Game of Thrones, scenarios and the Future of Europe

1      Introduction

“Don’t fight in the north, or the south. Fight every battle, everywhere, always, in your mind. (…) Every possible series of events is happening all at once. Live that way, and nothing will surprise you. Everything that happens will be something that you have seen before.”

In Game of Thrones (season 7, episode 3), Sansa, the lady of Winterfell, has to face an invasion of undead to the north, and deal with a potential attack from the Lannisters, a rival family, to the south. Littlefinger, one of the show’s master strategists, offers the above piece of advice to Sansa to help her cope with the difficult situation she is in.

But what is he talking about? What are these “possible series of events”, and how do you even begin to imagine these? Why would you even bother in the first place?

I like to think Littlefinger was talking about scenarios and scenario planning when he gave this advice. I have been involved in running quite a number of scenario (and strategy) development processes for a range of clients (for companies, research institutes, European research projects, etc.) and in different sectors (health, energy, climate change). Scenarios can be a great tool to deal with the complexity and uncertainties of the future, and the process of developing them can bring teams, organisations and communities closer together by creating a shared frame of reference.

In this article I will explain what scenarios are, what you can use them for, and provide an example (the Mont Fleur Scenario Exercise from the early 1990s in South Africa). This will allow me to discuss in detail the “White Paper on the Future of Europe”, published by the European Commission in March this year, which describes five “scenarios” – which are rather “strategic options”, and not very strategic at that.

2      Scenarios as a tool – “Possible series of events”

The term scenarios is used in different contexts and there can be quite some confusion (more on that later in section 2.2) – there is on that note not an “agreed” or established definition of the term.

There are nevertheless some common elements between different definitions, and scenarios therefore can be broadly described as a story about a hypothetical future, detailing a plausible, coherent and logical sequence of events over a period of time, covering social, technological, economic, environmental and (geo)political developments. Basically, they are the "possible series of events" Littlefinger was talking about.

Have a look at the following images as an example:

Images by Janós Orbán, BEE Environmental Communication (link).

These illustrate four scenarios, describing four different worlds, titled (clockwise) “Sustainability”, “Inequality”, “Regional Rivalry”, and “Fossil-fuelled Development”, developed by the EU-funded IMPRESSIONS project [1]. The images show a snapshot of 2070 for each scenario. Each scenario tells a story, in about one page in text, how Hungary could evolve by 2100 under extreme climate change (> 2 degrees Celsius), covering a variety of developments (social, technological, political, etc.).

Using a set of divergent stories (the number usually varies from 3-5), scenarios look to cover the “realm of possibilities” for an actor. The key defining characteristics for scenarios is that they are plausible, and context-related: scenarios are not an exercise in probability or an attempt to predict the future (see the difference below in section 2.2), and scenarios are not about actions an actor could take, but about how the context or external forces surrounding this actor could change and impact it.

Through divergent but logical storylines, covering different developments that could impact an actor, scenarios create a playing field of the future, on the basis of which we can make decisions. Our brains are hardwired to think in causal terms, and scenarios nicely play into this “feature”[2], which is why they can be so effective. There are obvious links with storytelling as well: a compelling scenario can be a powerful tool for many uses.

2.1     Why use scenarios? “Rehearsing the Future”

Scenarios can be used for many purposes and bring value in different ways. In essence, it is what Schwartz called “Rehearsing the Future”, talking about scenario planning in his book “The Art of the Long View”.[3] This is very much in line with Littlefinger’s quote at the start of this article: “Everything that happens will be something that you have seen before”. Scenarios can help us navigate the complexities and fundamental uncertainties of the future, by boiling these down into divergent storylines. This makes thinking about these complexities and uncertainties manageable, and makes them discussable. Simply put, they are a strategic planning and decision-making tool that help us answer “what if” questions.

For organisations, scenarios can be the basis for an adaptive strategy (i.e. if “X” happens we will put in place actions “Y” and “Z”), risk management, or stress testing. Embedding research and policy recommendations in scenarios can increase their relevance, by looking at a dynamic rather than a static future context. You can also use scenarios to test the robustness of business models, or even as a tool for innovation development.

