Government rejects Grenfell Inquiry recommendations and overwhelming stakeholder support for PEEPS - Part 1 of 2
“The Party told you to reject the evidence of your eyes and ears. It was their final, most essential command.” ― George Orwell, 1984
The UK government response to the PEEP consultation draws on false premises, misinformation, and ill-informed opinion to conclude that PEEPs should be abandoned on the basis that they are not, ‘practical’ or ‘proportionate’ or ‘safe’. It leaves me questioning how the government’s approach to the consultation aligns with evidence-based policymaking, a central tenet of good government. In this article I identify and address much of the legitimate confusion and fears expressed by some organisations in their response to the consultation, and the scaremongering of others.
The article is published in two parts; in the first, I question the approach adopted by the government and the legitimacy of their conclusions and go onto focus on common misconceptions, such as the need to have permanent staff, and concerns about the reluctance of family, friends and neighbours to be buddies, the ability to train them, excessive costs, etc; in the second and final part, I continue this discussion, and address the government’s proposed alternative to PEEPs, the lamentable EEIS.
PART 1: THE PEEP CONSULTATION AND COMMON PEEP MISCONCEPTIONS
(1)???THE HOME OFFICE PEEP CONSULTATION
Five years since the Grenfell tragedy, two and half years since the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 1 report made Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) a key recommendation [1], and one year since a Home Office (HO) public consultation found 83% support for their implementation, the government has abandoned the policy. The reason appears to be that alongside overwhelming support for PEEPs, the HO PEEP consultation findings (published on 18 May 2022 [2]) highlighted some concerns. And rather than exploring their legitimacy and how they could be addressed – consistent with evidence-based policymaking – the HO took unsubstantiated claims at face value, concluding that PEEPs could not be employed for reasons of ‘practicality, proportionality and safety’ [2].?How is this possible?
The formal PEEP consultation (8 June 19 July 2021) consisted of an online questionnaire, open to all interested parties and members of the public, and four two-hour online workshops (15 June to 8 July 2021), also open to interested parties (see pages 6 and 7 of [2]).?Even though the government describes the 18 May document as its response to this formal consultation, it reports the findings of the formal consultation process, without its response to the latter, or recommendations based on it.
From my reading of the consultation conclusions and recommendations, it appears that the substantive part of the HO response is based on a series of private meetings conducted after the formal consultation.?On page 44 of the 18 May document [2], the government reports that as a ‘follow up’ to the consultation process, they held these meetings with representatives from 18 organisations representing local authorities and housing associations from throughout England (i.e., organisation types that represented 40% of the participants in the formal consultation).?These meetings allowed this select group of stakeholders, who appear to have been largely sceptical of PEEPs, to again feedback their opinions, this time without challenge from stakeholders supportive of PEEPs.
While it is reasonable to follow up the consultation process with meetings with ‘experts’, this should not be confused with the results of the formal consultation, AND for these ‘expert’ meetings to be of real value, they should be balanced, with views from either side of the argument. It is simply not credible to seek ‘expert’ information from only one side of the argument, present it as part of the formal consultation response, and base the majority of conclusions and recommendations on this private, unsubstantiated opinion.
As it turns out, the representatives from the 18 organisations involved in the private follow-up meetings do not appear to have implemented PEEPs, or anything vaguely like them. Their replies are not based on practical experience, and do not represent the views of organisations with actual experience of implementing PEEPs. The views expressed appear to be biased opinion, echoing the fears and scaremongering of some of the organisations that responded to the formal consultation. It could further be argued that the organisations in these ‘follow up’ meetings don’t even have a deep understanding of human behaviour and evacuation dynamics.?As such, the HO has simply given another platform for certain organisations to express their fears of PEEPs, without pursuing, exploring or even entertaining informed counter argument, consistent with evidence-based policymaking.?
The HO appears to have based their response to the formal consultation solely on the views of a number of misinformed organisations, collected outside the stated formal consultation process.?It is as if the views of these few organisations (without experience of implementing PEEPs according to the HO (see page 50 of [2])) trump all other expert opinions.
(2)???WHAT DID THE GRENFELL TOWER FIRE INQUIRY RECOMMEND REGARDING PEEPS?
