Golden lesson from Russia and Ukraine: To make a peaceful future

RUSSIA-UKRAINE: ARE THE PEOPLE GETTING SOME LESSONS FROM WAR

?INTRODUCTION

All empirical studies prove that all the major inventions and discoveries are the base of knowledge or truth. It is an irony that until we face destruction and peril of our existence. It is called a universal rule accepted unanimously. From this perspective, we realize and take away from the experience gained from the havoc created by Russia and Ukraine conflicts have given a new orientation of combat zones and expostulations of traditional comprehension of conquest and downfall.

?A tri-service debate study after the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, revealed several new insights. Popular stalwart Sam Manekshaw remarked, “My dears, you can win as many battles as you like at sea, or in the air, or even lose them, but eventually it is the Army that will prove to be decisive”. But this is a pearl of conventional wisdom that the political purposes are perpetually victory on land, and also invariably means the seizing of territory. But since time was long-established, great maritime intellectuals like Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan highlighted that any great land victory would never be permanent or significant if the sea played a part in the conflict, in which case victory at sea was a crucial prerequisite. But the ongoing above-said war, challenge Manekshaw’s theory of the conquest of land and the following peace treaty justifying the state’s objective resulted from the war. But the prominent person on this subject is Claus Von Clausewitz and his famous dictum, “War is politics by other means”.

Other military thinkers have amplified this over the ages, Admiral Mahan, stressed the role of the sea in the effective inference of the war. Though Russia and Ukraine war was subjective in the mainland component, between a former superpower and an inconsequential land power. Preliminary predictions on the duration of the war overextended from four days to a week to many months but were still indecisive. ?The time period has changed forever. For example, during the 2nd World War, the Germans overran France, Belgium, and the British army in less than 40 days, ending with the British flight from Dunkirk. In the same plays, in the 1st World War, the Germans and the allies fought an indecisive land war for four years. The issue was finally solid by economic and civic disorders in German society caused by four years of British economic obstruction that completely secluded Germany into privacy, starvation, and civic disorder. Despite the peace treaty, the Armistice was contracted as a stain of defeat in a land war, even if great impairment happened at sea.

?The Ukraine war was foretold to be like the 2nd World War, though one side overrunning the other in a bombardment of four to five days, and not more than a week. ?But war proved the replica of the 1st World War, still inconclusive after so many months. Consequently, Clausewitz stated, war is just another form of state-to-state intercourse, as is trade and diplomacy. The conventional wisdom is that one of the primary roles of the Army is to penalize large-scale Pakistani terror strikes intermittently but frequently after the lapse of some period. It was reflected in a scenario in four or five repetitive war games played between Indian and Pakistani superannuated authorities under US supervision. The Pakistani side has always played its game to buttress the view that only a defeat in a land war in Punjab would be a trigger for a threat of nuclear retaliation. But, after Ukraine, the whole question of the validity of the use of the army as a punitive instrument is open to question. Will not an Indian land offensive degenerate into messy trench warfare of interminable length? ?None of any experts and veteran military professionals have found any answers but none seem to have sought answers from ARTRAC or TRADOC (the US army training and doctrine command).

RUSSIA’S FAILURE IN UKRAINE BACKFIRED: OUR COUNTRY MUST BE VIGILANT AND KEEP TRACK OF ALTERATIONS THAT HAPPENED IN THIS FIASCO.

Still, hi-tech battlefield does not exist. Concurrently, the reality is not all battlefields are hi-tech. The hi-tech battlefield diminishes the prominence of devastating armies, but without ushering the domain of military experts. Concisely, the propensity to hold war in abeyance is a way to shift intensity towards the arena of economics and diplomacy. Kissinger said, “Diplomacy is a restraint on power”. This makes more relevant of the study of Clausewitz’s Grand Strategy, being a mix of economics, diplomacy, and force. The most cited example in international studies is the efficacy of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which appeared geo-economic but though mostly military power hues, and enhances dynamic diplomacy, is termed as civil-military fusion. It is possible that some countries are totally oblivious to the insights from Russia and Ukraine wars, but inter-state relations have a sea-change, as the risk apt by large states (like India) is conceived no seriousness by smaller neighbors, subject to their reach to technology.

THE RELEVANT LESSONS TO INDIA FROM THE RUSSIA–UKRAINE WAR

The Russia–Ukraine war has been entering a new historic period, but from the viewpoint of drawing long-term lessons from the war, still seemed premature. The ongoing course of the war has indicated only partial clarity regarding Russia's terminal objectives even a strategic timeline that Russia may have assigned to its senior military leadership. In this opaque environment, we could not understand some of these issues, and drawing conventional lessons does become a challenge.

Similarly, if one understands lessons from conventional wars, these must ideally to place into an appropriate context to the situations and conditions of the countries involved. ?An inclination to relate this war ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine to the Indian context. However, India comprehends itself in a diverse risk environment opposite to Ukraine or Russia. In China and Pakistan, India has two adversaries which are nuclear weapon powers. Its present economic conditions and internal challenges do not suggest conventional war as a suitable option. China, despite having a vastly more potent force, does not have the kind of power differential with India to force major gains in a conventional war. It is more likely to lose than it could potentially gain through such an endeavor. However, in the given context, certain initial lessons regarding the war in Ukraine, as mentioned below, can indicatively be identified and realized as important ones:

·???????The Russians suffered severe undesirable losses because of ineffective assigning strategic objectives ignoring its incapacity to achieve within a week. The Russian assessment of the Ukrainian ability to withstand their offensive proved a folly. Expectations of an early capitulation of Ukrainian forces did not materialize. ?Lack of required cohesion amongst forces which was engaged by Russia during the initial time. This was reflected during the Special Forces landings and employment of armor. The lesson is the most important for any country undertaken to restructure its forces. The employment of armor in built-up areas highlighted its efficacy under such conditions which constrain its deployment.