Scenarios as a form of alternative analyses can help organisations prepare for the unexpected. The CIA for example reportedly instituted a “Red Cell” shortly after the 9/11 attacks, tasked with continuously challenging existing beliefs about the future within the organisation through alternative scenarios.[4] The official 9/11 Commission report in that sense also stated that “the most important failure was one of imagination”.[5] Similarly, in the same Game of Thrones episode mentioned above, Olenna Tyrell, head of one of the main families that has just been defeated by the Lannisters, before she commits suicide, says: “But your sister has done things I was incapable of imagining. That was my prize mistake. A failure of imagination.” Scenarios can be a great way to deal with tunnel vision and groupthink in organisations, challenging the status quo and stimulate creative thinking about the future.

2.2     Scenarios vs. “scenarios” vs. visions vs. forecasts

So how does our concept of scenarios differ from other uses, and similar concepts?

As mentioned in section 2, scenarios are not about what actors can do themselves, but about the changing context or “environment” surrounding the actor (geopolitics, social developments, technology, economics, etc.). The European Commission for example in its “Better Regulation Guidelines”[6], and various impact assessments accompanying legislative proposals, refers to the “baseline scenario”, describing it as “the option of changing nothing”. The term scenario is used here to describe what the European Commission could do, and not about contextual changes – different from the way we conceptualised them just now.

Scenarios are also not intended to be “normative”, i.e. a context that we want to see, which would rather be called a “vision” – another great tool to think about the future, but a separate topic altogether. There are of course inevitably some normative elements in scenarios: it is easy to decide in which world you would like to live in, when you have to choose between e.g. “Utopistan” or “Regional Rivalry”[7]. The European Commission also sometimes uses the term best-case scenario (and worst-case scenario) in various documents[8], but again, scenarios as we develop them are not supposed to have a normative value.

Finally, scenarios are not forecasts either: they are not meant to be precise, or attempt to predict the future. In our fast-paced world, where things can change quickly, making predictions, and underestimating uncertainty can be very risky. A set of scenarios seeks to cover the realm of possibilities through these alternative, and plausible narratives. Scenarios therefore are by definition less precise, but then again cover many possible developments, and in an integrated way, through the stories they tell. There is some research on how you can ensure you cover the relevant realm of possibilities, as a set of scenarios can suffer from “conservatism”, i.e. being too close to a “business-as-usual trajectory”, or contain an imbalance of both too extreme and conservative scenarios at the same time [9].

2.3     An example: the Mont Fleur scenarios

The Mont Fleur Scenario Exercise is a good example of what we described so far. In the early 1990s, at a time when Nelson Mandela had just been released from prison, South Africa stood at a crossroads: negotiations between the governing National Party, the ANC and other organisations were ongoing, mixed with the spread of violence – South Africa was facing a lot of uncertainty as to where it was headed. The question was asked how the country could make a successful transition from an apartheid regime to a democracy. The Mont Fleur scenarios provided perspectives as to how that future could play out. The set consisted of four economy-focused scenarios, i.e. “Ostrich”, “Lame Duck”, “Flight of the Flamingos”, and “Icarus”.

To give you an idea what scenarios are all about – take Icarus, which received a lot of attention from the ANC[10]. The scenario, named after the Greek mythical figure, is described as a story of “macro-economic populism”: the newly elected and popular government goes on a spending spree on different programs (e.g. food subsidies), leading to fantastic results (economic growth, improved living standards and social conditions), and additional popular support. This situation does not hold however: after a year or two, the bubble bursts, with the programs collapsing over financial constraints. The budget deficit balloons, and South Africa ends up in economic, social and political chaos. The likely result (the scenario does consider requests to the IMF or World Bank for assistance) is a return to authoritarian rule, with South Africans being worse off than before.[11]

The example of Icarus shows that scenarios are written not as a roadmap of actions an actor could take, but it is the context, the external forces (and uncertainties) around the actor that drive the scenario. Also, a good scenario is a good story: Icarus (as well as the other Mont Fleur scenarios) is compelling, and easy to read.