The Grenfell Tower fire Inquiry Phase 1 report recommended, “that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to prepare” PEEPs for “all residents whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised” (recommendation 33.22e [1]).?PEEPs are a way to identify obstacles that may make it difficult or impossible for disabled residents to evacuate a burning building safely, should the need arise.?In addition, they suggest reasonable mitigations that can be implemented to assist in the evacuation of disabled residents.?Thus, PEEPs attempt to identify and reduce the life safety risks experienced by disabled people in high-rise residential buildings. It is important to understand that, as with any fire mitigation measure, PEEPs are not intended to reduce life safety risks to zero, but to identify, manage and reduce risks to a reasonable level.
It is also important to note that the Person Centred Fire Risk Assessment (PCFRA) and Home Fire Safety Visit (HFSV) are not PEEPs.?These important and useful interventions are intended to assess fire safety issues within the flat of the disabled person (see 3.3.5d).??While they are useful fire safety measures in themselves, they are not intended to address evacuation from high-rise buildings.?A PCFRA or a HFSV cannot be claimed to be a PEEP.
A 'Stay Put' building, Grenfell Tower (14 June 2017)
(3)???WHAT WERE THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE PEEP CONSULTATION?
?3.1 Who took part?
Before discussing the findings of the formal consultation, it is important to note that there were 382 responses to the first phase. The largest groups represented were in the categories below (note individuals could identify with more than one group):
In the second phase of the consultation process, the workshops involved representatives from Fire and Rescue Services (FRS), Local Government, fire safety experts, leaseholders, housing associations, disability groups, those who described themselves as vulnerable residents, and concerned citizens.
It is important to note that the majority (40%) of the respondents to phase 1 were RPs, building owners, local authorities, etc.?Furthermore, the group that the HO consulted for their ‘follow up’ discussions was drawn from this category, with a focus on RPs and Local Authorities.?In contrast, only 6% of the respondents to the formal part of the consultation were fire professionals.?
?3.2 The main findings – overwhelming support for the PEEP concept.
The key results from each of the questions, for which a statistical result was provided, are as follows (note I have paraphrased each of the proposal questions; exact wording can be found in [2]). Overall, respondents expressed significant support for all the PEEP proposals. In each case, there was also considerable commentary, highlighting perceived challenges associated with implementing them. This will be discussed later.
An overwhelming 83% of the respondents either strongly agreed or tended to agree (the top two support categories), with only 11% in the disagree categories.?This result is significant, as it indicates that virtually all the participants, of which respondents such as Local Authorities, Responsible Persons, Building Owners and Property Company represent 40%, agree that PEEPs should be implemented.?
An overwhelming 88% of the respondents either strongly agreed or tended to agree (the top two support categories), with only 7% in the disagree categories.?A key finding is that the vast majority of the respondents were supportive of the development and general availability of a PEEP template.
An overwhelming 89% of the respondents either strongly agreed or tended to agree (the top two support categories), with only 7% in the disagree categories. ?A key finding is that the vast majority of the respondents were supportive of the need to keep the PEEP information up to date and making some form of the PEEP information available to the FRS.
An overwhelming 90% of the respondents either strongly agreed or tended to agree (the top two support categories), with only 5% in the disagree categories.?A key finding is that the vast majority of the respondents were supportive of the need to provide a template of the key information that should be provided to the FRS to facilitate ‘emergency evacuation’ and that this key information is available in the Premises Information Box (PIB).
It is clear that there is overwhelming support for each of the key proposals from across the entire community of stakeholders, with the minimum support being 83%.?Some of the positive written comments and discussion in the workshops also suggested how the PEEP process could be improved.?It is thus surprising that the HO has concluded that PEEPs cannot be implemented.?As suggested above, while there was overwhelming support for the concept of PEEPs, the consultation process highlighted concerns expressed by some, apparently influential, participants.?These concerns are associated with the collection and administration of information associated with PEEPs, the dissemination of that information, and the implementation of suggested PEEP mitigations.?While stakeholders in the formal consultation provided robust evidence to rebut or address these concerns, the government appear to have ignored these responses, preferring to listen to the opinions of those, who by their own admission (see page 50 of [2]), have no experience of implementing PEEPs.
While it is not possible here to address all the issues raised in the PEEP consultation report [2], I highlight and discuss some of the key recurring themes.?