?A factor vital in the future will contain the ability to grasp forces under hostile conditions, wherein, sub-conventional forces continuously undertake an operation costly in terms of constant attrition.?The employment of force multipliers like drones and handheld weapon systems has emerged as a choice against an adversary keen to fight a conventional war pruning the cost very substantially.

?UKRAINE WAR TRANSFORMED THE WORLD GEOPOLITICAL ECOSYSTEM

The belief is that the early 21st century is a turbulent era but a statement that represents less intense. But as per Historian's conclusion based on the last two decades, the international system has undergone the incremental reactivation and intensification of geopolitical rivalries. This phenomenon is hardly surprising in the grand scheme of things. This is a fateful turning point, the recent outbreak of the Ukraine War likely represents the first major violent clash of the new Cold War, an unfolding drama of rising strategic competition. This has destroyed the optimistic spirit that thrived in the 90s and exchanged it with a dark and ominous?zeitgeist, the general intellectual, moral, and cultural climate of an era. Despite its result is still unclear, but provides instructive lessons about developing trends and harsh realities crucial to foresee what the future might bring in the coming decades and preparing accordingly. Their consequences can always be unpleasant, but one cannot afford to ignore them for that reason. Thus, the in-depth integration of the following lessons is essential for policymakers, analysts, and researchers involved in foreign policy, national security, intelligence analysis, military statecraft, and grand strategy.

War is not a path to attaining any positive destination

?The least possibility of a direct war between great powers ? fortunately to a peace inclination to uncheck a nuclear Armageddon ? and the eruption of several irregular wars in decent decades has shown the deception that conventional interstate conflict is outdated. Such an impression is unreal as to be not proved in an empirical way: episodes like the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War validate that hard power is an asset that national states can act against their counterparts for pursuing their interests in a zero-sum world. Till the imperfect character of human nature and the radical structure of the international system prevails, the specter of war will keep poignant in the world.

Really, the Ukraine War especially since the proportions of the corresponding military mobilizations and the long-lasting implications of the conflict’s shockwaves denotes a similar direction. Simultaneously, we see that great powers think that kinetic power projection is a justified option each time they consider that their national security is at risk and those smaller nations under attack have no choice but to involve a superior rival that impends over their sovereignty or survival, though that demands bloodshed. Normally, a cue that it is an existential struggle, war embodies the potentially lethal collective distinction between friends and enemies as the archetypal concept of the political known by Carl Schmitt. We can never stop war till humans are political animals, and though individuals might even accept the creed of pacifism, war portends to immerse them anyways irrespective of their views. The prime political driver that provokes the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the interest in altering Kyiv’s strategic orientation and the parallel quest for?lebensraum. No clarity about the result will be gained through a force, but Moscow thinks that in a world that might often make right, the only fight is finally winning. Even though awareness of the huge costs that would have to be paid in terms of economic resources, political capital, material losses, and casualties, the benefits would be superior. The course of action followed by the Kremlin shows an attitude in which ‘soft power is seen as irrelevant, which is predictable that Russian strategic thinking has traditionally embraced the Machiavellian principle that it is better to be feared than loved if one cannot be both. However, as the historical record shows, overlooking the importance of the non-military aspects of war can be a recipe for disaster. The proof, the Americans did not lose a single battle in the Vietnam War and the US still was defeated despite its overwhelming military, economic, and technological superiority.

? The fight is a variegated spectacle

The prime nature of war is persistent, the versions of its grammar are endless, as military theorists like Sun Bin and Martin Van Creveld observed. The Ukraine War is a war that blends traditional and innovative elements. Its classical ingredients feature the traditional envelopment of enemy forces in urban positions in order to cut the flow of supplies, prevent the arrival of support, demoralize the defenders and maximize psychological pressure. Encircled by several edges, those inside said pockets have little choice but to surrender, flee or fight under harmful conditions in vicious street combat. This siege warfare approach is usually referred to as Kesselschlacht (i.e., ‘cauldron battle’). Oppositely, ?the defensive strategy employed by the Ukrainians against the Russians is paradoxically based on Soviet plans originally created during the Cold War to face any future invasion by NATO forces. The point is to use cities as fortified strongholds that drain enemy resources, capabilities, dynamism, and manpower.

Furthermore, this conflict is also notorious for the involvement of more modern components. For instance, the Russian version of ‘shock and awe includes airstrikes, drones, and hypersonic missiles to overwhelm the Ukrainians, as well as threats of nuclear saber-rattling to deter the direct intervention of NATO. The Ukrainians are responding with asymmetric engagements and weapons. Their fierce resistance cannot be explained without the crucial role played by Javelins and Stingers. Likewise, the Ukrainians are relying on FinTech platforms, cryptocurrencies, and digital assets in order to fund the purchase of military hardware, a development that highlights the growth in the value of virtual war chests for contemporary battlefields. Further, the presence of unconventional fighters like mercenaries, foreign volunteers, special forces, and paramilitary squads adds another layer of complexity that is reminiscent of operational theatres like Syria and Yemen. Fighters belonging to the Azov Regiment, the Chechen Kadyrovites, and the Wagner Group certainly challenge traditional conceptions of soldiering. On the other hand, the Ukraine War is not only being fought with bullets and rockets. The full span of the conflict in both depth and space goes much further. In fact, it also involves measures of economic and financial warfare. Although there are several meaningful precedents throughout history. this would arguably be the first time in which said weaponized vectors of coercion and disruption are used on such a massive scale. Similarly, the Russian ultimatum to stop the flow of natural gas to European consumer markets unless payments are designated in rubles shows the growing complexity of today’s geoeconomic chessboards. Moreover, the conflict confirms that cyberspace has become a confrontational domain that is suitable for acts of sabotage, espionage, attacks, and disinformation. Finally, the intensive use of psychological warfare has also been noteworthy. Even though the battle to win ‘hearts and minds is as old as dirt, the massive reach of digital technologies and platforms like social media exponentially increase the circulation of propaganda in order to shape perceptions, trigger strong emotional reactions, generate supportive attitudes amongst both local and foreign audiences and advance convenient narratives. Therefore, this war is not just being fought by regular Russian and Ukrainian servicemen or even irregular warriors. It also involves legions of financiers, bankers, business executives, hackers, influencers, and spin doctors. Hence, episodes like this emphasize the importance of holistic doctrines that can comprehensively explain the multifaceted character of modern war, including the Russian concept of hybrid warfare, the American concept of fourth-generation warfare, and the Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare. Permanent change and full-spectrum clashes are structural features of contemporary security environments.?