The story goes that the Mont Fleur scenarios, especially Icarus, profoundly shifted the ANC’s thinking, helping them steer away from economic disaster.[12] The scenarios thank their impact in part due to the fact that they were developed through a set of consecutive workshops, bringing together prominent South Africans – academics, activists, businessmen and politicians, including members of the ANC; black and white; from different backgrounds and ideologies.[13][14] This process of including different stakeholders through a set of workshops raises a new point on the importance of the process of developing scenarios.

3      Scenario development as a process – the Art of Strategic Conversation

Scenarios are not just a useful tool, but there is a lot of value in the process of developing them. There are many ways to go about creating scenarios[15], but there is always a participatory element to it – i.e. including different people’s perspectives, through interviews or workshops. Through a creative process you are bringing together people’s collective expertise, and develop shared understanding on what could happen.

A participatory scenario development process therefore offers great opportunities as a platform for discussion and potential collaboration between different stakeholder groups and across organisations – the Mont Fleur process of engaging a broad spectrum of individuals is a good example.[16] Scenarios allow us to talk about things that could happen, instead of things that should happen, and that can be very liberating. Plausibility also has a lower threshold for agreement than something that is normative (where politics come in).

Similarly, as part of IMPRESSIONS, an EU-funded research project, we have been organising a set of scenario & strategy workshops with Central Asian, Chinese, Russian, and European stakeholders to discuss the geopolitical implications of climate change in Central Asia, and how the EU can adapt its strategies in light of these.[17] Discussing these scenarios with stakeholders allowed us to address very contentious topics together in a constructive way. Co-developing the scenarios with stakeholders built ownership (although this is hard to measure), and in a way the process, although very complex and hard to pull off, created a community around this important topic for Central Asia.

Using scenario thinking within organisations, as part of a long-term and continuous process, can also bring value. Kees van der Heijden touched on this by approaching scenarios from a dynamic and organisational learning perspective. He focused on how to embed scenario planning into the culture of organisations, to make them more adaptive – “the Art of Strategic Conversation”.[18] Research by O’Reilly at Stanford has linked the concept of organisational adaptability or “ambidexterity” to longevity and financial performance of companies. A company’s survival and success lie in its capacity to manage its current business, as well as to prepare for changing conditions.[19] Scenarios can certainly help with the latter, and I would add they could help build an “adaptive” organisational culture[20], taking into account van der Heijden’s work as well.

4      The Future of Europe – the European Commission’s White Paper

“What future do we want for ourselves, for our children and for our Union?”

That is the tricky question the European Commission asked in its White Paper on the Future of Europe, published in March this year.[21] The document outlines key driving forces impacting Europe, and, more importantly, five scenarios on “how the Union could evolve by 2025”. In the foreword, Commission President Juncker mentions this is the start “of a process in which Europe determines its own path”. In September 2017, during his state of the union speech, he also addressed the White Paper, and introduced his own “sixth scenario”.

In terms of the timing, the launch of this process could not have been better: Brexit, Poland, Hungary, Catalonia, the migration crisis, tensions with Russia, terrorist attacks, strained relations with the US, climate change, etc., the EU is facing a lot of challenges and uncertainty. A scenario exercise would be a great way to discuss these challenges, lay them out in the open, reduce the complexity, and help the EU to plan ahead. The process of developing these scenarios would be a great way to build consensus and momentum for what direction the EU should take in the same vein.

Analysing the White Paper, the second chapter lays out the drivers of Europe’s future, describing some of the challenges mentioned above. The five scenarios are then presented in chapter three: i.e. “Scenario 1: Carrying on”, “Scenario 2: Nothing but the single market”, “Scenario 3: Those who want more do more”, “Scenario 4: Doing less more efficiently”, and “Scenario 5: Doing much more together”. Every scenario consist of: (I) a one-page text with subtitles on “Why and how?”, “By 2025, this means”, and “Pros and cons”; and (II), a page with a graphic illustration symbolising the scenario, including a table with impact on policies (e.g. single market & trade, EU budget, etc.), as well as “illustrative snapshots” in a few bullets.

