Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase II report

We now have in hand the c. 1,745 page phase II report.

Lots to read, consider, and respond to. I count 58 recommendations. In the first instance, I have summarised all of these recommendations:

1. The government should draw together under a single regulator all functions relating to the construction industry.
2. The definition of a "higher-risk building" for the purposes of the Building Safety Act should be urgently reviewed.
3. Responsibility for fire safety functions currently split between various departments should be brought into one department under a single Secretary of State.
4. A Chief Construction Adviser should be appointed with sufficient resources to provide advice on construction industry matters.
5. Approved Document B should be reviewed urgently, considering expert evidence, and continuously updated. It should be conservatively drafted to safeguard compliance with the Building Regulations.
6. Statutory guidance, including Approved Document B, should include a warning that meeting the guidance does not guarantee compliance with the law.
7. The effectiveness of compartmentation in overcladding buildings should be reconsidered when revising Approved Document B.
8. Vertical spread of fire calculations: guidance should highlight the need for a calculation of vertical fire spread and comparison to evacuation time (a new type of ASET/RSET).
9. Membership of bodies advising on changes to statutory guidance should include representatives from both the academic community and industry, selected for their experience and skill.
10. A fire safety strategy by a registered fire engineer must be submitted with building control applications for higher-risk buildings and reviewed at completion.
11. Steps should be taken to develop new test methods specifically for assessing vertical fire spread on external walls.
12. BS 9414 should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.
13. A construction regulator should assess the conformity of construction products with legislation and issue certificates. These certificates should become market-preeminent.
14. Certificates for construction products should include all test results, manufacturers should provide full testing histories, and manufacturers must legally provide test results upon request.
15. The profession of fire engineer should be legally recognised and regulated by an independent body that defines standards and maintains a register of members.
16. The government should urgently increase the number of places on accredited master’s level fire engineering courses.
17. Until a regulatory body is established, the government should convene a group of fire engineers and professionals to define the skills expected of a competent fire engineer.
18. The government should work with industry to encourage the development of fire engineering courses for construction professionals and fire service members as part of their continuing development.
19. The Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects should review recent changes to architectural education to ensure they are sufficient.
20. An application for building control approval for higher-risk buildings must be supported by a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer that the building will meet Building Regulations upon completion.
21. A licensing scheme for principal contractors working on higher-risk buildings should be introduced, with a legal requirement for senior managers to personally ensure compliance with safety regulations.
22. The government should appoint an independent panel to assess whether building control functions should be performed by those with a commercial interest in the process.
23. The same panel should consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.
24. The construction regulator should sponsor a knowledge library, possibly in collaboration with the University of Queensland, as a resource for designers.
25. The government should maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners, and public inquiries, alongside the actions taken in response.
26. A mandatory accreditation scheme should be established to certify the competence of fire risk assessors, with set standards for qualifications and development.
27. The government should seek urgent advice from the Building Safety Regulator and the National Fire Chiefs Council on the issue of fire control switches in lifts.
28. Every gas transporter should be required by law to check the accessibility of emergency gas valves every three years and report to the Health and Safety Executive.
29. The government should establish a national fire college with a permanent staff to provide training, research, and development for fire and rescue services.
30. The national fire college should have an adequate number of permanent staff.
31. The London Fire Brigade (LFB) control room should be inspected to assess its integration, effectiveness, and the adequacy of training for control room staff.
32. The LFB should review its arrangements for assessing and maintaining the competence of incident commanders at all levels.
33. The Inspectorate should inspect the LFB’s arrangements for collecting, storing, and distributing operational risk information, particularly for identifying high-risk residential buildings.
34. The LFB should establish effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering, and effectively implementing lessons learned from previous incidents, inquests, and investigations.
35. Fire and rescue services that continue to use low-power intrinsically safe radios as part of breathing apparatus should consider reserving them for situations where there is a real risk of igniting flammable gases and generally use higher-power radios, especially in high-rise buildings.
36. Fire and rescue services should equip all firefighters with digital radios.
37. Firefighters should receive training on how to respond to and restore lost communications, especially in environments where radio communication is unreliable.
38. All firefighters should receive basic training on the water supply system, including the types and functions of hydrants.
39. Fire and rescue services should establish protocols with water suppliers to ensure effective communication for firefighting purposes.
40. The British Standards Institution should amend BS 750 to clarify how flow coefficients for water supplies are measured.
41. The National Fire Chiefs Council should provide training on how and when firefighters may deviate from instructions during emergencies.
42. The Civil Contingencies Act should be reviewed, considering whether the Secretary of State should temporarily assume the role of a Category 1 responder during emergencies.
43. Category 1 responders should establish partnerships with voluntary, community, and faith organisations to improve emergency response.
44. Emergency preparedness guidance should be revised, consolidated, and reduced in length, with emphasis on recovery, vulnerable people, and collaboration with community groups.
45. Humanitarian considerations should be recognised as a key principle of emergency response and recovery.
46. The guidance on the London Local Authority Gold arrangements should be revised to ensure a clearer understanding of the process, particularly in cases affecting a single borough. Chief executives should receive regular training on its principles.
47. Local resilience forums should adopt national standards for emergency planning and training, with independent audits to ensure compliance.
48. A mechanism should be introduced to independently verify the frequency and quality of training provided by local authorities and other Category 1 responders.
49. Local authorities should train all employees, including senior managers, to integrate resilience into their responsibilities.
50. Local authorities should devise methods of obtaining and recording information about displaced or missing people during emergencies, ideally in electronic form, and practise implementing them in different scenarios.
51. Local authorities should ensure arrangements are in place to provide temporary accommodation during emergencies that meets personal, religious, and cultural needs.
52. Local authorities should establish plans for providing immediate financial assistance to people affected by emergencies.
53. Local authorities should ensure continuity of support during emergencies by making suitable contingency plans for key workers.
54. Local authorities should develop arrangements for maintaining communication with those in need of assistance during emergencies, using a range of technologies and languages.
55. Local authorities should include in their emergency plans arrangements for providing information to the public using the most effective combination of modern communication methods for their areas.
56. In future, to avoid confusion, wasted effort and frustration, what has previously been called a "casualty bureau" by the police should be renamed to make it clear that it does not provide information to the public about people affected by the emergency.
57. Further consideration should be given to the Phase 1 recommendations for requiring the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building to prepare Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) for residents whose ability to evacuate without assistance may be compromised. Information about vulnerable residents and their PEEPs should also be included in a premises information box.
58. The advice in paragraph 79.11 of the LGA Guide, which states it is unrealistic to plan for the evacuation and assistance of disabled and vulnerable residents in general needs blocks, should be reconsidered. Additionally, sufficient information about vulnerable occupants should be collected to enable appropriate measures to assist in their evacuation during a fire.