Geography is a key pivot in international politics

Place matters. This axiom is the intellectual cornerstone of geopolitics, an analytical model that examines the political control of space by states under Darwinian competitive conditions. As Hans Morgenthau explains, the importance of geography as a driver of state behavior comes from its permanence in time. In other words, kingdoms, empires, states, and rulers come and go but rivers, oceans, mountains, steppes, forests, and deserts remain. Not surprisingly, the nature of Ukraine as a contested battlefield for centuries is not random. It is a result of its condition as a geographical and logistical corridor that connects the European peninsula with the very core of the Eurasian ‘heartland,’ an area that Sir Halford Mackinder ? one of the towering theorists of classical geopolitical thinking ? regarded as pivotal for imperial pursuits of world domination. Such a position can represent a defensive buffer state, a lead for the projection of military power, or a bridge for economic exchanges. Hence, it has constantly operated as a magnet that has attracted the ambitions of conquerors, czars, and warriors. Moreover, it is also worth fighting for due to its agricultural comparative advantages, navigable waterways, warm water ports, infrastructure networks, demographics, and abundant deposits of mineral resources.?

?The global balance of power is in flux

The balance of power is never static. A lot like a clockwork mechanism in unending motion, it works as a dynamic correlation of forces in lasting fluctuation. As wars redesign existing political balances. So, chaos and order can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Thus, even though the Ukraine War is not a hegemonic conflict, the future structure of polarity and the prevalence of strategic stability in the international system are at stake. It is still unclear if the configuration more serve to the Western bloc ? undergirded by American leadership ? or the Eurasian axis of continental powers. It is important to underline pertinent to underscore that victory and defeat are never permanent conditions. As a revisionist state, Russia is engaged in a dangerous gamble to rewrite the architecture of European security. A decisive Russian triumph could very well represent a catalyst that could hasten Russian regional hegemony in the post-Soviet space, favor its reassertion as a force to be reckoned with and give birth to a more multipolar world. The West has joined forces in order to make sure that the combination of economic warfare and the exhaustion of Russian forces in Ukraine will diminish the strength of the Eurasian heavyweight, the expectation that what is left can potentially be used as both forefront and cannon fodder against China. No one can know l what would happen if Russia would collapse. Hypothetical scenarios involving turmoil, civil war, or balkanization cannot be ignored. ?Besides, the cohesion of the Western bloc should not be taken for granted. Several European states are already disinclined to antagonize Moscow. Other side Beijing is caught in a complicated position. It could take advantage of a weakened Russia as a junior partner under Chinese suzerainty, the rights, and obligations of a state, or try to reinforcer Russia even knowing the risk of opponent Washington and Brussels. But, the Russian invasion of Ukraine deflects American attention away from the Indo-Pacific. China can also to play with ambiguity for increasing its overall national ambitious projects designed to position itself as the axial cornerstone of a Eurasian geoeconomic corridor. However, the collapse of Russia is also problematic because it could mean that China is targeted next. Therefore, most countries from the Middle East, the Asian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa are acting cautiously attitude. It is too soon to make risky decisions according to winners and losers, shifts might happen. The Ukraine War also shows that the idea of a global ‘rules-based order’ as a system that can guarantee international governance and regulate state behavior is based on inaccurate assumptions. Such conditions are absent in an anarchic environment that inspires constant predation, and no such thing as an international community or a global village and the same values are universally shared. In the game of hegemony international politics, power is to keep power in check. When an imbalance reaches destabilizing proportions, there will be an organic reaction to correct it. But if joined properly through diplomacy to avoid their most adverse conditions, they can operate as anchors of predictability. ?The prevalence of a realist order does not mean that mutual animosities subside, only that their aftermath does not become too nasty.

?Nationalism is the robust political power

The strength of nationalism in the modern world is still valued. In fact, the Ukraine War reveals its growing traction as a powerful political force that resulting forcing people to die and kill under frightening and dangerous conditions. In the ruthless arena of international politics, abstract rhetorical appeals to humankind sound hollow. Therefore, as energy that encourages vitality, nationalism makes a lot of sense in a Hobbesian reality. Therefore, with the pro-Western orientation of Ukrainian foreign policy, Ukrainians are not fighting for the concept of democracy. What they are willing to sacrifice their lives for is the survival of their families, communities, and homeland. Paradoxically, rather than demoralizing the Ukrainian people, Russian aggression has strengthened their resolve to disregard their differences and bitter internal rivalries in order to resist together. That is why Russian troops have not been greeted as liberators in the streets of Ukrainian cities. But, the increasing ostracism of Russia and the prospect of imminent economic hardship has not demoralized the Russian people also. ?In fact, the imposition of sanctions designed to bring down Russia as a national state has encouraged widespread popular revanchism and resentment. After all, when a whole nation is targeted, rallying around the flag is a natural reaction. Naturally, most Russians aid Moscow’s military intrusion in Ukraine and the approval ratings of President Vladimir Putin are rising instead of falling.?