Looking at the content of the scenarios, the Commission’s conceptualisation seems rather different: first, the scenarios are written from the perspective of the EU in the driving seat – e.g. “the 27 Member States and the EU Institutions pursue a joint agenda for action”, or “The EU27 continues to focus on jobs, growth and investment”. Second, and linked to the previous point, the scenarios are not embedded in context, or “external forces” impacting the EU: the scenarios do not feature any of the key uncertainties (e.g. the migration crisis) as a driver for the stories, with a logical sequence of events. Rather, some of these uncertainties are briefly mentioned, but as a function of how they are addressed through the EU’s direction (e.g. in the “impact on policies” table, including migration & security). Third, there is no chronological build-up from now until 2025, no coherent story that is being presented. Instead, the “Why and how?” section provides a general description (without a timeline), with the next section translating that into what the EU would look like in 2025.

4.1     Strategic options, not scenarios

In short, these scenarios read as “strategic options”[22] rather than actual scenarios.

These strategic options have some value in terms of charting out different directions for the EU to take. However, describing possible paths to take, regardless of what happens around you, without testing it to different playing fields and uncertainties, is problematic. The options just describe what the EU27 could do and look like by 2025, not taking into account what happens in the meantime. Again, there are many issues facing the EU by 2025. What if Poland or Hungary breaks away from the Union? What will be left of your five strategic options? They are not very strategic that way.

Also, the way these scenarios are structured does not make for very compelling reading, which is an important aspect of regular scenarios (e.g. see the description of “Icarus” in section 2.3 – but chances are you will still remember it): the leap from the general description of the EU approach to the situation in 2025 forces you to make a lot of assumptions and makes buy-in more difficult for readers.

The argument that these are more strategic options than scenarios is further underlined by the fact that the break-up of the EU (complete or partial) is not covered. The Paper does state that the “starting point for each scenario is that the 27 Member States move forward together as a Union”, but in a genuine scenario exercise looking to cover the realm of possibilities, a break-up is certainly part of it. This was covered in a recent German Army scenario study[23]: its “leak” was followed by a frenzy of press articles stating that the German army was preparing for the EU to collapse. This perhaps proves the point that within the Commission it would have been politically difficult to have addressed this.

There is little information about the process that led to the development of these strategic options, and whether perhaps different departments (DGs) within the Commission, or different people from different backgrounds were included. That being said, the process after publication of the White Paper did receive considerable thought: the Annex of the Paper shows a timeline from March 2017 until the European Parliament elections in 2019, indicating different key events such as the G20, or President Juncker’s State of the Union speech in September. The President in that speech introduced his “sixth scenario”, which reads more as a vision (he also calls it that way himself), i.e. the kind of Europe he wants to see, with parts on “a Union of values”, “a more united Union”, “a stronger Union”, etc.[24]

The European Commission released a factsheet in July, which shows some impressive stats on how Commissioners have engaged “in dialogue with citizens and [listened] to their views on and expectations for the future of the Union”, including some 1750 events, with a 30 million reach potential.[25] The Commission calls it the “Citizen’s Dialogues on the Future of Europe”, but when reading some of the reports on past events, it does seem these events were rather unstructured, and in many instances did not even touch on the future of Europe, let alone the five strategic options.[26]

4.2     Conclusions and recommendations

Scenarios can be a great tool to “rehearse the future”, and can bring communities closer together. The White Paper and the process above, although well intended, misses the mark.

The strategic options do not reduce the uncertainty and complexity the EU is facing in the future. Bringing these Commissioners closer to citizens in the dialogue process of course has its merits, but it lacks structure, or focus on the actual future of the EU. I would argue that is partly because the White Paper is difficult to bring to citizens as a document for discussion. Perhaps Macron’s idea to launch “democratic conventions” across the EU, as he suggested in his September speech at the Sorbonne University, can provide some structure, as he wants to have a public debate on “priorities, concerns and ideas that will fuel our roadmap for tomorrow’s Europe”.[27]

In the same vein, the Commission could still conduct a genuine scenario development process, involving people from different EU Member States, different ages, backgrounds, etc., or just within the Commission internally as a strategic exercise. These scenarios might be a good way to test the strategic options in the White Paper.

