"?" Generation Warfare: Inadvertently Lessons Learned, Vital for Defensive & Offensive Military Doctrine for a Living, in Flux, Poly-threat Matrix
The title of this article, much like the subject matter, is hindered by limitations in describing the vast, rapidly, if not, exponentially developing nature of threat vectors, matrices & the overall global threat ecosystem. This article emerged as an evolution upon the original, also in flux, research question for my MS in innovations in intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance. That working question is "to what extent has the democratization of connectivity, information & connectivity (DCIT) affected the ISR/ISTAR and military capabilities of non-state armed groups?".
After accepting and completing an opportunity to work & research in Ukraine after many years spent in northeastern Syria, it made sense for me to finally draw a line to where my research would end, that being Ukraine. I found this a fitting end point considering the origin of my research; Syria, the birthplace of, and pinnacle of DCIT's effects on non-state armed groups across the MENA region, the transformation of the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) #drone into an ISR,ISTAR, close air support & short to mid range highly cost-effective kinetic strike system along with numerous guerilla, hybrid, irregular, & unconventional tactical to strategic solutions from warfare in all environments from urban, rural to mountainous. To #Ukraine, likely the world's most relevant epicenter of what is hypothetically DCIT-enabled ISR/ISTAR and overall military innovations.
Largely, inspired by the collected works of David Kilcullen , USSOCOM & The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory "Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies" series of texts among the seminal texts from the fields of #Counterinsurgency (#COIN) & #intelligence, analysis, ISR, ISTAR, the literature review of this research question certainly provided a wealth of excellent information while simultaneously, it identified a major gap in the question's related body of research. My research question for this thesis officially was accepted with distinction in late 2020.
Since then, I have seen that research related to my question has began to emerge, however I would argue that there is still a long way to go and many challenges to overcome to begin a thorough exploration of this question the onion it composes but one layer. In fact the aim of of my thesis was to not to answer the questions but rather highlight said questions and attempt to call attention to the gaps in between.
During this process, I have found countless case studies and examples of applications involving DCIT as a fundamental enabling factor. I have seen them in person and throughout my literature review, with a fair amount of cases preceding the onset of computers, the internet and smart devices. The principle of innovative adaptations, evolutionary and revolutionary responses to the conventional power of the State in ISR, ISTAR and other military aspects has always been there, however what I have described at DCIT has been a catalyst for a positive feedback cycle, running at an exponential rate.
This development, or natural evolution/phenomenon given the concurrent nature of DCIT and all of the factors that it covers, comes with both great potential and grave consequences, nevertheless, I would argue that it is a Pandora's Box that has been open which has and will continue to alter the nature of every aspect of both warfare and intelligence. I would even go as far to argue that it is a phenomenon which cannot and must not be ignored, and most certainly will not be ignored by both non-state armed groups but also States, especially those which have struggled to breach the ranks of their key regional competition let alone those actors at the global/international level.
Considering the global impact of weaponized, ISR and ISTAR capable modified COTS UAVs by both state and non-state actors, and the lack of any viable, meaningful, reliable strategic let alone tactical countermeasure. When the United States of America's Department of Defense effectively admits that it still has no coherent, complete and set defense against these systems, other than a serious work in progress with some updates and a deadline to finish by the end of 2024, it is an indication that even the world's superpowers are still struggle to come up with answers to an easily modified version of a drone that can be bought for a base range of $1-3,000 and used individually to destroy a multi-million dollar weapon system or used in a swarm with devastating effects to two other US near-peer adversaries' air and naval bases in northwest Syria (Russia and Iran).
Studies of Daesh's intricate logistical and supply chain networks which allowed the purchase and delivery of a steady flow of these drones to Iraq and Syria, reveal how, firstly, the existing literature on non-state actors' ability to develop sophisticated ISR and networks greatly underestimates how these groups have used DCIT to adapt to and overwhelmingly bypass restrictions from the end-user agreements, financial down to attempts to mitigate the use of COTs UAVs via "Geo-fencing" and modulation preventative measures that were placed in both hardware and software of such products.
