determined by the absolute Idea; this is the consciousness and attitude that Spinoza calls amor intellectualis Dei [the intellectual love of God]'

- 'Encyclopaedia Logic'

Hege's argument therefore may perhaps proceed as follows. The mind does, according to Spinoza, constitute itself as I, as free subjectivity, but this is incompatible with Spinoza’s substance doctrine. But it may be that Hegel is thinking more generally, contensding that proper I-awareness is incompatible with Spinozism. He views Spinozism not as just wrong but as an essential phase of philosophy that needs to be overcome or sublated and considers the concept of substance as adequate for describing the early stage of the human individual before it reaches I-awareness (the soul), the early stage of human society before individuals attained (modern) I-awareness (the Presocratic Greek city-state), and the early stage of the universe as a whole before self-conscious humans emerged. And so Spinozism has a necessary place in our understanding of things and yet it cannot accommodate the self-conscious subject. The judgement (Urteil) by which the I is constituted is not a proposition but an original (ur-) division (teil ), by which the mind extricates itself from its substantial life and from its surroundings. Consult §407.

'Zusatz. ( 1 ) Although the progressive determination of consciousness proceeds from its own interior and is also directed towards the object in a negative way, and the object is thus altered by consciousness, yet this alteration appears to consciousness as an alteration that comes about without its subjective activity, and the determinations that it posits in the object count for it as belonging only to the - object, as determinations that just are. (2) With Fichte there is always the difficulty of how the I is to cope with the Non-i. He does not get to any genuine unity of these two sides; this unity always remains only a unity that ought to be, because at the outset the false presupposition is made that I and Non-I in their separateness, in their Jinitude, are something absolute'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

After Fichte’s I has posited itself and posited the Non-I, its third and final preliminary step is to posit in the I a ‘divisible’ Non-I in contrast to the ‘divisible’ I, that is, it parcels out the available territory between the I and the Non-I. But Hegel is not primarily referring to the difficulties involved in this step. Fichte believed that after the I has, in interaction with the Non-I, created the material world, individual I’s, human societies, and so on, it in some manner reclaims them by its moral activity, but this reunification can only be attained at infinity, the unity of the I and the Non-I ought to be, but is approached only asymptotically. But It is not indubitably true that Fichte here makes the I and the Non-I each something finite bounded by the other yet absolute. The Non-I is produced by the I, which remains the partner in charge so to speak.

_______________________----

For my muse

Listen to my story it's a song of love

A story you never will forget

A story only made for you

I want you to believe it's true

Listen to the music

It's a song for you

Feel the wind blow through your hair

...

To love you every day and minute of my life

Beautiful lady ... you are the One ...

Beautiful lady ... you are the music ...

Coming up next:

Consciousness makes its appearance identical with its essence, to raise the certainty of itself to truth.

It may stop but it never ends.