Government must fight the risk unknown risks

When faced with a risky state, the decisions made by statesmen might bring unforeseen outcomes even in the worst-case scenario, backfire. ?The Ukraine War has given several illustrative examples. First, Russia’s heavy-handed approach towards the reincorporation of Ukraine into its geopolitical orbit has in fact galvanized the reluctance of Kyiv to return to Moscow’s sphere of influence. Moreover, the Russian invasion alienated even sectors of the Ukrainian population ? especially in its Eastern regions ? that used to harbor Russophile attitudes not long ago. Ironically, the refusal of the Ukrainians to be reabsorbed by an increasingly aggressive Russia has been strengthened by the Kremlin’s desire to realign Ukraine as a satellite through force. After the passage of time only will determine if even a pyrrhic victory could turn out to be feckless in the long run. Unless the tables are somehow turned, an occupation and a parallel protracted counterinsurgency campaign against rebels backed by intelligence, weaponry, cash, and logistical support provided by NATO have the potential to badly damage Russian national power. Nevertheless, the transatlantic bloc will also likely suffer the effects of this law. For instance, Europe has already experienced the results of outsourcing its national security and defense through a complacent overreliance on the nuclear umbrella provided by the US under the framework of NATO. Such direct engagement could literally trigger a nuclear exchange. Are the Americans prepared to accept the risk of a potentially apocalyptic confrontation with a great power armed with nukes to honor Article 5 of the NATO charter in the defense of Warsaw? ?Ironically, in hindsight, NATO expansion might have configured a more dangerous environment rather than acting as an effective security shield. Under Franco-German leadership, the EU is a geoeconomic heavyweight, but it lacks autonomous capabilities. As a result, it is being held hostage by a vortex of geopolitical rivalry between Russia and America. Moreover, the strategic desire to reduce dependency on the flow of Russian energy supplies is evident, but replacing Russian natural gas with American LNG will be an expensive solution. ?In turn, the economic disruptions unleashed by rising energy prices can generate political unrest and/or pressure to reassess the strategic pertinence of sanctions against Moscow.

The impressive projection of Western economic firepower through vectors like financial sanctions, the confiscation of monetary assets, and the infliction of economic disruptions against Russia is intended to punish Moscow, downgrade Russian natural power, deplete the Kremlin’s war chest, destroy wealth and instigate regime change. Hence, this onslaught will test Russian preparedness and resilience. This course of action might also trigger systemic game-changing shifts. Just, it highlights the relevance that states which could potentially challenge Western interests develop alternative financial and monetary platforms, systems, and nerve centers beyond the direct control of Washington and Brussels. The Western weaponization of finance can make strong the purpose of certain countries to bypass and even challenge both the status of the US dollar as the hegemonic reserve currency and the transnational financial arteries organically linked to its circuits through vehicles such as gold and other hard assets with intrinsic value, FinTech innovations, multilateral deals, and digital currencies. Thus, an accelerated bifurcation or fragmentation of the global monetary and financial order is a scenario that cannot be ruled out.?

Striking civilizational worldviews aggravate pressures

This development seemingly validates the idea advanced by Samuel Huntington that national states tend to gravitate towards their counterparts who share similar values and common heritage and clash with those whose historical, sociocultural, and ethnic backgrounds are basic differences. Russia is largely portrayed as an imperialistic, backward, kleptocratic, draconian, and repressive dictatorship. In several Western countries, even Russian products, music, works of literature and art are being removed as an outright condemnation of everything the Eurasian country stands for. , Russia sees itself as a proud and legitimate heir of the Byzantine Empire (Russian imperial tradition claims that Moscow is ‘the Third Rome’), a bulwark of Orthodox Christianity, the defender of the so-called ‘Russian world,’ a proponent of geopolitical multi-polarity and a boldly illiberal stronghold of order and tradition. The West is viewed as decadent, hedonistic, materialistic, hypocritical, godless, arrogant, and morally bankrupt. The outspoken rejection and mockery of ideological trends currently fashionable in much of the Western world is an overt reflection of this contempt. Therefore, although there have been intermittent episodes of both closeness and rivalries between Russia and the West, it looks like the current divorce is irreversible. The fact that the views advocated by both sides are profoundly messianic is difficult because a negotiated compromise is hard to reach when self-righteous ideological crusaders delegitimize each other. For the Western world, Russia has become an utmost heretic and pariah that deserves to be ‘canceled’ and, in response, Russia has stated its desire to embrace an eastward strategic orientation, a shift supported by the geopolitical theories of both the late Yevgeny Primakov ? a former KGB man like Vladimir Putin himself ? and Aleksander Dugin ? the chief ideologue of Eurasianism ? which hold the need to forge deeper ties with China, India, Iran, Turkey, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Far East instead of seeking a room with the transatlantic bloc. This reorientation would represent a radical departure from the time when French was the language of the Russian imperial court, the efforts undertaken by Peter the Great to modernize Russia in accordance with European standards, and the popularity of American rock music amongst younger generations during the Soviet era.

Ignoring the home front is a serious mistake

?The last Russia-specific public alert, Russia State-sponsored and criminal cyber threats to critical infrastructure.” was a reason for revision on May 9.? While US Department of Homeland Security DHS and the FBI are in frequent communication with various entities and individuals targeted by Russian cyberattacks. It requires DHS and others to get the American people to understand and better resist the Russian hybrid warfare campaigns that promote divisive propaganda and social-media manipulation. Russia’s hybrid-warfare strategy, which uses disinformation even more than cyberattacks, seems designed to wear down Western democracies’ opposition to Russia’s aggression. Senior DHS and administration officials should inform publicly what Americans can do to counter Russian disinformation, cyber threats, and another Russian hybrid-warfare targeting of the civilian population. Specifically, unity between the United States and NATO in opposing Russian aggression against Ukraine is a vital source of national power. Treating Ukraine as almost fully a military and diplomatic crisis could be a risky error.