3.3 Questions and concerns raised.
As part of the formal consultation process, respondents who participated to Phase 1 were invited to expand on their response to the key proposals by providing written explanations supporting their views or raising concerns with parts of the proposals. ?In Phase 2 of the consultation, stakeholders could put their concerns forward in workshops, so they could be challenged and addressed by others. Finally, in the ‘follow up’ to the formal consultation process, the HO invited local authorities and housing associations (who represented 40% of the participants in the formal consultation) to again feedback their opinions, this time in private meetings where they were unchallenged by stakeholders supportive of PEEPs.?
A number of recurring themes emerged from the formal consultation and ‘follow up’ private meetings, many of which are discussed briefly in the HO report [2].?While some may be legitimate fears, many are based on misinformation and false premises, or arise from a lack of critical thinking. For example, the government and those opposed to PEEPs often employ the logical fallacy of 'normalising extremes' in their argument.?This is where an extreme scenario e.g., a volunteer injuring a disabled person while transferring them to an evacuation chair, is mischaracterised as representative or likely to be the norm.?Based on this type of argument, PEEPs are labelled as not ‘practical’ or ‘proportionate’ or ‘safe’. However, those using this form of faulty logic are quick to claim that the Grenfell Tower fire is an outlier and an extreme case, so should not be used as a reason for the introduction of PEEPs, or in developing evacuation plans for ‘stay put’ buildings.?It is a profoundly misleading line of argument, and highlights the weakness of their position. ??Clarifying these issues would address much of the fears of organisations, and the scaremongering of others.??If the government were serious about wanting to address the evacuation of disabled residents, it could easily address these issues and focus on the task of making residential buildings safe for all.
Here I discuss why some of these issues are specious and how others can be addressed in a practical, proportionate and safe way. I focus particularly on misconceptions, such as the need to have permanent staff, and concerns about the reluctance of family, friends and neighbours to be buddies, an inability to train them, excessive costs, fears of resentment from non-disabled residents if asked to contribute to funding PEEP measures, etc. ?It is important to once again note that the formal consultation only involved 23 fire professionals, representing only 6% of the total respondents.?Perhaps, with a greater representation of fire professionals their voice would have been as loud as those expressing the concerns.
A residential building under 18m in height, Samuel Garside House, Barking (09/06/19)
3.3.1?Misconceptions associated with using volunteers to assist disabled residents
Central to the concerns of some was the use of volunteers – family, friends and neighbours – to implement the assisted evacuation of disabled residents, rather than permanent full-time paid staff.?These concerns manifested themselves in many ways throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2, and in the ‘follow up’ private meetings.?Here I discuss several of these recurring themes.
(a)???The use of volunteers does not provide a guarantee of support and hence success.
It is essential to understand that any fire safety measure, even the sacred concept of compartmentation, upon which the 'stay put' philosophy is based, never comes with a guarantee of success.?For example, a study has recently suggested that the frequency of compartmentation failure in fires within ‘stay put’ residential blocks of flats (e.g., the recent Deptford fire (26 April 2022)) averaged 10 per month over the 10 year period to 2020 (excluding smoke spread), and this only accounts for failures prior to the arrival of the FRS [3].??This is why even ‘stay put’ buildings need to have a viable Plan B (evacuation strategy), of which PEEPs form an integral part.?Even the ability of the FRS to control the fire and undertake ‘emergency evacuation’ (as suggested by the government EEIS proposal [4]) is not guaranteed.?It appears that PEEPs are the only measure the government requires to have an iron clad guarantee, while all other measures, in reality are essentially ‘best efforts’.?While PEEPs are not a guarantee of success, they identify specific risk factors, and implement mitigations that reduce the identified risk to acceptable levels.?
If the Grenfell Tower Inquiry proposals are implemented in full, essentially ALL high-rise residential buildings will have three layers of safety: Plan A (stay put), Plan B (evacuation, including PEEPs), and Plan C (FRS ‘emergency evacuation’). And the FRS will have two operational plans: Plan A (extinguish the fire), and Plan B (FRS instigated ‘emergency evacuation’).?So if, for any reason, the building Plan B failed to ensure the safe evacuation of all, the building Plan C would be implemented.?This multi-layered approach to building safety is called ‘safety in depth’, something that is lacking in current fire safety planning.?As there is currently no building Plan B (evacuation plan including PEEPs), residents who cannot self-evacuate are wholly reliant on FRS instigated ‘emergency evacuation’.?While the FRS report that they have developed a robust ‘emergency evacuation’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings, it is unclear how they would propose to safely instigate and manage ‘emergency evacuation’ of ALL disabled residents, let alone ALL residents unable to evacuate.
