Grenfell Tower - Major Lessons for Architects

Grenfell fire is one of the worst modern days disasters that happened in UK. The 24-storey residential tower got surrounded by sky touching flames within minutes after the fire broke out in one of the flats on the fourth floor. Seventy-two people died and several lost their homes and belongings. The fire spread quickly through the exterior cladding and wrapped the whole building from all sides. 

Picture source - https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Grenfell_Tower_fire

The main reason behind such a quick spread was the aluminium composite material (ACM) used for exterior cladding, with a highly combustible polyethylene polymer filler. In addition to it, the building smoke extraction system didn’t work and firefighters experienced problems in accessing the water supply because the tower did not have a ‘wet riser’ (a water-filled pipe running up the building to be used in the event of a fire). Another contributory factor was that none of the main doors to the apartments were meeting the fire resistance standards and failed to confine the fire.1

Picture Source - https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40301289 

Grenfell project was a result of combined failures at several fronts. It highlighted the loopholes present in the construction industry and the lack of accountability at each level. It also spread light on the regulatory guidelines, which are vague and provide opportunities for exploitation by the professionals. For the purpose of this article, I am limiting my observations with respect to the failure on the front of the architecture firm (Studio-E) deployed for the project with an intent to caution practicing architects about their responsibilities.

Studio-E did not have any experience with high-rise buildings. They were deployed out of convenience as they were already working with the employer on the adjacent Kensington Academy and Leisure Centre. However, the firm took the job knowing their incompetency. 

The founder of the firm Andrzej Kuszell accepted that the project architect had warned that the firm would need to do “rapid CPD” (Continuous Professional Development) for the project when it was first appointed.2

The fire escape strategy design by Studio-E failed to confine the fire. However, in defense against the selection of cladding panel project, the architect of Studio-E stated,

“…Taking the Building Regulations approvals process for the cladding… as part of my coordinating role I relied on the expertise of Rydon, a main contractor experienced in refurbishing high-rise residential blocks, a specialist subcontractor, Harley, who I understand stated that over-cladding tower blocks was very much what it does, Exova, which markets itself as a world leader in the provision of fire safety services and building control, which has specific competencies in verifying that designs comply with Building Regulations…”3

It is clear from the statement that the project architect didn’t assume any responsibility towards the fire safety of the building and relied on the competency of contractor, subcontractor and fire safety consultant. However, as per Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 guidelines4, project designer is responsible for all design decisions taking during the design phase,

“Principal designers have an important role in influencing how risks to health and safety are managed throughout a project. Design decisions made during the pre-construction phase have a significant influence in ensuring the project is delivered in a way that secures the health and safety of everyone affected by the work…”5

The case hearing highlighted several pitfalls of Studio-E, some of them are listed below6 - 

1. Project responsibility missing within the organisation - The architects were involved in the project as and when required. The architect who finalised the tender drawings and specifications was involved in the project only two months before the finalisation of the tender. Due to his limited involvement and inadequate knowledge of project background, he made few assumptions that became fatal for the project. Further, the project was not adequately documented to assist the new architect about the pervious project discussions among the stakeholders. 

“…I worked on the Project. I also do not recall discussing whether these panels came with fire retardant cores or whether any investigation on compliance with Part B of the Building Regulations 2010 (Building Regulations) had taken place. I may have assumed that compliance with Building Regulations had already been confirmed prior to my involvement…” 7

2. Project architect had limited knowledge of the relevant building codes mentioned in the specifications - The specifications were prepared based on the National Building Specification standard (standardised system of specification published by the Royal Institute of British Architects) which refers to the ‘Centre for window and cladding technology’ guideline for “Standard for systemised building envelopes”. Though the architect had included it in the tender specifications, he was himself not aware of the content of the code. 

Paragraph 6.6.2 (Insulation materials) of the CWCT Standard provides: "Insulation in walls of buildings with a storey more than 18m above ground level should be of limited combustibility."

Due to his lack of understanding of the requirements, he was not able to find the products (rain-screen cladding, windows, insulation) which were meeting the regulatory requirements. Further, based on the subcontractor’s suggestion polyethylene based composite panels were included in the specification. 

3. Scope gap between Studio-E (architectural firm) and Exova (Fire system experts) - The scope assigned to Exova was limited but Studio-E assumed that Exova would be handling all elements related to fire management plan. Because of such mismatch of scope, many fire safety points were left unaddressed. Further, the cladding specifications were not shared with Exova for review. Exova fire safety engineering stated;

“…So retrospective being that it is based on an existing building, so we are looking at the fire safety design for a building that is already there …it was really an informative piece of work to look at the fire safety design of the (refurbished) building for the design team rather than a holistic fire safety audit, … which would involve much more…”8

4. Appearance and Budget - The initial cladding specification was composite zinc but the client wanted to bring down the project cost within budget. While searching for alternatives, the Studio-E’s focus was on maintaining the building appearance and was looking for a cheaper alternative. ACM was included in the specification based on the suggestion of the subcontractor and his assurance, without conducting any research on architect’s end. Studio-E’s architect mentioned in an email to subcontractor; 

“…We are under pressure from the client regarding the costs with suggestions flagged of using aluminium. We (and the Planners) would much rather see zinc up there…”9

The underlying theme of these points is the lack of collaboration. Stakeholders working in silos and not bothered to ensure that whether their work is being understood and carried forward by others, as deigned. Dame Judith Hackitt in her Interim Report on Building a Safer Future 2017 stated “Many of the findings to date clearly identify the need for a major cultural shift across all of those who are part of the system within the construction, operation and maintenance of complex and high-risk buildings”

In the process of improving the current culture within industry, RIBA has laid out new plan of work to clarify the responsibilities of building professionals by providing a best practice process mapping for fire safety. RIBA’s process emphasises on early contractor involvement and collaborated working environment among architect, owner and contractor from the start of the project. 

There are big learnings from this sad accident which can and should be rectified by authorities in other regions as well. An incident like this causes irrecoverable damage to lives and hence all possible checks and regulations should be put in place before making a building operational.

1. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40301289
2. https://www.bdonline.co.uk/news/studio-e-we-wouldnt-have-won-grenfell-refurb-in-competitive-process/5104650.article
3. https://www.bdonline.co.uk/news/architect-signed-off-non-compliant-drawings-grenfell-inquiry-told/5104069.article
4. https://www.hse.gov.uk/construction/cdm/2015/principal-designers.htm
5. ibid 
6. https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/hearings/studio-e-evidence-11-march-2020
7. https://assets.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/SEA00014278_2018.11.09%20Witness%20Statement%20of%20Tomas%20Rek%20%28Studio%20E%29_0.pdf
8. https://assets.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/documents/transcript/Transcript%2016%20March%202020.pdf
9. https://assets.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/documents/transcript/Transcript%2011%20March%202020.pdf