?Invest deeply in key resilient partners

?The even USA aids billions of dollars worth of arms to Ukraine amid the ongoing war, it should also be planning for long-term security help to the country. The goal must be to ensure Ukraine’s ability to deter future aggression. ?This will be a bold undertaking; but like insurance, the costs pale in comparison to those of another round of war.?President Zelenskyy perceives itself?as “a big Israel,” and the model of US assistance to Israel similarly. ?US partners who are on the front lines of competition with Russia and China need capabilities—from missile defenses and anti-tank weapons to superior intelligence and counterintelligence—that enable them to absorb and survive strikes by adversaries. They also must have the ability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor.?Slowly building a Ukrainian air force, missile corps, and special forces that can defensively strike behind Russian lines will be essential. Annual appropriations, excess defense articles, and prepositioned US stocks for emergency use are all tools that can be employed to this end. Supporting the growth of a domestic industry that develops and produces innovative Ukrainian solutions to Ukrainian exposures will also be key. This approach reinforces a requirement that must attend such assistance: the willingness and ability of Ukraine to defend itself on its own, which is something its citizens have already demonstrated in spades. This also means that, in extremis, US interoperability with a key partner will be assured.

?The Alliance is a uniquely valuable institution that needs an enduring political and financial investment

?NATO is a mysterious institution where incongruity and drama are normal happenings among a membership that will soon reach thirty-two members. ?The Alliance can be an easy target for politicians seeking to score points domestically, as USA and France have doubted NATO’s utility and purpose. But these critiques inevitably overlook the outsize role NATO has played in enabling peace and prosperity in Europe and beyond. It gets a boost after the large-scale war is again raging in Europe within years of NATO’s most important members openly doubting its usefulness. ?Putin read American and French letdown with NATO as a lack of commitment to the Alliance and a chance to lastingly break transatlantic unity.?Luckily, the habits of cooperation that the transatlantic community has developed over seven decades are not easily displaced—and NATO is once again showing its indispensability as a political and military actor. It’s a lesson that political leaders must acknowledge after the resolution of Russia’s war in Ukraine. ?NATO relevance has again grown strong due to the current crisis unfolding, the incredible cooperation currently on display among allies favoring Ukraine and fortifying check in Europe would not be possible. It helps NATO to change leaders’ views to expand the political and economic capital to keep the Alliance healthy and adaptive.

??There’s no way back for relations with Russia

?Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, bilateral ties between post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia have been colored by centuries of imperial baggage. While this complex relationship became particularly thorny after Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, a significant number of Ukrainians continued to harbor positive attitudes toward Russians, while political parties advocating a thaw in bilateral ties remained popular in traditionally Russophile regions of Ukraine. All this changed dramatically on February 24. The unprecedented devastation caused by the invasion has completely transformed Ukrainian perceptions of Russia, particularly in formerly Moscow-friendly parts of eastern Ukraine. Many Ukrainians are no longer able to engage with Russian relatives while growing numbers are ditching the Russian language and switching to Ukrainian. Recent opinion polls reflect the profound nature of these changes, with Ukrainian backing for Euro-Atlantic integration skyrocketing and support for closer ties with Russia collapsing to record lows. The war is far from over, but it’s already clear that the relationship between Russians and Ukrainians has been irrevocably damaged.?

?Now Ukraine is not tomorrow’s Taiwan?

?Chinese strategists belief the USA’s strategic uncertainty over Taiwan is not dead, as shown by Biden’s repeated mistakes about Washington’s wish to protect the island through force and US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan. Yet even while the West has been able to inflict painful punishment on Russia’s economy, Putin’s war shows that sanctions are a double-edged sword, especially when it comes to China, the world’s second-largest economy.?Beijing has been keeping a close eye on European citizens, who are shouldering record-high inflation and surging electricity prices ahead of a potentially very cold winter. From Beijing’s perspective, political, diplomatic, and economic retaliation against pro-independence actions in Taiwan—when coupled with the threat of a total military blockade and China’s nuclear saber-rattling—can serve as a credible deterrent that puts the onus of escalation on the enemy (in this case, the United States). Therefore, Beijing will act under the assumption that, in the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait, time and momentum are on its side, meaning that the price the Chinese people are willing to pay for Taiwan is significantly higher than that of Western constituents.?

America will always do the right thing but as a last resort?

While this adage is often attributed to Winston Churchill but no record exists. Most recently, leaders from the United Arab Emirates publicly expressed their disappointment that the Biden administration didn’t respond quickly enough when Houthi rebels attacked the Abu Dhabi airport in January; similarly, Saudi leaders were aghast when the Trump administration didn’t respond after Iran attacked the country’s energy infrastructure in 2019.??But the Biden administration’s strong and unwavering response to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has proven that the USA to have relied on especially if confronted by a globally resonant crisis on a scale that necessitates American leadership. That lesson has not been lost on leaders in Taipei or Beijing. And leaders in the Middle East who are inclined to doubt American resolve should note that Washington has taken powerful and economically painful actions to support Ukrainian sovereignty, even though no treaty committed the United States to this in advance (just as there was no treaty that required the United States to come to Kuwait’s defense when Saddam Hussein invaded the country). Rather than demanding such commitments, American partners in the region would be better advised to work with the Biden administration to think through scenarios that might require a similar US response, and to work together to build interdependent capabilities to deter them.?

?Seize this moment for a strategic reversal?

