A glance of latest of war Russia and Ukrain
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?24 February 2022 was the fateful day, Russia?invaded?Ukraine?in a major escalation of the?Russo-Ukrainian War, which started in 2014. Russian president?Vladimir Putin?announced?a "special military operation", stating that it was to support the Russian-backed breakaway?republics of Donetsk?and?Luhansk, whose?paramilitary forces?had been fighting Ukraine in the?Donbas conflict?since 2014. The Russo-Ukrainian War is an?ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine that started in February 2014.?The war was triggered by the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, which ousted the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych.?Russia then annexed Crimea and supported pro-Russian separatists in parts of the Donbas region, which are internationally recognised as part of Ukraine. . The war has caused thousands of deaths and displaced millions of people.
Putin espoused?irredentist?views challenging Ukraine's legitimacy as a state,?falsely claimed?that Ukraine was governed by?neo-Nazis?persecuting the?Russian minority, and said that Russia's goal was to "demilitarise?and?denazify" Ukraine. Russian air strikes and a ground invasion were launched on?a northern front?from?Belarus?towards the capital?Kyiv, a?southern front?from?Crimea, and an?eastern front?from the?Donbas?and towards?Kharkiv. Ukraine enacted?martial law, ordered?a general mobilisation?and severed?diplomatic relations with Russia.The invasion, the largest conflict in Europe since?World War II, has caused?lacs ?of military casualties?and more than ?thousands of?Ukrainian civilian casualties. As of 2024, Russian troops?occupy about 20% of Ukraine. From a population of 41?million, about 8 million Ukrainians had been?internally displaced?and more than 8.2?million?had fled the country?by April 2023, creating Europe's?largest refugee crisis?since World War II.
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Latest development in 2024
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As per BBC news, Ukrainian troops launched a surprise attack across the border in early August, advancing up to 18 miles (30km) into the Russian region of Kursk. Almost 200,000 people were evacuated from areas along the border by the Russian government and President Vladimir Putin condemned the Ukrainian offensive as a "major provocation". After two weeks, Ukraine's top commander claimed to control more than 1,200 sq km of Russian territory and 93 villages. The regions of Kursk and Belgorod have both declared a state of emergency.
Now Putin is failed morally. No country is supporting Russia, it has got several sanctions. On the contrary, Jelenski has got moral support from every side, and he is gaining not only sympathy but help also in the form of aids of modern weapons, soldier training, etc. Ukrainian troops launched a surprise attack across the border in early August, advancing up to 18 miles (30km) into the Russian region of Kursk.
Almost 200,000 people were evacuated from areas along the border by the Russian government and President Vladimir Putin condemned the Ukrainian offensive as a "major provocation".
After two weeks, Ukraine's top commander claimed to control more than 1,200 sq km of Russian territory and 93 villages. The regions of Kursk and Belgorod have both declared a state of emergency.
????Ukrainian troops launched a surprise attack across the border in early August, advancing up to 18 miles (30km) into the Russian region of Kursk .Almost 200,000 people were evacuated from areas along the border by the Russian government and President Vladimir Putin condemned the Ukrainian offensive as a "major provocation". After two weeks, Ukraine's top commander claimed to control more than 1,200 sq km of Russian territory and 93 villages. The regions of Kursk and Belgorod have both declared a state of emergency.
The Russian push took place at the end of a four-month period when the US was not supplying weapons to Ukraine, due to a stalemate in the US Congress. The issue was finally resolved at the end of April, when the US passed a $61bn aid package to provide missiles, artillery and air-defence systems to the Ukrainian military. Ukrainian forces eventually held firm and even though the city of Kharkiv has come under repeated attack from glide bombs fired by Russian warplanes, it remains beyond the range of Russian artillery.
Russia's biggest advantage is manpower and it has shown a willingness to?throw soldiers at Ukrainian positions?to gain a few metres at a time. About 1,200 Russian soldiers were being killed or wounded every day in May and June, the highest rate since the beginning of the war, according to Western officials. In recent days, Russian troops have made some significant gains to the north-west of Donetsk and claim to have captured the small town of Niu-York.