While the battles rage across the MENA region and in Ukraine, it is important to note what Kilcullen (2020) noted, both the "dragons" (the states) and the "snakes" (the non-state armed groups) are watching. They are learning by the materials that are transmitted across the various layers of the web. Conventional social media, something as basic as Tik-Tok is littered with "war/kill porn" showing in detail the full arch of each innovation using COTS UAVs, which transmit and inspire the development of similar in other parts of the world the only differences being the adaptation based on the context in which they are used. It's not uncommon in this positive feedback cycle, that the successful architects of these designs and their propagandists eagerly share their adaptions and operations back into the same stream from which they originally discovered the source of their inspiration.
Considering only the progression of COTS UAVs and the previews of what is to come, be they swarms, smart swarms controlled by an AI or autonomous "mothership" drone operating at a higher altitude, capable of target triage where their swarms are assigned targets based on value or payout, or already existing long range high-payload (NATO/Soviet-compatible) loitering munitions/First Person View (FPVs), the effects of DCIT are already beyond the theoretical and well into practice as is their role in theaters of combat.
The more concerning questions arise when applied to civilian targets, or from the perspective of anti/counter terrorism, soft-targets. There are already cases of COTs UAVs being used to attack civilian gatherings, as we have seen in Brazil during the recent presidential campaigns, where far-right/ultra-nationalist ideologically motivated supporters of Bolsonario used agricultural drones to spray gallons of raw sewage and other irritants on rallies and gatherings of supporters of Brazil's now current President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. It is likely that this too will act as an inspiration for future ideologically motivated attacks on civilians be they political a gatherings or simple entertainment from football matches, as a recent article revealed how an individual was able to access the airspace over a English National League semi-final match between Chesterfield FC and Bromley FC.
Add to this the idea that State's such as Russia, have been actively engaged in influence, intelligence and information operations using the massive, anonymous chat forums and social media networks, largely serving as hotbeds for cynicism, nihilism, far-right extremism, including sub-sections where "lone-wolf" and "mass-shooters" are effectively worshiped and idolized as "the saints". These same forums serve as points not just for the dissemination of disinformation designed to further polarize, or radicalize, or illicit/validate preexisting, invented or perceived grievances that exist across these target populations.
Open sources have indicated that these kind of Russian campaigns have been initially politically agnostic, aimed simply to drive polarization, i.e. one day pushing a far left line, to the next disseminating far-right disinformation and trolling left-wing groups, to now focusing on the far-right and nationalist to ultra-nationalist parties of all NATO member and partner states with a specific focus on the EU, the United States and Canada. Other reports have shown that Russia has been mimicking far-right and possibly even Takfiri online recruiting elements and cells. The goal being to manipulate populations into putting candidates and parties that Russia has identified as more likely to end support to Ukraine and create divisions inside NATO and the EU, while using the same anonymity tools that had been created to protect oppressed peoples and movements from repression and authoritarian governments, to communicate, organize and provide resources to far-right extremist and possibly Takfiri violent non-state armed groups inside Europe.
In short, the above hypotheses are viable. When combined with the concepts and case studies that involve DCIT, specifically COTS UAVs as just one threat ecosystem, it would be wise to consider further researching, in depth how these ecosystems are formed and how the individuals and collectives that make them up operate and interact. From a global perspective, after a simple analysis, it is clear that the geopolitical situation has faced a serious crisis in 2023 with the number of ethnically-based conflicts emerging or more importantly re-emerging, with evidence of ethnic cleansing and genocide emerging met with muted and in some cases what is effectively encouragement by other state actors. This in turn has set into effect the renewal or intensification of conflicts across the globe that are either directly related or based on more nuanced interconnection. The result is not a powder keg but rather a series of interconnected geopolitical cluster mines. Given the number of actors, nuances, and alliances, in some cases contradictory, along with the equalizing effect of DCIT, among other factors, have placed us in a scenario of global polycrisis, capable of drawing the world into an era of unknown destruction and most importantly critical damage to both Humanity and the already rapidly decreasing value of human life.