?Putin’s war in Ukraine was a rude awakening for decision-makers in Berlin and for average Germans from Hamburg to Munich. This left Europe’s largest economy exposed to energy blackmail by Moscow and with few options to shore up NATO as the cornerstone of its own defense or hold Putin at arm’s length by supporting Kyiv with weapons.?Lofty pronouncements by Chancellor Olaf Scholz about boosting his country’s defense capacity have, in reality, been tough to follow with actual action. This is especially true for arms deliveries to Ukraine or Bundeswehr boots on the ground to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. . Berlin’s credibility as a reliable NATO and EU ally has taken a severe toll, especially in Eastern Europe. Further, the transatlantic partners will need a more strategic Germany—politically, economically, and militarily—as everyone prepares for a long-term confrontation and competition with Moscow and other autocrats. The indisputable failure of cornerstones in German foreign, defense, and energy policies extends beyond Berlin decision-makers. ?The United States and European allies should seize on Germany’s existential crisis as an opportunity for a reset and engage German policymakers in concrete initiatives. They should demand and support new German leadership in key areas, such as NATO’s eastern defense, Europe’s energy transition away from Russia, and new efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to reduce economic and technology dependencies on any one actor. Germany develops a new leadership role that advances European and transatlantic objectives.

?Putin’s government was not reliable and required to be defeated

?Six months of Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine, together with years of the Kremlin’s invasions of neighboring states and more recent hybrid warfare against the West, have made it clear that any agreements with Putin’s regime are simply not viable and often self-hurting. ?Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 after having committed to being a guarantor of its sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum; in its most recent assault, the Kremlin seized one-fifth of Ukraine’s territories following years of negotiations over the conflict in Ukraine within the Normandy format and the Minsk agreements. Moscow repeatedly disrespects international law, liberal institutions, and all kinds of international treaties with partners and rivals alike. By committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine, violating the basic principle of freedom of navigation, weaponizing food supplies and refugees, and engaging in energy and nuclear blackmail, Putin’s regime has posed existential threats not only to the future of the Ukrainian nation but also to rules-based world order. Appeasement, dialogue, and compromises with an aggressor have never worked. Russia escalates when it senses weakness and withdraws when it senses strength. If the world wants sustainable peace in the region rather than a tactical pause in Russian assaults the West must respond in the same language Putin understands.

??The United States can stop rely upon Hon strategic indistinctness

?Having immensely more power than its adversaries, a policy of strategic ambiguity can spark reluctance among those adversaries to take actions that might provoke retaliation—especially if the more powerful nation has a reputation for responding unpredictably or unduly. But when a state’s relative power is perceived to be in decline, then a policy of strategic ambiguity can, conversely, inspire adventurism in an adversary—especially if the declining power is seen to be withdrawing.???

The long era of strong American relative power allowed US policymakers the luxury of adopting policies that featured strategic ambiguity. But those days have passed, the time Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, undeterred by the intentionally ambiguous signals that the United States had sent during the preceding decades about the nature of its commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty. He was also encouraged by the perception of US weakness in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and dysfunction in its domestic politics. There is an important lesson here for US policymakers who might prefer to cling to strategic ambiguity when seeking to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, for instance, or Iranian aggression in the Gulf. Now, more explicit statements about US red lines are in order. In the current environment, such statements are likely to help prevent rather than incite an escalation.?

?The USA must cope with Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran simultaneously

?The Biden administration came to office believing it could park relations with Russia, and get a stable and predictable and e-prioritizing competition with China as part of its national-security policy. But Moscow had other ideas: By launching the largest land war in Europe since World War II, Putin reminded Washington how much its security and prosperity is tied to peace and stability in Europe. The Biden administration was forced to return to the drawing board and rewrite its national-security strategy because the first version gave short shrift to Russia. China should be a priority, but the United States remains a global power with global interests; its national-security strategy must reflect that reality. An effective approach must address the serious threats posed by China and North Korea in the Indo-Pacific, Iran in the Middle East, and Russia in Europe. Moreover, these threats are interrelated with Russia, China, and Iran increasingly working together. Success in one of these plays will strengthen, not sap, US power to deal with the others.?

?Arms and ammunition don’t win wars but the human does

?Russia almost spent about $65 billion on defense in 2021 or more than ten times what Ukraine did that year. If the equipment was the deciding factor, Russia would have achieved the crushing, lightning-fast victory it sought months ago. But in this war, Ukraine has shown that good leadership and training of which it has plenty, but Russia has made very little difference.

Since both countries share a long military tradition dating back to Imperial Russia, the difference in their respective performances on the battlefield is instructive. Since 1993, Ukraine has been part of the US National Guard’s State Partnership Program, in which its armed forces have been trained according to the US model of giving mission-type orders to junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), explaining the commander’s intent, and empowering them to make on-the-spot decisions based on the changing facts on the ground. No one becomes an expert combat decision-maker overnight, so realistic exercises are held and culture is fostered that encourages individual initiative and demands rigorous assessment. This open and transparent way of operating has resulted in high morale and performance on the battlefield.?Oppositely, Russia’s armed forces which rely heavily on conscripts lack professional NCOs and discourage initiative and feedback. Decision-making authority remains heavily centralized, with only senior officers permitted to act autonomously. This is why so many Russian generals have been killed in this war; nobody at a lower level had the leadership experience, big-picture understanding, or authority to act decisively when things didn’t go as planned. The Russian way of war has been predictable: battlefield failure and low morale.?