?(b)???Volunteers may not be present on the day or at the time of the emergency.
PEEPs are currently widely implemented in office buildings.?In many, there are likely to be a large number of disabled staff (including those with temporary disabilities) who require a PEEP and assistance to evacuate.?In these buildings, it is unlikely that there would be sufficient specially-employed staff to provide the required assistance, so volunteers – often called ‘buddies’ – are typically used to assist disabled colleagues in an emergency.?Buddies are regular employees trained in the general evacuation process and in the specialist skills required to assist their disabled colleague e.g. how to use an evacuation chair. As buddies are regular work colleagues, there is no guarantee they will be in the building at the time of the emergency; they could be out to lunch, at an off-site meeting, on vacation or off sick, for example.?But this does not mean that PEEPs cannot be implemented in workplaces.?Similarly, for residential buildings, there is no guarantee that the ‘buddy’ will be available when required.?This risk would be identified in the PEEP documentation and, where possible, measures would be put in place to mitigate it, e.g., provide more than one buddy.?
Furthermore, as this risk would be identified in the disabled person’s PEEP documentation, the FRS would be aware of this possibility and, as part of the FRS Plan B (i.e., building Plan C, see 3.3.1a), would prioritise the disabled person for ‘emergency evacuation’ if they were not accounted for.?
It should be noted that as part of the PEEP process, evacuated disabled residents should be assigned a post evacuation assembly location.?This will enable the FRS to determine rapidly which disabled residents have not managed to evacuate, and to prioritise them in their 'emergency evacuation' procedures.?This is one of the important omissions from the HO suggested summary PEEP template placed in the Premises Information Box (PIB) for the FRS (see Annex B of [5]).
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(c)????Volunteers, unlike trained firefighters, cannot be relied on to evacuate residents in a smoke-filled environment.
First, we cannot rely on firefighters to perform ‘emergency evacuation’ in all circumstances, especially in smoke-filled environments.?The experience of both Lakanal House and Grenfell Tower is evidence that there are no guarantees that the FRS will be able to evacuate non-disabled residents, let alone disabled residents.?But the expectation – as would be explained in the PEEP documentation and in buddy training – is that volunteers will not put their own lives at risk to assist in the evacuation of others.?It is similar for buddies in office buildings, who are not expected to perform the role of firefighters; they are expected to assist in the evacuation of disabled colleagues only when safe to do so.?And if for whatever reason, the volunteer in a residential building is unable to evacuate their assigned disabled neighbour safely, the building Plan C will be activated, i.e., ‘emergency evacuation’ by the FRS.
In their response to this issue, the HO did note that advocates of the use of volunteers to assist in the evacuation of others cited ‘academic research which shows that often in emergencies, people pull together and help each other’.?However, they neglect to say that it is evidence derived from studies of real-world disasters – not hypothetical studies, questionable experiments, or groundless opinion.
(d)???Some disabled residents may not have volunteers willing to assist them in an emergency.
Yes, it is possible that a particular disabled person may not have anyone willing or suitable to assist them in an emergency. If this were the case, at least the risk would have been identified and noted in the PEEP documentation.?And the FRS would be made aware and would be able to prioritise the person as part of their 'emergency evacuation' process (i.e., FRS Plan B and building Plan C).
This would also be the case in those situations where, for whatever reason, the assigned buddy was unable or unwilling to evacuate their assigned disabled person.
(e)???Volunteers could injure disabled residents while transferring them to the assist device.
In some cases, transferring a disabled person to an evacuation chair could cause serious injuries, if not undertaken appropriately.?In these cases, this risk would be highlighted in the PEEP, and volunteers would be trained to do the transfer correctly.?And if necessary, a hoist would be made available as part of the PEEP, if it were not already there.?However, in many, and probably most cases, wheelchair users are capable of transferring themselves.?They need to do this when transferring themselves from their wheelchair to the toilet or bed, or when getting into and out of a car.?The use of this argument is an example of 'normalising extremes'.
(f)????During an evacuation, disabled residents in evacuation chairs could slow the evacuation process or block the stairs
This outrageous statement is not supported with any evidence.?Indeed, evidence quantifying descent speeds of evacuation chairs controlled by trained handlers, suggests they can outperform typical stair descent walking speeds [6-12].