In response, Ukraine has ordered the evacuation of the city of Pokrovsk, with a local military official telling residents that Russian forces were "rapidly approaching". To the north, areas around Bakhmut have remained a flashpoint and have endured some of the heaviest fighting of the war.Although Ukraine gained some ground around Chasiv Yar, which is situated on high ground some 10km west of Bakhmut, Russian forces have since made further advances in the area.
To the north, areas around Bakhmut have remained a flashpoint and have endured some of the heaviest fighting of the war. Although Ukraine gained some ground around Chasiv Yar, which is situated on high ground some 10km west of Bakhmut, Russian forces have since made further advances in the area.
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In October 2024
It was billed as a decisive week for Ukraine. A chance for President Volodymyr Zelensky to present his boldly named "victory plan" to America’s most powerful politicians, during a visit to the US. But it’s unclear if Kyiv is any closer to getting any of the key asks on its wish list. And Zelensky has?antagonized senior Republicans,?including Donald Trump. Zelensky?told the New Yorker magazine?he believed Trump "doesn't really know how to stop the war", while he described his vice-presidential running mate JD Vance as "too radical".
His remarks about Trump and Vance were a "big mistake", says Mariya Zolkina, a Ukrainian political analyst and research fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE). Separately, Zelensky's visit to meet top democrats at an ammunition factory in the swing state of Pennsylvania was labelled as election interference by a senior congressional Republican. The backlash to the visit came as a "big surprise" to Zelensky’s team, adds Ms Zolkina – an operation normally known for its slick PR. Zelensky’s much-hyped visit was carefully timed to try and secure crucial support for Ukraine's war effort from President Joe Biden, who has just months left in office.
But that also meant walking straight into a highly-charged US election campaign – a tightrope act. After reports that Trump had decided to freeze Zelensky out, the pair did eventually meet on Friday at Trump Tower in New York City. Standing side by side in front of reporters it was, at times, an awkward encounter. Trump declared he had a "very good relationship" with both Zelensky and Russia’s Vladimir Putin – an equivalence that is painful to Ukrainian ears. Zelensky gently interjected to say he hoped relations were better with him than with Putin - a remark laughed off by Trump.
Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future.?Geolocated footage published on September 30 and October 1 shows Russian forces planting Russian flags and freely operating in various parts of Vuhledar, and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 1 that Russian forces seized the settlement.?A Ukrainian servicemember reported on October 1 that a part of the Ukrainian force grouping conducted a planned withdrawal from Vuhledar to avoid encirclement, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces began to withdraw from Vuhledar as of the end of September 30.Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces did not completely interdict Ukrainian egress routes before Ukrainian forces withdrew but that Russian artillery and drones inflicted unspecified losses on withdrawing Ukrainian personnel.The scale of Ukrainian casualties is unknown at this time, however, but the widespread reports of Ukrainian withdrawal suggest that the larger Ukrainian contingent likely avoided a Russian encirclement that would have generated greater casualties. Russian sources credited elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD), 5th Tank Brigade and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both part of 36th CAA, EMD), 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit of the 29th CAA), and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) for directly seizing or assisting in the seizure of Vuhledar.[4]?Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces continued to advance west of Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar).[5]
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The Russian seizure of Vuhledar follows a series of costly, failed Russian assaults near the settlement over the past two and a half years.?A prominent Russian milblogger celebrated reports of Vuhledar’s seizure by recalling an alleged conversation he had with a Russian high-ranking officer, who told him that the Russian decision to attack in the Vuhledar direction in March 2022 was ill-advised because Russian forces would get “stuck” on the settlement.?The milblogger implied that the officer was wrong given that Russian forces eventually seized Vuhledar, although the milblogger failed to acknowledge that Russian forces struggled to advance in the Vuhledar area for over two years. Russia attempted at least two major offensive efforts to seize Vuhledar in October-November 2022 and January-February 2023, both of which resulted in heavy personnel and military equipment losses. ?Russia's previous defeats around Vuhledar notably resulted in the attrition of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD).
