The future of relations between Egypt and Gaza after the war

There is the Rafah Corridor and the Philadelphi Corridor        

A strip of land running along the Egyptian border with Gaza that was controlled by Israel until its withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. Tensions are said to have escalated to the point that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi refused to make a phone call to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Egypt’s joining the ICJ case .

 Many wonder whether the Israel-Egypt peace treaty is at risk?        

In fact, the head of Egypt’s State Information Service warned in January that Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would constitute a violation of the 1979 peace treaty. The Multinational Force of Observers, the organization responsible for monitoring the treaty’s implementation, is expected to issue a report outlining any violations of the treaty during the war. Despite these tensions, both sides are clear in their commitment to the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, which is not in imminent danger, as was the case in the 1982 dispute between Egypt and Israel over the demarcation of the Taba border.

Egyptian-Israeli cooperation will be crucial to addressing the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza.

And what about the idea of a two-state solution?        

The broader Israeli public is increasingly skeptical of the two-state solution in the wake of the October 7 attack. But Netanyahu and his coalition partners have no alternative visions for how to end the conflict on a large scale, or even avoid the quagmire in Gaza. Going forward, it will be necessary to address the link between the political endgame and postwar reconstruction, as not all donors will be willing to fund reconstruction without assurances that their contributions will not be wiped out in a few years.

Creating a New Refugee Problem        

An Israeli invasion of Rafah, especially if it results in high levels of civilian casualties, could spark domestic protests against the regime of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Given Egypt’s already fragile economy and rapidly rising inflation, the Rafah tragedy could be the spark that Sisi has sought to avoid.

Will the Gaza security file be handed over to Egypt?        

There are efforts to hand over to Egypt (among other countries) responsibility for the security and future governance of Gaza, including confronting the remaining Hamas forces after the war ends.

What is the post-Hamas scenario - if the expression is correct ?        

There is no agreement on who will replace Hamas in Gaza. Egypt is understandably concerned that a vacuum there could lead to a wave of extremism and radicalism. Cairo sees rapid recovery and reconstruction as a way to mitigate that risk, The Palestinian Authority is the majority’s choice The Arab world—and much of the rest of the world—asserts that a reformed Palestinian Authority is the only solution. Israel continues to insist that Palestinian rule in Gaza after the war is the only solution. Despite working with the Palestinian Authority for years, the Israeli government has objected to this proposal. Cairo sees no real alternative but a path in this direction. Regional leaders insist that Israel and the United States must commit to the Palestinians’ right to self-determination in Gaza and the West Bank and support this effort to enable the region to shoulder the heavy burden.

What’s the deal with dual-use goods?        

Dual-use goods: A product or service that is “sustainable for both civilian and military uses,” meaning that it is generally used in a civilian context, such as industry, but can also be used to develop weapons or military equipment. Its export is not prohibited in principle, but is subject to restrictive controls that generally require a license.

There are also questions about how reconstruction will take place. If humanitarian assistance proves difficult, reconstruction—and especially the issue of “dual-use items”—will be even more difficult. The Biden administration’s May 2024 National Security Memorandum acknowledged that Israel has “at times extended dual-use issues to a troubling degree.” In dealing with recovery and reconstruction, new processes will be needed. The Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism established after the 2014 war is no longer fit for purpose, and Egypt is not confident that a more effective mechanism can be established in time to address Gaza’s critical recovery and reconstruction needs.

As for Israel’s relationship with the Palestinian interior        

the solution currently proposed by Israel appears to Egypt to be naive and short-sighted. The IDF is trying to build relationships with local dignitaries throughout the Gaza Strip, most of whom are heads of large, wealthy families, who could form the basis of a civil administration to replace the Hamas government. History seems to be repeating itself. In the late 1970s, Israel encouraged the creation of a Palestinian leadership based on local dignitaries in the West Bank. This network, called the “Village Leagues,” was intended to diminish the influence of the PLO and weaken Jordanian claims to Palestine. The experiment was met with vocal opposition at home and abroad, and thus failed. Today, the Egyptians fear that a similar plan for Gaza is also not feasible, and that it will pave the way for further chaos. Even if this initiative succeeds, it will pose its own challenges to Cairo because of the lost opportunity to link the two Palestinian areas into a unified state. The principle of “divide and conquer” will be maintained once again, but in a different form.