.Agile modern weapons can rout larger, conservatively armed forces if defending

?The USA has systematized an effective “Arsenal of Democracy” to defend Ukraine. In the battle for Kyiv, Russian tanks, troop carriers, supply trucks, helicopters, and fighter aircraft were devastated by small and mobile Ukrainian defensive units armed with weapons such as Stingers, Javelins, NLAWs, and drones. A platform-heavy, twentieth-century Russian force was beaten closely by a light twenty-first-century one. In the battle for the Donbas, Russia’s twentieth-century artillery greatly more than Ukraine’s artillery—until fairly small numbers of new American-made Highly Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) were introduced. Their precision-strike capability demolished scores of Russian ammunition dumps and headquarters, among other units, thereby slowing the Russian advance. And in the Black Sea, Russian naval vessels hugely more the remnants of the Ukrainian Navy—until accurate Ukrainian-made Neptune and American-made Harpoon missiles were introduced, forcing the Russian Navy to retreat. These were all essentially defensive situations for Ukraine. Now Ukraine will seek to regain as much of its occupied territory as possible, but not easy. ?Ukrainian forces will use many of these same precision-strike systems to try to regain Kherson and the Donbas, but they will also be advancing against strong Russian defensive positions. This worked well initially for American forces two decades ago when taking offensive action against Iraqi insurgents and Afghan insurgents, but it remains to be seen whether Ukrainian forces can pull off the same feat. The outcome will determine whether Putin can claim some degree of success in his ruthless adventure.

?Horde dispositions gave results better than the risks of economic sanctions

?As Russian troops gathered to invade Ukraine, many defense analysts believed the threat of severe economic sanctions would be enough to deter a Russian attack. But for Putin, a policy of seeking to retaliate (revanchist) territorial aims outweighed any potential harm that might be done to the Russian economy through Western sanctions. Colossal destruction has been done to the Russian consumer economy, the ruble has appreciated and foreign reserves have increased due to high oil prices and shifting Russian markets. Putin’s judgment appears to have been correct and succeeded in the short term.?NATO leaders had made it clear that they would not commit troops to defend Ukraine, which led Putin to misjudge on two fronts—undervaluing Ukrainians’ ability to protect themselves and the West’s disposition to rapidly arm them. So Western defense officials have relearned a Cold War-era lesson: What deters Russian aggression is NATO troops on the Alliance’s eastern flank, not the threat of economic sanctions. It’s possible that if Alliance troops had deployed to Ukraine, it could have deterred the invasion; but they may have also started World War III. Deploying troops forward on NATO territory now will assure that Putin does not miscalculate again. The cornerstone of the recent NATO summit was an effort to absorb and implement this lesson. NATO’s deterrent posture is shifting from “deterrence by punishment” to “deterrence by denial,” and allied forces are being positioned forward to deny Russia’s ability to occupy any bit of NATO territory. Battalion-sized NATO battle groups have now been deployed to eight frontline allies, and American forces in Europe have increased to one hundred thousand. Many believe that even more needs to be done to assure deterrence by denial—for example, by deploying brigade- or even division-level NATO forces to frontline allied countries.?

The novel tools of conflict are economic and powerful

?When Russia invaded Ukraine, President Biden made clear that the United States would not directly intervene militarily. ?instead, the Group of Seven (G7) nations decided to freeze about $350 billion in Russian assets, roughly the size of Austria’s entire economy. The move shocked Russian President Vladimir Putin and his central bank, putting massive pressure on the Russian economy. It also turned heads around the world: Most countries hold some reserves in dollars and euros, and now they’re thinking hard about the risks to those assets in the event of a future crisis. But since the United States, Japan, the European Union, and the United Kingdom are aligned, countries don’t see many alternatives. China’s renminbi is not yet a viable option as a truly international currency. So what’s the takeaway going forward for the global economy? The United States—and the dollar—are stronger with allies.

?Don’t separate sanctions from longer-term foreign-policy objectives

?In the run-up to the invasion, great hope was placed on sanctions as the primary tool with which to deter Russian aggression. Putin, the widespread thinking held, could not possibly want to ruin his economy for the sake of murdering Ukrainians. But rationality is a concept that can be perilously difficult to nail down, and economic rationality was not a factor in Putin’s plans for Ukraine. Sanctions as a deterrent were worth the effort but were ultimately not going to stop the invasion.?This lesson needs to remain front of mind during what is likely to be a long war. The inability of the West to use sanctions to prevent war does not mean they are a useless gambit; instead, they should constitute a strategy for longer-term goals. Any tactical advantages that accrue from sanctions should be considered positive externalities, not an explicit end goal. Those policy goals should remain what Biden discussed in late February: that sanctions are meant to isolate Putin and his regime so long as Putinism remains the dominant form of rule in Russia. There is no going back to the pre-war period, in which many in the West clung to the idea that trade could integrate Putin’s Kremlin into a rules-based system. Only after Putinism—the primary driver of Russia’s external aggression—is gone should the West use the leverage of lifting sanctions to allow for Russia’s economic reintegration.??

??Sanctions work, but not decisive and predictable and take time

?Policy tools are generally imprecise. This is especially true with sanctions, which can be intended to weaken an adversary over time.?These are the purposes of the current sanctions against Russia, which look like the inept, contentious, and inconsistent economic measures imposed against the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. While these measures did not cause the USSR to collapse, they made it harder for the Soviet leadership to escape the impacts of the unreformed Soviet economy’s weakness. They took away the Western investment, technology transfer, and loans and credits that had propped up the Soviet economy and masked the rot within. Putin’s decision to wage war on Ukraine may bring similar results. Technology restrictions have hurt Russian industrial production. New financing and investment from the West are basically absent. ?Russia’s income from exports will decline. Time is not on Ukraine’s side, which is why the country needs more military assistance. But Putin has chosen to wage a dirty war and make the West an enemy; sanctions and other means of economic pressure may make his choice seem like folly, in addition to evil.

?Wartime strategic communications to influence operations on daily basis.