Some Russian sources expressed doubts that Russian forces will be able to rapidly advance and achieve operationally-significant breakthroughs immediately after seizing Vuhledar.?Some Russian milbloggers noted that they do not expect the frontline to collapse following the seizure of Vuhledar, citing Ukrainian defensive positions northeast of Vuhledar and the need for Russian forces to completely clear Vuhledar to make it a useable position from which they can launch future assaults.?One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger attempted to misrepresent Vuhledar as “the last Ukrainian city in the southern Donetsk direction” which underpins the “entire Ukrainian defense” in western Donetsk Oblast — implying that Russia can steadily advance in western Donetsk Oblast following the capture of Vuhledar.?Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized a similar argument that the Russian seizure of Vuhledar would lead to the destruction of Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk Oblast and allow Russian forces to advance towards Kramatorsk and Slovyansk (both approximately 170km northeast of Vuhledar) after seizing Kurakhove and Pokrovsk. The milblogger implied that the argument dismisses the fact that Russian forces will need to fight through heavily fortified settlements far north and northeast of Vuhledar, such as Kostyantynivka, Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, Selydove, Kurakhove, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk.?ISW previously assessed that Russia's seizure of Vuhledar is unlikely to fundamentally alter the course of offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast, largely because Vuhledar is not a particularly crucial logistics node and because Russian forces have controlled most of the main roads running into Vuhledar prior to October 1, meaning that Russian forces have already had the ability to interdict Ukrainian logistics in this part of the front to some extent.[?Vuhledar is also about 30 kilometers south of Russia’s current main effort in the Pokrovsk direction, so Russian forces would need to maneuver across 30 kilometers of open terrain to meaningfully support offensive operations southeast of Pokrovsk. Vuhledar is also located 23 kilometers south of the H-15 highway that stretches between Donetsk City and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, but Russian forces would need to advance across an open field area during the upcoming muddy season to reach the highway. Advisor to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Igor Kimakovsky notably assessed before the Russian seizure of Vuhledar that the dirt road that Ukrainian forces could have used to withdraw from Vuhledar would soon become unusable due to mud, and it is likely that Russian forces will face similar problems if they soon resume mechanized assaults in the area.
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukraine is reducing Russia's battlefield artillery ammunition advantage, likely in part due to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots.?Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havryliuk stated on October 1 that the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery ammunition usage decreased from 8-to-1 in favor of Russian forces in Winter 2024 to 3-to-1 as of early October 2024.?A Russian milblogger, who is often critical of Russian authorities, claimed on September 30 that Russian forces in various sectors of the front are suffering from artillery ammunition shortages, possibly due to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots, including the September 18 strike against a Russian missile and storage ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast and the September 21 strike against the Tikhoretsk Arsenal in Krasnodar Krai.[?The milblogger complained that Russian defense industrial factories, which are operating every day, should still be able to produce and deliver ammunition to the Russian military but appear to be failing to do so. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on September 5 that Russian forces were firing two to 2.5 more artillery shells than Ukrainian forces but that Ukrainian forces were narrowing the gap.?Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also stated on September 13 that the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery ammunition usage in the Pokrovsk direction decreased from?12-to-1 in favor of Russian forces to 2.5-to-1 after the start of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Ukrainian officials' statements in early September 2024 about Russia's decreased artillery ammunition advantage suggest that although the recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots have likely decreased Russian artillery supplies, the strikes are likely not the only contributor to reportedly reduced Russian shell supplies. Western-provided military aid and increasing Ukrainian domestic ammunition production may have also allowed Ukraine to increase its ammunition usage.
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its June-August 2024 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.?The UN OHCHR reported that 589 Ukrainian civilians died and 2,685 sustained injuries from conflict-related violence from June 1 to August 31 – a 45 percent increase from the previous three-month period from March 1 to May 31.?The UN OHCHR assessed that Russian large-scale missile strikes against Ukraine on July 8 and Russian forces' intensified efforts to advance in Donetsk Oblast were the main reasons for the high civilian casualty numbers. The UN OHCHR interviewed 169 recently-released Ukrainian POWs, five Ukrainian retained medical personnel, and 205 Russian POWs held in Ukrainian captivity. The UN OHCHR reported that 104 of the 205 interviewed Russian POWs stated that they had faced torture or ill-treatment, mostly at the initial stage of their detainment before being transferred to official facilities, but that conditions in official Ukrainian-run POW locations generally complied with international humanitarian law. The UN OHCHR found that Russian authorities, in contrast, have subjected Ukrainian POWs to torture, ill-treatment, and inhumane conditions "in a widespread and systematic manner" and that almost all Ukrainians interviewed since March 2023 discussed a wide range of methods of torture and ill-treatment during all stages of captivity and interrogation. The UN OHCHR assessed that it is highly unlikely that Russian military superiors and administrators are not aware of the treatment of Ukrainian POWs and that Russian state entities may be coordinating the use of torture. Geolocated drone footage published on October 1 shows Russian forces executing 16 surrendering Ukrainian soldiers near Mykolaivka in the Pokrovsk direction, highlighting the most recent instance of clear Russian abuse of Ukrainian POWs.[20]?ISW has extensively reported on footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and observed a wider trend of prolific Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and upheld by Russian field commanders.
