GLAD TIDINGS
GLAD TIDINGS
Articles – Ad-Dustour - Date: 2017-06-12
By: Oraib Al Rantawi
There are enough signs to allow for expecting the 'glad tidings' of a new peace initiative to be launched that bears Donald Trump's signature this time around.
No one has sufficient details of this initiative so far, whose terms of reference and mechanisms have yet to be clarified. But leaks from various sources suggest that it will be based on five tracks:
- The first track is the most important and serious. This is the regional track that Trump has spoken of often ever since he entered the White House. The 'regional track' means, among other things, that Arab countries (most if, not all, Arab countries, and hence also most Islamic countries) would normalize their relations with Israel, gradually if need be and not necessarily by exchanging ambassadors or flinging the doors open to establishing embassies.
- The second track is economic in nature. This would be based on a package of projects and aid, by means of which it would be possible to convince the broadest possible section of Palestinians that a positive change is about to occur in their lives and living conditions.
- The third track is the security track. This primarily has to do with the PA, which will apparently be required to take further measures under the banner of 'ending incitement,' to stop paying salaries to the families of [Palestinian] martyrs and prisoners, to raise the level of 'security coordination,' and so on. In turn, this track requires loosening Israel's security hold over the territories by removing checkpoints, facilitating movement, and other such measures.
- The fourth track is the political track. Here it is possible to think of a regional conference with the participation of weighty Arab countries. The aim would be to launch direct negotiations without any terms of reference or 'pre-conditions' and without any timeframe, under exclusive American sponsorship.
- The fifth track is not an independent track. It involves specific steps that will be taken in the four previous tracks, and that aims to create a new climate between the two sides within which it is possible to create the impression that an important change has occurred.
For many reasons, most of which are personal in nature and have to do with Trump's self-image and his desire to give the impression that the new U.S. administration is serious about addressing the Palestinian dossier, the president early on appointed his (admittedly hardline) team for managing this file.
Unlike Barack Obama, who displayed no personal readiness to get involved in this dossier and referred it in its entirety to [former secretary of state] John Kerry without providing him with sufficient backing and support, Trump has kept this file for the White House under his own personal supervision, with no major role for the State Department or for the leader of U.S. diplomacy [Rex Tillerson].
But this in no way means that the administration will be successful, or that it will produce an initiative that satisfies the basic minimum of the Palestinians' rightful, just, and legitimate demands. So far, we do not know if Trump will adopt a step-by-step and 'rolling phases' policy as the mechanism for reaching a solution, or whether he will pursue a 'comprehensive deal' – or the 'deal of the century' as he has called it. The administration is divided over this, and its team of experts or specialists is not all 'reading from the same book.'
Assuming that the man will choose to propose 'the deal of the century' to the various parties, will it be fair and balanced, or will it be an expression of his warm and fervent feelings for Israel, more specifically for its extreme rightwing? And most important– in fact, the 'six-million-dollar question' – is this: How will Trump deal with Israel's intransigence and the attempts by its ruling 'troika' to abort any initiative and to denude it of any content? Will he abandon his posture of singing Israel's praises and boasting of his bias in its favor? Or will he exert pressure on it to force it to comply with the requirements of his initiative and its elements?
The president can do a lot in this regard. For he is not indebted to American Jews – neither to their vote nor their money – as is in the case of Democratic Party candidates and presidents. Moreover, the president – any president – has sufficient power and authority that renders him able to exert such pressures. In fact, Barack Obama used these powers with great skill when he went all the way to reach the nuclear deal with Iran against Israel's wishes and Netanyahu's attempts at obstruction. So, will Trump do the same? And does he have the political will to do so?
Among the initiative's five supposed tracks mentioned above, it seems that progress on all of them is possible, except for the political track that remains surrounded by mines that are likely to explode at the first misstep taken by an 'unwise administration,' and by a president who is accustomed to producing policies and foreign and domestic decisions via his Twitter page.
Confidence-building measures are possible. The economic track is an Israeli demand, is practically possible, and is welcomed by the Palestinians. The security track is extremely complicated, especially when it deals with extremely sensitive issues in the Palestinian people's consciousness and awareness, such as the prisoners and martyrs' file. As for the political track, it is entirely dependent on what the man [Trump] will reveal. There are claims that he will move 'after the [end of Ramadan feast] 'Id al-Fitr'. But there is nothing to justify any optimism as to the contents of the package that will be offered by Trump and his special team for the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.
The most dangerous of the five tracks is the regional track. This is based on comprehensive Arab – and probably Islamic – normalization with Israel. It begins by opening up Arab airspace to Israeli planes and by activating direct telephone lines with Israel (Area Code: 00972). Here there are claims that certain Arab countries have already taken practical steps in this regard after Trump's visit to the region. Moreover, normalization will be opened up to security coordination, 'joint maneuvers,' and exchanged visits, perhaps also the establishment of embassies and trade and diplomatic representation offices. If so, the Israeli point of view would have won, and the Arabs would have begun the rapid retreat of the peace initiative that they adopted at 2002 Beirut Arab summit.
If the regional track were to be launched as Trump/Netanyahu have been planning, then the 'full withdrawal in return for full normalization' equation would have totally collapsed. Arab normalization would be coupled with confidence-building measures and partial steps taken by Israel under a thick cover of illusions and disinformation about the resumption of the peace process. And the doors would have been opened before 'the new Middle Eastern alliance' that it has been decided will be implemented next year. And all this would happen without putting an end to Israel's occupation or its settlement activities.
In fact, it would all happen before and without the Palestinian people being able to practice their legitimate national rights as specified and defined by the Beirut [Arab Peace] initiative.