No one has a crystal ball, but in our volatile world, full of unexpected events, there are easy steps we can take to create some structure and clarity as to what could happen. This will help the EU to plan ahead, and regain its footing.

5      Footnotes

[1] For more on the IMPRESSIONS project, please visit: www.impressions-project.eu

[2] See Kahneman’s ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’ (2011), and Nassim Taleb’s ‘Black Swan’ (2007) on our brain’s automatic search for causal connections – we look for causal connections even when they’re not there.

[3] Schwartz (1996), ‘The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World’, Crown Business

[4] See Micah Zenko’s article ‘Inside the CIA Red Cell’ (2015): https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/30/inside-the-cia-red-cell-micah-zenko-red-team-intelligence/. In his book “Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy” (2015), Zenko also discusses alternative analyses more in detail.

[5] See “The 9/11 Commission Report” (2004), https://www.npr.org/documents/2004/9-11/911reportexec.pdf

[6] European Commission (2015), Better Regulation Guidelines (2015), see: https://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf

[7] Two scenarios that were developed in the IMPRESSIONS project – see www.impressions-project.eu. 

[8] For example, see European Commission (2017), ‘Impact Assessment amending Directive 2011/65/EU on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment’, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/rohs_eee/pdf/impact_assessment.pdf

[9] Carlsen, Henrik; Eriksson, E. Anders; Dreborg, Karl Henrik; Johansson, Bengt; Bodin, ?rjan (2016),"Systematic exploration of scenario spaces", Foresight, Vol. 18 Iss 1 pp. 59 - 75

[10] Reospartners (2010), “Learning from Experience: The Mont Fleur Scenario Exercise”, https://reospartners.com/learning-from-experience-the-mont-fleur-scenario-exercise/

[11] Global Business Network (1992), ‘The Mont Fleur Scenarios - What will South Africa be like in the year 2002?’, https://reospartners.com/wp-content/uploads/old/Mont%20Fleur.pdf

[12] Ibid. reference 11.

[13] Ibid. reference 12.

[14] Kahane (2012), ‘Transformative Scenario Planning: Working Together to Change the Future’, pp 4-5

[15] For an overview of techniques, see Peter Bishop, Andy Hines, Terry Collins, (2007) "The current state of scenario development: an overview of techniques", Foresight, Vol. 9 Issue: 1, pp.5-25, https://doi.org/10.1108/14636680710727516

[16] Prospex has been applying a specific methodology to ensure a spread of individuals across different criteria (gender, age, sector, etc.) at our scenario workshops – and this variety of perspectives has been a recurring point of appreciation in evaluation sheets.

[17] For more on the IMPRESSIONS project, please visit: www.impressions-project.eu

[18] Van der Heijden (2005), “Scenarios: the Art of Strategic Conversation”, Wiley & Sons, 2nd ed.

[19] O’Reilly (2013), ‘Why Some Companies Seem to Last Forever”. https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/charles-oreilly-why-some-companies-seem-last-forever

[20] O’Reilly (2014), ‘Finding a Corporate Culture that Drives Growth’, https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/charles-oreilly-finding-corporate-culture-drives-growth

[21] European Commission (2017), ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe’, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf

[22] Ogilvy in Forbes (2015), ‘Scenario Planning and Strategic Forecasting’, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2015/01/08/scenario-planning-and-strategic-forecasting/

[23] Der Spiegel (2017), ‘Milit?rplaner halten Zerfall der EU für denkbar’, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-studie-haelt-zerfall-der-europaeischen-union-fuer-denkbar-a-1176367.html

[24] European Commission (2017), PRESIDENT JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER'S State of the Union Address 2017, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm

[25] European Commission (2017), Future of Europe Debate Factsheet, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/foe-debate-factsheet_en.pdf

[26] For an overview of past (and upcoming) events, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/events/citizens-dialogues_en#bootstrap-fieldgroup-nav-item--past-events--2

[27] Emmanuel Macron (2017), Sorbonne speech, https://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html