The UN OHCHR report highlighted the difference between official Russian and Ukrainian reactions to the mistreatment of POWs, and Russian state media largely misrepresented the report by ignoring assessments about Russia's systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs.?The report noted that Russian government officials and state-owned media regularly use "dehumanizing" language about Ukrainian POWs, that some Russian public figures have explicitly called for the unlawful treatment of Ukrainian POWs, and that there are no known prosecutions or convictions against the Russian perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment of Ukrainian POWs. The report noted how the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported that it had conducted five pre-trial investigations into possible ill-treatment and murder of Russian POWs since mid-August 2024. The UN OHCHR reported that Ukrainian authorities continue to give the organization "regular and unimpeded" access to Russian POWs, whereas Russia has denied access to Ukrainian POWs since the start of the full-scale invasion. Russian state media only reported on the UN OHCHR's assessments about Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs, withholding the details of the report about Russia's systemic abuse of Ukrainian POWs.
The Russian federal budget for 2025-2027 has carved out funding to support online platforms belonging to a prominent Kremlin propagandist and a former opposition outlet, further highlighting the Kremlin's efforts to adapt its propaganda machine to Russians’ growing reliance on social media for information.?Russian opposition outlet?Astra?reported on September 30 that the 2025-2027 draft budget allocates 4.5 billion rubles ($47 million) and 49 million rubles ($511,000) in state funding towards the?Solovyov Live?Telegram channel and?Readovka?online news aggregator, respectively.[23]?Astra?noted that this is the first time these online platforms are receiving federal funding. A 2023 joint investigation by Russian opposition outlets?Meduza?and?The Bell?found that?Readovka?posed itself as a semi-opposition outlet prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but then actively started voicing pro-Kremlin views and working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after March 2022.[24]?The joint investigation noted that?Readovka?founder Alexei Kostylev "always wanted to be in the center," suggesting that the Kremlin viewed Kostylev's personal ambitions and affiliations as exploitable factors and coopted?Readovka?to further the Kremlin rhetorical line following the full-scale invasion.?Solovyov Live?is a Telegram channel run by Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov and has been a major platform through which the Kremlin has sustained its information narratives and dispelled the information space's criticism since the start of the war. Solovyov has been using the?Solovyov Live?Telegram channel to amplify his other online initiatives, such as podcasts, and most recently used the platform to defend the commander of a Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) unit who disbanded a specialized drone unit and sent specialized drone operators to their deaths while conducting an infantry assault.[25]?Both?Readovka?and?Solovyov Live?have a decidedly pro-Kremlin bent, and the Kremlin's sponsorship of these online platforms and initiatives suggests that the Kremlin is increasingly adapting its state-run propaganda machine, which previously focused on traditional TV and print media, to emerging social media platforms.
Key Takeaways:
So Vuhledar has fallen, but not after over two years of stalwart defence. ?The Russians roll on, but so slowly that at this rate they would need about another 20 years (and several hundred thousand dead Russians) to occupy the Donbas alone. ?Still, since the heady days of the Kursk incursion the good news has all been Russian - I have to say I'm surprised and disappointed at the failure to make a materially significant counterattack this year, I really thought it was obviously strategically essential for them to support the Democrats in the run-up to the election by showing the US that they could translate Western support into victory on the battlefield. ?Still a month to go though, maybe they will sneak something in before the rains!
Great to see the shell ratio significantly improving, apparently due to recent strakes on ammunition dumps and diversion of resources to the fighting in Kursk. ?However, gaining an advantage is only half the job, you then have to exploit it while it lasts - do the Ukrainians have anything still up their sleeve? ? ? ?
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