GENIUS AND GENERALS

Sometimes, Generals in combat exhibit a form of genius that sets them apart from their peers. Such an event occurred on 19 Dec 1944 at a dismally cold French barracks.

The Germans had begun their breakout in what would be called the Bulge. Information coming into SHAEF HQ was spotty and incomplete. However, the map began to clearly show that several US Divisions were over run and the Germans moving in spectacular fashion toward the Meuse and Antwerp, generally along the line between the British 21st Army Group and the US 12th Army Group.

General Eisenhower, concerned about the management of this situation, called a meeting at Verdun with his senior commanders; General JCH Lee, Commander of Services, General Bradley of 12th Army Group, LTG George Patton-Commander 3d Army and MG De Guingand representing General Montgomery. They were not a happy group.

Ike, at that moment and upon entering the room, displayed an unusually operational side of his persona. To date, he had been viewed as a sublimely effective strategic personality imbued with an exceptional skill in bringing the many elements and egos of the Allied effort into a state of great efficiency. He was not viewed as particularly operationally astute as Montgomery continuously mentioned in his communications with others.

Seeing the glum faces of his immediately subordinate commanders, he walked in and said in a declarative voice:

"The present situation is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster. There will be only cheerful faces at this table".

The effect was electric. Faces looked up, smiled and Patton quickly reinforced the point:

"Hell, let's have the guts to let the bastards go all the way to Paris. Then, we'll really cut'em off and chew'em up"

Patton was now revealing his particular genius.

Earlier, on 17 December, at his headquarters in the Saar, well to the South of the Bulge, his G2 had informed him of the events to the North. Patton studied the map and intuitively understood his Army would be engaged in the event. This was well before the breakout had even been acknowledged by 12th Army.

Regardless, he began to mentally form a plan. His Army was fully engaged and driving to the East. He had no uncommitted forces. He examined the positioning of the Sixth Army Group to his South and saw they were generally unengaged and capable of filling a portion of the ground he owned.

In his mind, he could see this freeing up at least three divisions, one armored and two infantry. He strode into the operations center, went to the map, pointing to Bastogne and told his G3, Col Paul Harkins to plan the following:

Bastogne is the objective. (Note that Bastogne was not yet occupied by the 101st.)

Pull these divisions-noting the three closest to Bastogne-out of the line and head them North with 4th Armored Leading and 5th Infantry following.

Plan on Sixth Army filling these positions-noting the three divisions in the South closest to the 6th-sliding those divisions North to fill the gap left.

Get the logistics elements aligned to support two directions-a continuance of the Saar and an attack to relieve Bastogne.

This is to be executed on 21 December.

Start now.

With this in his mind, he arrived at the Verdun meeting knowing his plan was already underway-a fact his superior, Gen Bradley did not and did not authorize. He told the group he could do this on the 21st. Ike told him 23 December was more logical. Patton said he was already underway making the dispositions a fait accompli. Ike knew it would take that time to get the 6th Army elements in position to free up the 3d Army elements but accepted the time lag to support Patton’s initiative.

This conversation was met in somewhat stunned silence with DeGuingand indicating that he thought such a compressed schedule likely undoable. Patton said otherwise for the 3d Army.

Ike now made several directives that would be the basis for the destruction of the German Army:

Montgomery to assume command of 1st US Army in the North.

12th Army Group to go on the defensive.

6th Army to slide into positions vacated by 3d Army.

3d Army to provide SHAEF Reserve.

3d Army to attack and relieve Bastogne

This meeting, less than thirty minutes, doomed Germany. By 26 December, Bastogne would be relieved. By 15 January, the bulk of the premier German forces would be destroyed and the original boundary achieved. The Allies could now penetrate the Siegfried Line. German now had less than six months to exist.

All because two generals saw what others did not.