If the entire building is simultaneously evacuating because compartmentation, and hence ‘stay put’, has failed (which, according to the government position, is impossible, because, in their opinion, all fire mitigation strategies must be guaranteed to work), then the single narrow stair will be full of occupants, and the descent speed of all residents will be slow, due to the high population densities.?In this case, the movement of the evacuation chair down the stairs is likely to be constrained by slowly moving non-disabled residents, not the other way round. ?And if the entire building is emptying out, due to the failure of compartmentation, the first priority of the FRS should not be firefighting, but assisting ALL residents to evacuate as part of the 'emergency evacuation' strategy i.e., the FRS Plan B.
If the disabled resident, due to the PEEP, has started their evacuation early, then there will be very few people on the stairs, and the evacuation chair would not impede or be impeded by the evacuation of others.?And if other residents were caught up behind, it would only be for one floor, as the evacuation chair operator would be trained to pull over on the landing to let the others by.
FSEG evacuation experiment involing the use of an evacuation chair on a crowded stair [6]??
(g)???If the PEEP relies on volunteers, the RP would be liable for the guaranteed safe evacuation of the disabled resident and their assistant.?
While this particular issue requires legal comment, I suggest that as there can be no guarantees concerning the success of any fire mitigation measure, liability would be limited to negligence while performing the required tasks.?
For example, the RP would need to demonstrate that they had instigated an appropriate PEEP; implemented appropriate evacuation mitigation measures (exemplified in guidance documentation, by providing, for example, a toolkit of appropriate measures, see 3.3.2b); been trained to do so or employed the services of an appropriately trained person; identified, with the assistance of the disabled person, ?individuals willing to and capable of undertaking the role of buddy; ?appointed a buddy approved by the disabled person and provided them with the appropriate training; put in place measures to ensure that the buddy attained an acceptable level of proficiency; provided the recommended recurrent training, and appropriate equipment; notified the FRS if an appropriate buddy had not been identified, so the disabled person would be prioritised for ‘emergency evacuation’ as part of the FRS Plan B (i.e., the building Plan C). Reasonable expectations would also be identified for the buddy.
The discussion will be continued in Part 2 available tomorrow.
REFERENCES:
[1] Grenfell Tower Fire Inquire Phase 1 Report recommendations. Recommendation 33.22 Evacuation:
There were no plans in place for evacuating Grenfell Tower should the need arise. I therefore recommend:
a. that the government develop national guidelines for carrying out partial or total evacuations of high-rise residential buildings, such guidelines to include the means of protecting fire exit routes and procedures for evacuating persons who are unable to use the stairs in an emergency, or who may require assistance (such as disabled people, older people and young children);
b. that fire and rescue services develop policies for partial and total evacuation of high-rise residential buildings and training to support them;
c. that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to draw up and keep under regular review evacuation plans, copies of which are to be provided in electronic and paper form to their local fire and rescue service and placed in an information box on the premises;
d. that all high-rise residential buildings (both those already in existence and those built in the future) be equipped with facilities for use by the fire and rescue services enabling them to send an evacuation signal to the whole or a selected part of the building by means of sounders or similar devices;
e. that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPs) for all residents whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised (such as persons with reduced mobility or cognition);
f. that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to include up-to-date information about persons with reduced mobility and their associated PEEPs in the premises information box;
g. that all fire and rescue services be equipped with smoke hoods to assist in the evacuation of occupants through smoke-filled exit routes.
[2] Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans in High-Rise Residential Buildings – recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report, Government response. 18 May 2022. https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/personal-emergency-evacuation-plans
[3] Dr Stuart Hodkinson, Phil Murphy, Andy Turner, The Fire Risks of Purpose-Built Blocks of Flats: an Exploration of Official Fire Incident Data in England. Interim Research Findings, University of Leeds Report, July 2021
[4] EEIS consultation document. Published 18 May 2022, UK Government.
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/emergency-evacuation-information-sharing/eeis-consultation-document
[5] Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans in High-Rise Residential Buildings – recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report. Government consultation 8 June 2021.