?Despite the risks it faces, the Ukrainian government successfully created and continues to implement a strategic communications plan to electrify international support, denigrate Russia, and inspire confidence in its ability to lead the country. It’s a grind—day in, day out—to share talking points with communicators, identify audiences to persuade, pull together data, and then connect with journalists, political figures, and influencers who can further spread the government’s message. But the beauty of what the Ukrainians have accomplished is that a vast network of people who follow the government’s messaging lead and further spread the campaign in ways that their individual networks can understand—thus building new advocates and reinforcing Ukraine’s base of support. Although President Zelenskyy is the focal point of this campaign, he’s in no way the only person who has remained on message. Every day people around the world feel empowered to advocate for Ukraine and disparage Russia. Images that include the blue and yellow of the Ukrainian flag, sunflowers, and children holding anti-war signs are so widely established that social-media posts that include these types of visuals no longer require any explanation. In large part, the Ukrainian government uses firsthand accounts and video clips as evidence, which further reinforces its message; and crucially, it has not resorted to large-scale mis- and disinformation as Russia has. Overall, the cohesion and duration of the Ukrainians’ campaign can, and should, be used as a template for what the United States and its allies can accomplish with an influence strategy, communications discipline, and a willingness to grind day-in, day-out to meet the end goal.?

?Take seriously the fundamentals?of hybrid warfare

?From every perspective, Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” turned into a strategic failure. ?Russia is arguably at its lowest point of soft influence in recent history, with pushback coming from neutral nations and even ones dependent on Russian energy. Russian war crimes have been laid bare for the world to see and repudiated by all but the Kremlin’s most stalwart allies. NATO's resolve is stronger today than many could have ever imagined. Russia has lost its dominance of the narrative and is instead regularly trolled by Ukraine, which offers an alternate example of executive leadership in Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Every day that Ukraine continues to resist, albeit at a horrific cost to its people, amounts to an incremental humiliation to Russia, squarely countering its ever-aspirational status as a “great power.” Much of the current condition has resulted from the Kremlin disregarding the fundamentals of warfare, including lessons openly observable from recent US forays in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. First and foremost, has been the poor utilization of intelligence, starting with Russia choosing the more kinetic end of the spectrum instead of focusing on its more adept gray-zone activities. Thus, Russia’s intelligence apparatus miscalculated both the resolve and capability of Ukraine, as well as the level of support for Ukraine from the international community. This has contributed to staggering Russian losses on the battlefield and horrors against the Ukrainian people perpetrated by an unprofessional Russian military. There have also been similarly poor results in the function of sustainment.

Hybrid warfare is not a knife, in pursuing strategic effects—and that level of precision requires robust awareness provided by a competent intelligence community that must be relied on to deliver bad news. Russia’s authoritarian governance model is poorly suited to this. Similar shortcomings have resulted in poor control of the information domain: Russia’s “Z” and “anti-Nazi” campaigns have been easily countered by a competent Ukraine that clearly knows its adversary and is able to effectively respond to its messaging through social-media campaigns coupled with broader outreach to the global community. In looking at Russia’s experience, the United States and its allies should ensure that the fundamentals of waging (hybrid) warfare are not ignored.

??Decades of energy negotiation can vanish with one brutal invasion

?Efforts to draw Russia into the democratic fold of its Western neighbors through decades of economic integration and trillions of dollars of energy trade failed to prevent a brutal, senseless war in Ukraine, as well as the Kremlin’s weaponization of energy supplies across Europe. As a result, European energy systems are transforming in record time toward operating without Russian oil and gas. This unprecedented shift is neither cheap nor easy and will take years to achieve in countries hooked on Russian energy and reliant on carbon-intensive economies.

In the meantime, skyrocketing energy costs mandated curtailments, and general uncertainty around energy supplies this winter will fuel temptations to slide back into the yoke of Russian energy dependence. But the risks of returning to the status quo of energy diplomacy with Russia monumentally outweigh any short-term relief that the Kremlin could offer through its supply blackmail. That’s because Moscow’s nationalization of the Russian energy industry leaves little room for market-based decisions, while geopolitical priorities (often aggressive ones) take precedence. Supply shut-offs and curtailment across Europe have shattered Russia’s veneer of reliability, while the country has doubled down on the unabated fossil-fuel economy rather than investing in diversification.

Regardless of the war’s conclusion and potential leadership changes in Russia, the de-Russification of European energy sources is heading toward a point of no return. The short-term costs and challenges of this massive transformation cannot be underestimated. But forging reliable, resilient, low-carbon, and affordable energy systems—ones that can’t be threatened or manipulated by monopolistic suppliers—will benefit all of European society.

CONCLUSION

The cosmopolitan, technocratic, and rosy worldview of the proverbial “Davos men” that Samuel Huntington himself criticized for its mistaken assumptions and intellectual short-sightedness has been mugged by the reality of the Ukraine War. Such a house of cards has been badly shaken by geopolitical seismicity. Modern ‘experts’ whose analytical prisms are narrow reach the conclusion that events that they cannot explain do not make sense at all or that those in charge are acting in an irrational way. Hence, the lessons taught by this rude awakening accentuate the imperative to embrace more sober and comprehensive frameworks that offer a sharper sense of situational awareness about complex phenomena and impersonal forces whose behavior challenges conventional wisdom and groupthink. Hence, in order to overcome both sophistry and strategic myopia, interpretative models like geopolitics, geoeconomics, political realism, long-range macro-historical analysis, and multidisciplinary strategic foresight can be useful. Overlooking the dramatic significance of the Ukraine War would not just be a cognitive shortcoming, such neglect could lead to an even greater tragedy in a foreseeable future. After all, accurate navigational compasses are badly needed to sail in the middle of a chaotic storm in a sea of uncertainty. In the lions’ den, wishful thinking, sanctimoniousness, and binary Manichean representations are pretty much useless. The metaphorical writing on the wall is clear, its message just needs to be read before it is too late.?