The Future in the Multiverse of Madness

"The value of ISR and PGM were again proven beyond all reasonable doubt. However, the aircraft and the systems alone can only?realise?their full potential when complemented by experts who possess a sound grasp of the scenario, the campaign aims and (never forget) an understanding of the utility of air power: capabilities and limitations." Lessons Identified by the UK armed forces, Op ELLEMY

The new NATO Strategy, DDA, offers a bright new hope for the alliance. In the review of the strategy [new_nato_strategy_will_usher_in_a_renaissance_in_allied_operations_941318.html] Matthew Van Wagenen?&?Arnel P. David offer an upbeat view of NATO thinking and a true reflection of the current re-energised NATO that I observe whilst walk down corridors in AIRCOM. But does all this talk of DDA and the re-focusing of policy and HQ staff go far enough? Does the current fixation of MDO actually contribute to limiting our thinking and creativity; the antithesis of the intent of MDO.

The Circle of Life

Once again, with the Russian invasion of the Ukraine it is clear that an attack on a Nation or implied attack on NATO, leads to a galvanisation of the populous and leadership. As we saw in WW2 and in other conflicts since then, an attack on a Nation invokes a national response that provides a stronger response than expected. Will Putin observe this and acknowledging the error, and adjust his tactics against NATO, if so what is the alternative? Attack isolated groups within a population such as the tactic in Crimea and the ongoing sub-threshold activity in the Baltics and Balkans? Probably. But where does that leave NATOS DDA and MDO policy? Will we be understanding the 5 war-fighting domains whilst of adversary out flanks us in the information and cognitive? Is this another 'Maginot Moment'?

What's in a Name?

In the article, the author cites the 'decades old NRF' as a process and capability in need of updating. The work NATO have done in this area is superb, but how many other areas are decades old? As an ISR commentator, I know that the current IRM and CM procedures are based on "decades old" TTPs, originally designed for Soviet target sets and updated in 2008 for COIN ops... but the Ukraine is so much more than either of these. So why use outdated procedures against a modern threat? We may re-brand procedures and hail advancements in preparedness and deployment, but these capabilities rest on the alliance's ability to find indicators and warnings, to create understanding at tempo, that will inform commanders and empower preparedness.

Here, the author describes does link readiness and posturing relies with multi domain awareness, specifically the ability to detect the change from peace, to crisis and from crisis to conflict. We know that shaping operations will be (are being) conducted outside of the NATO war fighting domains or Air, Land, Maritime, Space and Cyber. Therefore, how will NATO detect and

#understandattempo? NATO can updated the "tired readiness" and when physical activity was observed around the Ukraine, it was very successful. However, will NATO be as successful if they cannot detect the indicators and Warnings because they are blind in the cognitive and blinkered in the information domains? Was NATO successful in Crimea?

Precision

SACEUR stated that precision can defeat mass, but precision requires time and time is bought with space. The ISR community is responsible for creating this space through the creation of understanding at tempo, at range. But this understanding is not a simple case of finding 60 vehicle columns outside Kiev.?

“Such situational understanding (complementing the situational awareness provided by ISR) enables effective development of our own strategy from the campaign level down to specific tactical tasks.”

Without such understanding, what do we have? It was stated by some one far cleverer than I, that the strength of air power is targeting, and targeting relies on ISR. Without ISR, the power delivered by air is limited, as can be seen in the lessons identified from Op ELLAMY.

"Twenty two?missions were cancelled with 90% of those owing to a lack of SA as to the relative locations of pro and anti-regime forces — an indication (and cost) of the lack of ISR."

Summary

The Ukraine and future mission space will encompass all domains: physical, information and cognitive. If we limit ourselves to the current 5 war fighting domains, we will not be able to create understanding at tempo and/or range. Therefore we will not be able to create time and so precision. The whole ability of NATO to make precise decisions, be that to prepare, deploy, deter or defend, are undermined. The solution? On paper it is easy to identify what needs to be done, in practice the devil is in the detail.

In order to truly prepare for the next conflict and identify the insidious march from peace to conflict, NATO needs to embrace the cognitive domain. Although ACT are exploring this new frontier, it is imperative that NATO looks beyond cultural resilience and defence; in order to defend, we must understand that we are being attacked. That understanding comes from the intelligence communities of NATO including, the ISR community. The detail of this statement is fundamental to the current structure of NATO and, in a way the liberal way of life we enjoy in Europe. Here lies the rub, and here is the challenge to us all. Perhaps if we wish to remain unaffected by third party manipulation and social engineering, we need to allow some infringement of our liberties. When you say this out loud, it becomes ugly. But the choice is clear. Which way is correct? Only you know.

Coming full circle, if an affront on a nation causes the strengthening of that nation, then the only recourse to the attacker is more subtle attacks. These insidious actions will go un-noticed and therefore all of DDA will be futile because we cannot understand at tempo in all domains.