[6] Evacuation chair – can others overtake on stairs??Evacuation experiment, University of Greenwich, FSEG 2008.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_vtzuadKNUA&list=PL07Y9xXpCDutZ0G8zzg81vcXG8wqQEfIc&index=8
[7] Adams, A.P.M and Galea, E.R., “An Experimental Evaluation of Movement Devices used to assist People with Reduced Mobility in High-Rise Building Evacuations”, Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics 2010. 5th International Conference. Proceedings. March 8-10, 2010, Springer, New York, NY, Peacock, R.D., Kuligowski, E.D., and Averill, J.D., Editor(s), pp 129-138, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-9725-8_12, 2011.?
[8] Hunt, A., Galea E.R., and Lawrence, P.J., “An Analysis of the Performance of Trained Staff Using Movement Assist Devices To Evacuate the Non-Ambulant”, Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium, Human Behaviour in Fire, Cambridge UK, 2012, Interscience Communications Ltd, ISBN 978-0-9556548-8-6, pp 328-339, 2012.
[9] Hunt, A., Galea, E.R., Lawrence, P.J., An analysis and numerical simulation of the performance of trained hospital staff using movement assist devices to evacuate people with reduced mobility, Fire and Materials, Vol 39, Issue 4, pp 407-429, 2015,?https://dx.doi.org/10.1002/fam.2215
[10] Presentation concerning evacuation assist devices?presented at the Human Behaviour in Fire Conference held in the UK in Sept 2012.?https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E15GsZ_D3PM&list=PL07Y9xXpCDutMYVwrkhzlur_KBpawH6ek&index=10
[11] Question and Answer session related to [10].????
[12] Presentation concerning evacuation assist devices presented at the PED 2010 conference March 2010. Note this is part 1 of three parts, the other two parts to the presentation can also be found on the FSEG youtube channel (https://www.youtube.com/c/FSEGresearch999).?https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mvra04YVNYM&list=PL07Y9xXpCDutMYVwrkhzlur_KBpawH6ek&index=18
[13] Emergency Evacuation Planning Guide for People with Disabilities, NFPA, June 2016.
https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/Public-Education/By-topic/Disabilities/EvacuationGuidePDF.ashx
[14] Planning for Safety.?Evacuating people who need assistance in an emergency.?A guide for building managers and occupants. Office of Disability Issues. Canada, ISBN: 978-1-100-13896-1, 2009.
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/esdc-edsc/migration/documents/eng/disability/arc/planning_safety.pdf
[15] Guidance to support a temporary change to a simultaneous evacuation strategy in purpose-built blocks of flats.?Version 4 (this fourth edition replaces the previous version of the guide issued: 01/10/20). Draft document, National Fire Chiefs Council.
[16] Code of Practice for the Provision of Premises Information Boxes in Residential Buildings, FIA and NFCC, June 2021.
https://www.fia.uk.com/news/fia-and-nfcc-s-new-code-of-practise-on-the-provision-of-premises-information-boxes-pibs-in-residential-buildings.html
[17] Fire safety in purpose-built blocks of flats, HMG, 7 June 2021
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-safety-in-purpose-built-blocks-of-flats
Business & Management Communication specialist (E/F/G/NL). University lecturer. Trainer in Intercultural Communication.
2 年Purely coincidental that the UK government today announced the return of the Right to Buy scheme. No PEEPs necessary for private dwellings, right?
architect
2 年I look forward to reading Part2.
Strategic Leader,Specialising in Fire / Building Safety Risk Management & Compliance.
2 年Hi Ed Galea Playing devils advocate here and as to provide a balanced argument, how would you suggest dealing with the below scenario: Bariatric resident, who is bed bound and has care support via call in care workers on a rolling basis. Resident is primarily bedbound and weighs in excess of 25stone, and not self mobile, requires a sling and hoist for movement from bed. Has lived in his flat for many years and does not wish to be re-located. Has no live in family members. Given this how would you suggest a PEEP be undertaken, what would the evac plan detail? Am not providing this comment for others to start a heated debate, am rather interested in genuine thoughts on how other would suggest dealing with a situation. I’ve noted that you mention “buddies” could be utilised, but how would competence be measured, also how can a “buddie / neighbour” be guaranteed to be on-site ti provide assistance, and in this instance? Thanks
Director FSEG University of Greenwich
2 年The government position on PEEPs is a mindless disgrace. The PEEP consultation was a sham. The government’s suggested alternative, the EEIS, if not so dangerous for disabled residents, non-disabled residents and firefighters would be laughable. If you are from the UK, please sign the petition. https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/617645